THE  NEW  SYSTEM  OF  THOUGHT 

Which  Dr.  Snider  has  been  specially  engaged 
upon  for  some  years,  now  embraces  the  following 
works : 

1.  pstcnology  and  the  psychosis       .    .    $1.50 

2.  The  Will  and  its  World 1.50 

ii.  Social  Institutions     ........     1-50 

4.  The  State      1-50 

5.  Ancient  European  Philosophy    .    .    .      1  50 

6.  Modern  European  Philosophy 

(in  prejyaration)       1 .  50 

It  is  hoped  that  the  latter  may  be  completed  in 
the  course  of  the  present  year  (1903).  As  far  as 
can  be  now  foreseen,  the  Aesthetic,  or  the  Psychol- 
ogy of  the  Fine  Arts  will  follow. 

Sigma  Publishing  Co. 


ANCIENT 

European  Philosophy 


The  History  of  Greek  Philosophy 
Psychologically  Treated. 


BY 

DENTON  J.  SNIDER,  Litt.  D. 


^^^ 


ST.  LOUIS,  MO 

SIGMA  PUBLISHING  CO. 

210  PINE  ST. 


Copyright  bt 
D.  J.  SNIDER,  1903. 


NIXON-JONES   PTQ.   CO.,  215   PINE   ST.,  ST.  LOUIS. 


V 


l> 


WILLIAM  W.  PARSONS, 

einbiavia  Stale  Sldri^-iaC  §>choo\., 

^^^  toft  c  J  I-  o^  ci-  (oinj  |':icu6:>fiip  atib 


'^fic  Qutfvor. 


.•51790J 


Table  of  contents. 

PAGE. 

Introductiox 5-39 

Ancient  European  Philosophy     ...  40 

Chapter  I.  The  Hellenic  Period     .      .  56 

I.  Elementalism 69 

A.  The  Milesian  Movement       .     .  77 

1.  Thales 79 

2.  Anaximander 83 

3.  Anaximines 86 

B.  Eleatic  Movement 92 

1.  Xenophones 96 

2.  Parmenides 99 

3.  Zeno 103 

C.  The  Inter-connecting  Movement  113 

1.  Heraclitus 117 

2.  Pythagoras 123 

3.  Empedocles 139 


4  CONTENTS. 

II.  Atomism 151 

A.  CosMicAL    Atomism  —  Leucippus  162 

B.  Noetic  Atomism — Anaxagoras  .  173 

C.  Egoistic  Atomism  —  The  Sophists  184 

III.  Universalism 204 

1.  Socrates 216 

2.  Plato 252 

3.  Aristotle 348 

Chapter  II.  The  Hellenistic  Period   .  459 

I.  The  Theoretic  Movement     .     .     .  477 

1.  Dogmatism 481 

2.  Skepticism 500 

3.  Syncretism 512 

II.  The  Practical  Movement      .     .     .  523 

1.  Stoicism 528 

2.  Epicureanism 537 

3.  Legalism 543 

III.  The  Keligious  Movement      .     .     .  548 

1.  Philosophy  religionizes  .     .  554 

2.  Eeligion  philosophizes     .     .  559 

3.  Eeligion  reveals     .     .     .     .  564 

Chapter  III.  The  Neo-Hellenic  Period  577 

1.  Plotinus 602 

2.  Jamblichus 665 

3.  Proclus 685 


INTRODUCTION, 

In  these  days  not  a  few  European  writers  on 
Philosophy  have  proclaimed  the  demise  and  dis- 
appearance of  the  science  to  which  they  have 
devoted  their  powers.  Philosophy,  then,  has 
run  its  course ;  but  what  new  discipline  is  to  take 
its  place?  Such  is  the  coming  problem.  Other 
writers  have  been  willing  to  grant  to  Philosophy 
a  fresh  lease  of  life,  if  it  can  only  be  brought  to 
mend  its  ways.  And  the  way  often  recom- 
mended to  it  is  that  of  Natural  Science,  or  the 
purely  experimental  method.  Such  a  solution, 
however,  though  it  has  been  offered  by  meta- 
physicians as  well  as  by  scientists,  could  only 
end  in  the  abolition  or  at  least  the  enslavement 
of  Philosophy  as  conceived  by  its  greatest  mas- 
ters. An  outcome  of  this  sort  seems  not  alto- 
gether satisfactory,  and  so  the  solvent  word 
remains  unspoken. 

(5) 


6  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  men  who  are 
still  constructing  or  re-constructing  systems  of 
Philosophy,  wrought  after  the  old  pattern  with 
new  additions  here  and  there,  and  spiced  usually 
with  sharp  criticisms  on  all  other  systems.  Of 
such  Germany  has  been  and  still  is  the  prolific 
home.  In  the  first  half  of  the  past  century, 
Philosophy-building  became  the  chief  occupa- 
tion of  the  highest  order  of  German  intellect, 
with  wonderful  results ;  in  the  second  half  it  was 
still  kept  up,  though  the  output  was  less  in 
quantity,  and  far  inferior  in  originality.  The 
result,  however,  can  hardly  be  denied:  ancient 
Greece  and  modern  Germany  show  the  two  highest 
points  in  the  development  of  Philosophy.  But 
is  this  all  of  it?  What  is  to  be  its  future? 
In  its  antique  and  in  its  modern  periods  it  seems 
to  lie  before  us  rounded  out  and  complete.  Is  it 
again  to  be  an  epoch-making  utterance  of  human 
spirit? 

The  present  work  does  not  disguise  its  opinion 
on  this  point.  There  is  good  reason  for  believ- 
ing that  Philosophy  as  the  European  Discipline 
of  Thought,  has  substantially  delivered  its  mes- 
sage. This  does  not  mean  that  Philosophy  is 
now  to  be  thrown  aside,  and  need  no  longer  be 
studied.  On  the  contrary  its  value  will  remain; 
as  a  ofrcat  stajre  in  the  evolution  of  human  cul- 
ture  it  cannot  be  neglected.  If  the  higher  edu- 
cation be  the  reproduction  of  the  race's  spiritual 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

movement  in  each  individual,  Philosophy  will 
not  lose  its  meaning.  Homer  delivered  his 
message  ere  Greek  Philosophy  was  born,  still 
the  works  of  Homer  are  read  by  more  people  to- 
day than  ever  before.  In  like  manner  Philoso- 
phy, even  if  it  has  finished  its  cycle  and  told 
what  it  has  to  tell,  cannot  be  left  out  of  man's 
highest  trainino-. 

Nevertheless  the  demand  for  a  new  formulation 
of  Thought  is  heard  in  the  cry  of  the  time.  This 
means  not  another  system  of  Philosophy,  but  a 
new  Discipline  of  Thought,  which  does  not  de- 
stroy the  old  one  but  completes  it,  fulfills  it.  The 
study  of  Philosophy  is,  therefore,  the  introduc- 
tion to  a  new  science  of  mind,  and  the  History 
of  Philosophy  is  the  evolution  of  that  science. 
What  shall  we  call  it?  Our  name  for  it  is  Psychol- 
ogy, which,  even  as  word,  has  to  evolve  itself 
through  several  meanings,  as  was  also  the  case 
with  the  word  Philosophy  in  ancient  Greece. 

It  is  possible  that  this  statement  sounds  pre- 
tentious ;  but  it  simply  afiirms  what  is  acknowl- 
edged by  all  thinkers.  Every  great  and  original 
])eople  or  period  in  Europe  has  had  its  Philosophy, 
which  is  the  expression  of  its  spiritual  character 
by  and  for  thought.  In  like  manner  every  great 
and  original  people  or  period  in  the  Orient  has 
found  its  self-expression  in  a  Religion.  But  now 
the  Occident  is  here,  with  its  people,  its  govern- 
ment, its  social  institutions.    In  the  natural  order 


8  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  things  there  must  be  a  Discipline  of  Thought 
as  peculiar  to  it  as  Philosophy  is  to  Europe  or 
as  Religion  is  to  Asia.  It  would  be  the  excep- 
tion in  all  History  if  the  American  spirit  should 
find  its  adequate  self-expression  in  a  Greek  or 
German  Philosophy.  The  institutions  of  a  Re- 
public cannot  have  the  Philosophy  of  an  Empire ; 
indeed  the  Occident  cannot  have,  strictly  speak- 
ing, any  Philosophy.  It  must  have  another  and 
different  Discipline  of  Thought,  not  subordinate 
to,  but  parallel  with  Religion  and  Philosophy. 

This  is  Psychologjs  which  though  an  old  and 
hitherto  subsidiary  branch  of  knowledge,  must 
henceforth  declare  and  demonstrate  not  only  its 
independence  as  a  science  but  its  supremacy.  It 
has  been  heretofore  enslaved  to  Metaphysics  or 
Physics,  one  or  the  other  of  which  has  prescribed 
its  method.  Thus  it  has  not  been  a  free  science. 
But  now  Psychology  as  the  science  of  the  Self  is 
to  make  its  own  method  and  to  reveal  the  same 
in  all  creations  of  the  Self,  human  and  divine. 
Accordingly,  instead  of  having  a  Psychology 
which  is  philosophical,  that  is,  determined  by 
Philosophy,  we  are  to  find  out  that  Philosophy  is 
really  psychological,  that  it  is  and  always  has 
been  determined  by  Psychology,  toward  which 
it  has  been  developing  from  the  beginning.  The 
History  of  Philosophy  is,  then,  the  evolution  of 
Psychology. 

The  grounds  for  these  statements  we  shall  un- 


INTRODUCTION. 


fold  in  some  further  considerations  upon  what 
we  term  the  three  fundamental  Disciplines  in 
which  the  Thought  of  mankind  has  uttered  itself. 


We  can  well  take  as  our  starting-point  the 
human  Being,  the  Self,  who,  when  he  becomes 
human  and  rational,  begins  thinking,  which  is 
to  recognize  in  some  form  or  other  the  Self  in  all 
things.  This  thought  of  his  may  be  and  is  at  tirst 
exceedingly  simple  and  crude,  but  just  it  is  thetest 
of  humanity.  The  content  of  it  is  a  vague  notion 
of  the  All,  of  the  Universe,  which  like  himself 
must  be  essentially  and  primarily  a  Self.  The 
tirst  thought  then  is  not  a  part,  but  the  Whole. 
It  might  seem  easier  for  the  primitive  man  to 
seize  a  piece  of  the  Universe  with  his  mind,  but 
already  the  Universe  has  dawned  in  him  and  made 
him  a  man,  and  he  must  have  some  conception 
of  the  totality  before  he  gets  that  of  its  part. 
Very  indefinite  and  undeveloped  this  Whole  may 
be  in  his  spirit,  still  it  lies  back  of  every  particu- 
lar thought  and  act  of  rational  man,  and  is  the 
source  as  well  as  the  sign  of  his  rationality.  So  we 
answer  the  question,  What  is  the  first  thought  — 
the  primum  cogitatum  :  it  is  the  Whole  underlying 
all  wholes,  namely  the  Universe,  not  by  any 
means  explicitly  analj'Zed,  but  implicitly  present 
and  at  work,  seeking  to  make  itself  a  reality 
through  thovight  and  inthoiight. 


10  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

But  the  human  Being  (or  Self)  very  early  in 
its  rational  life  starts  on  its  career  of  sepa- 
ration, and  unfolds  its  primal  division  of  the 
Universe  into  three  parts,  which  are  variously 
designated,  and  assume  many  different  forms, 
but  which,  in  general,  correspond  to  God,  World, 
and  Man.  These  are  the  three  original,  fun- 
damental elements  which  the  human  mind  finds 
in  the  All,  and  which  it  will  strive  to  formu- 
late in  each  of  the  three  comprehensive  Discip- 
lines —  Religion,  Philosophy  and  Psjxhology .  To 
be  sure  the  distinction  is  at  first  unclear,  uncon- 
cious,  a  bursting  of  the  cosmical  bud;  the  three 
elements  overlap  and  intertwine,  still  they  lie  in 
the  nature  of  the  All,  and  likewise  in  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind  conceiving  the  All. 

Now  these  three  fundamentals  of  the  Universe 
are  not  merely  asunder,  separated  and  opposed, 
but  they  form  a  process  together,  which  is  indeed 
their  very  essence  and  life.  The}'^  are  stages  of 
the  one  movement  underlying  and  interlinking 
all  things,  we  may  for  the  present  call  it  the  soul 
of  the  Universe.  We  shall  hereafter  find  that 
each  of  these  elements  or  parts  has  in  itself  the 
same  process ;  each  member  of  the  triune  move- 
ment in  order  to  be  truly  a  member,  must  reflect 
and  also  enact  the  process  of  the  entire  Universe, 
and  it  is  just  this  process  which  the  thinking  Self 
must  penetrate  and  appropriate  in  order  to  think, 
that  is,  in  order  to  be  a  thinking  Self.     In  other 


INTRODUCTION.  H 

words,  God,  World,  and  Man  have  in  each  the 
essential  process  of  all  three  together,  otherwise 
each  could  not  be  a  stage  or  part  of  this  process, 
or  share  in  its  life.  The  earliest  philosopher  has 
not  failed  to  express  some  such  view,  conceiving 
that  there  was  a  World-Soul  in  the  vast  cosmical 
body  whose  members  were  instinct  everywhere 
with  universal  life,  of  which  his  own  individual 
life  was  a  reflection  and  also  a  part. 

This  process  of  God,  World,  and  Man  cor- 
responds, moreover,  to  that  of  the  Self,  of  the 
Ego,  which  on  one  side  it  determines,  on  the 
other  side  is  determined  by  it.  The  Universe 
cannot  be  conceived  to  suffer  external  division, 
for  there  is  primarily  nothing  external  to  it  till 
it  makes  externality,  which  is  thus  its  own. 
We  say,  the  Universe  must  make  its  own  out- 
sideness,  its  own  other,  its  own  di:fference,  which, 
therefore,  lies  within  itself.  That  is,  it  can  be 
conceived  only  as  the  process  of  self-division 
which  is  at  the  same  time  one  with  itself.  Here- 
in we  have  already  described  it  as  Self  or  Ego. 
For  the  only  thing  conceivable  by  man  w^hich 
has  the  power  to  divide  itself,  and  still  remain 
itself  in  the  act,  or  rather  to  complete  itself  by 
such  act,  is  his  Self  in  its  process,  the  process  of 
self -consciousness,  or  of  the  Self  knowing  itself. 
The  germinal  source  of  all  knowledge,  indeed 
of  the  knowledge  of  the  All  is  the  self-knowino^ 
Self,  which  may  furthermore  be  regarded  as  the 


12  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

fundamental  definition  of  Man,  who,  originally 
created  by  the  All,  must  at  last  recreate  the  same 
in  thought,  must  recreate  his  Creator  creating 
him. 

This  process  of  the  Self  or  Ego  in  its  three 
stages  as  implicit,  as  self-separating,  and  as  self- 
returning,  should  have  its  own  name;  we  call  it 
the  Psychosis.  A  full  unfolding  of  it  belongs 
properly  to  the  science  of  Psychology  (see  our 
Psychology  and  Psychosis,  Introduction  et  pas- 
sim). But  the  fact  we  now  wish  to  emphasize 
is  that  the  Universe  shows  this  same  general 
process  in  its  triune  movement  of  God,  World 
and  Man,  which  movement  Man,  a  part  of  it,  is 
forever  trying  to  grasp  and  formulate  as  a  Whole 
in  Religion,  Philosophy  and  Psychology.  The 
utterance  of  the  Little  Self  beholding  and  recog- 
nizing the  Great  Self,  how  each  determines  and 
is  determined  by  the  other,  cannot  be  omitted 
by  rational  man  without  losing  his  rationality  or 
giving  up  his  Selfhood.  Man,  the  created  por- 
tion, must  be  creatively  the  Whole  through  his 
thinking,  or  surrender  manhood. 

The  fundamental  process  of  the  All  or  of  the 
Universe  is,  therefore,  a  Psychosis  too,  which 
ought  to  have  its  special  name,  as  it  must  be 
often  used  in  our  thinkins:.  We  shall  term  it 
the  All-Psychosis,  or  the  Pampsychosis  after  its 
Greek  equivalent.  Such  a  designation  never 
fails  to  suggest  that  the  Universe  is  a  Self,  and 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

is  to  be  seen  and  identified  as  a  Self  by  Thouo-ht. 
For  the  human  Self  through  thinking  is  to  make 
itself  aware  of  its  oneness  with  the  universal 
Self,  in  fact,  it  can  know  nothing  at  all  without 
recognizing  and  sharing  in  the  original,  creative 
process  of  the  Universe.  Knowledge,  even  sen- 
suous knowledge  of  an  object  is  some  kind  of 
reproduction  of  that  object ;  in  a  degree  I  have 
to  reproduce  the  creative  act  which  made  it 
what  it  is.  The  common  bond  of  Man  and  the 
Universe  is  the  Psychosis,  through  which  he, 
though  a  separate  stage  of  the  total  process, 
returns  and  restores  that  total  process  by  his 
thinking. 

In  fact  the  main  object  and  content  of  human 
Thought  is  to  grasp,  formulate,  and  thus  make 
explicit  in  language  this  fundamental  process  of 
the  Universe,  which  we  have  just  named  the 
All-Psj^chosis.  The  three  supreme  Disciplines 
which  give  expression  to  human  Thinking  are 
Eeligion,  Philosophy,  and  Psychology,  each  of 
which  in  its  way  is  an  utterance  of  the  All- 
Psychosis,  thus  going  back  to  the  fundamental 
process  of  the  Universe  for  its  ultimate  content 
or  subject-matter,  as  well  as  for  its  underlying 
movement  or  method.  In  regard  to  Psychology, 
we  cannot  here  elaborate  the  reason  why  we 
place  it  in  such  high  company,  but  we  shall 
not  fail  to  do  so  hereafter,  only  premising  at 
present   that   we    do    not   mean    by   it    the   old 


14  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Rational  Psychology  or  the  newer  Physiological 
Psychology,  both  of  which  are  subordinate 
sciences,  the  one  being  determined  by  metaphys- 
ical and  the  other  by  physical  methods. 

It  looks  as  if  we  have  now  come  upon  the 
Norm  of  the  All,  the  rule  by  which  the  Universe 
is  built  or  builds  itself  both  as  a  Whole  and  in  its 
parts.  This  basic  Norm  gives  the  universal  pro- 
cess of  Man's  Thinking,  being  itself  just  the  pro- 
cess of  the  Universe,  which,  however,  in  turn  is 
to  be  grasped  and  formulated  in  categories  of 
Thought  by  Man's  Thinking.  Thus  if  the  Norm 
of  the  Universe  determines  the  process  of  human 
Thought,  the  latter  goes  back  and  determines  it 
in  definite  forms  of  expression,  producing  the 
before-mentioned  Disciplines.  Using  our  special 
terms,  we  may  call  Man  himself  a  Psj^chosis  (the 
microcosmic  Self)  whose  spiritual  destiny  is  to  find 
and  to  precipitate  into  speech  the  All-Psychosis 
(the  macrocosmic  Self),  which,  as  already  un- 
folded is  the  basic  Norm  of  all  things.  Strictly 
speaking,  man  can  only  think  what  is  already  a 
Thought,  realized  or  unrealized.  When  the  in- 
ventor makes  a  new  machine,  he  is  properly  re- 
creating a  thought  already  existent,  and  putting 
it  into  a  thing,  realizing  it  (^res)  or  expressing  it 
in  material  form.  If  the  mind  does  not  think 
Thought  already  existent,  it  is  not  thinking  at 
all,  it  is  dreaming  or  sensing  some  object.  In 
the  religious  realm  the  expression  has  long  since 


IN  TR  OD  UC  TION.  1 5 

been  familiar  that  Man  is  to  know  God,  the  all- 
creating  Self  in  whose  image  the  human  Self  has 
been  made,  and  yet  the  latter  has  to  return  and 
know  the  former. 

It  has  already  been  indicated  that  the  thinking 
Self  (or  the  human  Psychosis)  will  approach 
and  formulate  this  fundamental  process  of  the 
All  (the  Pampsychosis)  in  three  different  ways 
which  reveal  the  three  main  Disciplines  in  the 
development  of  man's  Thinking  —  the  religious, 
the  philosophical,  and  the  pyschological,  all 
of  which  are  derived  from  the  one  fundamental 
Norm  previously  mentioned,  and  are  express- 
ing the  same.  That  is,  all  Eeligion,  all 
Philosophy,  all  Psychology  may  be  named  in 
general.  Disciplines,  the  universal  Disciplines,  in 
which  the  Thought  of  Man  has  uttered  and  is 
uttering  itself  in  order  to  declare  and  define  the 
one  ultimate  process  of  the  Universe,  or  the  All- 
Psychosis  (often  called  simply  the  Universal). 
His  Thinking,  which  is  a  Psychosis,  must  see 
and  formulate  the  Psychosis,  of  God,  World,  and 
Man,  separately  as  well  as  all  together.  The 
Discipline  in  this  sense  is  the  training  or  the  road 
over  which  the  human  Ego  has  to  travel  in  order 
to  recognize  universal  Selfhood  or  the  Self  of 
the  Universe,  and  is  particularl}^  found  in  the 
History  of  Philosophy. 

Each  of  these  three  Disciplines  is,  then,  a 
formulation  of  the    one  fundamental    Norm  of 


16  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN'  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Universe,  each  in  its  own  distinctive 
way  and  with  its  own  distinctive  categories. 
Hence  comes  the  division  into  three  Norms, 
religious,  philosophical  and  psychological;  that 
is,  each  Discipline  has  its  own  ultinlate  Norm 
both  in  its  form  and  in  its  method  of  expres 
sion.  Still  we  must  not  forget  that  all  of 
these  three  basic  Disciplines  have  a  common  con- 
tent as  ultimate,  namely  the  one  fundamental 
Norm,  which  in  itself  has  its  own  process,  which 
process  we  have  called  the  Pampsychosis,  or  the 
triune  psychical  movement  of  the  Universe. 
This  movement  we  may  conceive  in  a  general  way 
as:  (1)  Immediate  origination,  or  the  absolute 
Will  which  is  one  with  Thought  —  God ;  (  2  )  the 
separated  and  opposite ,  or  the  originated  — -  World , 
Nature;  (3)  the  originated  as  also  originating  — 
the  self -returning  one,  the  Ego,  Man.  Each  of 
the  three  basic  Disciplines  proceeds  from  each  of 
these  three  stages  respectively  as  its  creative 
starting-point  and  pervasive  principle,  but  at  the 
same  time  each  contains  and  unfolds  within  itself 
all  three  above-mentioned  stages  of  the  Pam- 
psychosis. 

II. 

The  object  of  the  present  work  is  to  take  up  the 
philosophical  Discipline,  and  to  show  all  the  prin- 
cipal variations  of  its  Norm  from  its  first  ap- 
pearance in  ancient  Greece  till  the  present  time. 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

As  suggested  in  the  preceding  account,  it  lies 
between  the  religious  and  the  psychological  Dis- 
ciplines, being  the  middle  term  or  the  bridge 
connecting  the  two  in  thought,  in  time,  and  even 
in  space. 

Plainly  Philosophy  is  dual  in  its  relations,  be- 
longing both  to  the  before  and  the  after,  and 
parted  within  itself.  We  shall  find  this  dualism 
to  be  inherent  and  characteristic  of  the  philo- 
sophical Discipline  throughout,  indicating  it  to 
be  the  second  stage  in  the  total  sweep  of  the 
three  Disciplines  which  thus  form  a  process 
together  or  a  Psychosis,  though  each  has  its  own 
triune  movement  within  itself  thousandfold. 

The  philosophical  Norm  of  the  formulation  of 
the  Universe  is  preceded  by  the  religious  Norm, 
and  develops  out  of  it,  and  indeed  in  reaction 
against  it.  Hence  we  have  to  consider  Religion, 
the  first  Disciphne  of  Man  in  Thinking,  as  the 
forerunner  and  parent  of  Philosophy.  The  be- 
ginning and  end  of  the  religious  Norm  is  the 
Supreme  Being  as  a  personal  Will  which  creates 
the  Universe  by  fiat.  The  primal  process  of  this 
Norm  runs  somewhat  as  follows :  The  Creator 
(God),  the  created  (the  World),  and  finally  the 
created  (Man) ,  yet  this  created  one  is  to  return  to 
his  Creator  and  recreate  Him  in  his  own  soul 
through  thought  and  worship.  Thus  Man's 
religious  destiny  is  that  he,  the  derived  and  the 
created  part  of  the  process  of  the  All,  must  go 

2 


18  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

back  and  reproduce  in  Thought  the  source  whence 
he  came.  The  thinking  Ego  as  the  founder  of  a 
Eeligion  (Moses,  Zoroaster,  Buddha,  Mohammed, 
Christ),  establishes  this  religious  Norm,  and  has 
this  process,  though  in  very  different  forms  of 
realization.  The  absolute  Person  in  his  imme- 
diate will  as  Creator  is  the  center  and  circumfer- 
ance  of  Being  in  Asia,  which  is  the  original  home 
of  all  the  great  World-Religions  as  distinct  from 
mere  Nature-Religions.  Hence  we  may  say  in 
general,  that  the  religious  Norm  developed  in  the 
Orient,  whence  it  has  been  transmitted  westward, 
the  Oriental  mind  being  in  its  very  nature  relig- 
ious and  creative  of  Religions.  The  religious 
Norm  has  been  truly  productive  in  Asia  alone 
whose  highest  thinking  spontaneously  expresses 
itself  in  some  form  of  Religion. 

Next  we  may  look  at  the  philosophical  Norm 
which  has  developed  specially  in  Europe.  It 
seeks  for  the  essence  of  the  Universe  or  of  all 
Being  —  the  abiding  Principle,  Cause,  Law  of 
the  same  (the  Universal).  All  these  terms  are 
.  abstractions,  not  concrete  things  or  persons. 
Hence  Philosophy  is  abstract  from  the  start, 
being  a  product  of  abstraction  in  which  man  is 
now  to  be  trained.  Thinking,  therefore,  be- 
comes fundamentally  abstract  through  Philoso- 
phy. Again  we  must  note  the  separation  which 
lies  in  Philosophy  and  is  explicit  in  its  basic 
question:     What  is  the  essence  of  Being?     This 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

is,  then,  the  dual  chiinictcr  of  Philosophy  in  its 
origin,  whereby  it  reflects  what  we  may  call  the 
European  dualism  —  the  tvvofoldness  which  runs 
through  Europe's  Thought  and  Action  from  be- 
ginning to  eml. 

But  from  what  is  this  abstraction?     From  the 
creative  Self  or  Person  who  now  is  transformed 
into  a  Principle,  Cause,  or  Essence,  which  works 
not  by  will  but  by  its  own  inherent  continuous 
force.     This  act  of  abstracting  from  a  volitional 
and  personal  energy  and  positing  a  causal  and 
impersonal  one  as  the  creative  principle  of  the 
All    is  the  primal  philosophic   act,   which   still 
further  unfolds  in  its  own  process,  and  produces 
many  systems  of  abstract  Thought  called  Philoso- 
phies, all  of  them  containing  in  some  form  and 
likewise  developing  the  above-mentioned  primal 
abstraction.     Philosophy,  we  again  see,  is  sepa- 
rative, and  separates  from   the  first  Discipline, 
Religion,  and  is  the  abstraction  from  God,  that 
is,  from  the   Oriental  conception   of  God,  thus 
giving  birth  to  European  Thought  or  Science  far 
back  in  old  Greece,    as   we    shall  see  when  we 
come    to    the   details    of   the  History  of  Philos- 
ophy. 

The  early  Greek  saw  in  the  Oriental  world  the 
capricious  Will  of  a  ruler  made  absolute,  and 
felt  his  arbitrary  power.  There  dawned  on  the 
Greek  consciousness  the  idea  of  Law,  the  fixed 
and  settled  versus  the  volitional  and  uncertain  in 


20  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

a  personal  Will,  be  it  terrestrial  or  celestial. 
From  the  caprice  of  personality  on  earth  and  in 
heaven,  thinking  Hellas  began  to  turn  away  and 
to  seek  the  abiding  changeless  principle  which 
has  no  preference,  but  treats  all  alike.  Hence 
it  comes  that  the  first  age  of  the  philosophers  is 
also  the  first  age  of  the  lawgivers  in  Greece, 
who  sought  to  establish  a  settled  institutional 
order  and  life  accordino;  to  law  in  the  cities 
against  the  arbitrary  rule  of  the  despot,  good  or 
bad,  many,  few,  or  one. 

The  strong  antagonism  of  the  philosophers  to 
the  poets,  particularly  to  Homer  and  Hesiod, 
was  grounded  in  the  opposition  of  the  Greek 
Thought  to  a  capricious,  autocratic  God,  who, 
endowed  with  absolute  power,  could  do  as  he 
pleased  with  man  and  the  world.  As  they  hated 
the  Oriental  despotism  and  as  the  Greek  would 
fight  Persian  political  absolutism,  so  the  philos- 
ophers resisted  the  religious  absolutism  of  Homer 
and  the  Gods,  in  whom  they  saw  the  Olympian 
counterpart  of  Oriental  tyranny.  A  lawless 
deity  they  would  put  under  law  somehow,  and 
they  placed  in  his  stead  Cause,  Principal,  Essence 
as  the  governing  principle  of  the  All. 

Greek  philosophy  is,  accordingly,  a  re-action 
against  Oriental  absolutism  in  the  form  of  relig- 
ion.  It  began  at  Miletus  which  was  politically 
engaged  in  a  struggle  for  autonomy  with  the 
Lydian  monarchs  for  generations,  and  then  with 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

the  Persian  monarchs,  who  at  last  subdued   her 
permanently 

In  one  sense  the  Greek  thinker  broke  with  the 
religion,  because  of  its  capricious  and  hence  de- 
spotic Euler.     But  the  real  end  of  his  striving 
was  a  deeper  religion,  whose  God  was  not  law- 
less and  arbitrary,  but  institutional  and  self-legis- 
lative, under  whose  government  there  could  be 
freedom.      He  saw  no  such  deity  either  in  his 
own  religion  or  in  that  of  the  Orient,  and  hence 
comes  the  anti-theistic  tendency  observable  in  the 
early  Greek  philosophers.     In  fact  this  remains 
the  inherited  trouble  in  all  Philosophy  down  to 
the  present  time :  it  is  in  danger  of  losing  the 
element  of  personality  in  its  construction  of  the 
Universe  through  its  eagerness  to  get  rid  of  the 
caprice  of  a  personal  Will,  which  could  not  com- 
port with  freedom.     Negatively,  Philosophy  too 
can  destroy  and  has  repeatedly  destroyed  freedom 
and  also  God,  the  very  things  which  it  ought  to 
secure  and  place  upon  an  everlasting  foundation, 
in  its  zeal  to  affirm  the  stability  of  Law  against 
divine  and  human  caprice.     The  Natural  Science 
of  to-day,  in  so  far   as  it  philosophizes,  dwells 
largely  in  this  antinomy  between  Free-Will  and 
the  Laws  of  Nature,  and  seemingly  cannot  get 
out  of  it,  though  our  whole  industrial  civilization 
shows  Man's  Free-Will  grasping  and  employing 
these  Laws  of  Nature  for  the  securing  of  Free- 
WiU. 


22  ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Philosophy  has  hitherto  been  the  interpreter 
of  all  Being,  hence  of  all  the  other  sciences,  the 
scientia  scientiarum,  the  knowledge  of  all  knowl- 
edo;es,  the  Thouo;ht  thinking  all  other  Thouo;ht. 
'  The  universal  principle  or  essence  of  things  is 
its  content,  and  it  has  claimed  to  have  the  uni- 
versal method.  But  now  Philosophy  itself  needs 
an  interpreter,  its  dualism  is  calling  for  some 
reconciling  third  principle  which  will  complete 
that  deeper  process  of  which  it  has  found  itself  to 
be  only  a  part  or  a  phase.  It  has  run  through 
a  line  of  systems  from  Thales  down  to  Wundt, 
and  to  the  very  last  it  falls  into  the  same  dif- 
ficulty, the  same  dualism.  No  new  system  of  Phi- 
losoph}'^  can  cure  this  ailment,  for  as  Philosophy 
it  will  show  the  same  old  birth-mark  which  came 
with  it  into  existence  from  the  first  philosopher. 
Hence  not  a  new  Philosophy,  but  a  wholly  new 
Discipline  is  demanded,  which  the  struggling 
Thouojlit  of  the  time  is  seekino;  to  brins;  forth 
out  of  Philosophy,  as  it  once  brought  forth 
Philosophy  out  of  Religion.  This  coming  Dis- 
cipline we  have  already  indicated  to  be  Psychol- 
ogy in  its  regenerated  form,  which  is  to  mediate 
the  burning  problem  of  Philosophy.  For  Phi- 
losophy, though  starting  in  the  interest  of  free- 
dom in  the  ancient  world,  has  developed  into 
contradiction  with  the  freedom  of  the  modern 
world,  or  has  become  at  least  an  inadequate 
expression  of  it. 


INTBODUCTION.  23 

So  Philosophy,  which  has  been  the  great  inter- 
preter of  the  thought  of  civilization  hitherto,  must 
itself  now  be  interpreted.  Its  stream  of  abstract 
categories  flowing  down  through  the  ages  from 
the  old  Greek  world  rouses  the  question,  What 
does  it  all  mean?  What  is  the  significance  of  Phi- 
losophy anyhow?  The  very  interrogation  calls  for 
the  interpreter,  since  Philosophy  can  no  longer 
interpret  itself.  To  be  sure  it  has  often  declared 
itself  to  be  the  self -de  finer,  to  be  that  which  ex- 
plains all  the  world  and  itself  too.  This  claim 
within  limits  must  be  pronounced  valid ;  for  a 
long  stretch  of  time  and  for  a  laro;e  division  of 
the  civilized  earth  Philosophy  has  been  the  chief 
exegete  of  all  Being,  itself  included.  But  it 
has  come  to  a  boundary  which  it  cannot  tran- 
scend. There  is  not  one  but  many  Philosophies, 
not  one  interpretation  of  the  Universe,  but  a 
long  series  of  them  strung  along  the  ages ;  hence 
the  mind  has  come  to  demand.  What  is  the 
interpretation  of  these  manifold  interpretations? 
Something  underlies  them  all,  some  unity  creat- 
ing this  multiplicity.  It  is  no  adequate  answer 
to  give  us  simply  another  Philosoph}^  for  with 
it  the  same  problem  again  comes  to  the  front. 
Very  common  indeed  is  it  for  the  latest  philoso- 
pher to  regard  his  system  as  the  grand  finality,  as 
the  true  explanation  of  the  Universe  and  of  all 
the  antecedent  formulations  of  the  Universe. 
But  it  turns  out  to   have  the  same  fundamental 


24  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

limitation  which  is  noticeable  in  the  former 
Philosophies  —  a  limitation  which  is  inherent  in 
the  philosophic  Norm  itself  and  of  which  the 
time  has  become  conscious,  and  hence  distrust- 
ful. The  result  is  that  a  deeper  change  must  be 
made,  a  change  to  a  new  Norm  and  not  to  a  new 
Philosophy  which  can  only  be  another  variation 
on  the  old  Norm.  And  this  new  Norm  is  not 
simply  to  make  an  autocratic  system  of  thought, 
but  is  to  train  every  individual  Self  to  make  ulti- 
mately his  own  system  or  law  and  thus  be  free. 
The  History  of  Philosophy  (or  of  Philoso- 
phies) has,  then,  as  its  ultimate  end  and 
outcome  the  revelation  of  the  new  Norm  which 
we  have  called  psychological,  and  whose  total 
process  we  call  the  Pampsychosis.  Philosophy 
has  indeed  developed  all  lesser  potentialities  of 
Thought,  making  them  real;  but  it  has  now 
turned  out  to  be  itself  a  huge  potentiality  which 
is  to  be  developed  into  reality.  The  Pampsy- 
chosis is  the  lurking  potential  element  which  is 
secretly  moving  in  all  Philosophy  from  the  be- 
ginning, and  which  has  been  impressing  upon 
the  same  its  process;  we  may  call  it  the  leading 
motive  (the  Wagnerian  Leit-motif)  which  more 
or  less  implicitly  runs  through  and  organizes  the 
whole  sweep  of  philosophic  harmonies  from  an- 
tique Hellas  down  to  the  present.  As  the  Pam- 
psychosis is  the  end  toward  which  all  systems  of 
Philosophy  are  moving  and  for  which  they  really 


INTBODUCTION.  25 

exist,  it  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  them  all,  and 
hence  their  final  interpreter,  or  rather  it  is  just 
themselves  interpreting  themselves. 

The  inference  is  plain  that  this  point  of  view 
requires  the  complete  reconstruction  and  re- 
writing of  the  History  of  Philosophy.  In  the 
light  of  a  new  Discipline  the  line  of  European 
Thinking  is  to  be  seen,  moving  through  many 
shapes  along  down  the  course  of  some  twenty- 
five  centuries  to  its  own  self -illuminating  end, 
which  is  just  what  throws  back  upon  it  this  light 
of  a  new  Discipline. 


m. 


In  the  philosophic  Norm  the  Self  of  the  phi- 
losopher is  not  directly  introduced,  though  it  is 
just  what  is  doing  the  work  of  Philosophy.  It 
is  the  philosophic  Ego  which  is  putting  all  Being 
into  its  categories,  yet  leaves  itself  out  of  its  own 
process.  That  the  essence  of  all  things  is  the 
Atom,  is  the  declaration  of  a  well-known  Philos- 
ophy. But  who  makes  such  a  declaration  and 
what  is  the  source  or  ground  of  his  making  it? 
We  may  simply  answer,  Democritus,  and  there 
stop,  quite  as  the  old  Greek  did.  But  time  will 
develop  a  deeper  question :  Democritus  the  phi- 
losopher tells  us  what  is  the  essence  or  cause  of 
Being ;  will  not  somebody  now  tell  us  what  is 
the  essence  or  cause  of  Democritus   the  philoso- 


26  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

pher  himself?  The  reply  is,  Philosophy  explic- 
itly asks  for  and  unfolds  the  essence  of  Being, 
but  the  essence  of  the  philosopher  in  formulating 
the  essence  of  Being  remains  implicit  in  the 
philosophic  Norm,  which  primarily  makes  the 
abstraction  of  essence  and  unfolds  it  in  the  three- 
fold process  of  universal  Being  —  Nature's  Being, 
God's  Being,  and  Man's  Being,  which  are  the 
fundamental  themes  of  the  great  historic  stages 
of  Philosophy,  ancient,  medieval  and  modern. 

It  may  be  here  stated  that  Philosophy  begins 
with  the  Being  of  Nature  or  of  the  Cosmos  (the 
World)  which  is  the  second  stage  of  the  total 
process  of  the  All  (the  Pampsychosis),  since  it 
is  primarily  a  reaction  against  the  personal  Will 
in  creation.  Philosophy  regards  the  creative 
principle  as  immanent  in  the  object,  from 
which  it  is  to  be  separated  by  thought  and 
categorized.  The  philosophic  abstraction  moves 
away  from  a  creative  principle  as  transcendent, 
or  from  a  Supreme  Will  outside  and  over  all  to 
the  essence  or  cause  which  is  a  thought  or  an  in- 
tellectual principle  endowed  with  power.  In 
other  words,  the  creative  Intellect  now  appears 
behind  or  underneath  the  creative  Will,  which 
previously  in  the  religious  Norm  was  immediate. 
Thus  Philosophy  is  to  see  and  to  formulate  the 
intellectual  principle  in  the  Universe, — not  mere 
immediate  Will,  but  Will  explicitly  mediated  by 
Intellect  or  Thought.     Such  was  the  new  Disci- 


INTBODUCTION.  27 

pline  which  began  in  ancient  Hellas,  and  which 
started  to  training  man's  Intellect  to  sec  the  In- 
tellect (or  Thought)  in  all  thins^s,  Will  being 
implied  and  serving  the  creative  Intellect.  The 
Oriental  Will  was  crude,  immediate,  hence  de- 
spotic ;  the  Greek  proposed  to  have  it  determined 
both  in  speculation  and  in  action  by  Mind, 
Eeason,  Intellect.  So  he  philo80[)hized  Oriental 
religious  absolutism  and  fought  Oriental  political 
absolutism,  out  of  which  conflict  Europe  was 
born. 

In  the  religious  Norm  man  posits  himself  as  the 
directly  created,  and  thus  as  one  with  created 
Nature,  though  he  is  to  rise  out  of  Nature  and 
return  to  God.  But  unconsciously  in  the  religious 
act  he,  the  created,  has  to  re-produce  or  in  away 
re-create  by  thought  the  creator  God  creating  the 
world  and  himself.  So  much  creative  activity 
the  follower  or  worshiper  has  to  manifest,  but 
when  we  consider  the  originator  of  a  religion  we 
find  him  to  be  a  man  (the  name  of  the  founder 
is  given  in  all  the  great  world-religions )  who  has 
made  the  theogonic  and  cosmogonic  formulas 
of  the  various  cults  of  the  ages,  and  who  must 
accordingly  re-make  or  re-think  the  Creator 
creating  the  Universe.  Still  in  the  religious  Norm 
the  creative  founder  posits  himself  simply  as  the 
created,  as  the  merest  instrument  in  God'.s  hands, 
quite  without  much  Will  or  Intellect  of  his  own, 
so  that  the  supreme  deity  may  be  absolutely  au- 


28  ANCIENT  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tocratic  and  all-knowing.  The  founders  of  the 
great  world-religions,  notwithstanding,  appear 
to  have  been  men  of  prodigious  Will  and  Intel- 
lect, else  they  surely  could  not  have  done  their 
work. 

In  the  religious  Norm  the  thinking  Ego  (as 
founder)  does  not  posit  itself  as  creative  of  the 
said  religious  Norm,  though  it  has  created  the 
same  in  thought  and  formulated  it  specially ;  on 
the  contrary,  it  assigns  such  Norm  to  the  imme- 
diate creative  act  of  a  Supreme  Will.  In  the 
philosophical  Norm  the  thinking  Ego  (as  philos- 
opher) likewise  does  not  posit  itself^as  creating 
the  said  philosophical  Norm,  though  it  has 
created  the  same  in  thought  and  formulated  it 
specially ;  on  the  contrarjs  it  assigns  such  Norm 
to  an  impersonal  creative  essence  or  intellectual 
principle  primarily  and  not  to  the  Supreme  Will 
of  a  Person  immediately  exerted.  But  in  the 
ps3^chological  Norm  the  thinking  Ego  does  posit 
itself  as  creating  its  own  Norm  of  the  Universe, 
as  determining  in  thought  that  which  determines 
it.  In  Keligion  and  Philosophy  the  thinking 
selves  were  implicit  though  they  were  doing  the 
work  of  creating  their  respective  Norms,  but  in 
Psychology,  the  thinking  self  explicitly  affirms 
itself  as  the  determinant  in  thought  of  that 
Norm  which  as  Will  and  Intellect  determines  it. 
The  general  character  of  the  three  Norms  may 
be  indicated  as  follows ;  — 


INTRODUCTION.  29 

1.  Eeligion  —  the  thinking  Self  (implicitly) 
posits  or  takes  as  its  point  of  departure  God  or 
the  absolute  personal  Will  creating  the  Universe. 

2.  Philosophy  —  the  thinking  Self  (implic- 
itly) posits  or  takes  as  its  point  of  departure 
Cause,  Principle,  Thought  as  determining  or 
creating  the  Universe. 

3.  Psychology  —  the  thinking  Self  (explicitly 
now)  posits  itself  as  the  point  of  departure,  which 
creates  in  thought  the  Universe  creating  it  ac- 
tually. Thus  the  thinking  Self  has  become  con- 
scious of  itself  in  its  own  process.  Or,  to  use 
our  technical  terms,  the  Psychosis  knows  itself 
re-creating  thePampsychosis  which  has  created  it. 

In  Psychology,  therefore, Man,  the  third  factor 
of  the  Norm  of  the  Universe  (God,  World,  and 
Man)  receives  the  emphasis,  having  been  in 
Religion  as  Oriental  and  in  Philosophy  as  Euro- 
pean partially  suppressed  or  at  least  undeveloped 
and  unconscious  of  his  complete  creative  Self- 
hood. But  now  he  asserts  himself  as  the  crea- 
tor in  thought  and  the  formulator  of  the  new 
Norm  of  the  Universe,  the  psychological,  in 
which  the  thinker  of  the  thought  of  the  All  is  not 
to  be  left  out  of  his  own  All,  but  is  to  be  taken 
up  into  its  process  which  he  has  found  to  be  es- 
sentially his  own  or  that  of  his  own  Ego. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Psychology  is  a  return  to 
Religion  from  Philosophy,  since  it  goes  back  to 
the  absolute  Self  out  of  philosophic  abstraction, 


30  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  affirms  the  same  to  l)e  creative  of  the  human 
Self  creative.  Man  could  not  think,  he  could  have 
no  form  to  think  with,  unless  there  was  the  an- 
tecedent Divine  Thought,  which  he  is  to  re-think, 
and  so  re-create.  And  we  have  the  right  to 
affirm  that  without  this  perpetual  re-creation 
through  Man,  God  would  not  be,  at  least  would 
not  be  what  He  is.  As  Philosophy  was  a  reac- 
tion against  Theism  as  capricious,  so  Psychology 
is,  in  the  given  sense  a  reaction  against  the  anti- 
theistic  tendency  of  Philosophy,  seeking,  how- 
ever, the  return  not  to  a  capricious  and  arbi- 
trary, but  to  a  rational  and  institutional  God,  - 
who  is  re-created  consciously  by  the  Self  which 
he  creates,  and  who,  divinely  free,  wills  man's 
freedom. 

The  same  thought  is  realized  politically  in  the 
Government  of  the  United  States.  The  citizen 
obeys  the  law,  but  the  very  law  which  he  obeys 
he  is  ultimately  to  make.  He  almost  worships 
the  Constitution,  and  surely  to  make  a  worship- 
ful object  is  the  highest  function  of  a  human 
beino-.  Authority  undoubtedly  determines  the 
man,  but  man  is  also  to  determine  authority 
henceforth,  and  so  be  free.  The  Psychological 
State  is  the  American,  and  accordingly  different 
from  the  European  and  Oriental  States. 

Thus  the  Self  or  Humanity  has  begun  to  attain 
its  true  worth,  and  to  assert  its  most  fundamen- 
tal right,  the  right  which  comes  from  its  recog- 


INTRODUCTION.  31 

nizing  tluit  it  must  determine  all  that  determines 
it,  recreating  its  own  Creator,  making  its  own 
Philosophy  and  not  taking  that  of  some  other 
man,  producing  or  at  least  reproducing  all  the 
laws  which  govern  it  politically  or  otherwise.  So 
the  basic  Norm  of  the  All  (God,  Nature,  and 
Man)  enters  upon  its  third  stage,  completing  its 
grand  triune  movement,  which  embraces  spati- 
ally Orient,  Europe,  and  Occident,  and  spiritually 
the  three  supreme  Disciplines,  Religion,  Philoso- 
phy, and  Psychology,  the  last  of  which  shows  man 
turning  and  recreating  consciously  the  universal 
Norm  of  God,  World,  and  himself. 

In  Psychology  the  Self,  thus  becoming  con- 
scious of  its  supreme  creativity,  dwells  in  its  own 
eternal  presence,  as  well  as  in  the  presence  of 
God,  who  likewise  dwells  in  its  presence.  God 
is  not  simply  in  me,  but  in  my  presence,  being 
the  essence  or  the  very  process  of  all  objectivity. 
To  know  truly  any  external  object,  I  must  know 
Him  and  His  process  through  my  process  of  the 
Self  or  Ego.  His  Will  is  to  will  me  and  my 
freedom,  whereby  he  too  is  a  free  God.  In 
the  Orient  I  have  to  be  His  slave;  but  with 
my  enslavement  He  cannot  be  free,  or  only 
capriciously  so.  One  of  the  supreme  functions 
of  Psychology  is  to  restore,  God  to  free- 
dom out  of  arbitrariness,  out  of  Oriental 
caprice.  You  cannot  have  despotism  in  Heaven 
and  freedom    on   Earth.     The    ideal   must    not 


32  ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL O SOPHY. 

lag  behind  and  drag  down  the  real,  for  Religion 
is  what  ought  to  keep  alive  the  ideal.  Psychol- 
ogy in  its  new  form  must  drive  the  despot,  even 
though  he  be  benevolent,  out  of  the  Universe,  for 
its  end  is  freedom,  not  capricious,  but  institu- 
tional freedom.  The  God-consciousness  then  can 
be  restored  to  man  and  made  harmonious  with  his 
political  consciousness,  especially  in  its  Occidental 
stage  which  has  already  made  valid  in  institutions 
the  principle  that  man  must  determine  the  law 
which  determines  him  and  thus  be  free. 

The  Universe  sees  itself  in  me,  reflects  itself 
as  process  in  my  process,  which  is  in  turn  to  re- 
flect it  in  Thought.  I,  this  psychical  process 
(Psychosis)  go  forth  to  know  the  All  and  find 
in  it  essentially  the  same  psychical  process,  and 
identify  it  with  myself,  which  is  to  know  it  in 
Thought.  That  which  is  Universal  bears  the 
impress  of  the  Universe  and  its  three-fold 
process,  and  this  is  what  the  thinking  Ego 
sees  in  everything,  namely  Thought,  the  Univer- 
sal. This  predicate  can  only  be  derived  from 
the  Universe,  and  is  the  great  category  of  all 
Philosophy. 

IV. 

Philosophy  at  the  present  date  is  not  far  from 
2,500  years  old,  and  thus  has  a  long  period  in 
which  it  can  look  back  at  itself,  observing  its 
greater  and  its  lesser  movements  as  well  as  seek- 


INTB  OD  UC  TION.  33 

ing  to  discover  the  common  underlying  principle 
of  all  these  movements.  We  have  already  found 
it  to  be  the  middle  or  intermediate  Discipline 
between  Religion  and  Psychology,  and  we  may 
now  proceed  to  designate  it  in  its  own  internal 
process.  This  is  also  threefold  and  bears  the 
impress  of  the  fundamental  Norm  of  the  Universe 
of  which  it  is  a  product,  yet  also  a  necessary 
stage  or  part.  Philosophy  as  a  member  of  the 
Universe,  must  manifest  the  process  of  the  Whole 
to  which  it  belongs  as  a  member.  Its  prime 
function  is  to  grasp  and  formulate  the  funda- 
mental Norm,  expressing  the  same  abstractly  as 
the  Universal,  which  is  the  stamp  of  the  Universe 
on  everything,  even  on  the  word  which  you 
speak  and  which  the  Ego  reproduces  in  its 
thought,  since  it  too  has  this  Norm  active  within 
itself. 

Every  leading  historian  of  Philosophy  has 
divided  its  historic  movement  into  three  great 
periods :  ancient,  medieval  and  modern.  It  is 
said  to  fall  naturally  into  these  three  divisions. 
Still  the  eager  student,  since  his  science  is  always 
seeking  the  essence,  ground,  or  cause  of  things, 
must  ask.  Why  this  triple  movement?  Perhaps  a 
simple  inspection  of  the  fact  is  enough  ;  but  Phi- 
losophy, if  it  be  true  to  itself,  must  search  for  the 
principle  or  reason  of  the  phenomenon.  Just  at 
present,  however,  we  may  appeal  to  a  consensus 
of  the    best   judges  upon  this  matter,  and  give  a 

3 


34  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

brief  statement  of  these  three  periods.  Recol- 
lecting, then,  that  Philosophy  formulates  the 
essence  of  Being  to  be  the  Universal,  we  may 
begin  with  its  first  great  period. 

1.  Ancient  Philosophy,  which  is  essentially 
Greek  through  its  whole  course,  grasps  the  essence 
of  Being  as  the  Universal  and  develops  the  entire 
process  of  the  latter  within  itself.  It  is  the 
great  and  endurino;  advantage  of  Greek  Philos- 
ophy  that  it  unfolds  freely,  without  any  author- 
ity of  State  or  Church  determining  its  movement 
from  the  outside.  Thus  it  manifests  the  pure 
process  of  Philosophy  according  to  its  own  inner 
nature.  Of  course,  Greek  Philosophy  was  in- 
fluenced by  the  time,  was  indeed  the  child  of  the 
age  in  which  it  appeared.  But  it  came  in  its  own 
way  and  in  its  own  right.  Hence  we  may  say 
that  Greek  Philosophy  reveals  Philosophy  as  it  is 
in  itself  to  all  future  generations ;  never  again  will 
it  be  so  pure,  so  unique,  so  self-contained.  It  is 
thus  a  kind  of  standard  in  its  sphere,  which  stand- 
ard is,  however,  to  be  applied  in  many  different 
ways. 

Taking  as  its  content  the  philosophic  Norm  of 
the  Universe  Greek  Philosophy  will  unfold  within 
itself,  by  its  own  innate  power,  all  three  stages  of 
that  Norm,  beginning  with  Nature  or  the  Cos- 
mos, passing  to  and  through  Man  and  then  return- 
ing to  God  or  the  Absolute  One  in  Neo-Platon- 
ism.     Thus  it  completes  its    cycle  and  vanishes 


INTBOD  UC  TIO  N.  35 

from  the  real  world,  but  remains  a  potent  influ- 
ence for  all  time.  From  the  first  it  is  instinct- 
ively triaclal,  without  knowing  the  fact  it 
develops  according  to  the  threefold  pattern  of 
the  underlying  Norm,  till  at  last  the  triplicity 
becomes  completely  external  and  formal  in  the 
metaphysical  Triads  of  Proclus,  the  last  Greek 
philosopher  of  any  importance.  But  the  spirit 
of  the  Age  dropping  the  abstract  and  empty 
Triad  takes  up  or  rather  has  already  taken  up 
the  full  and  concrete  Trinity,  wherewith  a  new 
l)hilosophical  epoch  begins. 

2.  Medieval  Philosophy  affirms  the  essence  of 
Being  to  be  the  Universal  as  God,  whose  process 
is  likewise  threefold,  which  fact  is  declared  in  the 
Trinity.  The  fundamental  Norm  now  starts 
with  its  first  member  who  creates  the  other  two 
members,  the  World  and  Man,  by  an  act  of 
Will. 

The  great  struggle  of  Medieval  Philosophy  is 
to  make  this  creative  act  of  God's  Will  rational, 
and  not  to  let  it  remain  purely  capricious  as  it 
was  in  the  Orient.  For  this  purpose  it  calls  to 
its  aid  Greek  Philosophy,  which  Avas  primarily  a 
reaction  against  an  arbitrary  Will  placed  at  the 
center  of  the  Universe.  The  dogma  is  given  by 
the  Church  and  is  immediately  accepted  by  Faith, 
but  this  given  religious  element  must  be  made 
philosophical  for  the  Reason.  So  Greek  Philos- 
ophy goes  out  to  service  and  becomes  the  hand^. 


36  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHT. 

maid  (ancilla)  of  Religion,  losing  the  independ- 
ent position  which  she  once  held  in  her  native 
land.  Still,  though  she  be  determined  on  the 
one  hand,  on  the  othor  she  determines  and  she 
continues  to  give  the  form  for  all  thinking. 

Thus  Medieval  Philosophy  is  distinctly  twofold, 
divided,  separative  in  character,  and  so  belongs 
to  the  second  stage  in  the  great  process  of 
philosophical  history.  It  moves  through  various 
phases  in  seeking  to  explain  the  process  of  God 
as  triune,  which  process  is  primarily  given  by 
Faith  but  is  to  be  translated  into  metaphysical 
categories  originally  elaborated  by  Greek  Thought 
for  showing  the  philosophical  process  which  is 
ultimately  triadal.  That  is,  the  Trinity  of  Per- 
sons is  seen  to  be  grounded  on  the  Triad  of 
Thought.  Origen,  the  Christian  Theologian, 
developed  the  former;  Plotinus  the  Heathen  Neo- 
Platonist,  and  more  distinctly  Proclus  developed 
the  latter. 

3.  Modern  Philosophy  begins  with  the  Renas- 
cence, which  was  a  return  to  the  starting-point 
of  European  culture  in  order  to  round  itself  out 
to  its  last  completion.  There  was  a  going  back 
to  the  fountain-head  of  Greek  spirit  for  a 
rejuvenescence  of  the  world.  Philosophy  also 
went  back  and  studied  afresh  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle, and  found  in  them  an  expression  of  the  new 
time.  Art  and  Science  shared  in  the  grand 
revival  through  Hellas.     But  this  return  must  be 


INTEODUCTION.  37 

a  restoration  and  not  a  relapse,  a  regaining  of 
something  lost,  not  an  imitation  of  something 
past.  The  Eenascence  is  properly  the  third 
stage  or  the  completion  of  a  great  cycle  of  the 
World's  Thought,  of  which  Greek  Philosophy 
is  the  first  stage.  The  start  is  not  now  with 
Nature  as  in  the  Greek  period,  nor  with  God 
as  in  the  Medieval  period,  but  witli  Man  whose 
Ego  or  Self  is  to  be  philosophized  or  categorized, 
chiefly  in  terms  of  Greek  Thought. 

Modern  Philosophy  posits  the  essence  of 
Beinoj  to  be  the  Universal  as  determiuincr  the 
thinking  Ego.  Philosophy  now  begins  to  put 
its  main  stress  upon  the  Ego  thinking  or  knowing 
the  object,  applying  to  the  same  its  categories 
and  finding  in  the  same  its  process.  Its  leading 
question  is,  What  determines  or  causes  me  as 
thinking  Ego  to  think  the  object,  to  think  what 
it  is,  or  its  essence?  In  Greek  Philosophy  the 
question  simply  is.  What  is  the  essence  of  Being? 
The  Greek  thinkers  found  this  essence  and  for- 
mulated it  in  terms  which  have  lasted. 

Each  of  the  three  periods  begins  with  a  dif- 
ferent stage  of  the  philosophical  Norm.  The 
Greek  starts  with  a  search  for  Nature's  Beinsr 
(or  Being  in  itself),  the  Medieval  with  a  search 
for  God's  Being,  the  Modern  with  a  search  for 
Man's  or  the  Ego's  Being.  Greek  Philos- 
ophy is,  therefore,  a  pure  ontology  or  science 
of  Being,  Medieval  Philosophy  is  the  ontology 


tl179m 


38  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  God,  Modern  Philosophy  is  the  ontology  of 
the  Ego,  or  Self.  Thus  Greek  thought  with  its 
ontology  has  been  the  philosophic  determinant  of 
both  the  Medieval  and  the  Modern  Epochs. 

But  a  change  is  coming;.  The  thinking;  Effo 
discovers  itself  as  originator,  becomes  conscious 
that  it  has  posited  the  essence  of  Being  to  be  the 
Universal  in  each  of  the  three  great  })hilosophic 
stages.  Philosophy  has  run  its  course  and 
Psychology  begins  when  this  fornndation  rises  to 
the  surface:  the  thinking  Ego  posits  itself  as 
determining  the  essence  of  Being  to  be  the 
Universal  which  determines  it  (the  thinking 
Ego).  This  means  that  I  must  posit  the  abso- 
lute power  which  posits  me,  that  I  must  deter- 
mine the  Norm  (God,  Nature,  and  Man)  which 
determines  me,  that  I  must  make  the  law  which 
governs  me.  With  such  a  conception  we  pass 
out  of  the  sphere  of  Philosophy  to  that  of 
Psychology,  and  instead  of  a  Philosophy  of 
Psychology  we  find  before  us  the  necessity  of  a 
Psychology  of  Philosophy,  which  is  essentially 
our  present  work. 

In  such  fashion  we  bring  before  ourselves  the 
fact  that  the  long  travail  of  European  Thought 
called  Philosophy  has  resulted  in  bringing  forth 
a  new  Discipline,  has  led  up  to  a  realm  of 
Thought  beyond  itself.  Great  has  been  this 
training  and  is  not  to  be  dispensed  with  3'et  by 
any  means ;  rather  is  its  true  place  and  value  to 


INTBODUCTION.  39 

be  henceforth  more  clearly  recognized  in  the 
universal  scheme  of  humanity's  education. 
Philosophy  has  been  a  school  of  authority  placed 
over  man  to  bring  him  to  make  his  own  author- 
ity even  in  Philosophy.  Looking  back  through 
its  long  career,  we  can  see  that  its  end  is 
Freedom,  that  it  trains  man  to  make  a  free 
world  in  order  to  make  himself  free.  It  unfolds 
into  Psychology,  which  is  supremely  the  free 
science,  and  therefore  just  the  science  of 
Freedom. 


Ipart  fixeU 


ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSO- 
PHY. 

Wlieu  we  speak  of  Ancient  European  or  Greek 
Philosophy,  we  bring  before  the  mind  a  definite 
movement  of  Time,  having  a  beginning  and  end. 
But  within  this  movement  of  Time  lies  also  a 
movement  of  Spirit  which  goes  through  its  periods 
of  rise,  culmination,  decline,  and  final  cessation 
of  activity.  Moreover  Greek  Philosophy,  thus 
marked  out  by  distinct  temporal  limits,  has  its 
special  function  as  a  phase  or  part  of  all  Philoso- 
phy. The  student,  as  the  best  fruit  of  his  effort, 
must  attain  to  some  conception  of  what  this  long 
discipline  of  European  Spirit  means,  and  dis- 
cover some  reason  why  the  mind  of  our  race  has 
had  to  pass  through  such  a  strenuous  and  peculiar 
training. 
(40) 


ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY.  41 

Philosophy  has,  in  general,  to  investigate  and 
to  formulate  the  essence  of  all  Being,  or  of  the 
Universe  whose  fundamental  Norm  it  seeks  to 
express  in  speech,  or,  more  definitely,  in  a  cate- 
gory. Now  it  is  Greek  Philosophy  which  first 
makes  this  Norm  explicit  as  philosophical,  and 
applies  it  in  a  number  of  ways,  each  of  which 
gives  rise  to  a  system  of  Philosophy,  Still  all 
of  these  systems  have  fermenting  in  them  and 
seeking;  for  utterance  the  Norm  of  the  Universe, 
which,  when  uttered  abstractly,  can  only  be  some 
form  of  the  Universal.  Greek  Philosophy  is  the 
first  to  say  that  the  essence  of  Being  is  the 
Universal — upon  which  statement  a  good  deal 
is  to  be  said  hereafter,  since  it  will  embody 
itself  in  many  shapes,  being  the  subtle,  ever- 
changing,  yet  ever-persistent  Proteus  of  Greek 
Thought. 

The  history  of  Greek  Philosophy  has,  there- 
fore, a  Time-element  and  also  a  Thought-element. 
Which  of  the  two  is  to  rule,  the  Time  or  the 
Thought?  If  we  consider  the  movement  of  Phi- 
losophy as  a  line  of  successive  S3^stems  in  simple 
historic  sequence,  we  make  Time  the  autocrat 
over  Thought.  If  on  the  other  hand  we  make 
Thought  or  a  certain  sjstem  of  Thought  the 
dominant  principle  by  which  all  other  systems 
are  explained,  it  is  likely  that  we  shall  do  violence 
to  the  free  historic  development  of  Philosophy. 
Such  are  the  two  extremes  which  are  somehow  to 


42  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

be  reconciled,  otherwise  each  will  lame  if  not 
crush  the  other. 

The  first  fact  here  to  be  noted  is  that  Philos- 
ophy incorporates  itself  in  individuals,  in  a  long 
line  of  them  stretching  down  Time.  It  is  the 
Philosopher  who  primordially  makes  or  formu- 
lates the  Philosoph}^  His  thought  this  is,  the 
product  of  an  individual  brain;  thus  the  outward 
appearance  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  is  a 
gallery  of  great  personalities  whose  names  have 
been  preserved  as  the  thinkers  of  their  age  and 
as  the  founders  of  systems  of  Thought.  They 
are  indeed  a  mighty  spectacle  and  the  grand  at- 
traction ;  they  are  not  to  be  neglected  even  on 
their  personal  side.  Then  their  Thought  is  to  be 
carefully  set  forth  in  its  independence  and  in 
its  connection,  for  it,  though  in  itself  a  Whole, 
is  soon  found  to  be  a  link  in  a  larger  Whole,  and 
finally  in  the  largest  Whole. 

Now  the  individual  philosopher  reflects  the 
cast  of  his  own  mind,  the  circumstances  of  his 
life  and  the  trend  of  his  age,  in  his  work.  A 
thousand  peculiarities  flow  in  and  color  his  think- 
ing, specially  the  greatness  or  the  smallness  of 
his  native  genius.  He  unites  with  others  and 
forms  a  group,  which  has  a  common  principle 
and  produces  a  school  of  Philosophy.  But  it  is 
soon  seen  that  he,  however  colossal  he  may  be,  is 
a  part  of  a  mightier  movement,  a  member  of  a 
greater  totality  than  any  individual  philosopher. 


ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY.  43 

He,  though  a  process  in  his  Thought,  is  but  a 
stage  in  a  still  higher  process,  which  has  called 
him  forth  and  also  has  apparently  put  an  end  to 
his  existence  as  this  individual  thinker. 

So  the  philosopher  lives  his  time  and  then 
passes  away,  having  had  his  period  of  free  activ- 
ity. Yet  we  find  that  he  has  also  been  influenced 
deeply  from  the  outside,  that  he  has  but  expressed 
his  aofe  with  its  institutions  and  its  civilization. 
This  element  is  not  to  be  neglected  in  the  History 
of  Philosophy,  the  institutional  element  of  the 
social,  political,  and  religious  life  of  the  world  at 
the  time  of  any  given  Philosophy.  The  grand 
totality  of  existence  is  also  sweeping  through  its 
epochs  which  reflect  themselves  most  faithfully 
and  purely  in  the  thinking  of  the  philosophers, 
who  are  herein  subsumed  under  their  own  princi- 
ple. For  their  fundamental  doctrine  is  that  the 
essence  of  Being  is  the  Universal,  which  every 
individual  philosopher  has  to  utter  and  then  pass 
on,  being  simply  an  individual.  Only  insofar  as 
he  makes  himself  the  vehicle  of  the  Universal, 
will  he  live,  though  dead. 

Thus  we  find  that  the  philosopher,  even  in  the 
free  activity  of  his  inner  Self  has  something 
given  him  from  the  outside,  or  rather  imposed 
upon  him  by  an  apparent  necessity.  Into  the 
innermost  working  of  his  own  spirit  creeps  this 
external  power  with  its  behest  which  he  cannot 
help  obeying.     Indeed  it  is  ingrown  into  his  very 


44  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

existence,  it  is  an  integral  part  of  his  soul,  that 
part  which  he  must  express.  So  there  rises  the 
question,  What  is  this  supernal  Power,  Energy, 
or  Being  which  commands  the  individual  philoso- 
pher to  do  its  bidding,  to  think  its  Thought? 

The  reader  who  has  followed  us  hitherto  will 
be  able,  doubtless,  to  give  our  answer  to  this 
question :  the  universal  Power  or  rather  Process 
over  the  philosopher  as  well  as  in  him  and 
moving  him  within  is  what  we  have  called  the 
Pampsychosis.  Over  and  beyond  the  philoso- 
pher it  is,  beyond  his  consciousness,  yet  stirring 
him  within  unconsciously  to  make  himself  a  link 
in  the  chain  of  the  grand  totality  of  Being. 
The  moment  the  system  of  the  individual  thinker 
shows  itself  to  be  a  part  or  a  stage  of  a  still 
larger  process,  which  is  beyond  his  conscious 
purpose,  that  moment  an  ordering  Power  has 
appeared,  higher  than  he  is,  and  working  after 
its  own  Norm  and  for  its  own  end.  At  such  a 
point  the  philosopher  seems  to  be  whelmed  into 
the  vortex  of  Fate,  an  external  Necessity 
apparently  seizes  his  free  product,  and  reduces 
this  to  a  part  of  its  scheme,  which  scheme  is  itself 
subjected  in  turn  to  a  yet  larger  process.  Thus 
a  vast  movement  discloses  itself,  consisting  of 
an  ever-enlarging  series  of  processes  or  cycles, 
which  at  last  complete  the  total  round  of  the 
History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  and  of  all  PhilosO" 
phy,  aud  indeed  of  all  the  Disciplines. 


ANCIENT  E  UROPEAN  PHIL  OSOPH Y.  45 

This  History  is,  therefore,  conceived  to  move 
forward  not  merely  in  a  straight  line  of  succes- 
sive systems  clironologically  arranged,  ])ut  in  a 
chain  of  self-returning  processes  which  interlink 
while  advancing  in  time,  the  whole  chain  likewise 
being  a  self-returning  process.  The  historical 
evolution  of  Philosophy  is  not  to  be  dissolved 
into  a  broken  succession  of  single  systems ;  it 
has  another  and  far  loftier  character.  Funda- 
mentally each  part  reflects  the  process  of  the 
"Whole  or  rather  of  the  AH.  In  fact  each  indi- 
\  idual  philoso})her  in  his  thinking  bears  the  im- 
press of  the  Universe,  for  he  must  think  the 
Universal  which  can  onlv  be  derived  ultimately 
from  the  j)rocess  of  the  Universe. 

Here  lies  the  mediating  principle  of  the  above- 
mentioned  conflict  between  the  freedom  of  the 
philosopher  from  Avithin  and  the  fate  of  his 
world  and  of  his  ag^e  overwhelmino;  him  from 
Avithout  and  reducing  his  work  from  a  Whole  to 
a  part  or  phase  of  a  still  greater  "Whole.  But 
really  the  process  which  he  has  impressed 
upon  his  work  is  reaflSrmed  by  the  All  or  by 
the  Universe,  wdiich  is  just  this  process,  and 
which  thus  pronounces  his  process  to  be  its 
own.  In  Religion  every  man  or  human 
Self  is  declared  to  be  the  Son  of  God,  the 
absolute  Self ;  in  Philosophy  every  philosopher 
tliiukino;  and  formulating  the  Universal  is  taken 
u\)  l)y  and  made  to  share  in  the  process  of  the 


46  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

All,  which  is  primarily  his  own  innermost  Self. 
As  individual,  he  is  in  Time  and  subject  to 
the  conditions  and  occurrences  of  Time,  which 
constitute  the  element  of  Fate  in  his  life  and 
also  in  his  thinking.  He,  the  self-determined 
internally,  is  determined  externally  by  the  Neces- 
sity of  the  world,  but  this  world  is  controlled  by 
law,  or  better,  is  a  part  of  the  total  process 
of  the  Universe  which  is  the  absolutely  self- 
determined.  Thus  the  individual  philosopher 
must  do  his  thinking  in  Time  and  have  it  laden 
with  externality  and  limitation ;  still  upon  this 
finite  material  he  impresses  the  process  of  the 
Universe  and  thus  makes  his  thought  or  his 
S3^stem  an  integral  part  of  that  process  as  actual- 
izing itself  in  Time.  The  philosopher  who  can 
reveal  to  his  own  age  and  temporal  environment 
that  the  essence  of  all  Being  is  the  Universal 
has  verily  stamped  upon  Time  the  ineffaceable 
Image  of  the  Eternal. 

But  these  eternal  Images  in  Time,  namely 
systems  of  Thought,  are  like  the  statues  of  the 
Gods,  multitudinous.  The  History  of  Philosoph}', 
true  to  their  temporal  succession,  must  also 
be  true  to  their  spiritual  principle,  and  em- 
ploy a  method  which  gives  due  validity  both 
to  the  Time-element  and  the  Thought-element. 
Mere  sequence  of  systems  or  of  persons  is 
not  enough,  though  not  to  be  left  out;  there 
must    be    in    every    passing    system    or  person 


ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY.  47 

the  eternal   presence    of    the    one    fundamental 
process. 

These  general  thoughts  pertaining  to  History 
and  to  Philosophy  we  are  now  to  see  embodying 
themselves  in  the  History  of  Greek  Philosophy. 
The  primal  basic  fact  of  it  is  to  see  its  threefold 
spiritual  process  unfolding  itself  in  the  temporal 
framework  of  the  ages.  Accordingly  we  divide 
the  History  of  Greek  Philosophy  into  three 
Periods,  the  Hellenic,  Hellenistic  and  the  Neo- 
Hellenic,  which  is  indeed  the  first  and  all-embrac- 
ing process  of  it.  To  each  of  these  three  periods 
we  shall  devote  a  few  prefatory  words. 

I.  The  Hellenic  Period.  This  embraces  the 
first  great  epoch  of  Greek  Philosophy,  from 
Thales  to  and  through  Aristotle.  It  seeks  to 
know  Being,  to  find  and  to  formulate  its 
principle,  which  is  the  One  under  all  multiplic- 
ity. This  One  is  at  first  simply  a  physical  element, 
as  the  water  of  Thales,  but  it  passes  through  a  line 
unfolding  concepts  or  categories  till  it  reaches 
the  self-knowing  One  of  Aristotle.  This  self- 
knowing  One  is,  however,  still  Being,  not  the 
individual  Ego. 

This  first  stage  of  Greek  Philosophy,  the  Hel- 
enic,  is  national,  and  has  an  external  movement 
corresponding  to  Greek  History.  It  is  at  first 
colonial,  starting  in  the  East  at  Miletus,  moving 
West  to  Italy  and  Sicilv,  also  shooting  up  in  the 
North,  at  Abderafor  instance  (Democritus),  and 


48  ANCIENT  E  UROPEAN  PHIL  O SOPHY. 

finally  concentrating  itself  at  Athens,  as  did  the 
Greek  political  world  and  all  forms  of  Greek 
Spirit.  This  concentration  becomes  profoundly 
internal  in  Aristotle's  philosophy  whose  highest 
point  posits  the  Psychosis  as  Being,  though  not 
as  Ego.  Such  is  the  great  step  compassed  by 
the  Hellenic  Period  of  Greek  Philosophy  in  the 
revelation  of  the  Pampsychosis.  The  movement 
seeks  to  discover  the  principle  or  inner  creative 
element  of  all  Being,  that  is,  the  Norm  of  the 
Universe,  and  in  Aristotle  reaches  the  height  of 
seeing  and  declaring  that  this  universal  principle 
is  the  Thinking  of  Thinking. 

Moreover  Nature  (Physis)  or  the  Cosmos  is 
the  first  object  of  this  first  Period  of  Greek 
philosophizing.  That  is,  in  Thales  thought 
starts  with  manifesting  itself  as  cosmocentric. 
The  investigator  hunts  after  this  essence  in 
Nature,  and  seeks  to  make  it  explicit  in  categories. 
But  from  Nature  philosophic  interest  passes  to 
Man  in  Socrates. 

More  definitely  stated,  the  Hellenic  Period 
shows  that  the  essence  of  Being  is  the  Universal 
as  self -unfolding,  as  coming  to  itself  consciously 
out  of  its  unconscious  condition. 

But  the  Universal,  having  recognized  and  for- 
mulated itself,  moves  over  into  the  next  Period. 

H.  The  HeMenistic  Period.  The  Greek  Na- 
tional Philosophy  passes  to  other  nations  and 
races,  which  it  helleuizes  partly,    and   is    partly 


ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY.  49 

barbarized  by  them  in  turn  ())iirbarizecl  in  the 
Greek  sense,  made  non-Hellenic).  This  move- 
ment is  connected  with  the  loss  of  Greek  political 
independence.  Greek  Philosophy  transcends  the 
national  limit,  goes  to  the  Orient  with  Alexander, 
and  moves  west  to  Rome,  the  seat  of  univer- 
sal empire.  Internally  the  self -knowing  One  of 
Aristotle  enters  the  individual  and  produces 
the  wise  man,  the  Philosopher  who  is  universal 
within,  and  hence  ethical. 

If  in  the  previous  stage  Greek  Philosophy  con- 
centrates itself  in  one  city  and  in  one  mighty 
movement,  and  shows  the  forming  of  the  Sun  of 
philosophic  thought,  in  the  present  stage  it  scat- 
ters itself  from  that  center  and  rays  out  over  the 
world,  having  become  the  irradiating  luminary 
of  that  age  and  indeed  of  all  succeeding  ages. 
Thus  it  universalizes  itself  in  one  sense,  yet  it 
also  individualizes  itself,  putting  its  principle  into 
the  individual  and  into  his  conduct,  and  so  moral- 
izing him. 

It  should  be  added  that  this  inner  process  sepa- 
rates the  individual  from  the  City-State  of 
Greece;  he  can  no  longer  remain  in  immediate 
oneness  with  his  community ;  he  has  become  a 
citizen  of  the  world,  being  a  Roman.  Moreover 
he  deems  himself  to  have  the  God  within  him ; 
the  Aristotelian  principle  of  Being  is  turned 
from  the  world  into  his  soul,  which  has  thereby 
in  it  the  self -knowing  One. 

4 


50  ANCIEN T  E  UBOPEA N  PHILOSOPHY. 

Thus  the  Hellenistic  Period  of  Greek  Philoso- 
phy starts  with  becoming  anthropocentric,  seek- 
ing to  unfold  and  to  formulate  the  principle 
of  Man's  Being  rather  than  Nature's  Being, 
which  was  the  lirst  search  in  the  previous  Hel- 
lenic Period.  The  individual  is  now  to  embody 
in  himself  the  true  Being  of  Man.  Not  Plato, 
not  Aristotle  is  alone  to  be  the  philosopher; 
every  man  is  to  become  a  philosopher.  It  is 
true  that  both  Plato  and  Aristotle  sought  to 
construct  the  philosophic  city  controlling  the 
individual  more  or  less  from  the  outside;  but 
such  a  city  must  be  inside  the  man. 

We  should  likewise  observe  the  separative 
character  of  this  Second  Period  in  the  multi- 
plicity of  philosophic  systems  which  shoot  forth 
from  the  previous  movement  of  Grecian  thought. 
The  Hellenic  Period  was  rather  a  succession  of 
insights  or  first  principles  unfolding  in  order  and 
constituting  a  great  totality  which  is  itself  a 
self -developing  system.  But  in  the  Hellenistic 
Period  each  of  these  single  insights  has  a  ten- 
dency to  build  itself  out  into  a  system  as  Stoi- 
cism, Epicureanism,  and  Skepticism,  and  finally 
Eclecticism  particularly  in  the  Roman  world. 

But  the  prime  fact  of  the  Hellenistic  Period 
may  be  stated  more  succinctly  as  follows :  the 
essence  Being  is  the  Universal  still,  but  as  indi- 
vidualizing itself,  as  passing  into  individuals  who 
thus  become  universal.     But  from  these  universal 


ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY.  51 

ones  there  is  a  going  back  to  the  one  Universal 
of  Aristotle  and  Plato,  and  even  beyond  them. 
Hence  the  next. 

III.  The  Neo-IIeUenic  Period.  This  is  a 
return  to  Hellenic  Philosophy  whose  self-know- 
ing One  has  been  divided  into  many  self -know- 
ing Ones  (individuals)  w^ith  their  varied  develop- 
ment of  centuries.  So  Neo-Hellenic  thought 
posits  the  principle  of  Being  anew  as  the  One, 
yet  not  now  as  over  the  many  phj'sical  ones  but 
as  over  the  many  self-knowing  Ones.  The  One 
or  Being  of  Plotinus  is,  accordingly,  above  all 
forms  of  conscious  mind,  and  projects  them  into 
existence,  downward  out  of  itself. 

Hence  Neo-Hellenic  Philosophy  strives  for  a 
principle  of  Being  which  is  beyond  all  self-con- 
sciousness. The  self-conscious  One  of  Aris- 
totle (noesis  noeseos)  fell  back,  or  perchance  fell 
forward,  into  a  multiplicity  of  self-conscious 
ones  in  Hellenisticism ;  hence  the  absolute  One 
(or  God)  must  be  beyond  them,  attainable  not 
l)y  Reason,  but  by  Trance  or  Ecstasy.  The  One 
of  the  third  period  of  Greek  Philosophy  is 
supra-rational;  Reason  (Nous)  is  supra-sensible; 
the  soul  (Psyche)  is  supra-natural.  Thus  there 
is  the  lapse  from  above  to  the  soul  which  still 
further  lapses  to  body  and  matter. 

Such  is  the  tremendous  struggle,  truly 
ecstatic,  to  recover  the  One  of  Greek  spirit,  the 
pure  Being  which  was  veritably  its  essence,  the 


52  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Universal.  "We  call  it  a  return  and  so  it  was  — 
a  return  to  the  primal  soul  of  Hellas  through  the 
grand  separation.  It  was  a  return  to  Plato  and 
hence  often  called  Neo-Platonic ;  but  it  was  like- 
wise a  return  to  Aristotle  and  also  to  Pythagoras. 
The  world  was  becoming  Christian  ;  Neo-Hellen- 
isni  was  a  going  back  to  Heathen  Greece,  an 
attempted  renewal  of  Heathendom  by  ingrafting 
the  Gods  ui)on  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Thus  it 
conflicted  with  Christianity  on  the  one  side,  yet 
paved  the  way  for  Christian  Scholasticism  on 
the  other. 

Plotinus  (Neo-Platonist)  has  the  Psychosis, 
he  employs  it  and  sees  it  as  the  movement  of 
Being  or  the  object ;  but  he  does  not  recognize 
it  as  the  movement  of  the  Self  or  the  subject, 
though  just  his  Self  is  what  is  beholding  and 
indeed  creating  this  Psychosis  of  Being.  Plotinus 
is  the  self-conscious  One  who  knows  and  formu- 
lates the  absolute  One  above  all  self-conscious- 
ness ;  this  is  the  special  form  of  his  dualism,  which 
dualism  in  one  shape  or  other  is  common  to  all 
European  Philosoph}^ 

The  tirst  stage  of  Greek  thinkino;  has  the 
Psychosis  implicit  in  it  till  Aristotle,  who  reaches 
the  point  of  seeing  and  even  stating  it,  though 
he  does  not  apply  it.  Plotinus,  however,  knows 
it  and  applies  it,  but  still  as  Being,  which  he 
sometimes  calls  God,  still  this  God  cannot  be  a 
person,  since  He  must  be  above  person. 


ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY.  5  3 

Greek  Philosophy  has  as  its  end  to  make  the 
Psychosis  explicit  as  Being  and  in  Being.  This 
is  necessarily  the  final  result  and  conclusion  of 
the  thought  of  the  Greeks,  which  strove  to  find 
the  Being  of  all  Being,  to  behold  the  essential 
Being  in  Being.  Proclus,  the  last  philosopher 
of  this  period,  has  the  Psychosis  explicit  as  on- 
tological,  but  not  at  all  as  psychological,  nor 
even  as  theological.  Doubtless  intimations  of 
both  these  last  principles  we  may  find  in  him, 
but  not  definite,  not  distinctly  elaborated. 

Thus  we  behold  the  three  completed  stages  or 
periods  of  Greek  Philosophy  —  Hellenic,  Hellen- 
istic, Neo-Hellenic  —  which  in  themselves  form 
a  Psychosis,  making  a  very  important  cycle  of 
the  total  movement  of  Philosophy.  It  has  been 
and  will  remain  the  great  intellectual  training- 
school  of  mankind,  teaching  all  who  endeavor  to 
think  the  thought  of  their  race  what  is  the  creative 
essence  of  the  world,  or,  more  technically,  the 
Psychosis  of  Being.  The  pedagogical  value  of 
Greek  philosophy  is  of  the  highest,  provided  we 
get  out  of  it  its  true  discipline,  which  consists 
not  in  erudite  details  or  a  mere  collection  of 
curious  opinions  in  chronological  order.  If  we 
can  bring  away  from  its  study  the  psychical  pro- 
cess inherent  in  all  existence,  we  have  learned 
something:  of  the  highest  worth. 

There  is  a  sense  of  completeness  about  Greek 
philosophy  which   makes   it  akin   to  Greek  art. 


54  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

A  well-rounded,  finished,  plastic  shape  we  may 
concede  to  it  as  a  whole ;  it  is  like  the  totality  of 
Homer  embracing  the  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey  in 
one  completed  cycle  of  action,  which  takes  up 
in  its  movement  many  special  events  and  charac- 
ters, harmonizing  them  all  into  one  grand  poetic 
organism.  In  like  manner  Greek  Philosophy, 
th()uo;h  extendin<2^  through  so  lono;  a  stretch  of 
time  and  showing  a  vast  multiplicity  of  princi- 
ples and  systems,  reveals  an  organic  Whole,  a 
complete  })hil()sophic  editice. 

Greek  Philos()})liy  will  have  much  to  do  with 
the  Universal;  in  fact,  the  whole  Hellenic  Period 
is  the  Greek  mind  coming  to  it  and  getting 
aware  of  it.  The  Universal  is  the  process  of  the 
Universe  separated  bv  Thought  and  categorized ; 
it  is  the  fundamental  Norm  of  the  All,  seized  by 
the  philosopher,  abstracted  from  the  reality  and 
given  an  abstract  name.  But  the  philosopher  is 
an  individual  living  at  a  particular  epoch,  and 
determined  by  his  environing  world.  The  result 
is  that  his  statement  of  the  Universal  is  an  indi- 
vidual one  and  falls  into  Time.  Thus  arises  the 
series  of  philosophical  systems  Avhich  form  the 
subject-matter  of  the  History  of  Philosoph3^ 
Still  all  these  different  sj-stems  have  in  them  a 
principle  which  is  eternally  the  same  within,  but 
is  seeking  a  more  adequate  self-expression,  and 
hence  has  beo^otten  this  lonoj  line  of  Philos- 
ophies.     Such  a  principle  is  the    Pampsychosis, 


ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY.  55 

which  must  be  grasped  not  merely  as  a  process 
but  as  a  psychical  process.  Or,  as  we  have 
before  stated,  it  is  not  simply  the  individual 
Psychosis,  or  Self,  but  the  All-Psychosis,  .the 
process  of  the  Universe  as  Self  or  psychical, 
w^hich  the  philosopher,  who  is  the  individual 
Psychosis,  or  human  Ego,  seizes  and  formulates 
in  his  thinking,  whereby  he  makes  a  Philosophy. 
For  this  Ego  of  mine  and  yours  bears  in  itself 
ideally  and  implicitly  the  process  of  the  Universe 
which  it  has  to  make  explicit  and  actual  in  order 
to  attain  true  selfhood.  So  it  comes  that  the 
movement  of  Philosophy  shows  on  the  one  hand 
the  movement  of  the  human  Ego  or  Psychosis 
toward  its  supreme  self-realization,  and  on  the 
other  the  movement  of  Pampsychosis  toward  its 
highest  self-expression  in  Thought.  Such  a 
development,  as  already  indicated,  carries  us 
finally  out  of  Philosophy  into  the  new  Discipline. 
At  present,  however,  the  first  task  is  to  take 
up  Greek  Philosophy  in  its  first  Period,  and  to 
show  its  unfolding  in  Time  as  well  as  its  process 
in  Thought. 


CHAPTER  FIRST.  —  THE  HELLENIC 
PERIOD. 

What  we  call  the  Hellenic  Period  of  Greek 
Philosophy  begins  with  Thales  and  ends  with 
Aristotle.  It  is  the  greatest  epoch  in  all  Philos- 
ophy, since  the  latter  was  not  only  created  in  this 
time,  but  manifested  its  complete  Norm,  accord- 
ing to  which  it  has  ever  since  proceeded  and 
unfolded.  Hence  the  Hellenic  Period  is  the 
most  important  for  the  student  of  Philosophy;  in 
it  he  has  the  substance  of  the  whole  science, 
culminating  in  its  greatest  names,  Socrates, 
Plato  and  Aristotle. 

From  the  Thales  to  Aristotle  is  a  gradual 
ascent  from  the  foot  to  the  top  of  the  mountain, 
which  is  not  only  the  highest  elevation  but  also 
the  most  complete  concentration  of  Hellenic 
thought.  What  Thales  starts  with  unconsciously. 
Aristotle  employs  consciously ;  the  old  Milesian 
(56) 


THE  HELLENIC  PEBIOD.  57 

philosopher  assumes  that  there  is  an  essence  of 
Being,  and  states  it  in  his  fashion ;  but  the  later 
Attic  philosopher  explicitly  and  purposely  grasps 
that  essence  of  Being  and  elaborates  it  into  a 
science  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  things. 
Hence  it  comes  that  the  investigator  of  early 
Greek   Philosophy    looks    back    at   it    primarily 

'  through  the  eyes  of  Aristotle  and  his  categories. 
For  it  was  he  who  first  became  fully  aware  of  the 
Greek  philosophical  movement  and  sought  to 
express  it  in  the  terms  of  abstract  thinking, 
which  is  indeed  the  creation  of  this  Hellenic 
Period.  Man  now  begins  to  separate  the  cause, 
the  law,  the  principle,  the  essence  from  the 
immediate  Being  of  the  World,  and  to  utter  the 
same  in  human  speech.  Great  and  far-reaching 
is  the  discipline  of  the  race  in  making  these 
abstractions  of  pure  Thought,  of  seeking  to  dis- 
cover and  to  express  what  truly  is,  namely  the 
essence.  It  is  man's  grand  process  of  self-sepa- 
ration from  immediate  unity  with  nature  in  which 
he  had  been  hitherto  chiefly  a  physical  link.  But 
he  makes  the  abstraction  of  himself  as  thinking 
and  holds  this  thought  of  his  up  before  himself 

r  as  the  true  Being  against  the  apparent  Being  of 
nature.  Here  he  is  asserting  himself  in  his 
thinking  as  the  determiner  of  the  world,  instead 
of  being  determined  by  it.  Thus  Philosophy 
gives  forth  an  early  note  of  man's  freedom,  even 
if  not  a  complete  expression  thereof. 


58  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is,  then,  Aristotle  who  is  more  fully  aware 
of  this  abstraction  of  the  Hellenic  spirit  than 
any  other  Greek,  and  who  has  consequently  been 
able  to  formulate  it  the  best.  Specially  in  his 
3Iefa2)hf/8ics  he  has  the  one  theme  to  which  he 
always  comes  back  from  his  wildest  digressions: 
the  true  Being  of  all  things,  or  their  essence. 
He  turns  it  over  in  many  wajs  and  gives  to  it 
many  names,  such  as  Real  Being,  Primal  Being, 
Being  as  Being.  Thus  he  strives  to  reach  the 
Being  underneath  all  Being,  to  which  he  gives 
also  the  name  essence  or  substance,  as  well  as 
cause,  principle,  element,  etc. 

Through  all  these  diverse  categories  we  need 
not  follow  him,  but  we  can  select  two,  which  are 
enough  for  our  present  purpose,  namelj'.  Essence 
and  Being,  which  are  to  be  united  in  the  pivotal 
phrase,  the  Essence  of  Being  (in  Greek  the 
ous i a  oi  the  on).  So  important  is  this  expres- 
sion, containing  as  it  does  the  creative  germ  of 
all  Greek  philosophizing,  that  we  shall  devote  to 
it  specially  a  few  pages  of  exposition. 

Hellenic  Philosophy,  accordingly,  from  the 
start  has  before  it  some  conception  of  Being, 
which  it  is  seeking  to  formulate  in  words,  or  to 
put  into  a  definition  or  category.  What  is  Be- 
ing? may  be  taken  as  the  fundamental  question 
of  Greek  Thought.  This  What  calls  for  some- 
thing back  of  Being  which  explains  it,  calls  for 
a  Being  which   will  enable  us  to   know  Being. 


THE  HELLENIC  FEB  WD.  59 

Thus  the  starting-point  of  Philosophy  is  a 
dualism,  the  division  of  Being  into  two  sorts  of 
Being. 

The  Greeks  will  begin  to  name  these  two  sorts 
of  Being,  related  yet  different.  The  first  or 
simple  Being  is  on  or  to  on  (the  neuter  participle 
of  the  verb  einai,  to  be) ;  the  second  Being 
which  is  to  explain,  or  perchance  to  unfold,  or  to 
l)ring  forth  the  first,  is  ouma  (a  noun  derived  from 
the  feminine  participle  of  the  same  verb  einai,  to 
l)e),  and  usually  translated  by  the  words  essence 
or  substance.  It  is  well  for  the  modern  student 
usino;  a  different  lano:uao:e  to  bring  before  his 
mind  the  linouistic  sugo^estion  contained  in  these 

O  Gel 

terms  for  the  Greek  who  first  employed  them. 

Tlie  principal  problem,  then,  of  Greek  Philos- 
ophy is  to  find  and  to  state  the  ousia  of  the  on, 
or  as  we  have  to  translate  it  in  words  far  less 
concrete,  the  essence  of  Being.  We  shall,  how- 
ever, often  use  the  Greek  words  in  expressing 
this  Greek  problem,  deeming  that  the  student 
will  thereby  obtain  ultiuiately  a  more  definite 
idea  of  the  subject. 

The  question,  What  is  the  ousia  of  the  on, 
calls  for  an  answer ;  this  answer  brings  out  the 
third  principle  expressed  in  speech,  or  the  cate- 
gory specially.  Greek  Philosophy  will  give 
many  answers  to  the  above  question,  showing  a 
line  of  many  categories  from  its  beginning  to  its 
end ;   a  chief  function  of  it  is  to  order  and  to  in- 


60  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

terrelate  these  categories.  One  will  be  Water, 
and  another  Number,  still  another  the  Becoming. 
Thus  the  temple  of  Greek  Philosophy  may  be 
considered  a  Pancategoreon,  in  striking  parallel 
with  the  Greek  Pantheon,  or  the  total  temple  of 
Greek  Religion  containing  the  many  Gods  who 
likewise  evolve  out  of  one  another  in  the  Mythus. 

Accordingly  the  oiisia  of  the  on  is  expressed 
in  a  category  by  the  philosopher,  who  thereby 
founds  a  special  philosophy.  This  category  is 
called  the  first  principle  (arche)  or  the  cause 
(ai(ion)  or  the  element  (^stoicJteion)  or  the  defini- 
tion {orismos).  Under  all  these  terms  and  others 
besides  the  student  is  to  detect  and  to  hold 
fast  to  the  one  main  matter :  the  philosopher  is 
seeking  to  express  the  ousia  of  the  on  (the  es- 
sence of  Being)  in  a  category. 

And  it  may  be  well  to  note  for  the  sake  of  the 
future  that  it  is  the  philosophic  Ego  which  is  do- 
intr  all  this  work,  which  is  the  secret  demiurge 
categorizing  the  ousia  of  the  on  and  thereby  start- 
ing to  transform  the  Universe  into  a  system  of 
Thought.  When  Anaximines  said,  air  is  the  first 
principle  of  all  things,  or  is  the  ousia  of  the  on, 
he  threw  daringly  the  whole  Universe  into  one 
category  which  expressed  for  him  at  least,  the 
essence  of  all  Being.  Mark  again  his  Ego,  for 
it  is  the  bold  categorizer  who  is  not  content  with 
mere  immediate  Being  but  seeks  to  penetrate  and 
utter  its  essence. 


THE  HELLENIC  PEBIOD.  61 

Three  basic  terms  we  have  designated  which 
together  express  the  process  of  primal  philosophic 
thought.  First  we  place  on  which  is  Being  as 
immediate,  present,  the  given,  possibly  the  sensu- 
ous ;  the  second  is  ousia,  Being  separated  in  itself, 
the  Being  of  Being,  or  the  Essence  of  Being,  or  the 
inner  Being;  third  is  the  special  Category  which 
utters  (or  outers)  this  inner  Being  in  anew  Being 
which  is  speech  and  is  the  principle  or  element  or 
thought  of  a  Philosophy.  We  call  this  third  the 
special  Category,  since  the  two  others  are  also 
categories  in  a  g-eneral  sense.  Moreover  it  should 
be  noted  that  this  special  Category  connects  with 
the  first  (the  on)  and  thus  becomes  a  new  Being 
in  the  world,  but  mediated  through  the  second, 
ousia  or  essence.  Thus  we  have  the  three  funda- 
mental stages  or  acts  of  the  psychical  process  of 
the  Ego  (immediate,  separative,  returning),  ob- 
servable in  the  on,  ousia,  and  the  category 
respectively. 

This  somewhat  detailed  statement,  which  gives 
the  general  formula  of  all  Greek  philosophizing 
from  Thales  up  to  Aristotle  and  down  again  to 
Proclus,  may  be  illustrated  by  a  concrete  exam- 
ple. When  Heraclitus  declared  that  all  Being 
had  as  its  essence  the  Becoming,  he  went  through 
the  preceding  triple  process,  giving  the  on,  the 
ousia  and  the  special  category.  Moreover  this 
process  was  fundamentally  that  of  his  own  Ego 
or  Self,  for  he  had  no  other  means  of  finding  or 


62  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOFHY. 

recognizing  such  a  process  of  Being.  It  is  true 
that  Heraclitus  was  not  conscious  of  his  own  Ego 
performing  this  movement,  nor  was  any  Greek 
Philosopher  fully  so,  from  first  to  last.  Indeed 
the  complete  self -awareness  of  the  Ego  as  the 
creator  of  objective  Being  belongs  to  the  modern 
world,  really  to  the  latest  phase  of  the  modern 
world,  the  Occident.  Still  the  Ego  of  old  Herac- 
litus, all  unknown  to  itself,  projected  out  of 
itself  the  foregoing  process  of  Being. 

Again,  Plato  declares  that  the  Idea,  the  so- 
called  Platonic  Idea,  is  the  eternal,  unchangeable 
essence  of  all  Being,  which  latter  is,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  transitory,  the  phenomenal.  That  is, 
Idea  is  the  fundamental  category  of  the  Platonic 
system.  The  student  will  here  note  again  the 
above  mentioned  process :  Plato,  asking  himself 
the  basic  question  of  Greek  Philosoplu^,  What 
is  the  ousia  of  the  on?  answers  his  question  by 
showing  it  to  be  expressed  in  the  category  Idea. 

One  may  observe  in  the  present  connection 
that  the  on  is  what  is  immediate,  what  is  given 
to  the  mind  from  the  outside,  perchance  visible, 
Avliile  the  ousia  is  something  called  for  by  the 
mind  and  even  produced  by  it,  something  there- 
fore intellectual  and  lying  back  of  the  on.  The 
human  spirit  passing  from  the  on  to  the  ousia 
has  begun  its  great  philosophic  quest,  lasting 
thousands  of  years  already,  and  seemingly  not 
yet  ended.     Eeally,  let  it  be  said  here  in  advance, 


THE  HELLENIC  PEBIOD.  63 

the  spirit  in  this  quest  is  seeking  to  find  itself,  or 
to  know  itself  as  the  true  ousia  of  the  oji,  or  as 
the  essence  of  Being,  which  essence  it  finally 
thinks  to  be  just  its  own  process  of  thinking. 

Here  another  example  suggests  itself ,  in  a  num- 
ber of  respects  the  greatest  name  in  Greek  Phi- 
losophy, Aristotle.  He  throws  many  forms  of 
Being  into  categories,  he  is  indeed  the  grand  cat- 
egorizer  of  the  Greek  world.  But  in  a  supreme 
moment  he  uttered  his  supreme  category  of  the 
essence  of  Being,  namely  noesis  noeseos,  literally 
the  Thinking  of  Thinking,  or  Thought  thinking 
Thought.  Thus  Aristotle  predicates  the  ousia  of 
the  on  to  be  the  noesis  noeseos,  which  may  be 
fairly  considered  the  highest  point  that  Hellenic 
Philosophy  attained.  For  the  Greek  thinker 
has  now  discovered  that  his  much  hunted  ousia 
is  not  simply  some  other  form  of  external  Being, 
but  is  Thought,  yea  the  very  process  of  Thought 
as  such,  or  Thought  thinking  Thought.  Still  let 
it  be  remembered  that  this  category  expresses  not 
the  subjective  Ego  in  the  modern  self-conscious 
sense,  but  is  the  utterance  simply  of  the  objec- 
tive principle  or  essence  of  all  Being;  that  is,  it 
is  still  a  category  of  the  ousia  of  the  on,  and 
another  answer  to  the  fundamental  question  of 
Greek  Philosophy.  That  old  thinker  in  Athens, 
however,  has  reached  the  point  of  seeing  that  his 
Thinking  is  one  with  the  inner  process  of  all 
Being,   is   indeed    the    essence  of   the  objective 


64  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

world,  which  latter  is  accordingly  in  its  inner- 
most nature  a  Thinking  of  Thinking,  not  exactly 
as  the  subjective  individual  Ego  but  as  the  true 
Being  of  Being. 

To  keep  alive  the  process  in  this  matter,  the 
order  of  the  three  terms  should  not  be  neglected : 
on  the  first,  ousia  the  second,  and  the  special 
category  the  third.  Thus  we  identify  this  triple 
process  as  the  ever-recurring  fundamental  Psy- 
chosis underlying  and  generating  Greek  philo- 
sophic thought.  This  implicit  creative  Psychosis 
is  what  is  to  become  explicit  and  conscious  in  the 
long  discipline  of  Hellenic  Spirit. 

This  same  tendency  to  find  and  formulate  the 
essence  of  Being  we  may  see  in  the  ancient  Greek 
lawgiver,  who  arose  with  the  philosophers  and 
belonged  to  the  same  spiritual  movement.  He 
took  a  mass  of  traditions,  customs  and  prescrip- 
tive regulations,  and  out  of  these  he  extracted 
the  essence  which  was  his  code  of  laws.  Solon 
the  lawgiver  was  also  called  a  philosopher,  and 
other  philosophers  are  reputed  to  have  given  laws 
to  their  respective  cities.  The  Law  written, 
fixed,  stable,  instead  of  the  capricious  will  of  the 
absolute  monarch,  was  the  chief  product  of  the 
Greek  political  consciousness,  and  was  one  phase 
of  its  reaction  against  a  personal  ruler  like  the 
Oriental  despot.  One  form,  then,  of  the  essence 
of  Being  is  the  Law  of  the  State. 

In  like  manner  the  Greek  poet  of  this  Period 


THE  HELLENIC  PERIOD.  65 

took  the  My  thus  of  his  people,  more  or  less 
chaotic  and  disconnected,  and  he  unfolded  the 
essence  of  it,  thereby  producing  his  poetic  work, 
whose  material  he  did  not  create,  but  trans- 
formed. More  particularly  sculpture,  the  truly 
Greek  art  of  the  present  Hellenic  Period,  was  a 
striking  example  of  unfolding  and  forming  the 
essence  of  Being.  The  sculptor  Phidias  would 
take  the  rude  block  of  marble,  which  was  Being  as 
immediate  or  natural,  and  hew  out  of  it  the  form 
of  the  God  Zeus,  the  creative  essence  of  all 
things,  even  of  the  block  of  marble  from  which 
he  was  made.  So  the  sculptor  or  the  artistic 
Ego  seeks  for  the  essence  or  the  creative  Self,  and 
puts  it  into  visible  shape,  while  the  philosopher 
is  striving  to  find  and  to  formulate  the  essential 
principle  in  the  world  of  objects ;  the  outcome 
of  the  one  is  a  statue,  of  the  other  is  a  category. 
Still  each  in  his  own  way  is  seeking  to  reach  and 
to  formulate  the  essence  of  Being. 

So  much  for  the  germinal  idea  of  Greek  phi- 
losophy and  indeed  of  all  philosophy,  to  which 
idea  with  its  formula  we  shall  often  recur,  since 
it  is  that  which  generates  the  whole  science, 
and  hence  is  the  fuudamcutal  thing  to  be  ac- 
quired. But  now  we  shall  return  to  the  special 
subject  of  the  present  Chapter,  which  is  the  Hel- 
lenic Period  of  Greek  philosophy.  If  we  look 
at  the  total  sweep  of  this  Period  we  observe  its 
rise    from    taking  a    sensuous    element    as  the 

5 


66  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

essence  of  Being  to  taking  the  Concept,  the 
Universal,  or  Thought  (and  indeed  the  Thought 
of  Thought),  as  the  essence  of  Being.  It  has 
three  distinct  stages  which  together  make  up  its 
movement  and  are  as  follows :  — 

I.  Elementalism.  The  process  of  Being  is 
elemental,  since  its  essence  is  taken  to  be  an  ele- 
ment, which  belongs  to  Nature,  and  is  physical, 
sensuous  and  continuous.  Or  the  principle  of 
Nature  as  Being  is  an  immediately  given,  natural 
object  or  element  as  substrate.  This  stage  will 
show  the  Psychosis  of  Being  as  elemental  or 
immediate. 

Here  the  essence  of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the 
o)i)  is  categorized,  but  the  category  or  concept 
belongs  to  Nature  or  is  immanent  in  some  ele- 
ment of  it.  But  now  we  are  to  see  this  process 
turn  about  to  its  opposite :  instead  of  the  concept 
remaining  an  element,  the  element  becomes 
a  concept  and  no  longer  is  of  Nature,  but  is  of 
Mind. 

II.  Atomism.  The  process  of  Being  is  atomic 
or  individual.  The  Atom  is  conceived  to  be  in- 
divisible, unchangeable,  indestructible,  and  so  is 
a  concept,  visible  onl}'  by  Mind,  even  when  it  is 
supposed  to  be  material  (as  is  the  Cosmical  Atom 
of  Leucippus).  The  essence  of  Being  is  now 
the  Atom  or  the  Individual  (both  are  etymolog- 
ically  the  same).  In  all  Atomism  we  have  a 
twofoldness :    the   concept    and  the    Individual, 


THE  HELLENIC  PERIOD.  67 

which  are  in  a  process  with  each  other.  From 
considering  the  Atom  or  Individual  as  a  concept 
wc  pass  to  considering  the  concept  as  something 
individual  (soi)liisticism).  But  the  concept  is 
universal  and  has  itself  as  its  own  content;  with 
which  statement  we  have  already  passed  into  the 
next. 

III.  Universalism .  The  process  of  Being  is 
universal.  Thus  the  essence  of  Being  now  is 
not  an  element  nor  an  atom,  but  is  the  Universal 
as  concept.  The  third  stage  returns  to  the  first 
and  grasps  its  own  process  therein  as  the  essence 
of  Being.  The  movement  now  is  the  process  of 
the  Universal  unfolding  the  universal  process  of 
Being. 

Already  in  the  starting-point  of  Thales  the 
Universal  is  present  and  working,  but  potential 
and  implicit.  "When  he  declares  that  the  essence 
of  Being  is  the  element  w^ater,  w^e  mi\y  supply 
the  implicit  Universal  in  his  statement  as  follows  : 
the  essence  of  Being  is  the  Universal  as  the 
element  Avater.  For  he  is  unconsciously  seeking 
the  Universal,  or  the  principle  of  all  things, 
though  he  puts  it  into  something  wholly  alien. 
But  when  Socrates  ushers  in  the  stacre  of  Uni- 
vcrsalism,  he  declares  the  essence  of  Being  to  be 
the  concept  or  the  Universal  in  itself.  That  is, 
what  was  before  implicit,  is  now  explicit;  the 
third  sta^e  returns  to  the  first  stajj-e  and  draft's 
out  to  light   its    covert   meaning,   which  is  the 


68  ANCIEN T  E  UROPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

propelling  cause  of  all  Philosophy.  In  the 
Hellenic  Period,  Thought  at  last  comes  to 
recognize  itself  as  the  essence  of  all  Being,  or 
as  the  Universal,  which  though  present  in  the 
previous  stages,  was  unrecognized  and  unformu- 
lated. 


THE  HELLENIC  PEEIOD.  69 


I.  Elementalism. 

Thus  we  seek  to  concentrate  in  a  vsingle  word 
the  first  stage  of  the  Hellenic  Period,  which  stage 
is  also  a  process  within  itself  consisting  of  several 
stages.  Hence  we  develop  the  thought  of  Ele- 
mentalism into  the  following  sentence:  it  is  ^Ae 
Process  of  Being  as  elemental.  The  essence  or 
principle  of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the  o/i)  is  an 
element  taken  from  or  connected  with  Nature. 
As  this  process  of  Elementalism  is  likewise  a 
psychical  one  —  which  is  indeed  the  ultimate  fact 
of  it  —  we  shall  also  call  it  at  times  the  elemental 
Fsi/chosis.  Such  a  designation  is  verily  far-reach- 
ing, since  it  suggests  the  underlying  principle 
which  interlinks  this  stage  with  all  Philosophy. 

The  early  Greek  philosophers  began  with 
Nature  as  the  fountain  of  Being  and  sought  to 
discover  and  formulate  its  essence  or  principle. 
Hence  these  first  thinkers  are  called  physicists  or 
physiologists  ]fy  Aristotle  and  other  later  phi- 
losophers. Their  primal  struggle  was  with  the 
relidous  or  mvthical  conception  of  the  world, 
which  world  they  would  remove  from  the  per- 
sonal caprice  of  a  Creator,  and  put  under  a  fixed 
principle  or  law.     This  is  very  intimately  con- 


70  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

nected  with  the  Greek  reaction  against  Oriental- 
ism, which  politically  believed  in  the  one  ruler 
of  the  State,  autocratic,  personal,  and  hence 
capricious.  The  Greek  began  the  rule  of  Law 
for  the  State  as  well  as  for  the  cosmos.  lie 
fousfht  for  and  thouo;ht  for  autonomy  which  was 
to  be  immanent  in  his  city  and  in  his  universe. 
Such  a  struggle  could  start  only  on  the  border- 
land between  Europe  and  Asia.  Accordingly  we 
find  these  two  kinds  of  autonomy  first  asserted 
in  the  Greek  cities  along  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor,  which  struggled  for  their  independence 
ao'ainst  the  autocratic  domination  of  the  Lydian 
and  Persian  Monarchs,  and  began  to  think  of  the 
cosmos  as  governed  and  ordered  by  a  principle 
or  by  a  fixed  Law.  The  conflict  of  societies  and 
institutions  called  forth  the  first  Philosophy,  and 
indeed  every  succeeding  Philosophy,  which  means 
anvthing  to  anybody.  Every  great  social  and 
institutional  change  must  have  in  some  form 
its  Philosophy,  which  utters  its  essence  or  crea- 
tive thought  in  its  own  categories.  Now  Philos- 
ophy itself  arose  from  the  deepest  of  all  social 
and  institutional  changes  hitherto  made  in  his- 
tory —  that  between  Orient  and  Europe,  the  latter 
being  represented  in  its  earliest  period  by  Ilellas. 
Such  is  the  philosophic  starting-point  on  the 
Eastern  rim  of  the  Hellenic  world,  where  the 
latter  rasped  against  the  Orient.  This  rim  engird- 
ling continental  or  central    Hellas  with  a  circle 


THE  HELLENIC  PERIOD.  71 

of  colonies  which-  had  raj^ed  out  from  that  center 
eastward,  westward,  northward,  southward,  is  to 
he  particularly  noticed,  as  these  colonies  are  the 
birth-places  of  all  the  early  Greek  Philosophies 
without  exception.  It  is  a  significant  fact  that 
not  old  Greece  but  new  Greece  began  to  philoso- 
phize, that  not  Athens  and  Lacedemon  but  the 
Ionic  and  Doric  colonies  first  broke  forth  into 
Philosophy.  The  most  aspiring,  adventuresome, 
and  liberal  spirits  form  usually  the  colonists  of 
a  people,  while  the  more  timid  and  conservative 
stay  at  home.  To  leave  the  native  town  in  these 
early  da3^s,  to  grapple  with  the  sea,  and  to  wrest 
land  from  barbarous  possessors  both  required 
and  developed  a  hardy  and  a  daring  character. 
It  is  no  wonder  then  that  the  great  spiritual 
break  from  the  old  to  the  new  was  made  by  the 
colonies,  whose  inhabitants  had  already  snapped 
the  ties  of  their  native  land,  and  had  asserted 
their  personal  courage  and  sclf-sufficingness. 

The  next  curious  point  in  this  connection  is 
that  Philosophy  will  not  stay  on  the  eastern 
borderland  of  Hellas  where  it  arose  through 
attrition  with  the  Orient,  but  is  borne  across 
the  sea  from  Asia  Minor  to  Italy,  yea  to  the 
Avestern  coast  of  Italy  where  it  springs  up  at 
Elea  in  a  School  opposite  in  place  and  in  thought 
to  the  Eastern  or  Ionic  School  at  Miletus, 
This  second  or  Eleatic  School  is  supposed  to 
represent  Dorism    versus  lonism,    and   thus    to 


72  ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

indicate  the  great  split  which  runs  through  the 
Hellenic  world.  We  must  grant  some  truth  to 
this  statement;  still  it  is  not  to  be  forgotten 
that  Elea  was  an  Ionic  colony  (doubtless  with 
a  strong  Doric  admixture)  from  Phocaea  in  Asia 
Minor,  and  that  Xenophanes  the  founder  of  the 
Eleatic  School  was  an  Ionian  from  Colophon. 

Another  fact  here  to  be  mentioned  is  that  these 
colonies  will  be  joined  together  in  an  overarching 
philosophic  movement  which  connects  east  and 
west.  Then  a  northern  colony,  Abdera,  will 
contribute  its  Philosoj)hy  which  is  the  Atomism 
of  Leucippusand  Democritus.  Finally  a  southern 
colony,  Cyrene,  will  give  a  modest  contribution 
called  the  Cyrenaic  school,  which  was  founded  bv 
Aristippus,  a  pupil  of  Socrates.  Thus  the  peri- 
phery of  colonial  Philosophy  is  fairly  complete, 
though  its  most  fruitful  portion  lay  in  the  east 
and  west,  whence  it  will  gradually  move  to  the 
rising  center  of  the  Greek  world,  Athens,  and 
pass  from  its  centrifugal  to  its  centripetal  period. 

Having  thus  considered  the  topographical  re- 
lations of  these  early  Greeks  philosophies,  we 
may  next  glance  at  their  chronological  relations. 
Here  the  uppermost  fact  is  that  nearlj^  all  of  them 
are  substantially  contemporaneous.  Unquestion- 
ably the  Milesian  Philosophers  are  first  in  time, 
while  the  great  Athenian  Philosophers  are  later. 
But  between  these  two  schools  lie  all  the  early 
Greek  systems,  in  a  period  of  httle  more  than 


THE  HELLENIC  PEBIOD.  73 

fifty  years.  The  exact  dates  of  their  foundation 
and  development  cannot  be  given,  but  their  cul- 
minating period  can  be  stated  as  the  middle  half 
of  the  fifth  century  B.  C. 

From  this  fact  comes  the  following  result : 
These  systems  have  to  be  ordered  according  to 
their  thought  quite  independently  of  their  time  of 
origin.  Very  treacherous  is  any  chronological 
arranoenient  of  them.  Moreover,  some  Philoso- 
phies,  like  some  individuals,  mature  rapidly, 
others  slowly.  That  is,  one  philosopher  may  be 
older  in  years  than  another,  but  later  in  his 
thought.  Some  such  principle  Aristotle  himself 
acknowledges  in  reference  to  these  early  Greek 
thinkers,  though  he  lived  hardly  more  than  a 
century  after  them,  knew  their  writings  and  './as 
in  line  with  their  traditions.  Comparing  Empe- 
docles  and  Anaxagoras  he  saj^s  (Met.  I.  3,  984a) 
that  the  latter  "  was  before  the  former  in  age, 
but  was  after  him  in  his  works,"  that  is,  more 
advanced  in  his  thought.  In  other  words  chro- 
nology, even  if  we  knew  it  exactly  (and  Aris- 
totle must  have  known  it  much  more  exactly 
than  we  do),  is  not  to  determine  the  order  of  the 
systems  of  these  Greek  philosophers.  To  be 
sure  the  element  of  time  need  not  be  wholly 
eschewed,  but  it  cannot  in  the  present  case  de- 
termine their  succession.  The  Philosophies, 
then,  which  lie  between  Anaximines,  the  last  of 
the   Milesians,    and   Socrates,   the   first   of  the 


V  4  ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

Athenians,  are  not  to  be  ordered  according  to 
time-relations,  but  according  to  thought-relations, 
being  substantially  synchronous  in  their  origin  and 
development  as  far  as  we  know  them  at  present. 

Thus  from  the  rim  of  the  Hellenic  world  and 
not  from  its  center  Philosophy  seemed  to  burst 
out  almost  at  once  in  different  forms  and  in  dif- 
ferent places.  Separately,  yet  quite  contempo- 
rancousl}',  these  diverse  systems  of  thought 
sprang  up  and  showed  an  inner  process  with  one 
another.  How  shall  we  account  for  these  strange 
philosophical  phenomena,  which,  outwardly  so 
disconnected  in  locality,  nevertheless  manifest  al- 
ways an  interior  line  of  close  relationship  in  their 
common  national  character? 

To  answer  this  question  we  must  grasp  the  fol- 
lowing thought:  the  total  Hellenic  soul  was  phi- 
losophizing, not  simply  one  little  corner  of  it  in 
this  place  or  that.  The  soul,  we  say,  in  the  w^hole 
body  of  Hellas  had  felt  the  need  of  an  utterance 
in  thought,  and  this  utterance  broke  forth  almost 
simultaneously  around  the  border  of  the  entire 
Greek  territory,  where  life  was  most  active  and 
progressive,  and  conscquentlj'^  where  the  earliest 
and  strongest  demand  for  self-expression  had 
arisen.  Now  this  total  Hellenic  soul  would  utter 
one  phase  of  itself  at  Miletus,  another  at  Elea, 
still  another  at  Abdera,  and  so  on,  according  to 
the  human  vehicle  and  the  circumstances,  still 
such  a  phase  would  belong  to  the  whole  and  be 


THE  HELLENIC  PERIOD.  75 

determined  by  it.  ^Moreover  all  these  different 
phases  called  Philosophies  are  required  to  express 
the  total  Hellenic  soul  in  its  complete  process, 
which  is  indeed  the  fundamental  process  ordering 
these  various  Philosophies.  Herein  we  may  see 
the  interior  line  of  connection  between  the  early 
Greek  systems,  and  in  fact  all  Greek  systems, 
and  really  all  Philosophy  from  beginning  to 
end.  Underneath  the  diversity  of  systems  of 
thought  the  soul  of  the  nation  or  of  the  age  or  of 
the  world  is  working,  and  perchance  wrestling  to 
speak  itself  out  in  adequate  utterances  which  will 
show  various  stages  of  the  one  ultimate  psychical 
process,  which  stages  are  the  particular  philoso- 
phies of  the  period. 

In  this  manner  what  we  have  called  the  Pam- 
psychosis  will  give  the  first  philosophic  revelation 
of  itself  in  the  epoch  before  us,  bringing  forth 
and  ordering  after  its  own  inner  self  the  mani- 
fold and  seemingly  disconnected  philosophic 
principles  continually  rising  to  the  surface.  For 
the  Hellenic  soul  is  psychical,  yea  in  the  case 
before  us  pampsychical,  and  its  expression  is  not 
simply  for  Greece  and  the  present  but  for  Europe 
and  the  future. 

Thus  there  is  a  total  Greek  Philosophy  express- 
ing itself  in  the  different  particular  Philosophies 
blossoming  as  separate  flowers  around  the  edge 
of  the  Hellenic  estate.  That  is.  Philosophy  first 
individualizes  itself  in  the  individual  philosophers, 


76  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

each  with  his  special  principle.  But  all  these 
principles  are  to  be  united  in  one  process  ere  we 
can  catch  the  movement  of  the  total  Hellenic  soul 
philosophizing,  which  is  the  great  object  of  our 
vision  in  the  present  search. 

Such  is,  in  general,  the  ground  of  the  divi- 
sions of  the  subject  before  us.  But  now  we 
return  to  the  starting-point  of  the  present  por- 
tion of  Greek  Philosophy  which  we  have  called 
Elcmentalism,  or  the  Elemental  Psychosis.  This 
we  shall  tind  to  be  a  psychical  process  with  its 
three  stages.     These  we  designate  as  follows:  — 

I.  The  Milesian  Movement  (East-colonial), 
whose  principle  is  Being  as  a  particular  sensuous 
element. 

II.  The  Eleatic  Movement  (West-colonial), 
whose  principle  is  Being  as  a  universal  sensuous 
element,  or  abstract  Being  with  a  sensuous  sub- 
strate (Space). 

III.  The  Inter-connecting  Movement  (Inter- 
colonial), whose  principle  is  Being  as  Becom- 
ing, which  will  pass  through  three  different 
phases,  yet  all  of  them  elemental. 

The  characteristic  common  to  eachstasre  of  this 
process  is  the  element  as  sensuous ;  the  principle 
or  essence  of  all  things  is  declared  to  be  ele- 
mental, to  be  a  given  sensuous  element,  which 
is  not  always  material,  since  Space  we  call  a  sen- 
suous element  of  Nature  though  it  is  not  mate- 
rial.    Hence  the  pure  or  abstract  Being  of  the 


TEE  MILESIAN  MOVEMENT.  77 

Eleatics  belongs  in  the  present  division,  since  it 
has  Space  as  its  sensuous  substrate.  These 
points  will  come  out  more  fuUy  in  the  following 
development. 

More  formally  stated,  Elementalism  affirms 
that  the  essence  of  all  Being  is  the  Universal 
as  an  element  of  Nature,  which  thus  becomes  a 
category  of  Th-ought.  For  Elementalism,  simple 
and'^sensuous  as  it  is,  would  not  be  Philosophy 
unless  it  grasped  and  categorized  the  Universal 
in  some  form,  which  is  here  elemental. 

A.  The  Milesian  Movement. 

The  first  Movement  of  Philosophy  as  a  Euro- 
pean Discipline  is  placed  at  Miletus  in  Asia  Minor 
during  the  sixth  century  B.  C.  It  is  a  Move- 
ment, not  some  isolated  bits  of  reflection  (like 
those  of  the  so-called  Seven AVise  Men) ,  and  is  fol- 
lowed by  many  philosophic  Movements  reaching 
down  to  the  present  time.  At  Miletus,  then,  the 
human  mind  has  begun  the  persistent  inquiry 
after  the  Essence,  Law,  Cause  or  Principle  of  all 
things,  and    has  given   the  first  answer  to  the 

question. 

This  city,  Miletus,  was  a  colony  of  Athens, 
hence  was  an  offshoot  of  the  Greek  race  in 
Europe,  which  for  a  time  outgrew  and  out- 
ranked the  parent  in  commercial  and  intellec- 
tual  greatness.      Strewn  along  the    same  coast 


78  ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  Asia  Minor  were  many  other  Greek  colonies, 
Ionic,  Doric,  Aeolic,  all  of  them  alert  mentally, 
full  of  business  enterprise,  and  daring  navigators ; 
they  had  grappled  with  the  sea,  making  it  a  means 
of  communication,  and  in  manifold  ways  subject- 
ing it  to  their  will.  A  great  new  epoch  was  dawn- 
ing in  these  groups  of  political  communities, 
connected  by  water,  otherwise  independent  and 
autonomous  or  seeking  desperately  their  auton- 
omy. It  may  be  said  that  in  these  cities  Occi- 
dental freedom  was  in  the  process  of  being  born 
])oliticall3',  along  with  the  inner  freedom  of  phi- 
losophic thought.  For  the  first  time  in  the  history 
of  mankind  we  hear  that  world-encompassing 
word  Democracy  spoken  among  these  cities  and 
made  an  object  of  aspiration.  Miletus,  the  great- 
est of  them,  was,  for  a  while  at  least,  a  Democ- 
racy, doubtless  crude  and  rude  enough,  still  the 
people  there  had  the  desire  and  in  part  the  power 
to  govern  themselves.  An  interior  line  of  con- 
nection we  may  well  trace  between  this  rise  of 
political  Freedom  with  the  rise  of  Philosophy. 

In  the  Milesian  Movement  three  individual 
philosophers  stand  out  prominent  as  its  support- 
ers, and  their  doctrines  are  recognized  to  have 
an  internal  connection,  yes,  to  form  a  process 
together.  Their  common  principle  is  often  called 
hylozoism,  which  means  that  matter  is  alive,  that 
there  is  no  separation  between  matter  and  life. 
The  cosmos  is  an  animal,  and  the  First  Principle 


THE  MILESIAN  MOVEMENT.  79 

or  Essence  is  not  dead,  but  living  and  creative, 
even  if  it  be  an  element. 

The  three  Milesian  philosophers  are  Thales, 
Anaximander,  and  Anaximenes,  whose  doctrines 
are  in  some  respects  not  very  certain,  but  may  be 
o-iven  in  their  leading  outlines  as  follows. 

1.  Thales.  —  The  name  of  Thales  of  Miletus 
heads  the  list  of  European  philosophers,  who 
succeed  him  in  a  line  substantially  unbroken 
down  to  the  present.  Authorities  differ  in  re- 
gard to  the  exact  dates  of  his  birth  and  death, 
but  his  chief  period  of  activity,  political,  scien- 
tific and  philosophic,  must  have  lain  in  the  first 
half  of  the  sixth  century  B.  C.  He  must  have 
been  a  mature  man  in  600  B.  C. ;  he  saw  his 
native  city  together  with  that  rising  Greek  world 
along  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  put  under  the 
yoke  of  an  Oriental  Monarch,  Croesus,  king  of 
Lydia ;  then  he  probably  had  the  satisfaction  of 
seeing  this  same  Croesus  subjected  to  another 
and  greater  Oriental  Monarch,  Cyrus  of  Persia. 
All  of  which  is  told  in  a  fresh,  simple-hearted 
style  by  the  Father  of  History,  ancient  Herodotus, 
who  regarded  this  conflict  between  Croesus  and 
the  Greek  cities  of  the  coast  as  the  opening 
struggle  of  Orient  with  Occident,  and  as  the 
origin  of  History,  which  may  thus  be  said  to 
have  been  definitely  born  at  the  same  time  and 
place  with  Philosophy.  Besides  these  two  we 
should  also  chronicle  the  birth  of  Natural  Science 


80  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

at  the  same  time  and  place.  Thus  the  three 
great  disciplines  of  European  culture  appeared 
together  (Philosophy,  History,  and  Natural 
Science),  and  were  chiefly  cultivated  by  the  same 
class  of  men,  being  sprung  of  the  same  great 
movement  of  human  spirit.  Thales,  for  instance, 
was  active  as  statesman,  scientist  and  philoso- 
pher. Evidently  an  integral  man  bearing  the 
whole  soul  of  his  period. 

Undoubtedly  we  may  find  in  the  Orient  numer- 
ous traces,  sometimes  important,  though  usually 
fitful,  of  Histor}^  Science  and  Philosophy.  But 
they  all  had  to  be  born  anew  for  the  Occident,  in 
which  they  have  had  a  continuous,  ever-unfolding 
life  down  to  the  present.  This  birth,  or,  if  you 
choose,  re-birth  of  these  three  disciplines  took 
place  in  an  Asiatic  borderland  which  had  become 
Greek.  It  is  a  significant  fact  that  Thales  was 
an  Oriental  who  had  become  Greek.  His  family 
was  Phoenician,  as  reported  by  Diogenes  Laer- 
tius  (I.  22,  37)  ;  moreover  he  is  declared  to  have 
visited  Eg3'pt  and  to  have  studied  its  mathe- 
matical lore.  Herodotus  says  that  he  predicted 
an  eclipse  of  the  sun,  thus  assigning  to  a  natural 
cause  what  had  hitherto  been  regarded  as  the  act 
of  a  supernatural  personal  Will.  This  fact  in- 
dicates the  epoch  and  the  great  spiritual  transi- 
tion taking  place  in  it,  whereof  Thales  w^as  the 
representative. 

This  brings  us  to  the  distinct  philosophic  act 


THE  HELLENIC  PERIOD.  81 

of  Thales :  he  declared  water  to  be  the  substrate 
uuderl}  ing  all  things,  the  one  element  in  all  the 
multiplicity  of  Nature.  At  the  first  glance  this 
seems  a  very  simple  if  not  senseless  utterance, 
but  there  is  a  surprising  unanimity  among  ancient 
and  modern  philosophers  that  it  is  just  the 
golden  sentence  which  begins  Philosophy.  We 
observe  first  that  it  takes  a  physical  cause  or 
principle  as  the  source  of  the  world,  and  not  a 
divine  fiat,  quite  as  we  saw  in  the  case  of  the  solar 
eclipse.  In  the  next  place  it  predicates  unity, 
the  one  principle  of  all  things.  Likewise  it  seeks 
for  the  essence  of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the  on). 
With  such  a  question  propounded  in  such  a 
fashion.  Philosophy  has  certainly  begun,  and  that 
is  the  fact  to  be  distinctly  grasped  at  the  present 
stage. 

Thales  then,  is  the  first  who  definitely  for- 
mulates the  question  of  his  period :  What  is  the 
essence  of  all  this  Being  which  lies  before  us 
and  around  about  us?  He  also  answers  his  own 
question  with  his  special  category :  water.  Aris- 
totle, our  oldest  and  best  judge  in  these  matters, 
places  Thales  at  the  head  (Met.  I.  3)  ;  he  cites 
an  opinion  which  takes  those  primeval  Gods, 
Oceanus  and  Tethys,  deities  of  the  sea,  as  "  the 
parents  of  generation"  or  of  world-creating. 
, Thales  is  thus  supposed  to  have  transformed 
those  hoary  mythical  shapes  into  a  purely  natural 
cause  corresponding  to  the  element  over  which 

6 


^'2  AKCIEKT  E  UR  OPE  AX  PSIL  OSOPHY. 

they  ruled.  This  again  indicates  the  spiritual 
transition  of  which  he  is  a  representative,  the 
transition  from  the  mythological  to  the  scientific, 
from  the  imaginative  to  the  historical,  from  re- 
ligion to  philosophy,  from  the  poetic  conscious- 
ness to  prose. 

Nor  should  we  omit  a  reflection  upon  the 
nature  of  water  conceived  as  a  first  principle. 
It  is  supremely  formable,  yet  always  dropping 
back  into  the  formless ;  the  waters  of  the  Egean 
sea  before  Miletus  would  rise  up  into  an  infinite 
number  of  forms  and  half -forms  (Tritons, 
Nereids,  hundredfold  Protean  shapes)  under  the 
Etesian  winds.  A  Milesian  philosopher,  pass- 
ing from  the  Mythus  to  Thought,  might  well 
consider  water  with  its  plasticity  as  the  mother 
of  all  the  forms  of  nature,  or  as  the  formative 
principle  of  all  things.  The  sea  appealed 
strongly  to  the  plastic  imagination  of  the  Greeks 
as  is  seen  both  in  their  poetry  and  in  their  art. 
Their  first  philosopher  struck  this  same  note  in 
his  thinking  when  he  took  water  as  the  original 
element  of  the  shapes  of  the  world.  And  ,we 
should  not  forget  that  Miletus  specially  was  a 
maritime  city,  owing  its  wealth  and  supremacy 
to  the  outlying  waters  before  its  gates.  The  sea 
was  indeed  the  mother  of  Miletus  spiritually  and 
materially,  and  her  first  philosophic  word  was  a 
true  echo  of  her  own  soul. 

But  her  second   philosophic  word  was  some- 


^HE  MILESIAN  MOVEMENT.  8^ 

what  different,  being  spoken  by  another  of  her 
sons,  to  whom  we  now  pass. 

2.  Anaximander.  A  friend,  pupil  and  com- 
patriot of  Thales,  somewhat  younger,  yet  a  co- 
temporary  substantially.  Still  the  two  differed ; 
as  Cicero  puts  it,  "  Thales  could  not  persuade 
his  pupil  that  water  was  the  source  of  every- 
thing." But  Anaximander  probably  received 
from  Thales  the  philosophic  inspiration  to  seek 
for  the  source  of  the  All,  though  he  propounded 
for  it  a  different  principle. 

This  principle  was  the  Infinite  (^to  apeiron), 
which  now  makes  its  first  appearance  in  Philos- 
ophy, and  which  has  had  a  vigorous  life  among 
thinkers  of  the  nineteenth  and  preceding  cen- 
turies, with  no  signs  of  ceasing  to  exist  in  the 
twentieth.  Such  a  perdurable  category  of  human 
Thought  did  that  old  philosopher  strike  out, 
somewhere  about  five  centuries  and  a  half  B.  C. 
Anaximander,  then,  is  the  author  of  the  philo- 
sophical Infinite,  which  he  declared  to  be  the 
true  essence  of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the  on). 

This  fact  is  nearly  all  we  know  about  the  mat- 
ter, perhaps  it  is  nearly  all  that  is  to  be  known. 
No  complex  philosophic  system  must  be  expected 
at  this  early  stage  of  thinking,  in  fact  no  distinct 
idea ;  the  first  mention  of  such  a  word  is  sur- 
prising enough,  having  such  a  mighty  progeny 
and  procreative  power. 

We  can,   however,  v/ork    out   the    thought  a 


84  ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPB  Y. 

little  and  say  that  Anaximander  must  have  con- 
ceived along  with  his  Infinite  its  counterpart,  the 
Finite,  and  have  gotten  a  glimpse  of  the  negative 
nature  of  the  latter.  The  term  Infinite  as  well 
as  its  idea  imply  the  negative  of  the  Finite,  of  the 
Limited,  of  the  Sensuous.  A  germ  of  idealism, 
yes,  of  the  dialectic  of  finitude  we  may  trace 
here,  though  certainly  the  germ  is  not  developed. 
Truly  a  main  path  of  all  future  Philosophy  leads 
out  of  this  Infinite  of  the  old  Milesian  thinker. 

Still  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  hold  that  Anax- 
mander  seized  the  idea  of  the  Infinite  purely; 
there  was  in  it  a  material  substrate  belonging  to 
his  period  and  to  the  infancy  of  Thought.  What 
this  material  substrate  was  no  one  has  ever  been 
able  to  tell  exactly.  It  was  not  a  definite  element 
like  water  or  earth  or  even  air,  though  it  had  its 
resemblance  to  the  latter.  The  best  view  of  it  is 
to  consider  it  the  circumambient  ether  or  atmos- 
phere surrounding  the  earth,  quite  invisible  and 
unbounded.  So  this  early  Infinite  hovers  between 
the  material  object  and  meutal  concept  somewhat 
doubtful  of  itself.  Still  it  will  free  itself  of  its 
corporeal  shell  in  time ;  even  Anaximander  is  re- 
ported to  have  declared  it  "  immortal  and  inde- 
structible," according  to  Aristotle.  A  kind  of 
immaterial  materiality  it  has,  this  first  chrysalis 
of  thinking,  not  easy  to  understand  till  we  see 
what  it  becomes. 

One    other   important  term   in  Philosophy  is 


THE  MILESIAN  MOVEMENT.  85 

ascribed  to  Anaximander,  the  Greek  word  arche, 
the  beginning.  That  is,  he  first  used  the  begin- 
ning not  as  purely  physical  but  as  metaphysical 
also,  not  merely  as  an  object  but  likewise  as  a 
thought.  The  Latin  word  principium  has  the 
same  double  meaning,  literal  and  metaphorical; 
it  signifies  both  a  sensuous  beginning  and  a 
principle,  which  latter  in  English  is  mental. 
Thus  Anaximander  elaborated  a  new  category  to 
fix  all  future  thinking,  aware  that  it  must  have 
a  first  principle  or  arclie  (also  called  cause, 
element,  essence)  in  which  it  definitely  cate- 
gorizes itself.  From  these  two  categories  of 
his  (the  Infinite  and  the  First  Principle)  we  may 
conclude  that  Anaximander  was  the  first  abstract 
categorizer  of  Greek  Philosophy,  recognizing 
that  it  must  express  itself  in  a  series  of  cate- 
gories. Herein  he  is  seemingly  an  advance  upon 
Thales,  whose  chief  term,  water,  is  not  pri- 
marily a  category  of  Thought,  such  as  are  the 
Infinite  and  the  Finite. 

Anaximander,  like  Thales,  was  a  famous 
physicist,  writing  on  Nature,  theorizing  about 
the  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  which  were  larger  and 
smaller  apertures  in  an  encompassing  Heaven, 
and  let  through  a  proportionate  light  from  the 
exterior  sphere  of  fire  which  enveloped  the  Cos- 
mos, ^lore  practical  was  his  invention  of  the 
first  map,  doubtless  giving  in  outline  the  coun- 
tries  around  the   Mediterraueau  visited   by  the 


86  ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL 080PHY. 

Milesian  navigator.  To  him  is  also  ascribed  the 
construction  of  the  sun-dial,  which,  however,  he 
may  have  borrowed  from  the  Orient.  Some 
say,  too,  that  the  first  map  belongs  to  Egypt. 
But  wc  can  well  understand  how  the  attempt  to 
make  a  map  at  that  time  brought  impressively 
l)efore  the  mind  of  Anaximandcr  the  bounded 
territory  and  the  boundless  Beyond  of  the  earth's 
surface,  in  correspondence  with  the  Finite  and 
Infinite  of  his  Thought.  Nor  must  we  omit  to 
mention  that  remarkable  gleam  of  Evolution 
far  back  in  Miletus:  num  is  descended  from  a 
fish,  which  with  the  lower  animals  arose  first 
from  the  primitive  slime  of  the  earth,  so  Anaxi- 
mandcr said  accordinjj  to  Plutarch. 

But  the  great  philosophic  fact  in  the  career  of 
Anaximander  is  that  he  categorized  the  Infinite 
and  handed  it  down  to  the  future.  Compared 
to  the  simple  element  of  Thales  (water)  his  is  a 
kind  of  double  principle,  a  kind  of  universal 
matter,  that  is,  both  material  and  universal. 
An  advance  of  the  sensuous  element  toward  the 
supersensible  we  can  see  in  this  second  stage 
of  the  Milesian  movement.  But  now  a  third 
philosopher  is  to  appear,  with  a  new  principle, 
yet  connected  with  the  two  before  him  in  one 
process  of  Thought. 

3.  Anaximenes.  This  philosopher,  also  a 
Milesian,  was  the  friend  and  pupil  of  Anaxi- 
mander, and  his  career  belonged  to  the   second 


THE  MILESIAN  MOVEMENT.  87 

half  of  the  sixth  century  B.  C  He  seems  to 
have  been  less  important  than  either  of  the  two 
preceding  thinkers,  still  he  has  his  definite  place 
in  the  Milesian  movement. 

Anaximenes  held  that  the  essence  of  the  All 
was  air,  but  not  the  continuous  atmosphere  of 
Anaximander,  but  air  as  breath,  spirit,  or  soul 
(psj^che);  that  is,  air  individualized,  made  defi- 
nite by  and  in  a  living  organism.  Here  rises 
some  faint  conception  of  the  World-soul,  after- 
wards rendered  famous  by  Plato  in  his  Tu)i(eus; 
but  the  idea  of  the  Cosmos  being  a  huge  animal 
with  its  own  peculiar  life  was  common  to  many 
Greek  philosophers.  Anaximenes  makes  or  begins 
to  make  the  transition  from  the  material  sub- 
strate of  Being  to  the  psychical ;  yet  this  psychical 
element  is  still  regarded  as  the  air  or  a  material 
element.  It  is,  however,  invisible,  a  cause  unseen 
producing  effects  which  are  seen;  hence  it  has 
its  suggestion  of  spirit.  The  air  as  the  breath 
of  the  cosmic  animal  has  in  it  a  process,  that  of 
inspiration  and  expiration;  it  is,  as  above  said, 
individualized  —  which  fact  forms  the  conclusion 
of  the  JVIilesian  movement,  which  has  lasted 
about  one  hundred  years,  between  600  and  500 
B,  C.  This  is  the  period  of  the  greatest  glory 
of  Miletus,  which,  thcmgh  subjugated  by  the 
Persians  for  a  part  of  the  time,  enjoyed  a 
certain  degree  of  independence.  But  the  city 
took  a  leading  part  in  the  great  Ionic  revolt  about 


88  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

500  B.  C.  The  Persians  cai)tured  Miletus,  slew 
its  male  inhabitants,  and  sold  its  women  and 
children  into  slavery  (494  B.  C.)-  This  blow 
crushed  it  completely,  it  had  no  further  prestige 
in  Greek  Historj',  Science,  or  Philosophy,  whose 
first  great  movement  it  contributed  to  Occiden- 
tal civilization.  Its  three  famous  philosophers 
spanned  the  century  of  its  honor,  and  the  last 
of  them  probabl}'  did  not  live  to  see  his  country's 
degradation. 

Observations  on  the  preceding  Movement .  — 
We  term  it  Milesian  because  it  belongs  to  Miletus 
and  nowhere  else. 

1.  This  group  of  philosophers  is  often  called 
the  Ionic  school,  but  such  a  name  is  wrong  when 
the  right  one  is  just  at  hand.  It  it  true  that 
Miletus  was  an  Ionic  city  but  there  were  many 
other  Ionic  cities  besides  this,  and  many  other 
Ionic  philosophers  besides  these.  Pythagoras,  for 
instance, and Anaxagoras  were  lonians;  butchiefly 
Socrates  and  Plato  were  lonians,  for  they  were 
born  Athenians,  and  Athens  was  an  Ionic  city. 
In  fact,  when  we  look  into  the  matter  we  find 
that  it  was  the  Ionic  Greek  who  philosophized 
not  the  Dorian,  not  the  Aeolian.  The  Spartans, 
the  typical  Dorian  people,  never  produced  a  phi- 
losopher worthy  of  note.  Some  Dorian  colonies 
had  schools  of  Philosophy,  but  these  were 
founded  by  Ionic  settlers,  as  we  see  in  the  case 
of  Pythagoras  of  Samos  and  of  Xenophaues  of 


THE  MILESIAN  MOVEMENT.  89 

Colophon.  It  may  be  affirmed  that  substantially 
all  the  Philosophy  of  the  Hellenic  Period  from 
Thales  to  Aristotle,  its  creative  epoch,  was  Ionic. 
Rightly  designated,  the  Milesian  is  simply  the  first 
stage  of  the  total  Ionic  movement  of  Thought. 

2.  We  call  these  three  persons  philosophers 
because  they  were  seeking  the  essence  of  Being 
{theousia  of  the  ow)  and  expressed  the  same  in  a 
special  category.  This  is  the  process  common  to 
every  Philosophy,  the  earliest  as  well  as  the  latest. 
Accordingly  the  Milesian  movement  w411  show 
three  essential  categories,  water,  the  infinite  as 
atmosphere,  and  air  as  soul,  or  individualized. 
Now  the  point  must  be  emphasized  that  these 
three  principles  form  a  single  process  by  them- 
selves ;  in  other  words  they  constitute  a  Psycho- 
sis. The  first  stage  is  the  simple,  immediate 
one,  in  which  an  individual  material  element  is 
taken  as  first  principle  —  the  water  of  Thales; 
the  second  stage  brings  twofoldness,  since  the  at- 
mosphere of  Anaximander  has  distinctly  both 
sides,  that  of  a  mental  concept  and  that  of  a  ma- 
terial object,  and  shows  the  incipient  interplay 
of  all  Philosophy  between  the  Infinite  and  the 
Finite ;  the  third  stage  indicates  a  return  to  the 
individual  element  of  the  first  stage,  yet  through 
the  second  —  the  air  of  Anaximenes,  even  though 
the  same,  is  not  immediately  taken  (as  by  Anaxi- 
mander) but  is  the  result  of  a  process,  even  the 
world's  process,  being  its  breath  or  soul, 


90  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

3.  Here,  then,  we  have  the  first  philosophic 
triiid,  implicit  to  be  sure,  but  soon  becoming  ex- 
plicit and  growing  more  and  more  concrete  down 
to  the  present  time.  Philosophy  will  never  lose 
this  triune  movement  started  in  the  old  Greek 
city,  though  it  was  declared  long  before  in  the 
Asiatic  religions.  Moreover  it  incarnated  itself 
at  Miletus  in  three  persons  distinctively,  each  of 
whom  was  an  P^go,  a  Self  which  was  seeking  to 
find  itself  in  the  world.  When  it  asks  what  is 
the  real  essence  of  Being,  the  true  answer  is  the 
Self,  but  such  an  answer  lies  far  in  the  future. 
Still  the  student,  tracing  the  inner  connection  of 
all  Philosophy,  is  to  see  that  just  this  is  what 
lay  iu  the  fermenting  souls  of  these  ancient  Mile- 
sian philosophers. 

4.  Accordingly  the  significance  of  this  early 
movement  lies  chiefly  in  the  fact  that  it  is  the 
first  Psychosis  of  the  Philosophy  of  Europe. 
As  Thought  it  is  very  rude  and  primitive ;  but 
it  is  the  germinal  starting-point  for  what  may 
be  called  the  highest  European  Discipline.  Let 
us  term  it  the  primordial  cell  out  of  which  the 
total  organism  of  Philosophy  is  to  develop; 
this  Milesian  Psychosis  is  such  an  embryonic 
cell  begetting  a  vast  progeny  of  philosophic 
Psychoses,  the  chief  line  of  which  we  shall  try 
to  follow  out  in  the  present  book.  And  to  con- 
tinue our  illustration,  that  water  of  Thales  may 
be  regarded  as  the  nucleus,  or  even  nucleolus. 


THE  MILESIAN  MOVEMENT.  91 

of  the  cell  out  of  which  is  to  develop  all  future 
Philosophy.  So  we  see  that  Thales  announced 
a  truth  in  his  categor}^  though  with  a  different 
sense  from  what  he  intended :  Water  has  been 
the  first  principle,  if  not  of  all  things,  at  least 
of  many  Philosophies. 

5.  So  much  we  can  affirm  lookino;  hack 
through  a  vista  of  twenty-five  centuries.  No 
man  could  tell  beforehand  what  lay  in  that  little 
nucleus  of  Thales,  just  as  in  human  embryol- 
ogy the  germ  must  be  interpreted  by  its  evolu- 
tion. And  that  embryonic  Psychosis,  as  we  may 
name  it,  of  the  three  Milesian  thinkers  will  be 
more  fully  explained  by  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Twentieth  Century  than  by  that  of  any  previous 
period. 

6.  The  city  of  the  sea-coast  of  Hellas  will  differ 
much  from  the  city  of  the  river-valley  of  the 
Orient,  such  as  are  the  cities  of  the  Euphrates  and 
Nile.  The  sea  uniting  Peoples  and  producing  a 
new  life  by  commerce  and  intercourse  suo-o-ests 
the  creative  import  of  water  (Thales).  Then 
the  sea  is  boundless  and  hints  the  Infinite  (An- 
aximander),  which  is  nevertheless  to  be  grasped 
and  possessed.  The  sea,  too,  in  its  movements 
seems  a  living  thing,  a  huge  body  of  ani- 
mated matter,  or  hylozoism  incorporate.  The 
Hellenic  sea-city  makes  an  epoch  in  the  history  of 
the  World,  and  forms  the  transition  out  of  Asia 
to  Europe  in  thought  and  institutions. 


92  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

7.  We  are  not  to  forget,  however,  that  the 
principle  of  each  of  these  Milesian  Philosophers 
goes  back  to  and  reposes  upon  a  special  element 
of  Nature  existing  for  the  senses.  Hence  the 
movement  is  elemental  in  a  particular  and  even 
material  form  ;  thus  the  Infinite  of  Anaximander 
has  its  material  substrate,  as  we  have  seen.  To 
this  fact  we  must  not  fail  to  give  due  weight, 
since  it  shows  the  Milesian  Psychosis  as  the  first 
or  immediate  stage  of  the  total  elemental  move- 
ment. 

8.  There  were  more  Philosophers  belonging  to 
the  Milesian  Movement  than  those  above  men- 
tioned. One  has  been  specially  brought  into 
prominence,  Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  a  contem- 
porary of  Anaxagoras  and  also  a  resident  of 
Athens,  though  probably  a  Cretan  by  birth.  He 
is  interesting  as  relapse  to  an  earlier  stage,  but  is 
not  an  integral  part  of  the  original  Milesian 
Movement. 

B.  The  Eleatic  Movement. 

Already  in  Anaximander,  the  second  of  the  Mi- 
lesian philosophers,  we  find  a  decided  effort  to  rise 
out  of  the  particular,  sensuous  element  as  the  es- 
sence of  Being.  His  Infinite  (apeiron),  however, 
is  simply  another  particular  sensuous  element ,  from 
which  the  rest  spring,  and  so  does  not  get  beyond 
Milesiauism  in  spite  of  its  struggle.      But  the 


THE  ELEATIC  MOVEMENT. 


93 


Eleatic  Movement  now  follows,  affirming  the  es- 
sence of  Being  to  be  Pure  Being,  and  therein 
negating  all  particularity.  Still  this  Pure  Being 
too  will  be  found  to  have  an  elemental  substrate, 
and  hence  belongs  to  Elementalism,  in  whose  total 
process  it  is  the  second  stage. 

The  name  is  derived  from  a  small  city  in  Magna 
GrjBcia  (Southern  Italy),  Elea,  where  dwelt  the 
three  leading  spirits    of    this  second    important 
phase    of  Greek   Philosophy.     A    quiet,  retired 
spot  it   was  in    contrast  with  the  large,  active, 
throbbing  world-city,    Miletus;    almost    its    sole 
fame  comes  from  its  being  a  philosophic  town. 
Such  a  place    comports  in  character  with  Eleati- 
cism,  which  is  an  abstraction  and  inuer  withdrawal 
from  all  concrete  and  variegated  existence  into  the 
colorless  realm  of  Pure  Being.    Like  the  Milesian, 
the    Eleatic    movement   lasted    about  a  hundred 
years,  beginning  somewhere  in  the  latter  half  of 
the  sixth  century  B.  C,  toward  its  end  probably. 
Again  a  single  city  gives  name  to  a  great  philo- 
sophic movement,  as  was  the  case  also  with  Mile- 
tus.    But  from    the  eastern   borderland  of  the 
Hellenic   world  we  pass  by  a  sudden  leap  to  the 
western.     In   this  fact  we  may  see  something  in 
the  nature  of  a  reaction  from  the  Milesian  Move- 
ment, especially  since  the  founder  of  the  Eleatic 
School  was  born  and  grew  to  manhood  at  Colo- 
phon,  an   Ionic  city  of  Asia  Minor  not  far  from 
Miletus,    whence    he    migrated   to    Italy.      Elea 


04  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPSf. 

seems  to  have  had,  in  part  at  least,  a  Doric 
population,  and  in  the  Eleatic  Philosophy  a 
Doric  character  has  been  detected,  though  its 
founder  was  an  Ionian.  Yet  we  trace  also 
among  the  Eleatics  an  Oriental  Pantheistic  tend- 
ency, so  that  the  reaction  from  Miletus,  like  most 
reactions  and  reformations,  may  have  been  back- 
ward as  well  as  forward.  Still  Eleaticism  is  an 
emphatic  separation  from  Ionia  and  the  domi- 
nant Milesian  thought  there ;  this  separation  is 
not  onl}^  in  space  but  also  in  doctrine. 

The  Eleatic  principle  of  Being  is  Pure  Being, 
Being  as  such  and  alone,  not  an}' form  or  material 
element  of  Being,  such  as  water  or  air.  Here 
lies  the  emphatic  separation  and  opposition  of 
Elea  to  Miletus.  One  must  abstract  from  all  mul- 
tiplicity of  Beings,  from  all  sensuous  appearances, 
and  grasp  the  one  Being,  veritably  the  One  which  is. 
That  mobile,  material,  particularized  Ionic  world 
dominated  by  Miletus  we  must  flee  from,  taking 
a  long  hazardous  voj'age  across  the  sea  to  the  free 
West  not  yet  occupied  by  any  Philosophy. 

The  Eleatics  are,  accordingl}',  seeking  the 
essence  of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the  o?i),  and  will 
declare  its  category.  This  essence  they  will  find 
not  in  an}'  elemental  substance,  but  in  Being 
itself  as  substance,  and  nothing  else.  Pure 
Being  thus  is  their  category,  which  in  spite  of 
its  oneness  will  show  a  process,  as  it  unfolds 
itself  in  three  leading  forms  through  three  lead- 


Tee  ELEATic  Movement.  9o 

ing  minds.  For  the  Eleatic  Movement,  like  the 
Milesian  in  this  respect,  incorporates  itself  in 
three  transcendent  philosophers,  though  there 
are  many  mediocre  and  partial  Eleatics.  In 
other  words  we  shall  have  an  Eleatic  Psychosis, 
personal  indeed,  but  also  of  ideas. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  Eleatic  doctrine  rests 
upon  abstraction,  negation,  in  fact  just  the  nega- 
tion of  the  finite  world.  Pure  Being  is  siuiply 
this  universal  abstraction  seized  as  a  concept  by 
itself  and  uttered  in  a  category.  From  beginning 
to  end  it  has  a  decided  negative  element  running 
through  it ;  from  this  point  of  view  Eleaticism 
may  be  deemed  the  birth  of  the  Negative  in 
Philosophy.  Still  its  immediate  purpose  is  posi- 
tive; Pure  Being,  in  spite  of  its  negative  source, 
is  regarded  by  the  Eleatics  as  a  positive  principle. 

This  inherent  negativity  of  the  Eleatic  Move- 
ment will  come  to  the  surface  in  Zeno  with  his 
negation  of  Non-Being.  But  his  pupil  Gorgias 
will  put  the  negative  i)rinciple  inside  of  Being 
and  destroy  it,  blowing  it  to  pieces  with  its  own 
petard.  Gorgias  is,  therefore,  not  strictly  an 
Eleatic,  but  we  may  consider  him  the  Eleatic 
destroyer  of  Eleaticism. 

Pure  Being,  as  Eleatic,  has  an  elemental  sub- 
strate, namely  Space.  Not  any  particular  form 
of  a  material  element  is  this ;  otherwise  the 
Eleatic  would  not  differ  from  the  Milesian  Move- 
ment.    But  a  total   element   is  taken  which  in- 


96  ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

eludes  all  particular  elements,  the  element  of 
elements.  Thus  the  Eleatics  rise  from  the  par- 
ticular to  the  general,  but  the  latter  is  still  an 
element  with  them;  that  is,  the  general  as 
element  (Eleatic)  rises  out  of  the  particular 
as  element  (Milesian).  Of  course  this  is  not 
the  general  or  the  universal  in  its  purity,  which 
does  not  appear  before  the  time  of  Socrates.  It 
is,  however,  an  important  mile-stone  on  the  way 
thither. 

Thus  we  see  that  Eleaticism  is  still  elemental, 
and  belongs  to  the  elemental  phase  of  the  Hel- 
lenic Period  of  Greek  philosophy.  Moreover, 
it  is  the  second  or  separative  stage  thereof, 
which  is  manifested  by  the  fact  above  given, 
that  it  is  fundamentally  a  separation  or  abstrac- 
tion from  the  particular  Elementalisni  of  the 
Milcsitms,  which  was  the  first  stage,  this  separa- 
tion being  also  local  as  well  as  spiritual. 

The  idea  of  Pure  Being  now  becomes  incarnate 
(so  to  speak)  in  three  philosophers,  each  of 
Avhom  manifests  a  phase  of  its  movement.  And 
Philosophy,  passing  from  East  to  West  to  a 
Greek  colony,  shows  what  we  may  call  its  West- 
colonial  Movement,  which  took  a  strong  hold  of 
the  Greek  mind  in  Southern  Italy  and  Sicily. 

1.  Xenophaiies.  The  outward  life  of  this  phi- 
losopher was  that  of  a  rover,  first  from  East  to 
West,  then  through  various  places  of  the  West  in 
Sicily  and  Italy.   His  youth  reaches  back  to  Anax- 


TEE  ELEATIG  MOVEMENT.  97 

imander  whose  pupil  he  is  suid  to  have  been,  and 
possibly  to  Thales,  whose  thought  he   assailed. 
He  was    born  at  Colophon,  from  which  he  was 
driven  away,  possibly  on  account  of  his  religious 
opinions  which  attacked  the  existent  polytheism. 
He  was  an  Ionian,   and  must  have  known  the 
Milesian  Philosophy  in  all  its  phases  at  first  hand, 
of  which,  however,  he  became  the    most  decided 
opponent.     In  some  lines  written  at  92  preserved 
by  Diogenes  Laertes,  he  says  he  has  been  roam- 
ing around  in  Greek  lands  for  67  years,  since  he 
was  25.     He    composed  verses  setting  forth  his 
views,  which  he  recited  in  the  towns  he  visited. 
He  was  an  old  Greek  Johnny  Appleseed,  and  is 
reported  to  have  lived  till  he  was  more  than  a 
hundred  years  of  age,  dying  in  extreme  poverty. 
Many  kinds  of  poetry  were  ascribed  to  him  — 
Epics,  Elegiacs  and  Satires;  he  wrote  a  poem  on 
the  founding  of  Elea  in  2000  hexameters.     His 
philosophic  ideas  were  given  in  a  didactic  poem, 
of  which  some  fragments  remain.     In  these  he 
asserts  "the    one    supreme  God"    who  is    not 
"  like  mortals  in  body  or  thought,"  as  were  the 
popular  deities  of  Greek  religion   and  art.     He 
severely  blames    the  poets,  naming  Homer  and 
Hesiod,  who  show  the  Gods  guilty  of  "  the  most 
unjust  things— lying,  theft  and  adultery."     In 
a  famous  line  he  says  God    is  "all  eye,  all   ear 
and  all  thought,"  or  as  we  might   translate    it. 
He  is  the  "  All  seeing,  hearing,  thinking." 

7 


98  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  plain  from  these  citations  that  Xeno- 
phanes  was  a  preacher  of  Monotheism  against 
the  prevailing  Polytheism.  Probably  this  repre- 
sents but  a  phase  of  the  philosopher  who  says, 
•'  everything  is  one,"  and  is  declared  by  Aristotle 
to  be  the  first  promulgator  .of  the  unity  of  all 
things.  That  is,  Xenophanes  seems  to  pass  from 
Monotheism  to  Monism,  and  to  conceive  the 
true  essence  to  be  "  the  One  and  All,"  and  not 
necessarily  a  person.  Thus  he  moves  out  of 
religion  to  ontology,  and  becomes  the  founder  of 
a  philosophic  sect.  He  is  reported  as  saying: 
"  Wherever  I  turn  my  mind,  everything  dissolves 
into  the  one  substance." 

Xenophanes  has  'an  ethical  strand  in  him,  as 
we  see  by  his  attack  on  the  immoralities  of  the 
Greek  Gods,  wherein  he  will  have  many  a  suc- 
cessor among  the  philosophers.  As  to  his  reac- 
tion from  lonism  to  Dorism,  it  may  lie  just  in  this 
absorption  of  the  indi^'idual  into  an  all-ruling 
Being,  and  he  will  not  be  the  last  Ionic  philoso- 
pher who  will  lean  to  Doric  institutions,  since 
Socrates  and  Plato  show  the  same  tendency. 

We  should  conceive  Xenophanes  as  uniting  in 
his  thought  of  the  Supreme  One  both  a  monothe- 
istic and  a  monistic  element ;  the  two  principles,  the 
personal  and  impersonal,  are  not  yet  fully  differ- 
entiated in  his  mind.  Thus  he  represented  the 
first  or  irnplicit  stage  of  Eleaticism.  Further- 
more he  occupied  himself  with  phjsical  theories, 


THE  ELEATIC  MOVEMENT.  99 

showing  that  he  naively  took  for  granted  a  phe- 
nomenal world  alongside  of  his  one  Being.  Nor 
did  he  engage  in  the  deeper  discussions  of  the 
later  Eleatics,  whose  fight  was  against  Non- 
Being,  Becoming,  and  the  Multiplicity  of  things. 
These  divisions  lay  in  him  implicit,  not  yet  de- 
veloped; but  now  we  are  to  consider  the  man 
who  developed  them,  and  thus  made  Eleaticism 
a  distinctive  philosophic  doctrine. 

2.  Farmenides.  The  philosophic  career  of 
Parmenides  lay  within  the  first  half  of  the  fifth 
century  B.  C.  The  exact  years  of  birth  and 
death  cannot  be  fixed  in  his  case,  as  inmost  cases 
of  these  early  philosophers.  He  was  born  at 
Elea  of  a  wealthy  and  important  family,  and  re- 
mained a  citizen  of  the  place  during  life ;  in  fact, 
he  is  said  to  have  given  laws  to  his  native  city. 
He  was  not  a  wanderer  like  Xenophanes,but  had 
a  fixed  abode.  Still  he  traveled;  Plato  gives  an 
account  of  the  visit  of  two  Eleatic  philosophers, 
Parmenides  and  Zeno,  at  Athens,  where  Socra- 
tes, then  very  young,  heard  them.  This  indi- 
cates that  even  the  contemplative  and  remote 
philosophers  of  Elea  went  abroad  to  impart  their 
own  doctrine  and  to  learn  that  of  others. 

The  common  voice  of  antiquity  celebrates  the 
lofty  character,  the  profound  thought,  and  even 
the  personal  beauty  of  Parmenides.  In  early 
years  he  was  attached  to  the  Pythagoreans  of 
Southern  Italv,   and  their  strict  and   somewhat 


100         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ascetic  life  he  seems  to  have  followed  to  the  last. 
But  their  philosophic  doctrine  he  renounced  for 
that  of  Xenophanes,  whom  he  may  have  heard 
chanting  hexameters  in  some  market-place.  For 
this  statement  indeed  there  is  no  historic  evidence ; 
but  it  is  certain  that  the  high-born  Doric  aris- 
tocrat adopted  the  philosophic  message  brought 
by  the  poor  Ionic  wanderer:  an  event  which 
has  often  had  its  parallel  in  the  world.  Nor  can 
we  help  adding  to  the  picture  the  probable  but 
unverified  touch  that  the  rich,  highly  respected 
citizen  established  his  homeless  fellow-thinker 
at  Elea  where  they  started  the  world-famous 
Eleatic  School  (as  is  similarly  reported  of  two 
New  England  philosophers  at  Concord). 

As  already  stated,  the  doctrine  of  Parmenides 
shows  a  philosophical  development  beyond  that  of 
Xenophanes,  since  the  former  has  freed  himself 
of  the  latter' s  theological  element  and  has  become 
distinctly  ontological.  That  is,  he  seizes  Pure 
Beinof  as  the  One,  havintr  little  or  nothing  to 
say  of  the  one  God.  Then  he  elaborates  the 
category  of  Non-Being,  under  which  he  places 
all  Becoming,  all  Multiplicity,  as  well  as  Motion 
and  Chano;e.  Beinoj  cannot  besin  to  be  or  cease 
to  be;  it  cannot  be  divided  and  so  be  many,  but 
is  One,  just  the  One,  ever-present,  eternal,  un- 
changeable. What  about  Thought,  especially 
this  Thought  of  Being?  It  is  one  with  Being, 
cannot  be  separated  from  it,  for  Being  allows  no 


TEE  ELEATIC  MOVEMENT.  101 

separation  within  itself.  From  this  point  of  view 
Parmenides  must  deny  the  world  as  distinct  from 
Thought,  and  so  may  be  considered  an  acosmist 
like  Spinoza,  whose  so-called  pantheistic  idealism 
has  this  Greek  forerunner. 

Still  Parmenides,  true  to  the  instinct  of  this 
early  stage  of  Hellenic  Philosophjs  has  a  sub- 
strate which  may  be  called  physical.  He  con- 
ceives his  Being  as  space-filling,  as  extended 
through  all  space,  if  not  just  the  divisionless  ex- 
tension of  Pure  Space.  This  fact  is  also  implied 
in  his  immediate  oneness  of  Thought  and  Being;, 
The  distinction  between  subject  and  object  is  not 
his,  nor  has  he  yet  clearly  discriminated  between 
the  immaterial  and  material,  both  are  one  in  Be- 
ing. In  fact,  any  distinction  is  non-existent,  his 
Being  is  pure  identity,  it  is  all  fullness  and  there 
is  no  void  to  break  the  One  and  the  Same. 

But  Parmenides  did  not  allow  his  Being  to  be 
unlimited  or  without  bound;  that  would  make  it 
formless,  chaotic,  and  would  violate  his  Greek 
plastic  sense.  Hence  he  compared  it  to  a  sphere, 
giving  to  it  completeness  of  form.  It  could  be 
eternal  and  unchangeable,  but  not  strictly  infinite. 

Already  the  keen  reader  has  not  failed  to  find 
inconsistencies  in  this  Being  of  Parmenides. 
But  his  chief  inconsistency,  one  which  cracks 
his  philosophy  wide  open  and  leaves  it  a  gaping 
dualism,  is  next  to  be  mentioned.  He  wrote 
a  poem  setting  forth  his  doctrine  in  hexameters, 


102         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  which  some  fragments  remain.  The  first 
part  of  his  work  treated  of  Being  or  Truth, 
whose  leading  points  have  been  given  in  the 
preceding  account.  But,  strangely,  he  added 
a  second  part,  which  treats  of  that  which  is  not, 
never  was  and  never  will  be  —  a  most  remarkable 
somersault.  So  his  Non-Being  after  all  has  a 
kind  of  Being,  at  least  in  his  own  mind,  which, 
however,  was  supposed  to  be  one  with  Being. 
Parmenides  also  occupied  himself  extensively 
with  physical  investigations  and  theories,  which 
decidedly  implied  the  Being  of  his  Non-Being. 
Many  attempts  have  been  made  in  ancient  and 
modern  times  to  explain  this  contradiction,  but 
it  lies  deep  in  the  mind  of  the  philosopher  and 
in  the  principle  itself  —  Parmenides  would  not 
be  Parmenides  without  this  dualism,  and  Eleat- 
icism  would  not  be  Eleaticism  without  it. 

His  service  to  culture  is  to  have  taught  man- 
kind to  make  the  mighty  abstraction  from  all 
change  and  multiplicity,  and  to  seize  the  change- 
less One,  Pure  Being.  To  be  sure,  he  did  not 
reach  the  Concept  through  his  abstraction,  this 
was  reserved  for  Socrates,  who  may  have  received 
his  hint  when  he  saw  and  heard  in  his  youth 
Parmenides  at  Athens. 

Thus  the  dualism  inherent  in  the  Eleatic  doc- 
trine becomes  explicit,  though  perchance  unac- 
knowledged, in  Parmenides.  With  all  his  assertion 
of   Being  and  his  denial  of  Non-Being,  he  ends 


THE  ELEATIC  MOVEMENT.  103 

with  taking  for  granted  the  Being  of  Non-Being. 
This  gives  the  starting-point  of  the  third  great 
Eleatic  philosopher  who  will  make  a  new  hercu- 
lean attempt  to  rescue  his  school  from  its  self- 
devouring  dualism  by  showing  that  Being  alone 
is  and  Non-Being  is  not  at  all. 

3.   Ztno.     The  intimate  friend,  the  companion 
in    travel,    and,  according    to    one    author,    the 
adopted  son  of  Parmenides,  was  this  Zeno,  born 
at  Elea.     He  was  twenty-five  years  younger  than 
Parmenides,  in  the  account    of    Plato,    but  an- 
other reckoning   puts  this   difference   of    age    at 
forty  years.     We  can  say,  in  general,  that  Zeno 
is  not  only  the  third  great  person,  but  represents 
the  third  generation  of  the  Eleatic  School,   and 
substantially  completes  its  movement.     He,  like 
Parmenides,  shared  in  the  Pythagorean  life,  and 
he  evidently  had  something  of   a  political  career 
in  his  native  city.     But  his  chief   public  action 
was  his  part  in  deposing  or  even  slaying  a  tyrant, 
who  put  him  to  torture  in  order  to  wring  from 
him  some  confession.     But  Zeno  bit  off  his  own 
tono-ue     and    contemptuousl}^     spit  it    into    the 
tyrant's  face  as  if  to  show  his  philosophic  defiance 
of    suffering  as    well    his    determination    to    be 
silent.     Of  course  this  was  a  legend  w^iich  trans- 
formed    Zeno    into    a   tyrant-slayer,    w^ho    was 
always  a  popular  Greek  hero  in  story  and  song.  It 
is  not   at  all  improbable  that  Zeno  did  have  a 
hand  in  some  such  work,  since  quite  every  Greek 


104         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

town  had  similar  occurrences  taking  place  in  the 
natural  order  of  its  history.  Still  to-day  the  joy 
of  the  Greek  ballad-singer  is  the  bold  youth  who 
slays  a  Turk,  his  country's  oppressor, 

Aristotle  makes  Zeno  the  founder  of  the 
Dialectic,  others  say  he  invented  the  Dialogue, 
but  he  was  probably  not  the  first  Greek  prose- 
writer,  as  is  sometimes  declared.  As  his  life 
was  one  long  attachment  to  Parmenides,  so  his 
work  had  the  one  object  of  defending  his  mas- 
ter, though  the  indirect  results  of  that  work 
reached  far  beyond  Eleaticism.  Parmenides,  as 
well  as  Xenophanes,  had  simpl}'^  asserted  that 
apjiearance,  multiplicity,  change  did  not  exist, 
and  had  bolstered  their  statement  with  some 
grounds  more  or  less  external ;  but  Zeno's  pro- 
cedure is  different,  he  shows  that  Multiplicity  is 
self-contradictory  in  its  nature  and  negates  itself 
through  its  inner  ^movement.  Now,  this  inner 
movement  of  self -negation  is  the  first  appearance 
of  the  Dialectic  in  Philosophy,  and  it  is  still 
working  at  the  present  day.  Let  us  take  another 
illustration:  I,  as  Eleatic,  may  deny  Motion, 
and  seek  to  refute  it  by  certain  arguments ;  now 
Zeno  too  denied  Motion,  but  his  method  was  to 
make  it  deny  itself ;  he  did  not  care  to  refute 
Motion  from  the  outside,  but  he  set  it  goins 
and  let  it  refute  itself,  of  course  under  his 
su])tle  guidance.  Such  is  the  emphatic  point  in 
Zeno's  philosophizing,  and  a  great  contribution 


TEE  ELEATIC  MOVEMENT.  105 

it  was    to  the  intellectual  treasures   of    man  to 
render    him    conscious   of   this   process    of   his 

thinking. 

If  we  with  Parmenides  embrace  Multiplicity, 
Becoming,  Change,  Motion,  Appearance  in  the 
one  category  of  Non-Being,  then  the  labor  of 
Zeno  may  be  summed  up  in  the  statement 
that  all  Non-Being  is  internally  self -negative. 
Here  too  we  may  see  his  advance  upon  the  doctrine 
of  Parmenides,  who,  as  we  have  already  noted,  had 
been  compelled  practically  to  admit  the  Being  of 
Non-Being  after  stoutly  denying  it,  and  so  fell 
into  dualism.  Zeno  will  seek  to  vindicate  his 
master  by  eliminating  this  dualism,  which  he  does 
by  making  Non-Being  annihilate  itself  through 
itself,  that  is,  through  its  own  inner  Dialectic. 
So,  if  Non-Being  destroys  itself,  there  is  left 
Pure  Being  in  all  its  original  glory,  as  first  as- 
serted by  Parmenides  and  Xenophanes.  Herein 
we  see  that  Zeno  is  a  return  to  the  purity  of  the 
Eleatic  One  out  of  the  twofoldness  into  which 
it  had  lapsed,  which  fact  shows  him  to  be 
the  third  stage  of  the  Eleatic  Movement  (or 
Psychosis). 

In  general,  the  argument  of  Zeno  turns  against 
all  separation,  division,  twoness  or  dualism.  To 
be  sure,  he  does  not  universalize  his  doctrine,  but 
applies  it  to  three  main  spheres,  all  of  them 
belonging  to  external  Nature:  (1)  to  Multiplic- 
ity or  Matter  in  order  to  assert  its  opposite  or  the 


106         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

oneness  of  Being ;  (2)  to  Motion,  in  order  to  assert 
its  opposite  or  the  unchangeableness  of  Being ; 
(3)  to  Space  as  limited  in  order  to  assert  Space 
undivided  as  the  substrate  of  Being.  All  these 
concepts  he  shows  to  be  self-negating  specially, 
but  the  general  concept  of  the  negation  of  the 
negation  he  does  not  consciously  reach,  though 
it  is  certainly  implied  in  his  examples.  Zeno  lil^e 
all  these  early  phil()soi)hers,  required  a  physical 
elemental  substrate — Motion,  Matter,  Space  — 
for  his  thinking.  Still  the  Dialectic  of  all  divis- 
ion, separation,  negation  is  born  in  his  work, 
though  later  hands  must  rear  this  Zciioiiian  infant 
to  manhood. 

Zeno  of  course  does  not  grasp  his  own  Ego  as 
the  source  of  this  dialectical  movement,  still  less 
does  his  own  Ego  consciously  grasp  itself  as  just 
this  movement,  which  he  has  projected  into  that 
of  Being  and  Non-Being.  Still  Zeno  has  given 
the  ps3'chical  process  of  the  Ego  or  Self,  not  in 
its  own  form  or  psychologically,  butontologically, 
in  an  alien  or  external  form,  namely  that  of  im- 
mediate Being,  Non-Being,  and  the  return  to  Be- 
insr  throuirh  the  sclf-neijation  of  Non-Being.  It 
is  the  eternal  merit  of  Zeno  that  he  overcomes 
the  second  stage,  that  of  division,  separation, 
negation,  and  makes  the  grand  return  to  the  posi- 
tive, which  is  here  Being. 

All  this  takes  place  within  Eleaticism,  but  Zeno' s 
work  cuts  yet  deeper,  since  it  drives  Eleaticism 


THE  ELEATIC  MOVEMENT.  107 

beyond  itself.  For  this  is  also  a  second  stage  in 
a  still  larger  movement  (or  Psychosis),  which 
Zeno's  Dialectic  has  caused  to  negate  itself  and 
to  pass  over  to  a  third  stage  of  this  larger  move- 
ment, which  we  have  already  named  the  Elemental 
Psychosis,  and  which,  taken  as  a  whole,  is  the 
first  great  movement  of  the  Hellenic  Period 
of  Greek  Philosophy.  Let  it  then  be  noted 
that  Zeno  has  given  the  inner  dialectic  process 
of  every  second  stage,  the  separative  or  negative 
stage,  which  is  in  every  movement  of  philosophic 
Thought.  To  be  sure,  he  is  not  conscious  of 
any  such  far-reaching  result  of  his  Dialectic; 
indeed  modern  Philosophy  has  not  fully  developed 
the  significance  of  this  Zenonian  procedure.  It 
suggests  the  inherent,  eternallj^  recurring  contra- 
diction in  Nature  herself,  who  has  always  lurking 
in  her  activity  the  self-opposition  and  the  final 
self-undoing  which  Zeno  pointed  out  in  the 
phenomenal  world  of  Change,  Motion,  Multi- 
plicity. Greek  Philosophy,  striving  mainly  for 
the  ^essence  of  Nature  or  of  the  Cosmos,  will 
unfailingly  bring  to  the  surface  its  inner  self- 
negation  first  indicated  by  Zeno,  and  go  to  pieces 
on  it  without  fully  knowing  why.  Not  till  the 
thought  of  man  can  put  Nature  into  its  true 
place  as  a  stage  of  the  total  Process  of  the 
Universe,  and  grasp  its  function  in  such  a 
totality,  can  he  master  its  negative  power 
over  his   thinking.     The    Zenonian   Dialectic  is 


108         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHIL OSOPB T. 

profoundly  working  in   the  Natural  Science  of 
to-day. 

Observations  on  the  Eleatic  Movement.  It  is 
not  to  be  understood  that  there  were  no  other 
Eleatic  philosophers  except  these  three.  But 
the  rest  were  of  lower  rank,  and  are  not  neces- 
sary to  the  movement  as  a  whole. 

1.  Of  these  lesser  Eleatics  the  first  place  is 
usually  assigned  to  Mclissus  of  Samos,  who, 
besides  being  a  philosopher,  was  a  famous  gene- 
ral. He  re-affirmed  the  Pure  Being  of  Parmen- 
ides,  from  whom  he  differed  in  one  respect:  he 
declared  Being  to  be  infinite  in  space,  thereby 
doino-  away  with  its  spherical  form,  which  Par- 
menidcs  gave  to  it.  Thus  the  spatial  substrate 
of  Pure  Being  is  without  any  limit,  just  as  Pure 
Being  has  no  limit  in  time,  being  eternal  ac- 
cordinsr  to  the  Eleatics. 

2.  A  pupil  of  Zeno,  Gorgias  of  Leontini  in 
Sicil}',  may  be  mentioned  in  this  connection, 
though  he  properly  belongs  to  the  Sophists.  He 
carries  out  the  negative  procedure  of  his  master  to 
the  point  of  negating  Pure  Being  itself.  Zeno,  as 
above  indicated,  simply  negatives  Non-Being  in  the 
form  Motion,  Change,  Multiplicity,  and  thereby 
returns  to  Pure  Being.  But  Gorgias  directs  the 
destructive  might  of  the  Dialectic  against  just 
this  result,  and  destroys  Eleaticism  with  its  own 
weapon.  He  wrote  a  famous  book  On  Non-Being 
in  which  he  elaborates  this  triple  negative :  — 


THE  ELEATIC  MOVEMENT.  109 

(1)  Nothing  exists; 

(2)  And  if  something  did  exist,  we  could  not 
know  it; 

(3)  And  if  we  knew  it,  we  could  not  impart 
such  knowledge. 

So  Gorgias  is  the  first  theoretical  nihilist,  hay- 
ing pushed  the  negative  principle  inEleaticism  to 
the  point  of  absolute  self-negation.  We  have 
already  noted  that  Pure  Being  is  a  product  of  ab- 
straction, of  mentally  doing  away  with  all  partic- 
ularity, and  holding  fast  to  the  One,  or  Pure  Being. 
But  this  One  just  in  such  a  process  becomes 
particular,  and  has  its  own  negative  nature  turned 
back  upon  itself  through  Gorgias,  who  is,  there- 
fore, an  Eleatic  undoing  Eleaticism,  the  demon  of 
the  system. 

Still  the  reader  will  note  that  Gorgias  is  at  the 
same  time  undoing  himself  in  a  truly  comic  fash- 
ion. He  says  we  cannot  know  anything,  and  yet 
he  claims  to  know  something  about  nothing,  to 
the  extent  of  writing  a  book  upon  the  subject. 
So  he  must  know  a  good  deal  about  what  cannot 
be  know^n,  and  is  ready  to  impart  that  knowledge 
which  he  says  cannot  be  imparted  Thus  the 
nihilism  of  Gorgias,  hke  all  nihilism,  annihilates  it- 
self, after  making  some  noise ;  the  demon  is  burnt 
up  in  the  hell-fire  of  his  own  negation. 

Goro-ias,  who  was  sophist  and  rhetorician,  rep- 
resents  the  negative  phase  of  Sophisticism  (it  has 
other  phases)  better  than  any  one  else,  employ- 


1 1 0        ANCIENT  E  UB  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

ing  speech,  according  to  his  principle,  not  to 
impart  knowledge  or  truth, but  seemingly  the  op- 
posite. But  from  this  point  of  view  he  belongs 
to  a  later  stage  of  Hellenic  Philosophy,  which 
will  be  developed  in  its  proper  place. 

3.  Though  Eleaticism  seems  to  have  vanished 
as  a  school  after  Zeuo,  it  has  remained  an  influ- 
ence through  the  whole  course  of  Philosophy. 
The  attempt  to  get  the  One,  the  true  Being  or  the 
Real  Object  underhung  all  phenomenaUty  has 
always  been  and  probably  always  will  be  a  fasci- 
nation for  the  philosophic  mind.  We  see  it 
working  in  Plato  and  Plotinus,  in  Spinoza  and 
Heo'el,  in  the  modern  movement  from  Monothe- 
ism  to  Monism.  The  eternal,  unchangeable,  im- 
perturbable, self-identical  Being,  without  the 
caprices  of  a  Person,  even  of  a  Divine  Person, 
works  with  a  mighty  spell  at  times  over  every 
human  soul. 

The  influence  of  Eleaticism  goes  out  directly 
upon  the  succeeding  Greek  thinkers  and  helps 
determine  their  various  systems,  which,  however, 
will  seek  to  avoid  its  pitfall,  namely,  the  asser- 
tion of  the  non-existence  of  the  phenomenal 
world.  At  the  same  time  the  Eleatic  concept  of 
Being  eternal,  immutable,  ever  the  One  and  the 
Same,  will  not  be  lost,  but  will  be  taken  as  the 
essence  of  all  things  changeful  and  finite.  In 
other  words,  the  negative  side  of  Eleaticism,  hav- 
ing undone  itself,  will  be  dropped,  but  its  posi- 


THE  ELBA  TIO  MO  YEMEN  T.  Ill 

tive  principle  will  persist,  and  will  show  itself  in 
the  systems  of  Empedocles  and  the  Atomists, 
and  thence  will  pass  into  Attic  Philosophy. 

4.  We  are  to  keep  in  mind  that  Eleaticism 
still  belongs  to  the  elemental  stage  of  Hellenic 
Thought.  It  has  a  phj'sical  substrate  and  is 
not  free  of  a  material  suggestion.  Parmenides 
conceives  his  Pure  Being  as  existent  in  space,  as 
a  sphere  extended  on  all  sides  from  a  center. 
Indeed  his  Pure  Being  would  seem  to  find  its 
best  physical  counterpart  in  Pure  Space,  which 
is  itself  the  abstraction  from  all  physical  deter- 
minations, and  is  still  considered  physical.  In 
fact  all  this  early  Greek  thinkmg,  which  we  have 
called  elemental,  could  not  stand  alone,  as  it 
were ;  it  had  to  have  a  support  or  prop  in  Matter ; 
this  material  hypostasis  is  doubtless  etherealized 
in  Pure  Being,  still  is  never  quite  absent. 

5.  Eleaticism  is  the  complete  reaction  against 
the  caprice  of  an  all-controlling  Will,  in  favor  of 
the  immutable,  eternal,  impersonal  Law  which  is 
the  essence  of  the  Universe.  So  absolute  and 
autocratic  is  it  that  it  does  not  allow  change  to 
exist ;  external  mutation  and  inner  caprice  are 
swallowed  up  and  disappear  in  this  all-de- 
vouring Eleatic  One,  which  alone  is.  Herein 
philosophic  Europe  affirms  its  entire  separation 
from  theistic  Asia  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the 
other  makes  the  complete  abstraction  from  the 
particular,  phenomenal  world.     The    changeless 


1 1 2         ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PBIL O SOPHY. 

Eleatic  character  is  in  strong  contrast  to  the 
vohitile  Ionic  Milesian,  who,  indeed,  as  Greek 
called  for  the  one  essence  of  all  things,  but 
deemed  it  to  be  a  particular,  changeful  element, 
like  water  or  air,  thus  falling  back  into  the 
opposite  of  what  his  question  demanded. 

6.  The  fact  should  also  be  noted  that  Elea  in 
Italy  is  half  way  across  Europe,  far  from  the 
Asiatic  border,  and  is  thus  emphatically  Euro- 
pean in  location.  Still  further,  Elea  is  a  neigh- 
boring city  to  Rome,  which  had  been  founded 
some  three  hundred  years  when  the  Eleatic  Phi- 
losophy was  in  bloom,  and  which  had  already 
felt  a  Greek  influence  from  the  cities  of  South- 
ern Italy.  In  450  B.  C.  Rome  is  said  to  have 
sent  three  embassadors  to  Greece  for  the  purpose 
of  studying  its  laws.  The  Ronum  in  these  early 
days  seems  to  have  had  a  premonition  of  his  his- 
toric vocation  as  lawgiver  to  the  world.  The 
Eleatic  Philosophy  with  its  immutable  and  im- 
personal One  as  the  Law  ot  the  Universe  is  a 
kind  of  prophes}^  of  the  universal  Roman  Law, 
which  makes  practical  this  Greek  thought.  Yet 
both  are  Italic,  — the  Eleatic  Philosophy  and  the 
Roman  Law  —  and  suif^est  the  character  and  the 
work  of  ancient  Italy  in  its  two  aspects,  theoreti- 
cal and  practical,  or  its  Intellect  and  its  Will. 
Thus  we  observe  again  that  Philosophy  is  always 
found  in  an  institutional  setting,  which  it  ex- 
presses for  the  present  or  for  the  future.     Elea 


THE  INTER-CONNECTING  MOVEMENT.      HS 

formulated   the    already    existent    aspiration    of 
Eoman  Italy. 

7.  But  the  Eleatic  One,  as  the  fixed  and 
changeless,  is  separated  from  the  Manifold,  and 
excludes  from  itself  all  Change,  whereby  it  shows 
itself  incomplete,  and  so  a  part  of  a  process 
which  is  higher  and  more  complete. 

C.  The     Inter-connecting    (or    the    Inter- 
colonial) Movement. 

The  previous  Eleatic  Movement  denies  all 
Movement,  denies  itself  to  be  a  Movement,  and 
so  goes  to  pieces  of  its  own  inner  contradiction. 
It  is  followed  by  a  Movement  whose  fundamental 
principle  is  to  assert  Movement,  or  the  Process, 
or  more  abstractly,  the  Becoming.  But  here  a 
new  question  comes  up :  What  is  the  cause  or 
essence  of  the  Becoming?  Three  different  an- 
swers will  be  given  to  this  question  in  the  present 
Movement,  which  answers  will  in  themselves 
show  a  process,  which  we  name  as  above. 

We  employ  the  second  adjective  in  the  fore- 
going caption  in  order  to  suggest  a  designation 
which  corresponds  with  the  title  of  the  two  pre- 
ceding Movements  (Milesian  and  Eleatic,  or 
East-colonial  and  West-colonial),  both  of  which 
are  named  according  to  their  locality.  So  the 
term  Inter-colonialis  intended  to  call  to  mind  that 
this  third  Movement  unites  within  itself  Greek 


114         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

colonies  both   East  and  West,  Ionic,  Italic  and 
Sicilian. 

The  term  Inter-connecting  is  employed  to  sug- 
gest in  a  general  way  the  inner  character  of  the 
present  movement,  in  contrast  to  the  two  preced- 
inor  ones,  which  were  single  and  isolated,  each 
taking  place  in  one  city  substantially  by  itself. 
But  now  we  shall  find  three  different  Philoso- 
phies, each  in  its  own  locality  forming  a  Move- 
ment under  the  lead  of  three  different  Philoso- 
phers, so  that  we  behold  a  trinity  both  of  persons 
and  their  doctrines  as  well  as  of  places.  These 
are  in  order  the  doctrine  of  Heraclitus,  who  was 
born  in  Ephesus,  Asia  Minor;  the  doctrine  of 
Pythagoras  who  was  ])oru  in  Samos  but  migrated 
to  Italy ;  the  doctrine  of  Empedocles  whose  life 
was  passed  at  Agrigentum  in  Sicily. 

If  we  notice  these  localities  in  relation  to  one 
another,  we  find  that  they  lie  on  the  border  in  a 
peripheral  line  drawn  around  and  inclosing  the 
Hellenic  world-  All  of  these  are  colonies  (as 
were  likewise  Miletus  and  Elea),  and  thus  show 
what  is  called  an  Inter-colonial  Movement. 
Moreover  we  observe  a  repetition  of  the  transfer 
of  Philosophy  from  the  extreme  East  of  the 
Greek  frontier  to  the  extreme  West,  such  as  was 
noted  in  the  transition  from  Miletus  to  Elea. 
The  same  change  from  lonism  to  Dorism,  but 
more  emphatic,  takes  place.  So  we  go  back 
again   to   Asia   Minor,     for   our   starting-point, 


THE  INTER-  CONNECTING  MOVEMENT.      1 1  •> 

which  is  a  single  city ;  next  the  migration  of 
Pjlhagoras  draws  a  line  from  East  to  West,  in- 
dicating their  separation ;  finally  the  Movement 
comes  to  a  close  in  a  single  city,  Sicilian  Agrigen- 
tum.  In  these  outer  local  facts  the  reader  will 
find  a  hint  of  what  takes  place  spiritually. 

This  Inter-connecting  Movement  will  show  its 
character  in  three  different  ways.  First  its  dif- 
ferent doctrines  svill  be  found  to  be  related  to 
those  of  the  two  previous  Schools;  secondly,  its 
three  Philosophies  will  be  joined  together  in  one 
pyschical  process  (Psychosis)  ;  thirdly,  this  pro- 
cess will  show  itself  to  be  the  third  stage  of  a  still 
greater  process  which  embraces  the  Milesian  and 
the  Eleatic  Schools.  This  is  the  process  of 
Elementalism,  that  is,  of  Being  as  elemental, 
which  has  been  already  designated  as  the  first 
stage  of  the  Hellenic  Period  of  Greek  Philoso- 

The  problem  which  chiefly  calls  forth  the  phi- 
losophizing of  this  Movement  may  be  general- 
ized as  the  Becoming.  TheEleatics  worked  over 
Being  which  was  the  unchangeable  essence,  while 
Non-Being,  as  Muliplicity,  Change,  Matter  did 
not  exist  for  them.  Still  they  had  always  to 
pre-suppose  this  Non-Being  in  order  to  reach 
their  Being  by  some  form  of  abstraction.  If 
they  attained  Being  by  negating  Non-Being, 
surely  the  latter  had  to  be  in  order  to  be  negated. 
Hence  the  next  step  in  thinking  was    to  aiSrm 


116         ANCIENT  E  UliOPEAN  PHIL OSOPEY. 

explicitly  the  Being  of  Non-Being.  Therewith 
the  Eleatic  stage  was  definitely  transcended,  and 
a  new  Movement  of  Thought  opened. 

This  is  the  present  Inter-connecting  Move- 
ment, in  which  we  find  three  different  Philoso- 
phies connected  together  as  follows  :  — 

1.  That  of  Heraditus.  The  Becoming  is 
immediate;  all  is  in  a  state  of  flux,  or  change. 

2.  That  of  the  Pythagoreans.  The  Becoming 
or  Change  is  mediated  or  controlled  by  Number, 
which  is  the  essence  of  all  Being.  But  Number 
in  its  turn  becomes,  or  changes,  hence  there  are 
two  Becomings,  the  mathematical  and  the  ma- 
terial. 

3.  That  of  Empedodes.  The  Becoming  exists 
immediately  as  change  or  the  flux,  but  has  within 
it  as  cause  or  essence,  not  Number,  but  the  four 
elements,  fire,  air,  earth  and  water  (not  fire 
or  air  or  water  singly,  as  other  philosophers 
before  Empedocles  had  said).  These  four  ele- 
ments, themselves  unchangeal)le,  produce  all 
Change  or  Becoming  by  separation  and  com- 
bination. 

In  these  three  Philosophies  we  are  to  catch  the 
psychical  movement  which  not  only  inter-con- 
nects them,  but  joints  them  into  the  total  move- 
ment of  Phihvsophy.  Empedocles  seeing  or 
feeling  that  there  was  just  as  much  Change  or 
Becoming  in  number  as  in  matter,  renounced  the 
Pvthagorean  explanation   of  Nature,   and    went 


THE  IN TEB-  C ONNE C TIN G  MO  VEMENT.      1 1 7 

back  to  pure  Becoming  (that  of  Heraclitus),  and 
sought  to  explain  it  with  all  its  qualitative  trans- 
mutations by  means  of  the  four  primary  ele- 
ments already  noted. 

1.  Heraclitus.  He  was  of  Ionic  Ephesus,  on 
the  eastern  border  of  Hellas,  opposite  to  Italic 
Elea,  to  whose  philosophers  he  was  in  like  man- 
ner opposite.  For  they  affirmed  that  Being  alone 
is  and  that  Non-Being  is  not.  But  Heraclitus 
emphatically  declares  the  Being  of  Non-Being 
against  Parmenides,  though  the  latter  had  implied 
it  in  his  very  denial,  as  was  noted  above.  Then 
Heraclitus  also  affirmed  the  counterpart  to  the 
foregoiuo;  declaration  when  he  proclaimed  the 
Non-Being  of  Being,  which  is  really  the  outcome 
of  Zeno's  Dialectic.  For  Zeno,  when  he  showed 
the  Non-Being  of  the  Many,  showed  implicitly 
the  Non-Being  of  Being,  since  the  Many  is. 
Heraclitus,  therefore,  undoes  Eleaticism  from 
two  sides,  through  its  two  chief  representatives, 
showing 

1.  The  Being  of  Non-Being  against  Parmen- 
ides. 

2.  The  Non-Being  of  Being  against  Zeno. 

3.  Their  union  in  the  Becoming,  which  gives 
the  doctrine  of  Heraclitus. 

Of  the  life  of  Heraclitus  very  little  is  known ; 
he  is  said  to  have  flourished  at  Ephesus  500 
B.  C.  This  date  makes  him  a  contemporary 
of  the  later  Milesians  as  well  as  of  the  Eleatics, 


1 18        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  miLOSOPHY. 

though  older  than  Zeno.  He  withdrew  from  the 
public  life  of  his  city,  iu  contempt  of  its  people. 
Tie  believed  in  fire  a.s  the  First  Principle  and  evi- 
dently had  some  of  it  in  his  tongue  and  in  his 
heart;  he  has  been  called  the  pessimist  among 
these  old  philosophers.  From  antiquity  he 
received  the  title  "the  obscure;"  he  wrote  a 
book  on  his  Philosophy  which  Socrates  read  but 
could  not  understand  fully.  Cicero,  who  evi- 
dently did  not  comprehend  him,  says  he  com- 
posed obscurely  on  purpose,  so  that  he  might 
seem  deep  to  the  vulgar  mind;  a  similar  charge 
is  heard  still  to-day  from  those  who  expect  to 
read  philosophic  works  as  they  do  uewspapei's. 
The  book  of  Ilcraclitus  has  come  down  to  us 
only  in  a  number  of  separate  fragments  wiiich 
have  produced  a  strong  imi)ression  upon  some 
distinguished  thinkers  of  modern  times,  for  in- 
stance Schleiermacher  and  Hegel  and  Lassalle 
the  SociaUst,  the  latter  writing  a  special  work  in 
two  yolumes  upon  the  ancient  Greek  philosopher. 
So  Heraclitus  still  has  a  constituency  of  students, 
if  not  followers. 

His  chief  proposition  runs  thus:  All  flows,  is 
in  a  flux  or  perpetual  movement;  nothing  stays 
the  same.  Directly  opposed  is  this  to  the  Eleatic 
statement  that  All  is  the  One  and  the  Same  —  no 
multiplicity  and  no  motion.  He  declares  that  a 
man  cannot  descend  into  the  same  stream,  indeed 
the  same  man  cannot  descend  into  a  stream,  for 


THE  INTEB  CONNECTING  MOVEMENT.     119 

both  stream  and  man  are  in  the  universal  flux  of 
the  world. 

More   abstractly  stated,   the  thought  is    here 
that  of  the  Becoming,  as  the  continual  unity  and 
interflow  of  Being  and  Non-Being.     For  Being 
is  unceasingly  passing  into  Non-Being,  and  Non- 
Beinof  is  unceasingly  passing    into  Being.     The 
first  is  always  separating  froin  itself  and  going 
over  into  the  second,  which  in  its  turn  is  always 
separating  from  itself  and  returning  to  the  first. 
From  this  we  see  that  Ilcraclitus  has  seized  the 
very  process  of  Being  which  is  in  fact  Being  as  a 
process.     It  is  evident  that  this  process  is  one 
yet  threefold :   first,  is  immediate  unity  ;    second, 
is  the  separation;   third,  is  the  returning  ])hasc. 
There  is  no  stop  in  this  whirl  or  double  whirl  of 
the  universe;   all  is  arising  yet  all  is  ceasing ;   all 
is  being  born  yet  all  is  dying ;   all  is  negative,  yet 
this  negative  is  i)erj)ctually  negating  itself.     Both 
Being  and  Non-Being  have  this  process    within 
themselves ;   hence  we  can  have  a  conception  of 
what  Ilcraclitus  meant  when  he  said  that  Beinr/ 
and  Non-Beinrj  areone — a  statement  reiterated  by 
Hegel  in  the  beginning  of  his  Logic.    Thatis,  they 
are  really  stages  or  phases  of  one  process ;   held 
apart  from  that  process  or  from  each  other,  each 
becomes  contradictory  or  negative  of  itself  and 
passes  into  the  other.     Hence  the  reality  of    Be- 
ing and  Non-Being  can  only  be  their  unity,  their 
process,  which  is  otherwise  called  the  Becoming. 


120         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Through  such  a  hazy  dance  of  abstruse  catego- 
ries the  old  Ephesian  philosopher  leads  us ;  no 
wonder  he  was  named  "  the  obscure,"  the  reader 
will  now  probably  understand  the  epithet.  Still 
let  it  be  affirmed  that  this  thought  of  Heraclitus 
has  been  oug  of  the  most  prolific  in  ancient  Phi- 
losophy. It  asserts  the  primal  process  of  Being, 
or  that  Being  nuist  be  seized  as  a  process,  with 
which  conception  Philoso})hy  makes  a  fresh  be- 
ginning. Zeno  had  this  process  indeed,  but  not 
fully  explicit  and  so  denied  it  in  his  conclusion. 
Heraclitus  affirms  unity  too,  not  as  dead  or  at 
rest,  but  as  a  process ;  Being  is  not  simply  the 
One,  but  the  one  process,  or  the  process  of  the 
One,  which  is  the  Becoming,  which  again  is  both 
neorative  and  self-neo;ative. 

But  Heraclitus  has  also  his  implicit,  uncon- 
scious side.  Reall}'^  it  is  the  process  of  his  own 
thinkinor  which  has  beheld  itself  in  this  external 
process  of  Being  or  the  Becoming.  His  Ego  has 
caught  a  glimpse  of  the  divinely  creative  Ego 
creating  the  Cosmos,  and  has  uttered  the  same 
to  men.  His  process  is  thus  the  Psychosis  in  the 
form  of  Being ;  from  this  point  of  view  we  may 
call  it  the  first  or  immediate  Psychosis  of  Be- 
ing with  its  triune  movement.  Of  any  such  inner 
movement  Heraclitus  was  not  conscious,  nor  was 
any  ancient  philosopher  fully  so.  Still  Heracli- 
tus uncovered  the  primal  psychical  process  of  all 
Being,    and    so    he    has    a   lofty    place    in    the 


TEE  INTEE.CONNECTINQ  MOVEMENT.      121 

unfolding  of  the  Pampsychosis,  the  universal 
creative  principle  which  develops  itself  through 
all  Philosophy,  indeed  through  all  Science  and 
Religion. 

Heraclitus  was,  however,  an  early  Greek  phi- 
losopher, yes  an  Ionian,  and  like  his  class  he  had 
to  have  a  material  substrate  to  his  thinking,  indeed 
one  of  the  elements,  of  which  two  at  least  had 
already  been  taken  by  the  Milesians.  This  ele- 
ment is  Fire,  which  may  be  regarded  as  a  visible 
manifestation  of  his  Becoming,  which  both  arises 
and  ceases  to  be,  is  both  negative  and  self -nega- 
tive, and  leaves  behind  a  new  beginning  which 
may  again  take  fire.  A  still  more  subtle  phj^sical 
principle,  that  of  Time,  Heraclitus  brought  into 
connection  with  his  Becoming.  For  we  can  say 
of  Time  that  while  it  is,  it  is  not,  the  Being  of  it 
is  its  Non-Being  or  Vanishing,  and  its  Vanish- 
ing is  the  return  back  into  itself  as  the  Now. 
Thus  the  ever-vanishing  and  the  ever-returnino; 
Now  is  Nature's  pure  act  of  Becoming  without 
any  material  substrate,  her  primal  form  of  the 
process  corresponding  to  the  thought-form  of  it, 
which  was  termed  the  unity  of  Being  and  Non- 
Being.  Moreover  Heraclitus  imaged  to  himself  a 
process  of  the  elements  in  which  they  were  meta- 
morphosed into  one  another  in  a  cycle :  Fire 
was  condensed  to  Water,  Water  to  Earth,  which 
was  "  the  way  down;"  then  there  was  "  the  way 
up,"  showing    apparently  the  return.     Again  he 


122         ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPHT. 

connected  Fire  with  the  soul,  even  with  the  world- 
soul  ;  the  universe  is  burning,  so  is  man ;  both 
are  in  the  process,  in  the  same  process.  In 
such  fashion  Ilcraclitus  seeths  and  ferments 
darkly,  darkly,  like  the  Cosmos  being  born  out 
of  Chaos;  he  is  his  own  Becoming,  an  incessant 
maelstrom  of  arising  and  departing,  whose  Being 
is  forever  in  a  whirl  into  Non-Being,  and  whoso 
Nou-Beins:  is  forever  in  a  whirl  back  to  Being. 
No  wonder  ho  was  a  pessimist,  for  he  seems  to 
have  been  about  the  most  harassed,  writhing 
restless  soul  of  all  anti(|uity,  if  we  may  judge  by 
those  turbid  and  turbulent  fragments  of  his  al- 
ways becoming  and  never  become:  he  seems  the 
abolute  denial  and  annihilation  of  that  Greek 
serenity  which  we  behold  in  the  art,  in  the  Gods, 
and  in  many  great  characters  of  Hellas.  But 
where  now  is  the  ataraxia  of  Philosophy?  Not 
in  the  Becoming  of  Heraclitus  who  declares  that 
"  War  (polemos)  is  the  father  of  things,"  here 
of  course  the  War  of  all  Creaticm. 

Thus  we  must  put  the  stress  upon  the  strifeful, 
negative  phase  of  Heraclitus,  both  in  doctrine 
and  in  character.  Still  we  are  not  to  think 
that  he  had  not  the  return  and  reconciliation. 
Through  his  war  and  strife  of  the  universe  come 
harmony,  peace,  friendship,  which  after  such 
violent  birth-pangs  ought  to  be  appreciated. 
Heraclitus  has  the  process,  he  knows  that  in  all 
the  hurly-burly  of  Becoming  must  lurk  the  Be- 


THE  IN  TER  -  C  ONKE  C  TIN  a  MO  VEMEX  T.      123 

come,  the  One  and  Eternal.  This  he  names  va- 
riously Necessity,  Law  and  Order,  Reason  (logos) . 
This  Reason  is  for  him  the  divine  process  in  all 
Becoming,  which  process  we  must  participate  in 
if  we  would  know.  Says  he  :  We  act  and  think 
ever^'thing  rightly  according  to  our  participation 
in  the  Divine  Reason ;  if  we  act  and  think  simply 
of  ourselves,  we  are  as  in  a  dream.  Already 
Parmenides  had  said  that  Thinking  and  Being:  are 
one;  Heraclitus  utters  the  same  thought.  But 
neither  of  them  has  yet  separated  the'self-reflect- 
iug  Ego  with  its  process  from  that  of  Being;  sul)- 
ject  and  object  are  still  one  in  their  philosophiz- 
ing, though  we  may  well  suppose  that  a  faint  rift 
of  separation  is  beginning  to  make  itself  felt. 

2.  Pythagoras  and  the  Pythagoreans.  Chro- 
nologically Pythagoras  himself  as  distinct  from 
his  School  belongs  to  the  latter  half  of  the 
sixth  century  B.  C.  He  must  have  been  an 
old  man  in  500  B.  C,  how  many  years  after 
that  time  he  lived  is  uncertain.  He  was  contem- 
porary with  the  Milesian  Anaximander  and  also 
with  the  Eleatic  Xenophanes;  Heraclitus,  though 
doubtless  younger,  could  have  known  him  per- 
sonally. But  the  doctrines  of  all  these  philoso- 
phers belong  in  thought  before  Pj^thagoreanism 
in  its  developed  form. 

Here  we  must  make  a  distinction  between 
Pythagoras  and  his  School.  This  philosopher 
wa3   able   to   raise   up   a   set   of   disciples   who 


124         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

unfolded  his  ideas  to  full  maturity.  The  master 
has  become  so  intergrowu  with  his  pupils  that  it 
is  quite  impossible  to  separate  their  respective 
contributions  to  the  common  body  of  doctrine 
except  in  a  very  few  cases.  Aristotle  who  has 
much  to  say  of  Pythagoreanism  very  rarely  speaks 
of  Pythagoras  by  name  but  of  the  Pythagoreans. 
This  is  so  different  from  his  ordinary  usage 
in  citing  previous  philosophers  that  modern 
historians  of  Philosophy  have  very  generally 
followed  his  example.  This  trait  of  Pythagoras 
is  quite  uu-Greok,  at  least  un-Toiiic.  For  Greece 
specially  developed  the  individual  standing  apart 
and  by  himself,  like  the  statue  of  their  distinctive 
art,  sculpture.  The  Greek  character  has  an  inner 
plastic  form,  within  its  limits  well-rounded 
and  self-sufficing,  the  incarnation  of  individu- 
ality as  such.  Herein  lies  the  source  of  its 
transcendent  merits  as  well  as  of  its  transcendent 
shortcomings.  Pythagoras,  however,  sank  his 
individuality  into  his  School,  imparted  it  to  his 
disciples,  by  whom  it  was  preserved  as  an  imme- 
diate influence  and  presence  for  a  thousand  years. 
To-day  we  read  Plato  and  Aristotle  and  catch 
their  personal  message;  not  so  Pythagoras,  not 
so  Christ;  we  have  to  receive  their  tidings 
through  the  fragmentary  utterances  of  their 
disciples,  who,  as  it  were,  breathe  the  breath  of 
the  master  laden  with  his  word  down  the  ages. 
Pythagoras  was  born  in  the  Ionic    island   of 


THE  INTER-CONKECTING  MOVEMENT.      125 

Samos,  which  lies  not  far  from  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor.  Thus  he  belonged  in  time  and  place  to 
the  great  upspring  of  the  human  spirit,  which  we 
have  already  noted  as  centering  in  Miletus.  It 
was  also  a  time  of  great  commercial  enterprise 
and  distant  voyaging  on  the  part  of  the  lonians. 
There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  Pythagoras 
traveled  extensively  in  the  East,  and  especially 
in  Egypt;  his  later  life  shows  the  influence  of 
such  a  journey,  and  it  was  a  very  easy  and  nat- 
ural thing  to  do  in  those  days,  particularly  from 
Samos,  w^hicli  had  a  large  ~navy  and  cultivated 
navigation  during  the  time  of  its  great  ruler, 
Polycrates,  who  established  the  first  historical 
Thalassocracy  (ruleof  the  sea)  in  Greece.  Of  this 
Samian  monarch,  who  was  connected  by  friendly 
ties  with  Amasis,  the  king  of  Egj'^pt,  Pythagoras 
was  a  prominent  subject,  and  would  certainly  have 
crossed  the  sea  to  the  Nile  in  a  Samian  ship  bearing 
letters  to  king  Amasis,  unless  we  regard  the  young 
philosopher  as  not  feeling  the  least  thirst  for 
knowledge.  Very  improbable,  therefore,  is  the 
skepticism  of  Zeller  in  this  matter. 

The  next  great  fact  of  Pythagoras  is  his  migra- 
tion to  Italy.  He  returned  to  Samos,  and  like 
many  another  traveler  who  has  stayed  away 
from  home  too  long,  he  found  his  country 
uncongenial.  From  his  Oriental  experience  he 
had  acquired  new  ideas  of  life  which  were  not 
altogether  consonant  with  his  Greek,  and   par- 


126         ANCIENT  E  UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

ticularly  not  with  his  Ionic,  environment.  So  in 
his  case,  too,  as  in  that  of  Xcnophanes,  we  may 
see  a  reaction  against  his  surroundings  which 
sends  him  over  the  sea  to  the  now  West  wliere 
was  offered  a  free  licld  for  realizing  his  now  ideas. 
This  is  the  outer  local  separation  of  Pythagoras 
corresponding  to  his  inner  separation,  the  former 
of  which  we  can  imagine  as  a  line  drawn  from 
the  eastern  circumference  of  the  Hellenic  world 
to  the  western. 

"We  may  now  discern  the  outlines  of  the  three 
periods,  undated  yet  visible,  in  the  life  of  Pytha- 
goras. First  is  his  earl}'  work  at  Samos,  doubt- 
less that  of  a  teacher,  who  had  clarified  into 
his  fundamental  doctrine  and  had  announced  it 
in  its  simplest  clomentiiry  form :  Number  is  the 
essence  of  all  things.  This  is  a  Greek  answer  to 
a  Greek  problem ;  it  is  the  response  of  Pytha- 
goras to  the  primal  Milesian  question:  What 
is  ousia  of  the  on?  Such  is,  then,  his  first  or 
pure  Greek  stage,  or  we  may  deem  it  his  Ionic 
stage.  Second  is  the  period  of  his  travels  to  the 
Orient,  accompanied  with  increased  knowledge 
and  with  now  views  of  life  and  new  plans;  but 
his  fundamental  i)rinciple  of  Number  remains  and 
correlates  all  his  added  stores  of  learning  and 
wisdom  from  the  Orient.  Third  is  his  return 
home  and  migration  thence  to  the  Greek  Occi- 
dent, in  which  he  performs  the  great  work  of 
his  life.     The   Greek   cities   of  Southern   Italy 


THE  INTEE-CONNEGTING  MOVEMENT.      127 

constituted  his  chief  field  of  propagandism, 
where  his  society  acquired  great  authority,  even 
to  the  extent  of  obtaining  supreme  pohtical  rule 
in  certain  localities. 

The  fundamental  tenet  of  Pythagoras,  then, 
is  that  Number  is  the  essence  of  all  things.  The 
authorities,  headed  by  Aristotle,  are  agreed  upon 
this  point.  It  is  a  simple  statement,  almost  triv- 
ial; but  on  examination,  difficulties  arise.  Num- 
ber is  affirmed  to  be  not  a  property  or  a  relation 
of  objects;  it  is  their  essence.  Nor  is  it  a  sym- 
bol or  archetypal  pattern  after  which  things  are 
created;  it  is  one  with  them,  it  is  their  essence. 
Number  is  the  true  genus,  the  creative  principle 
of  the  universe,  to  which  it  imparts  order  and 
harmony.  Sensible  objects  are  numbers  made 
manifest,  which,  however,  must  be  at  last  ab- 
stracted from  such  objects  and  seized  in  their 
purity. 

Thus,  Number  is  another  step  on  the  philo- 
sophic path  to  a  supersensible  world,  as  was  also 
the  Pure  Being  of  the  Eleatics.  It  is  likewise 
one  in  essence ;  in  fact  Number  starts  with  the 
essential  One  (Monas),  which  is  now  a  distinct 
and  actual  concept.  With  the  Eleatics  the  One 
as  a  whole  was  not  yet  differentiated  from  Beingr 
as  a  whole.  Hence  the  Pythagorean  One  as 
Number  is  more  developed  and  later  in  thought 
than  the  Eleatic  One  which  is  hardly  yet  a  num- 
ber.    This  fact  is  important  as  it  helps  us  clas- 


128         ANCIENT  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPH  T. 

sify  the  two  systems  aright  -^  the  Pythagoreans 
being  usually  placed  before  the  Eleatics  in  the 
histories  of  Philosophy.  We  shall  further  see 
that  the  Monas  of  the  Pythagoreans  has  a  pro- 
cess within  it,  while  the  Eleatic  One  has  not,  be- 
ing simple  unbroken  identity  from  eternity  to 
eternity. 

But  whence  did  it  get  this  process?  From 
Heraclitus ;  at  least  such  is  its  relation  to  the  Be- 
coming of  Heraclitus,  which  we  have  already  seen 
to  be  the  process  of  Being  as  immediate.  Hence 
Heraclitus  in  thought  is  to  go  before  the  Pytiia- 
goreans,  even  if  he  be  younger  in  age  than  Py- 
thagoras himself ;  also  he  is  to  be  placed  after  the 
Eleatics,  since  he  has  the  process  in  his  Being, 
which  makes  it  the  Becoming.  Thus  we  order 
genetically  these  early  Greek  Philosophies,  each 
according  to  its  first  principle,  as  they  grow  more 
and  more  concrete,  that  is,  as  they  become  more 
and  more  an  expression  of  the  fundamental  move- 
ment of  the  All  (the  Pampsychosis). 

The  Pythagoreans,  accordingly,  made  the  ab- 
straction of  the  essence  from  the  sensuous  world, 
and  called  it  Number.  In  fact  they  abstracted 
the  essence  from  Becoming  and  made  it  a  kind  of 
ideal  Becoming,  or  the  numerical  process,  which 
is,  in  general,  the  Trias.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
Pythagoreans  were  the  first  to  declare  that  the 
process  of  all  things  or  of  the  Universe  is  three- 
fold, though  this  threefoldness  of  theirs  is   com- 


THE  IXTER- CONNECTING  MOVEMENT.      129 

posed  simply  of  numbers,  and  hence  is  an  ex- 
ternal arithmetical  triplicity.  To  be  sure  the 
number  three  was  held  sacred  long  before  Py- 
thagoras, and  in  parts  of  the  Orient,  especially  in 
Egj'pt,  was  divinely  embodied  in  many  Trinities. 
But  the  Pythagorean  view  is  not  a  religion,  but  a 
philosophy;  not  three  persons,  but  three  num- 
bers are  the  essence  or  the  creative  principle  of 
all  things.  Number  was  called  divine,  not  so 
much  because  Number  was  a  God  as  because  God 
was  a  Number,  and  if  any  creating  was  to  be  done 
by  either.  Number  would  create  the  God,  rather 
than  God  the  Number. 

Thus  the  Pythagoreans  split  the  Becoming  of 
Heraclitus  in  twain,  making  two  processes  out 
of  it,  an  ideal  or  numerical  one  and  a  mate- 
rial or  phenomenal  one,  which  latter  was  con- 
trolled, and  indeed  produced  by  the  former. 
Hence  Pythagoreanism  had  a  decided  germ  of 
ideahsm,  and  contributed  an  important  element 
toward  the  Ideas  of  Plato. 

But  mark  well  the  distinction.  A  system  of 
pure  idealism  like  the  Platonic  it  was  not.  Py- 
thao-oreanism  still  held  to  the  elemental  substrate 
for  the  abstraction  of  Number.  Herein  Aristotle 
gives  us  help.  "  Numbers  are  the  things  them- 
selves," and  do  not  stand  apart  from  the  phe- 
nomena like  the  ideas  of  Plato.  Nor  are  they  the 
patterns  or  archetypes  after  which  things  are 
made.     Number  is  a  form  which  is  one  with  its 


130        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

matter.  It  is  uudoubtedly  conceived  as  an  ab- 
straction, but  this  abstraction  is  still  an  element, 
an  element  of  elements.  The  Pythagorean  Num- 
ber is  still  immanent  and  elemental,  not  yet  tran- 
scendent and  spiritual,  as  was  its  later  conception. 
The  separation  was  present,  but  it  was  in  the 
thing,  which  thus  had  two  elements,  a  mathe- 
matical and  a  material.  Or  we  may  say  that  Py- 
thaj^oreanism  had  two  Becomini^s,  that  of  number 
and  that  of  matter,  yet  both  belonged  to  the  one 
thing,  or  to  the  one  Nature  or  Cosmos.  This  is 
the  sense  in  which  we  are  to  grasp  the  formula : 
Number  is  the  essence  of  all  things.  Thought 
has  reached  the  essence,  but  is  as  yet  unable  to  do 
without  the  thing.  Herein  we  see  that  P^thagor- 
eanism  can  not  yet  do  without  the  element,  but  has 
itsphysical  substrate,  and  belongs  to  the  iirst  or  ele- 
mental phase  of  Hellenic  Philosophy.  Moreover 
the  twofoldness  of  the  world,  as  mathematical  on 
the  one  hand  and  phenomenal  on  the  other,  is  the 
fundamental  fact  of  Pythagoreanism,  and  places 
it  in  the  second  stage  of  the  general  movement  of 
the  Becoming,  which  we  have  above  named  the 
Inter-connecting  Movement  (or  Inter-colonial). 

The  greatness  of  Pythagoreanism  and  its  im- 
portance for  human  culture  lies  chiefly  in  its  pe- 
culiar doctrine  of  the  twofoldness  of  all  thingrs. 
One  element  is  the  numerical,  which,  though  it 
has  its  process  within  itself  and  thus  is  a  great 
advance  upon  the  crystallized  Eleatic  One,  is  the 


THE  INTER-OONNECTINQ  MO VEMENT.      1 3 1 

eternal  and  abiding  process  inherent  in  the  phe- 
nomenal side  of  the  universe.  Mathematics  still 
retain  this  characteristic,  and  as  a  discipline  for 
first  bringing  the  mind  to  see  the  fixed  basis  of 
the  world  and  of  itself,  they  can  hardly  be  too 
highly  estimated. 

From  this  general  thought  of  Number  and  the 
numerical  process  as  the  essence  of  all  things, 
the  School  will  build  a  vast  structure,  of  which 
only  a  l^rief  outline  can  be  here  given.  The  de- 
tails are  very  diversified,  often  fantastic,  and  by 
no  means  consistent,  still  we  can  trace  in  them 
the  lineaments  of  a  great  totality.  The  entire 
sweep  of  Pj^hagoreanism  shows  three  stages  or 
divisions,  which,  though  interconnected,  ramify 
and  subdivide  themselves  in  many  directions. 
The  three  main  divisions  pertain  to  learning,  to 
doing,  and  to  living;  we  shall  call  them  the  Math- 
esis,  the  Praxis,  and  the  Askesis  of  Pythagorean- 
ism. 

(1)  yiathesis.  The  word  is  derived  from  a 
Greek  verb,  to  learn,  and  means  the  process 
of  learniusr  or  education.  From  the  same  word 
comes  our  term  JMathemafics,  which  originally 
meant  things  to  be  learned.  The  School  of 
Pythagoras  is  thus  connected  with  the  school 
of  to-day  which  still  retains  as  a  primary  dis- 
cipline the  science  of  numbers.  Indeed  it  looks 
as  if  the  old  Greek  founded  and  organized  the 
school   proper   with  its  essential   branches    (the 


132         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

three  K's),  which  school  has  gone  through  many 
obscurations  in  the  ages  since,  but  has  really 
never  lapsed  in  its  continuity  down  to  the  present. 
In  fact  Pythagoreanisni  may  be  deemed  the  first 
pedagogical  pliilosoi)h\',  and  hence  it  occupies 
a  very  important  phice  in  the  history  of  pedagogy. 

The  first  element  of  this  Mathesis  is  Number, 
which,  as  ah'cad}'  said,  is  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  the  Pythagorean  School,  and  thus  the 
science  of  Number  is  the  fundamental  science, 
which  is  Arithmetic.  This  begins  with  the  con- 
ception of  the  One,  the  Monas,  which  is  not 
simply  an  indifferent  one,  but  is  creative,  divides 
within  itself  and  produces  the  Two  (Dyas)  and 
with  it  all  multiplicity  (or  many  Ones).  Under 
the  Dyas  or  Twouess  the  Pythagoreans  elab- 
orated a  system  of  pairs  or  opposing  categories, 
odd  and  even,  finite  and  infinite,  etc.  Then  came 
the  Three  (Trias),  which  was  a  very  important 
number,  being  considered  the  completeness  and 
reality  of  the  One  (Monas)  which  is  now  a 
return  out  of  Twoness  or  separation  (Dyas) 
and  thereby  becomes  concrete  and  a  process. 
Still  the  Pythagoreans  did  not  stop  with  the 
Trias  but  went  on  with  their  numbers  up  to 
ten  (Decas),  whereby  the  numerical  principle 
showed  its  externality  and  insufloiciency. 

The  second  element  of  the  Pythagorean  Ma- 
thesis  is  the  science  of  Form  (spatial),  and  un- 
folds   into    Geometry.       This    too   sprang  from 


THE  IXTEB-COXXECTIXG  MOVEMEXT.      133 

numbers,  as  follows:  the  spatial  One  (Monas) 
was  the  Point,  the  spatial  Two  (D^^as)  or  separa- 
tion was  the  Line,  while  the  spatial  Three  (Trias) 
was  Surface  inclosed  in  its  simplest  way,  namely 
in  the  triangle.  Out  of  the  triangle  as  right- 
angled  Pythagoras  constructed  the  famous  geo- 
metric proposition  which  still  goes  by  his  name, 
whereby  Number  can  be  applied  to  all  Form, 
spatial  or  material,  and  the  physical  universe  can 
be  measured,  and,  as  it  were,  handled  by  mind. 

This  brings  us  to  the  third  element  of  the 
Mathesis,  measure,  or  what  is  often  called  Ap- 
plied Mathematics.  By  the  aid  of  the  sciences 
of  Number  and  of  spatial  Form  the  Pythagoreans 
began  the  great  work  of  measuring  and  weighing 
the  Cosmos  as  a  whole  and  in  all  its  parts,  of  re- 
ducing Nature  to  a  mathematical  formula  which 
shows  the  order  of  its  working  and  the  means  of 
its  control.  Their  most  celebrated  measurement 
was  that  of  musical  sounds  between  which  they 
ascertained  the  quantitative  proportions  and  thus 
laid  the  basis  of  the  science  of  harmony.  They 
also  carried  these  numerical  proportions  into  the 
heavenly  bodies  whose  motions  were  supposed  to 
produce  sounds  like  a  musical  instrument.  In 
general,  the  Pythagoreans  laid  the  mathematical 
basis  for  Music  and  Astronomy. 

Such  are  the  three  leading  sciences  in  the  school 
of  Pythagoras  —  Arithmetic,  Geometry,  Men- 
suration.    It  was  a  very  solid  course  of  study  for 


134         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

those  early  times  iu  spite  of  many  fantastic  ap- 
l)lications,  to  which  numbers  easily  lent  them- 
selves. This  was  the  intellectual  discipline,  but 
Pythagoreanism  had  an  equally  important  prac- 
tical side,  which  we  must  note :  — 

(2)  Praxis.  Here  the  training  of  the  Will  has 
place,  upon  which  the  Pythagoreans  j)ut  great 
stress,  some  think  tiie  chief  stress,  as  if  regard- 
ing the  ethical  interests  and  needs  of  man  greater 
than  his  intellectual. 

First  of  all,  the  disci[)line  of  the  School  as  a 
social  body  was  very  important.  In  it  was  that 
primal  order  which  sprang  from  Number;  strict 
obedience  was  enforced,  the  authority  of  thePyth- 
agorean  master  has  become  proverbial  iu  the  term 
ipse  di.xit  (aafos  epJia  )  ;  silence  was  enjoined  u])on 
that  most  unruly  Greek  member,  the  tongue. 
Ethical  subordination,  probably  often  with  Doric 
severity,  was  bred  into  the  pupil  by  the  school. 

Secondly,  the  Pj'thagoreans  formulated  a  sys- 
tem of  Morals,  and  inculcated  personal  virtue, 
which,  however,  was  coupled  with  Number.  Aris- 
totle says  that  Pythagoras  was  the  first  who  at- 
tempted "  to  tell  about  virtue,"  but  damaged 
his  theory  on  account  of  "  his  referring  the  vir- 
tues to  numbers."  For  instance,  justice  was  a 
number;  according  to  some  it  was  four,  accord- 
ing to  others  an  other  number.  In  this  capri- 
cious play  with  numbers  lies  the  weakness  of 
Pythagoreanism. 


THE  IXTEE-COXXECTIXG  MOVEMEXT.      135 

Thirdly,  there  was  an  institutional  training 
and  participation  among  the  Pythagoreans. 
They  became  political  leaders,  they  ruled  the 
State,  they  were  law  givers.  They  are  reported 
to  have  favored  aristocracy,  which  was  in 
harmony  with  their  Doric  leanings.  But  the  re- 
sult was  that  the  party  of  democracy  coming  into 
power  in  various  Greek  cities  of  Southern  Italy  - 
banished  them,  so  that  they  were  scattered 
through  the  rest  of  Greece.  Their  School  had 
also  a  religious  side ;  it  was  something  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  church,  to  use  our  term.  So  they 
showed  phases  of  the  three  leading  institutions  — 
School,  State,  and  religious  Institution.  With 
the  Family  the  Pythagorean  order  could  not  have 
very  strong  ties,  though  women  belonged  to  it, 
and  Pythagoras  himself  was  married.  Theano, 
his  daughter  (some  say  his  wife),  was  the  most 
famous  of  Pythagorean  women. 

With  the  religious  and  ethical  aspects  of  Py- 
thagoreanism  is  doubtless  connected  its  doctrine 
of  Metempsychosis.  Why  are  we  here?  The 
soul  on  account  of  its  former  transgression  is 
whelmed  into  flesh  for  punishment,  and  after 
death  may  enter  Cosmos  or  Tartarus  or  be  com- 
pelled to  assume  afresh  some  human  or  animal 
shape.  This  un-Greek  view  is  probably  a  strand 
of  Orientalism  which  Pythagoras  picked  up  in  his 
travels,  and  wove  into  his  doctrine  quite  exter- 
nally, for  it  has  no  inherent  connection  with  his 


136         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

fundamental  category  of  number,  even  if  the 
soul  be  a  number. 

(3)  Askesis.  By  this  somewhat  unusual  word 
we  seek  to  designate  the  Pythagorean  Life  which 
was  the  result  of  both  Mathesis  and  Praxis.  It 
is  possible  for  man  both  to  learn  and  to  act  with- 
out living  in  a  high  sense.  The  school  of  P3lhag- 
oras  sousrht  to  transform  the  life  of  its  mem- 
bers ;  in  this  respect  it  resembles  a  religious  order, 
and  its  founder  has  been  compared  to  the  founder 
of  a  religion.  One  of  its  words  was  palingenesia, 
or  the  second  birth  of  the  soul,  which  may  have 
orisinallv  meant  the  return  of  the  soul  to  the 
body  after  a  period  of  transmigration ;  but  the 
word  must  have  had  also  its  deeper  meaning, 
which  we  designate  by  the  term  regeneration. 
The  end  both  of  the  Mathesis  and  of  the  Praxis 
was  just  this  inward  life  or  character  which  was  to 
transfigure  all  thinking  and  doing,  and  thereby 
reach  the  Askesis.  The  school  evidently  required 
a  probationary  period  in  its  membership ;  not  all 
who  were  highly  capable  of  learning  and  acting, 
were  capable  of  the  Askesis.  Thus  there  arose 
a  continuous  and  vigorous  apostolate  which  per- 
petuated the  school  and  its  doctrine  far  into  the 
Christian  Era. 

In  this  respect  the  work  of  Pj^thagoras  is 
unique  among  these  old  Greek  philosophers. 
A  great  schoolmaster  was  this  first  one,  for  he 
had  a  school   and  he  was  the  master  of  it  with- 


THE  INTER- COXXECTIXa  MOVEMENT.     137 

out  question.  But  his  greatest  deed  was  that 
he  could  rear  other  Pythagorases  to  succeed  him 
and  to  keep  eternally  active  his  work ;  still  fur- 
ther, he  trained  teachers  to  teach  teachers  to  be 
such  as  he  was,  and  so  propagated  his  actual 
presence  and  selfhood  for  so  many  generations 
through  his  school,  which  lived  his  life,  and  prac- 
ticed his  Askesis.  This  was  the  eternal  element 
in  it,  each  member  of  it  became  a  living  Pythag- 
oras through  the  power  of  the  Askesis  which 
he  received  and  transmitted. 

Very  rarely  have  other  schoolmasters  shown 
this  power.  Pestalozzi  had  something  of  it.  But 
the  only  modern  who  has  approached  Pj^thagoras 
in  this  respect  is  Froebel,  who  has  also  his  Math- 
esis  in  his  theroetical  doctrine,  and  his  Praxis  in 
the  manipulation  of  his  instrumentalities  for  the 
training  of  the  child.  But  the  truly  marvelous 
trainino-  in  this  work  is  that  of  the  teacher  or  the 
kindergardner  herself.  Through  the  Mathesis 
and  the  Praxis  she  —  for  the  woman  has  occupied 
the  present  field — attains  the  Froebelian  Askesis, 
which  is  not  simply  a  vocation  but  a  life ;  she  be- 
comes a  kind  of  re-incarnation  of  the  master,  and 
a  most  devoted  apostle  of  his  cause,  having  carried 
it  already  quite  around  the  world  and  kept  it  alive 
and  active  with  consecrated  energy.  To  external 
argumentation  against  her  faith  she  pays  little  heed, 
having  the  witness  of  the  spirit  within ;  she  is  well 
aware  that  she  has  something  which  the  outsider 


138         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHT. 

knows  not  of,  and  that  she  has  gotten  it  through 
her  Froebelian  discipline,  which  has  still  in  it 
much  that  comes  down  directly  from  the  founder. 

So  we  seek  to  bring  before  ourselves  the  last- 
ing element  of  the  Pythagorean  school,  the 
Askesis,  not  very  easy  to  grasp  and  formulate  to 
one's  satisfaction,  yet  the  essential  fact  of  the 
whole  movement.  Still  we  are  by  no  means 
to  neglect  the  other  two  stages,  the  Mathesis 
and  the  Praxis.  The  significance  of  Number  is 
very  great,  being  the  first  mastery  of  Nature, 
or  among  the  first;  a  kind  of  machine  we  may 
consider  it  for  controlling  the  Cosmos,  which 
machine  Pythagoras  had  a  large  part  in  construct- 
ing, and  which  he  set  to  running  quite  on  the 
lines  of  its  future  development. 

Hence  we  may  say  that  the  Pythagoreans 
began  with  Physics  and  sought  an  explanation  of 
Nature  through  Number ;  in  this  sense  they  were 
physicists  and  belonged  to  the  early  Greek  Phi- 
losophers. But  they  had  also  a  metaphysical 
thread  as  well  as  an  ethical  one  in  their  fabric. 
Thus  we  see  the  three  branches  of  Greek  thought 
as  developed  later  —  Metaphysics,  Physics,  and 
Ethics  —  germinating  in  their  system,  though 
it  cannot  well  be  divided  in  this  way.  Still  their 
Mathesis  or  Mathematics  they  carried  over  into 
practice,  and  joined  to  it  previous  religious  con- 
ceptions, and  so  unfolded  the  Askesis  or  the 
Pythagorean  Life. 


TEE  INTER  CONNECTmQ  MOVEMENT. 


139 


It  was  possible  to  participate  in  the  Pytha- 
gorean Askesis,  without  accepting  the  doctrine 
of  Number.  Parmenides  the  Eleatic  is  said  to 
have  received  training  in  the  School  of  Pythag- 
oras, but  to  have  gone  over  to  the  philosophy  of 
Xenophanes.  Still  more  emphatic  is  the  case  of 
Empedocles,  who,  evidently  discontented  with 
^he  doctrine  of  Pythagoras,  felt  himself  com- 
pelled to  found  anew  Phih)sophy,  through  which 
the  onward  movement  of  Greek  speculation  passes 
beyond  Pythagoreanism. 

3.  Empedocles.     We  have  reached   the  third 
sta<^e  of  the  Inter-connecting  Movement,  whose 
locality  is  Agrigentum  in  Sicily,   also    a  Greek 
colony  in  the  West.     The  representative  of  this 
stage   is    Empedocles.     The  exact  dates    of    his 
birth  and  death  are  uncertain,  as  has  been  o1)- 
served  already  of  so  many  of  these  old  philoso- 
phers.    But  the  generally  received  opinion  now 
is  that  he  lived  about  sixty  years,  which  are  placed 
between  494  and  434  B.  C.     He  was  of  aristo- 
cratic lineage,  yet  had  democratic  leanings,  taking 
a  prominent  part  in  the  political  movements  of  his 
city  and  his  time.     He  is  said  to  have  refused  the 
offer  of  kingship  over  his  countrymen. 

Of  his  spiritual  pedigree  there  are  many  diverse 
reports.  The  bloom  of  his  activity  quite  co-in- 
cides  with  that  of  the  Pythagorean  School  in 
Southern  Italy,  though  he  could  not  well  have 
been  a  pupil  of  Pythagoras  himself.     His  writ- 


HO         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ings  certainly  show  an  acquaintance  with  Pytha- 
gorean doctrine;  they  also  indicate  a  reaction 
ao'ainst  that  doctrine  and  a  return  to  Heraclitus 
and  to  the  older  philosophies,  Eleatic  and  Milesian. 
But  the  prime  fact  in  the  ordering  of  the  philos- 
ophy of  Empedocles  is  that  it  is  a  reaction  against 
the  Pj^thagorean  principle  of  number  and  a  going 
back  to  the  physical  element  as  the  principle  of 
Beinsf  in  the  form  of  the  Becoming  of  Heraclitus. 
Thus  we  behold  in  the  Inter-connecting  (Inter- 
colonial) Movement  a  psychical  process  with  its 
three  stages. 

Still  Empedocles  is  by  no  means  the  return  to 
the  simple,  immediate  Becoming  of  Heraclitus, 
else  his  would  be  no  original  philosophy,  but  a 
mere  repetition.  He  carries  along  with  himself 
the  experience  which  he  may  have  obtained,  and 
doubtless  did  obtain,  from  his  Pythagorean 
study :  beneath  the  world  of  change  and  multi- 
plicity, or  of  Becoming,  lies  a  principle  unchang- 
ing, underived,  and  indestructible.  The  Py- 
thagorean number  started  with  being  such  a 
principle,  but  did  not  hold  out.  It  claimed  to 
be  the  essence  underlying  all  change,  but  it  too 
changed  and  showed  itself  derivable,  in  part  at 
least.  At  this  point  we  may  trace  the  dissatis- 
faction of  Empedocles  with  Pythagoreanism,  and 
of  his  turning  back  to  the  Becoming  and  seeking 
a  new  principle  or  new  principles. 

The  peculiarity  of  his  principle  is  that  it  is  not 


THE  INTEB  CONNECTING  MOVEMENT.     141 

one  but  four  —  the  so-called  four  elements, 
which  he  names  the  roots  (^rhizomata)  of  all 
Being,  and  of  which  the  phenomenal  world  in  all 
its  diversity  is  composed  through  combination 
(mixture)  or  separation.  Now  these  four  ele- 
ments are  always  self -identical,  qualitatively 
unchangeable,  which,  however,  produce  all 
qualitative  change  by  mechanical  union  and 
division.  Just  here,  it  should  be  noted,  is  the 
primal  conception  of  the  Atom.  The  elements 
of  Empedocles  might  be  named  the  macrocosmic 
Atoms  but  for  one  difficulty:  they  are  not 
claimed  to  be  indivisible,  nor  are  they  infinitely 
small,  as  is  the  microcosmic  Atom  of  Leucippus 
and  Democritus,  which  is  the  very  next  develop- 
ment of  Philosophy.  So  Empedocles  still  be- 
lono-s  to  the  Elementalists  and  not  to  the 
Atomists ;  indeed  he  is  a  decided  reaction  toward 
earlier  stages  of  Elementalism,  which  he  strives  to 
recover  and  to  harmonize  with  the  new  incoming 
idea,  but  his  struggles  are  really  the  desith 
convulsions  of  the  elemental  epoch  of  Greek 
thinking. 

In  this  genesis  of  the  thought  of  Empedocles 
we  should  further  note  that  the  multiplicity  in 
his  principle  is  a  strain  of  his  Pythagorean  train- 
ing. Number  is  multiplex,  and  hence  as  a  prin- 
ciple of  Being  has  multiplicity.  So  it  comes  that 
Empedocles  preserves  numerical  multiplicity  in 
his  elements,  but  excludes  all  changeability  and 


U2        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PBILO SOPHY. 

derivability.  His  four  elements  have  a  certain 
resemblance  to  four  i)riiuary  numbers,  out  of 
whicli  all  other  numbers  may  be  obtained  by  ad- 
dition and  subtraction.  Of  course  the  compari- 
son does  not  hold  throughout,  since  the  com- 
bination and  separation  of  the  four  elements 
produce  all  qualitative  changes,  and  not  simply 
(juantitative.  In  fact,  Empedocles  doubtless  quit 
Pythagoreanisni  because  he  saw  that  its  play  of 
numbers  could  only  show  quantitative  change, 
but  could  never  account  for  qualitative  change 
or  the  real  Becoming.  Some  writers  also  point 
out  that  the  number  of  the  elements,  four,  allies 
him  to  the  Pythagoreans,  this  number  having  a 
very  important  place  in  their  system  (the  te- 
trad ijs). 

One  other  relation  of  Empedocles  we  may 
mention  as  it  has  been  much  emphasized,  and  in 
our  judgment  over-emphasized.  Some  ancient 
reports  make  him  a  pupil  of  Parmenides  and 
call  him  an  Eleatic.  He  posits  an  unchange- 
able principle  as  his  pure  Being,  as  do  the 
Eleatics;  but  into  this  pure  Being  he  in- 
jects multiplicity,  which  contradicts  at  once  the 
Eleatic  fundamental  category,  which  is  the  One, 
or  the  oneness  of  Being.  It  cannot  be  said  that 
he  denies  Becoming ;  on  the  contrary  he  accepts 
it  and  seeks  to  explain  the  changeability  through 
the  changeless  elements.  He  indeed  denies  in  a 
weU-known  passage  the  ordinary  conception  of 


THE  IKTEB-GONNECTINQ  MOVEMENT.     143 

Death  and  Birth,  "as  it  is  called  among  men;  " 
but  this  is  not  a  denial  of  change,  for  it  is  just 
here  explained  as  "  a  commingling  and  a  separat- 
ing of  things  commingled."  Much  too  great 
stress  has  been  placed  upon  the  Eleaticism  of 
Empedocles  by  the  historians  of  Greek  Philoso- 
phy. The  fact  is,  the  entire  Inter-connecting 
Movement  was  in  opposition  to  Eleaticism  and  a 
going  back  to  the  physical  Elementalism  of  the 
Milesian  (or  Ionic)  School,  from  which  Eleati- 
cism was  a  separation.  K  the  reader  fully  studies 
the  meaning:  of  the  Inter-connecting  Movement 
as  the  third  stage  of  the  total  elemental  process 
of  the  Hellenic  Period,  he  will  see  that  both 
Herachtus  and  Empedocles  as  well  as  the  Pytha- 
goreans participate  in  a  return  to  the  first  or  Mile- 
sian stage  as  above  set  forth.  Still  we  must  not 
forget  that  this  return  is  not  a  relapse,  but  shows 
that  the  third  Movement  has  gone  through  the 
second  (or  Eleatic)  in  order  to  reach  back  and 
take  up  the  first. 

Such  is  the  general  character  of  the  Phi- 
losophy of  Empedocles  and  his  relation  to  his 
predecessors.  But  he  has  other  doctrines,  not 
all  of  which  can  be  brought  into  organic  con- 
nection with  his  fundamental  thought.  The 
general  process  of  his  thought  may  be  seen  in  the 
following  outline. 

I.  The  Becoming  as  such,  or  as  immediate 
furnishes  the  problem    of   his    system.     In  the 


144         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  rHILOSOPHY. 

technical  languasre  of  the  time  he  aflSrms  that 
both  Being  and  non-Being  exist,  with  perpetual 
interchange  into  each  other.  But  he  also  holds 
to  a  principle  changeless  underneath  all  change ; 
to  discover  and  to  categorize  this  principle  con- 
stitutes the  salient  fact  of  his  Philosophy. 

II.  Tlie  four  elements,  fire,  air,  earth,  and 
water  are  the  original  principle  (or  principles) 
which  are  given,  presupposed,  hence  uncreated 
and  indestructible  as  well  as  unchangeable. 
They  are,  however,  divisible  and  combinable, 
though  an  empty  space  between  them,  such 
as  the  Void,  seems  expressly  denied.  Still  he  has 
pores  between  his  small  particles  which  are  like- 
wise invisible.  In  all  these  matters  Empedocles 
is  very  uncertain  and  inconsistent,  but  it  is 
astonishing  how  near  he  approaches  to  Atomism. 
He  was  a  contemporary  of  Leucippus  though  less 
mature  than  the  latter  in  his  thought.  There 
was  apparently  no  attempt  to  reduce  his  four  to 
one  element. 

III.  Finallv,  the  question  must  arise,  what  is 
the  power  commingling  and  separating  these  four 
elements,  and  thus  producing  the  changeful  phe- 
nomenal world?  Here  again  Empedocles  pre- 
supposes or  picks  up  from  the  outside  two  new 
principles  —  Love  and  Hate.  He  hardly  consid- 
ers them  as  dynamic,  but  rather  as  corporeal ; 
really  they  are  for  him  two  new,  active  elements, 
in  addition  to  the  previous  four,  which  seem  to 


ATOMISM.  161 

every  man  has  to  have  a  capricious  microcosm 
within  himself,  whereby  every  Ego  becomes  a 
world-swallowiug  vortex  which  can  only  end  by 
swallowing  itself. 

This  Caprice  of   Atomism  is  what   the   next 
stage  of  thinking  (which  we  call  Universalism) 
must  transcend.     Each  atomistic  Ego  asserts  its 
own  subjective  criterion  as   final,    and   so   must 
sooner  or  kter  get  into  conflict  with  its  neighbor 
who  is  also  a  self-asserting  atomistic  Ego.     This 
is  indeed  the  picture  of  the  Greek  world  at  the 
present  period   (just    before  the    Peloponnesian 
War) ;   all  Hellas    shows   the  tendency   to  turn 
atomistic  politically    and  socially,  as  well  as  in- 
tellectually.    The  counter-revolution,  as  we  shall 
see  later,  was  headed  by  Socrates,  and  is  what 
constitutes  mainly  his  epoch-making  appearance 
in  the  philosophic  world. 

We  may  now  see  that  the  process  of  Atomism 
is  to  individuate  the  All  or  the  Universe  in  its 
three  grand  divisions  —  Nature,  God  and  Man. 
To  be  sure,  this  is  not  done  in  the  purest  and 
highest  fashion;  still  in  a  general  way  we  can 
see  that  Cosmical  Atomism  deals  with  Nature, 
Noetic  Atomism  with  the  Divine  Eeason  {Nous) 
and  Egoistic  Atomism  with  Man.  So  we  must 
come  to  the  thought  that  Atomism  in  the  three 
stages  of  its  psychical  process  reflects,  even  if 
faintly,  the  triple  movement  of  the  whole  Uni- 
verse (or  the    Pampsychosis).     The    details  of 

11 


162  "     ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

this  process  we  may  now  look  into  more  fully  in 
the  following  exposition,  which  will  illustrate  the 
points  briefl}'^  touched  upon  in  the  present  gen- 
eral introduction  to  Atomism. 

A.  Cosmic AL  Atomism. 

As  already  noted,  there  are  three  kinds  or  rather 
stages  of  Atomism,  each  of  which  is  to  be  desig- 
nated by  an  adjective  characterizing  it.  Cosmi- 
cal  Atomism  connects  directly  with  Empedocles 
whose  four  elements  pass  over  into  innumerable 
Atoms  which  compose  the  Cosmos.  So  now  the 
essence  of  Being  is  affirmed  to  l)e  the  Atom  as 
cosmical,  which  has  to  be  tJiougJit,  not  sensed,  as 
a  material  object. 

Hence  it  comes  that  this  kind  of  Atomism  is 
often  called  materialistic  Atomism  since  it  has 
been  a  chief  source  of  what  is  known  as  a  mate- 
rialistic view  of  the  world.  But  it  may  be  also 
designated  as  ideo-pliysical,  since  the  Atom  is 
ideal,  purely  a  conception  of  the  mind,  though  it 
is  conceived  to  be  physical.  Thus  it  is  the  con- 
cept materialized,  or  rather  the  Ego  itself  put 
iuto  a  material  form  and  made  the  fundamental 
constituent  of  the  universe.  One  of  the  books 
of  Democritus  is  said  to  have  been  entitled 
"  Concerning  Ideas,"  and  by  Ideas  he  must  have 
meant  Atoms,  curiously  paralleling  Platonic  Ideas 
with  a  material  counterpart,   which   must   have 


COSMIOAL  ATOMISM.  163 

been  a  horrible  phantasm  to  the    idealist  Plato, 
who  was  a  younger  cotemporary  of  Democritus. 

It  should  also  be  added  that  Cosmical  Atomism 
is  essentially  microcosmic  (micros,  small)  in  con- 
trast to  the  preceding  elementary  stage  which 
is  macrocosmic.  Cosmical  Atomism,  however, 
looks  at  the  large  world  also,  but  reduces  it  to 
the  small,  the  Atom,  which  is  the  unit  underlying 
all  change.  The  endeavor  is  to  get, down  to  the 
primal  One  out  of  which  the  universe  is  built, 
to  find  the  pattern  brick  which  enters  into  every 
construction  of  nature's  architecture. 

Cosmical  Atomism  is  chiefly  connected  with 
two  names,  Leucippus  and  Democritus.  Of  the 
former  little  is  known,  but  he  was  probably  the 
founder  and  first  teacher  of  the  system,  while 
the  latter  was  his  pupil  and  chief  expositor. 
Leucippus  left  few  if  any  writings ;  he  was  evi- 
dently the  creative  spirit  and  the  oral  teacher, 
Hke  Socrates ;  while  Democritus  was  the  scribe, 
the  literary  apostle  of  the  atomistic  doctrine,  hav- 
ing written  a  vast  number  of  books,  all  of  which 
have  perished  except  fragments.  In  later  an- 
tiquity Leucippus  seems  to  have  been  quite  for- 
gotten, but  our  own  time  has  restored  him  to  his 
place  as  founder,  as  well  as  revived  his  Philoso- 
phy, making  it  the  basis  of  Natural  Science. 
Thus  the  Atom,  brought  into  the  world  of  thouo-ht 
through  Leucippus,  has  shown  itself  very  per- 
sistent. 


164        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Democritus,  the  pupil,  was  born  about  460 
B.  C.  He  asserted,  according  to  Diogenes  Laer- 
tius,  that  he  was  forty  years  3'ounger  than  An- 
axaojoras  who  is  likewise  declared  to  have  been  a 
pupil  of  Leucippus ;  from  the  latter,  accordingly, 
proceeded  two  chief  streams  of  Atomism.  This 
fact  puts  Leucippus  into  a  high  rank  as  a  mind- 
fcrtilizino;  oenius.  Doubtless  the  third  stream  of 
Atomism,  the  sophistic,  was  strongly  influenced 
also  by  Leucippus  in  the  person  of  Protagoras, 
who  came  from  Abdera,  where  Democritus  was 
born  and  where  Leucippus  taught.  The  historic 
facts  about  these  men  are  hazy  and  uncertain, 
still  they  show  a  tendency  to  lead  back  to  Leu- 
cippus as  the  fountain-head  of  all  three  stages  of 
Atomism  —  the  Cosmical,  developed  by  Democ- 
ritus, the  Noetic,  developed  by  Anaxagoras,  and 
the  Egoistic,  represented  most  prominently  by 
the  sophist  Protagoras.  The  home  of  Leucip- 
pus is  variously  stated  as  Miletus  in  the  east,  Elea 
in  the  west,  and  Abdera  in  the  north ;  he  was 
evidently  a  wandering  teacher,  a  prototype  of 
the  later  Greek  sophist  or  of  the  medieval  roving 
scholastic.  His  teacher,  or  one  of  his  teachers, 
is  said  by  Simplicius  to  have  been  Parmenides, 
and  Atomism  is  distinctly  a  development  out  of 
Eleaticism,  though  connected  with  other  early 
Greek  philosophies.  Very  mistily  but  hugely 
the  outlines  of  a  great  character  loom  up  out  of 
this  early  Greek  age  in  the  person  of  Leucippus, 


COSMICAL  ATOMISM.  165 

a  kind  of   roaming  Socrates  ready  to  plant  his 
thoughts  in  any  congenial  mind. 

The  chief  fact  of  Cosmical  Atomism  is  that  it 
puts  the  immediate  or  outer  world  through  the 
process  of  individuation.  It  takes  nature  or 
matter,  and  subjects  it  to  the  principle  of  di- 
vision till  it  finds  the  undivided  or  the  indivisible, 
which,  however,  it  can  find  only  as  a  concept  or 
thought.  This  is  the  individual  of  nature  —  the 
Atom,  being  the  ultimate  unitary  principle  of  the 
Cosmos.  Hence  we  have  Cosmical  Atomism, 
which  also  has  its  process. 

1.  The  Atom.  The  starting-point  being  ob- 
tained, the  Atom  may  be  given  its  predicates. 
It  has  no  beginning  or  end,  it  becomes  not  but 
is,  wherein  we  see  the  assertion  of  Eleaticism 
against  Heraclitism.  It  is  the  absolutely  given, 
the  pre-supposed,  not  derived,  not  perishable, 
the  one  persistent  identical  thmg  in  the  Cosmos. 
It  is  not  divisible,  has  no  space  or  pores  within 
it,  which  would  imply  separation  and  division 
inside  of  it;  it  is  unchangeable,  self -identical, 
excludes  all  inner  transformation ;  also  it  is  im- 
penetrable, for  that  would  mean  divisibility. 
Each  is  wholly  separate,  stays  by  itself,  individ- 
ualized, yet  all  have  the  same  common  charac- 
teristic, hence  they  are  simple,  homogeneous. 
Such  is  the  germ  of  all  Atomism,  or  of  Being  as 
individual. 
la  these    numerous    predicates   there    is  one 


166        ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

effort  and  one  purpose :  all  separation  and  vari- 
ety must  be  taken  out  of  the  Atom,  so  that  no 
form  of  division  can  penetrate  the  same.  Im- 
penetrable, indivisible,  unchangeable,  imperish- 
able —  every  one  of  these  terms  is  a  negation 
of  the  separated  and  manifold,  and  an  assertion 
of  the  One  which  is  the  Atom.  This  is,  accord- 
ingly, the  denial  of  the  elemental  principle  of 
previous  Philosophies,  which  always  became 
self -contradictory,  since  it  claimed  to  ])e  the  one 
essence,  yet  turned  out  to  be  manifold  in  the  end. 

Thus  it  is  that  all  inner  difference  is  sought  to 
be  eliminated  from  the  atom.  We  have  seen 
this  same  purpose  in  the  Pure  Being  of  the  Ele- 
atics.  But  as  the  Atom  is  to  constitute  the 
world  and  all  its  variety  (which  is  difference), 
the  question  rises:  How  does  this  difference  get 
to  be?  It  is  on  the  Atom,  not  in  it;  hence  the 
Atom  has  an  infinite  difference  of  form,  and  for 
this  reason  it  was  also  called  a  Form  or  an  Idea 
by  Democritus,  as  already  noted.  Atoms  were 
likewise  said  to  be  distinguished  from  each  other 
by  their  size  and  weight:  in  which  statement  the 
theory  begins  to  contradict  itself,  for  difference 
is  gettino;  inside  the  Atom. 

Through  the  infinitely  diverse  combinations  of 
these  Forms  (Atoms)  there  will  be  produced  all 
qualitative  differences  in  the  world.  Every  phe- 
nomenon will  be,  from  this  point  of  view,  caused 
by   an    arrangement   of   the   Atoms  peculiar  to 


COSMIC AL  ATOMISM.  167 

itself;  the  Atoms  do  not  change  in  themselves, 
but  their  order  changes.  Accordingly  there 
must  be  conceived  in  addition  a  place  for 
changes  outside  of  the  Atoms. 

2.  The  Void.  This  is  the  second  principle  of 
Atomism,  usually  known  by  its  dual  name,  the 
Full  and  the  Void,  or  the  Atom  and  the  empty 
space  around  the  Atom. 

Through  the  Void  the  Atoms  are  separated 
externally,  and  are  preserved  as  individuals.  Thus 
separation  is  put  outside  of  them,  yet  they  are 
given  a  field  of  movement  and  arrangement. 
Points  of  contact  between  Atoms  seem  to  have 
been  allowed,  but  there  was  no  entrance  to  this 
Holy  of  Holies.  The  universe  might  crash  to 
pieces,  the  Atom  was  safe  in  its  citadel,  guarded 
by  an  impassable  barrier,  the  Void,  which,  we 
must  remember,  is  also  a  conception,  being  in- 
visible on  account  of  its  smallness. 

Still  the  Void,  though  a  conception,  was  con- 
ceived as  real,  just  as  real  as  the  Atom.  Accord- 
ingly the  Atomists  declare  that  Non-Being  (which 
is  the  Void)  is,  or  has  Being — .  wherein  the  doc- 
trine departs  from  the  Eleatics  (who  affirm  that 
Non-Being  is  not)  and  agrees  with  Heraclitus, 
whose  Becoming  the  atomic  principle  seeks  to 
explain. 

The  possibility  of  change,  being  excluded  from 
the  Atom,  is  restored  by  the  Void,  in  which  the 
changeless  Atoms  can  combine  mechanically  and 


168        ANCIENT  EUROPEAX  PniLOSOPHT. 

produce  all  the  manifold  diversity  of  the  world. 
Herein  we  see  the  fundamental  purpose  of  Atom- 
ism :  to  reduce  the  varied  multiplicity  of  Na- 
ture to  Atoms  for  the  purpose  of  knowing  it. 
Science  is,  according  to  the  Atomists,  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  qualitativo  to  the  quantitative,  v.'hereby 
it  can  be  counted  and  measured. 

We  have  obtained  the  Atom  and  a  place  for  it 
to  move  in ;  now  follows  the  question,  what  moves 
it?  Plerewith  we  come  to  the  third  presupposi- 
tion of  Atomism  —  Motion. 

3.  The  Vortex.  Each  Atom  is  moving,  is  en- 
dowed with  motion  from  all  eternity,  and  cannot 
help  moving,  motion  being  itself  eternal.  Thus 
the  changeless  One  of  Nature  is  perpetually 
changing  its  place  in  the  Void,  making  new  com- 
binations and  producing  new  phenomena.  De- 
mocritus  seems  to  have  ascribed  weight  to  his 
Atoms,  so  that  they  were  moved  by  gravitation, 
thus  there  is  a  perpetual  fall  of  the  Atoms.  In 
this  fall  they  impinge  upon  one  another,  and  from 
the  collision  and  recoil  arises  the  grand  whirl  of 
the  Atoms  (dinos,  vortex),  the  circular  movement 
in  the  macrocosm  as  well  as  in  the  microcosm. 

In  this  atomic  maelstrom  there  was  no  design 
or  end,  for  Democritus  specially  opposed  the 
telism  of  Anaxagoras,  of  which  we  shall  speak 
later.  Hence  there  was  an  element  of  chance  in 
this  collision  of  the  Atoms.  Yet  also  an  element 
of   necessity,   for  their  fortuitous  meeting   and 


COSMICAL  ATOMISM.  169 

clashing  terminated  in  the  whirl.  Democritus 
uses  even  the  word  logos  (Reason)  to  express 
this  overruling  necessity.  Still  the  grand  fact 
of  the  Cosmos  is  the  masquerade  of  the  Atoms, 
full  of  external  caprice  as  regards  movement, 
even  if  this  everlasting  mutual  jostling  turns  into 
the  universal  gyration. 

The  scheme  of  Cosmical  Atomism  would  seem 
not  to  be  well  adapted  for  Ethics,  still  Democ- 
ritus had  his  ethical  writings.  But  they  could 
Hardly  have  been  an  integral  part  of  his  system ; 
he  was  the  cotemporary  of  Socrates  and  Plato 
whose  thought  was  so  strongly  ethical,  and  he 
naturally  responded  to  a  call  of  his  time,  even  if 
this  was  not  a  call  of  his  doctrine.  He  also 
speaks  of  the  Gods,  though  they  are  quite  abol- 
ished by  his  Philosophy.  But  he  is  not  the  only 
philosopher  who  injects  unassimilated  material 
into  his  system. 

The  soul  is  composed  of  Atoms  according  to 
Democritus,  of  the  fine,  smooth  and  round 
Atoms,  which  adjectives  pertain  to  no  inner 
quality  but  only  to  externa}  form  and  size.  In  fact 
the  soul's  Atoms  are  those  of  fire,  are  endowed 
with  motion  and  hence  able  to  produce  motion 
by  contact,  for  they  have  no  power  to  originate 
motion  in  themselves.  From  this  we  can  see 
the  eround  of  his  assertion  tliat  soul  was  innna- 
nent  in  all  things,  inasmuch  as  it  was  ultimately 
reducible    to    Atoms     with     their     movement. 


170        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Here  we  note  the  great  difference  between  him 
and  Anaxagoras,  who  placed  a  transcendent 
power  {Xous)  over  his  Atoms. 

In  general,  we  observe  that  there  are  three 
pre-suppositions  or  postulates  in  Cosmical  Atom- 
ism—  the  Atom,  the  Void,  and  Motion.  All 
three  are  assumed  as  original,  eternally  existent, 
uncaused.  Then  the  three  together  form  a 
triple  process,  which  is  the  atomic  whirl,  world- 
producing.  Creation  in  all  its  variety  is  the 
mechanical  concourse  of  Atoms;  to  see  this 
supersensible  mechanism  is  knowledge.  Atom- 
ism in  its  [)resent  sphere  atomizes  the  Cosmos, 
reduces  it  to  the  irreducible  unit,  which  is  the 
cosmical  individual  (Atom). 

We  are  impelled  to  look  into  the  origin  and 
nature  of  this  Cosmical  Atom.  The  difficulty 
with  the  preceding  elemental  philosophies  was 
that  their  essence  or  principle  was  always  divis- 
ible, hence  manifold  and  changeable,  and  there- 
fore no  true  essence  or  principle.  But  now  the 
divisible,  through  division  reaches  the  indivisible 
(individual),  which  is  just  the  opposite  of  itself 
(as  element),  and  is  given  only  by  thought.  In 
Cosmical  Atomism,  therefore,  the  mind  begins  to 
create  its  own  principle  of  nature,  and  not  take  it 
as  already  given,  which  we  have  seen  to  be  the  case 
in  the  previous  elemental  stage  of  Philosophy. 
This  is  a  great  step  and  marks  a  very  important 
change  in  the  movement  of  early  thinking. 


COSMICAL  ATOMISM.  1"! 

But  the  Atom  is  conceived  as  natural,  hence 
as  extended,  though  infinitely  small.  But  if 
extended  it  must  be  divisible.  Here  lies  the 
inner  contradiction  which  will  destroy  the  Cos- 
mical  Atom.  As  a  conception  it  has  two  differ- 
ent and  indeed  antagonistic  predicates.  Thus 
difference,  which  was  supposed  to  be  eliminated, 
lurks  in  the  Atom  and  tears  it  in  twain.  After 
all  it  is  twofold  and  self-opposed,  and  must 
cease  to  exist  as  Atom. 

Still  the  Atom  has  a  sphere  of  existence,  as  we 
shall  find  hereafter,  but  this  is  not  the  material 
world.  Only  the  Ego  can  be  self -separated  or 
self-opposed,  and  exist.  Its  very  essence  is  to 
divide  into  two  opposites,  subject  and  object, 
and  therein  be  one  and  a  process.  Such  is  the 
true  individual,  which  is  philosophically  not  yet 
born,  though  conceived.  For  the  Cosmical 
Atom  is  the  Ego  materialized,  externalized, 
thrown  outside  of  itself  into  matter,  or  rather  an 
imatre  of  matter.  And  the  process  of  Atomism 
is  the  Psychosis  made  material. 

One  of  the  peculiar  facts  about  the  atomic 
theory  is  its  revival  in  modern  times.  Apparently 
in  antiquity  Leucippus  and  Democritus  were  not 
regarded  with  much  favor,  their  system  was  dis- 
credited and  their  writings  were  allowed  to  per- 
ish. Certain  it  is  that  Plato  and  Aristotle  occu- 
pied substantially  the  philosophic  field  through 
the   ancient   and   medieval   periods.     But   after 


172        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PniLOSOPHT. 

more  than  two  thousand  3'ears  of  neglect  the  old 
atomists  come  into  favor  and  furnish  a  principle 
for  the  new  science  of  the  world.  That  is  a  long 
time  to  wait  for  recognition ;  it  may  look  as  if 
they  were  nuuli  farther  in  advance  of  their  age 
than  Plato  and  Aristotle.  When  the  circling 
years  brought  man  around  to  the  study  of  nature 
once  more,  tlie  Atom  rose  from  its  long  sleep  and 
began  a  new  life  of  activity. 

The  mind  creating  and  ordering  the  Atoms  is 
imi)licit  in  Leuci})pus  and  in  Cosmical  Atomism. 
But  that  mind  is  next  to  become  expHcit,  sepa- 
rate from  the  Cosmos,  and  recognized  as  the 
movinj?  or  arranginij  ]irincii)lo  in  the  Xous  of 
Anaxagoras,  which  is  thus  the  second  stage  of 
the  atomistic  movement.  The  fortuitous  throw 
of  the  cosmical  dice  (Atoms)  by  Chance,  Neces- 
sity, or  even  by  the  God  of  Democritus,  is  now 
transformed  into  a  pre-ordering  and  purposeful 
act  of  the  World's  Reason  {Xous). 

Before  leaving  his  Little  World,  we  gladly 
cast  back  a  glance  at  ancient  Leucippus,  whom 
we  must  deem  the  original  Atom  (Individual) 
determining  these  Atoms,  having  separated  them 
from  the  visible  Cosmos,  described  them  and  de- 
clared them  to  be  inseparable  within.  Yet  mark 
what  he  has  done :  the  atomic  Leucippus  has  per- 
formed the  act  of  ordering  these  Atoms,  wherein 
he  is  already  the  N^ous  of  Anaxagoras ;  still  fur- 
ther, he  has  performed   the  act  of   separation, 


NOETIC  ATOMISM.  173 

which  must  finally  get  inside  the  Atom  so  that  it 
will  be  self-separating,  and  so  become  the  very 
Ego  which  now  produces  it  —  the  atomic  Ego. 
So  Leucippus,  in  creating  and  positing  the  Cos- 
mical  Atom,  has  to  go  through  implicitly  the 
whole  process  of  Atomism,  transcending  his  own 
principle  in  practice,  though  not  in  theory.  After 
all,  something  mightier  than  he  is,  has  hold  of 
him. 

B.  Noetic  Atomism. 

If  the  soul  of  all  Ilellas  be  philosophizing  at 
this  time,  as  has  been  affirmed,  and  uttering 
special  phases  of  itself  in  these  various  systems 
of  thought,  then  that  total  Hellenic  soul  must 
call  forth  out  of  itself  a  counterpart  to  the  one- 
sided view  of  Cosmical  Atomism.  Having  begot- 
ten the  Atoms  in  their  capricious  whirl,  it  must 
beget  next  the  Atom-compeller,  the  atomic  Zeus, 
who  will  transform  this  realm  of  Cosmical  Atom- 
ism into  a  Cosmos. 

Accordingly  the  stress  is  now  to  be  placed  upon 
the  one  controlling  Atom,  the  Atom  of  Atoms 
which  is  in  this  relation  called  Reason  {Nous, 
whose  adjective  is  Noetikos).  The  important 
point  is  to  find  and  to  formulate  the  governing 
principle  in  the  vast  whirl  of  Atoms  which  must 
be  something  other  than  blind  Chance  or  equally 
blind  Necessity,  one  of  which  seems  to  be  the 
final  arbiter  in  the  preceding  Cosmical  Atomism. 


174        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PEILOSOPHY. 

Consequently  a  new  form  steps  forth  with  great 
distinctness,  still  atomic,  yet  the  orderer  of  Atoms 
according  to  an  end  (telos).  This  was  the  work 
of  Anaxagoras  of  Clazomena?,  which  was  one  of 
the  Ionic  towns  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  not 
far  from  Miletus. 

His  birth  is  usually  assigned  to  the  year  500 
B.  C.  Ilis  country  then  lay  under  the  absolute 
authority  of  Persia;  his  youth  must  have  seen 
the  great  invasion  of  Greece  by  the  Orient  as 
well  as  the  overwhelming  defeat  of  the  latter  at 
Salamis  and  Platcnea}.  When  he  was  about  forty 
years  old  he  came  to  Athens,  which  was  then  in 
its  bloom,  and  was  the  center  of  attraction  for 
the  aspiring  souls  throughout  the  Hellenic  world. 
Empire  as  well  as  lutellect  were  collecting  there, 
the  Atoms  from  all  Greece  were  moving  in  that 
direction.  Among  them  was  Anaxagoras,  who 
arrived  at  Athens  about  460  B.  C.  where  he 
remained  more  than  thirty  years,  giving  instruc- 
tion and  having  intercourse  with  the  distinguished 
men  of  the  city,  which  at  that  time  was  full  of 
artists,  poets,  philosophers. 

A  sio-nificant  fact  in  the  life  of  Anaxaojoras  is 
his  friendship  for  Pericles,  the  great  statesman 
of  the  epoch,  and  its  typical  character.  As 
Athens  was  the  center  of  all  the  city-states  of 
Greece,  so  Pericles  was  the  center  of  Athens, 
with  its  mighty  whirl  of  democratic  Atoms,  each 
of  whom  was  in  a  way   self -controlling,  yet  also 


NOETIC  ATOMISM.  175 

controlled  by  the  central  Atom,  by  the  Nous  or 
Keason  of  Pericles.  Particularly  did  this  Eeason 
of  Pericles  have  an  end  for  his  state,  and  in- 
stilled it  into  the  Athenian  people,  or  the  atomic 
mass  swirling  around  him.  Such  was  the  polit- 
ical phenomenon  which  Anaxagoras  had  before 
him  for  thirty  years  or  more,  and,  as  he  stood 
in  intimate  relation  to  its  central  individual,  he 
could  hardly  help  mirroring  the  situation  in 
his  Philosophy.  For  the  true  philosopher  is  not 
simply  blowing  bubbles  for  the  fun  of  the  thing, 
but  is  the  most  earnest  of  men,  seeking  to  for- 
mulate in  thought  the  profoundest  fact  of  his 
age  and  of  his  nation. 

We  may  now  see  why  Anaxagoras  could  not 
remain  satisfied  with  the  Cosmical  Atomism  of 
Leucippus.  It  is  reported  that  he  was  the  pupil 
of  Leucippus,  and  certainly  his  theory  has  its 
atomic  side,  as  we  shall  see.  On  the  border  of 
Hellas  at  Abdera,  the  Atoms  of  the  Greek  world 
just  after  the  Persian  War  might  seem  in  an 
everlasting  jostle  and  gyration ;  but  at  the  cen- 
tral city,  Athens,  there  was  an  ordered  movement 
consonant  with  a  great  purpose  in  all  the  bustle 
and  strenuous  activity  of  the  democratic  Atoms. 
In  them  was  manifested  particularly  during  this 
period  the  World's  Reason,  which  was  voiced  by 
the  eloquence  of  Pericles,  and  found  a  many- 
sided  expression  in  art.  It  should  be  remem- 
bered that  Socrates  was  a  younger  contemporary 


1 V  6         ANCIENT  E  UB  OPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPE  T. 

of  Anaxagoras,  and  must  have  begun  his  philo- 
sophic career  during  the  bloom  of  that  of  the 
latter.  The  two  could  hardly  help  meeting  each 
other,  and  the  junior  philosopher  may  well 
have  received  his  early  stimulus  from  the  senior. 
Anaxagoras  was  probably  the  first  to  bring 
Philosophy  to  Athens,  where  it  was  destined  to 
celebrate  its  proudest  triumph  immediately  after 
him,  and  in  a  line  of  succession  with  him.  It 
was  borne  thither  by  him  from  the  periphery  of 
Hellas,  on  which  we  have  seen  it  bursting  forth, 
as  it  were  all  around  the  horizon. 

Toward  the  end  of  his  life  he  was  accused  of 
impiety  and  compelled  to  leave  Athens.  He 
went  to  Lampsacus  where  he  died  about  428 
B.  C.  at  the  age  of  seventy-two.  The  Atom  had 
to  flee  from  the  center  back  to  the  border, 
whence  it  originally  came ;  the  controlling  J^ous 
(Pericles)  had  no  longer  the  power  to  protect. 
It  is  a  significant  fact  of  the  age,  a  change  is 
takinsj  place  which  is  otherwise  betokened  by 
the  Peloponnesian  War.  Anaxagoras  had  deliv- 
ered his  message  and  taught  his  generation.  And 
a  great  generation  it  was,  having  what  we  may 
call  a  7ioetic  character;  its  mighty  individuals 
seemed  to  participate  in  a  world-mastering 
Olympian  N'ous,  as  if  of  Zeus  himself,  whereof 
we  may  still  catch  a  breath  in  the  Parthenon,  in 
the  statues  of  Phidias,  in  the  dramas  of  Aeschy- 
lus and  Sophocles. 


ATOMISM.  161 

every  man  has  to  have  a  capricious  microcosm 
within  himself,  whereby  every  Ego  becomes  a 
world-swallowing  vortex  which  can  only  end  by 
swallowing  itself. 

This  Caprice  of  Atomism  is  what  the  next 
stage  of  thinking  (which  we  call  Universalism) 
must  transcend.  Each  atomistic  Ego  asserts  its 
own  subjective  criterion  as  final,  and  so  must 
sooner  or  later  get  into  conflict  with  its  neighbor 
who  is  also  a  self-asserting  atomistic  Ego.  This 
is  indeed  the  picture  of  the  Greek  world  at  the 
present  period  (just  before  the  Peloponnesian 
War) ;  all  Hellas  shows  the  tendency  to  turn 
atomistic  politically  and  socially,  as  well  as  in- 
tellectually. The  counter-revolution,  as  we  shall 
see  later,  was  headed  by  Socrates,  and  is  what 
constitutes  mainly  his  epoch-making  appearance 
in  the  philosophic  world. 

We  may  now  see  that  the  process  of  Atomism 
is  to  individuate  the  All  or  the  Universe  in  its 
three  grand  divisions  —  Nature,  God  and  Man. 
To  be  sure,  this  is  not  done  in  the  purest  and 
highest  fashion;  still  in  a  general  way  we  can 
see  that  Cosmical  Atomism  deals  with  Nature, 
Noetic  Atomism  with  the  Divine  Keason  {H^ous) 
and  Egoistic  Atomism  with  Man.  So  we  must 
come  to  the  thought  that  Atomism  in  the  three 
stages  of  its  psychical  process  reflects,  even  if 
faintly,  the  triple  movement  of  the  whole  Uni- 
verse  (or  the    Pampsychosis).     The    details  of 

11 


162         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

this  process  we  may  now  look  into  more  fully  in 
the  following  exposition,  which  will  illustrate  the 
points  briefly  touched  upon  in  the  present  gen- 
eral introduction  to  Atomism. 

A.  CosMicAL  Atomism. 

As  already  noted,  there  arc  three  kinds  or  rather 
stages  of  Atomism,  each  of  which  is  to  be  desig- 
nated by  an  adjective  characterizing  it.  Cosmi- 
cal  Atomism  connects  directly  with  Empedocles 
whose  four  elements  pass  over  into  innumerable 
Atoms  which  compose  the  Cosmos.  So  now  the 
essence  of  Being  is  affirmed  to  be  the  Atom  as 
cosmical,  which  has  to  bo  thought,  not  sensed,  as 
a  material  object. 

Hence  it  comes  that  this  kind  of  Atomism  is 
often  called  materialistic  Atomism  since  it  has 
been  a  chief  source  of  what  is  known  as  a  mate- 
rialistic view  of  the  world.  But  it  may  be  also 
designated  as  ideo-physical,  since  the  Atom  is 
ideal,  purely  a  conception  of  the  mind,  though  it 
is  conceived  to  be  phj^sical.  Thus  it  is  the  con- 
cept materialized,  or  rather  the  Ego  itself  put 
into  a  material  form  and  made  the  fundamental 
constituent  of  the  universe.  One  of  the  books 
of  Democritus  is  said  to  have  been  entitled 
"  Concerning  Ideas,"  and  by  Ideas  he  must  have 
meant  Atoms,  curiously  paralleling  Platonic  Ideas 
with  a  material  counterpart,   which   must   have 


COSMIC AL  ATOMISM.  Ifi3 

been  a  horrible  phantasm  to  the    idealist  Plato, 
who  was  a  younger  cotemporary  of  Democritus. 

It  should  also  be  added  that  Cosmical  Atomism 
is  essentially  microcosniic  (micros,  small)  in  con- 
trast to  the  preceding  elementary  stage  which 
is  macrocosmic.  Cosmical  Atomism,  however, 
looks  at  the  large  world  also,  but  reduces  it  to 
the  small,  the  Atom,  which  is  the  unit  underlying 
all  change.  The  endeavor  is  to  get  down  to  the 
})rimal  One  out  of  which  the  universe  is  built, 
to  find  the  pattern  brick  which  enters  into  every 
construction  of  nature's  architecture. 

Cosmical  Atomism  is  chiefly  connected  with 
two  names,  Leucippus  and  Democritus.  Of  the 
former  little  is  known,  but  he  was  probablj^  the 
founder  and  first  teacher  of  the  system,  while 
the  latter  was  his  pupil  and  chief  expositor. 
Leucippus  left  few  if  any  writings ;  he  was  evi- 
dently the  creative  spirit  and  the  oral  teacher, 
like  Socrates ;  while  Democritus  was  the  scribe, 
the  literary  apostle  of  the  atomistic  doctrine,  hav- 
ing written  a  vast  number  of  books,  all  of  which 
have  perished  except  fragments.  In  later  an- 
tiquity Leucippus  seems  to  have  been  quite  for- 
gotten, but  our  owu  time  has  restored  him  to  his 
place  as  founder,  as  well  as  revived  his  Philoso- 
phy, making  it  the  basis  of  Natural  Science. 
Thus  the  Atom,  brought  into  the  world  of  thought 
through  Leucippus,  has  shown  itself  very  per- 
sistent. 


164        ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHT. 

Democritus,  the  pupil,  w:is  bora  about  4(50 
B.  C.  He  asserted,  according  to  Diogenes  Laer- 
tius,  that  he  was  forty  years  younger  than  An- 
axagoras  who  is  likewise  declared  to  have  been  a 
pupil  of  Loucippus;  from  the  latter,  accordingly, 
proceeded  two  chief  streams  of  Atomism.  This 
fact  puts  Leucippus  into  a  high  rank  as  a  mind- 
fertilizing  genius.  Doubtless  the  third  stream  of 
Atomism,  the  sophistic,  was  strongly  influenced 
also  by  Leucippus  in  the  person  of  Protagoras, 
Avho  came  from  Al)dera,  where  Democritus  was 
born  and  where  Leucippus  taught.  The  historic 
facts  about  these  men  are  hazy  and  uncertain, 
still  they  show  a  tendency  to  lead  back  to  Leu- 
cippus as  the  fountain-head  of  all  three  stages  of 
Atomism  —  the  Cosmical,  developed  by  Democ- 
ritus, the  Noetic,  developed  by  Anaxagoras,  and 
the  Egoistic,  represented  most  prominently  by 
the  sophist  Protagoras.  The  home  of  Leucip- 
pus is  variously  stated  as  Miletus  in  the  east,  Elea 
in  the  west,  and  Abdera  in  the  north ;  he  was 
evidently  a  wandering  teacher,  a  prototype  of 
the  later  Greek  sophist  or  of  the  medieval  roving 
scholastic.  His  teacher,  or  one  of  his  teachers, 
is  said  by  Simplicius  to  have  been  Parmenides, 
and  Atomism  is  distinctly  a  development  out  of 
Eleaticism,  though  connected  with  other  early 
Greek  philosophies.  Very  mistily  but  hugely 
the  outlines  of  a  great  character  loom  up  out  of 
this  early  Greek  age  in  the  person  of  Leucippus, 


COSMIGAL  ATOMISM.  165 

a  kind  of  roaming  Socrates  ready  to  plant  his 
thoughts  in  any  congenial  mind. 

The  chief  fact  of  Cosmical  Atomism  is  that  it 
puts  the  immediate  or  outer  world  through  the 
process  of  individuation.  It  takes  nature  or 
matter,  and  subjects  it  to  the  principle  of  di- 
vision till  it  finds  the  undivided  or  the  indivisible, 
which,  however,  it  can  find  only  as  a  concept  or 
thought.  This  is  the  individual  of  nature — the 
Atom,  being  the  ultimate  unitary  principle  of  the 
Cosmos.  Hence  we  have  Cosmical  Atomism, 
which  also  has  its  process. 

1.  The  Atom.  The  starting-point  being  ob- 
tained, the  Atom  may  be  given  its  predicates. 
It  has  no  beginning  or  end,  it  becomes  not  but 
is,'  wherein  we  see  the  assertion  of  Eleaticism 
against  Heraclitism.  It  is  the  absolutely  given, 
the  pre-supposed,  not  derived,  not  perishable, 
the  one  persistent  identical  thmg  in  the  Cosmos. 
It  is  not  divisible,  has  no  space  or  pores  within 
it,  which  would  imply  separation  and  division 
inside  of  it;  it  is  unchangeable,  self -identical, 
excludes  all  inner  transformation;  also  it  is  im- 
penetrable, for  that  would  mean  divisibility. 
Each  is  wholly  separate,  stays  by  itself,  individ- 
ualized, yet  all  have  the  same  common  charac- 
teristic, hence  they  are  simple,  homogeneous. 
Such  is  the  germ  of  all  Atomism,  or  of  Being  as 
individual. 

In  these    numerous    predicates    there    is  one 


1  (i&         ANCIEN  T  EUB  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

effort  and  one  purpose :  all  separation  and  vari- 
ety must  be  taken  out  of  the  Atom,  so  that  no 
form  of  division  can  penetrate  the  same.  Im- 
penetrable, indivisible,  unchangeable,  imperish- 
able —  every  one  of  these  terms  is  a  negation 
of  the  separated  and  manifold,  and  an  assertion 
of  the  One  which  is  the  Atom.  This  is,  accord- 
ingly, the  denial  of  the  elemental  principle  of 
previous  Philosophies,  Avhich  alwaj^s  became 
self -contradictory,  since  it  claimed  to  be  the  one 
essence,  yet  turned  out  to  be  manifold  in  the  end. 

Thus  it  is  that  all  inner  difference  is  sought  to 
be  eliminated  from  the  atom.  We  have  seen 
this  same  purpose  in  the  Pure  Being  of  the  Ele- 
atics.  But  as  the  Atom  is  to  constitute  the 
world  and  all  its  variety  (which  is  difference), 
the  question  rises:  How  does  this  difference  get 
to  be?  It  is  on  the  Atom,  not  in  it;  hence  the 
Atom  has  an  infinite  difference  of  form,  and  for 
this  reason  it  was  also  called  a  Form  or  an  Idea 
by  Democritus,  as  already  noted.  Atoms  were 
likewise  said  to  be  distinguished  from  each  other 
by  their  size  and  weight:  in  which  statement  the 
theory  begins  to  contradict  itself,  for  difference 
is  gettino;  inside  the  Atom. 

Through  the  infinitely  diverse  combinations  of 
these  Forms  (Atoms)  there  will  be  produced  all 
qualitative  differences  in  the  world.  Every  phe- 
nomenon will  be,  from  this  point  of  view,  caused 
by   an    arrangement   of   the   Atoms  peculiar  to 


COSMICAL  ATOMISM.  167 

itself;  the  Atoms  do  not  change  in  themselves, 
bu*  their  order  changes.  Accordingly  there 
must  be  conceived  in  addition  a  place  for 
changes  outside  of  the  Atoms. 

2.  The  Void.  This  is  the  second  principle  of 
Atomism,  usually  known  by  its  dual  name,  the 
Full  and  the  Void,  or  the  Atom  and  the  empty 
space  around  the  Atom. 

Through  the  Void  the  Atoms  are  separated 
externally,  and  are  preserved  as  individuals.  Thus 
separation  is  put  outside  of  them,  yet  they  are 
given  a  field  of  movement  and  arrangement. 
Points  of  contact  between  Atoms  seem  to  have 
been  allowed,  but  there  was  no  entrance  to  this 
Holy  of  Holies.  The  universe  might  crash  to 
pieces,  the  Atom  was  safe  in  its  citadel,  guarded 
by  an  impassable  barrier,  the  Void,  which,  we 
must  remember,  is  also  a  conception,  being  in- 
visible on  account  of  its  smallness. 

Still  the  Void,  though  a  conception,  was  con- 
ceived as  real,  just  as  real  as  the  Atom.  Accord- 
ingly the  Atomists  declare  that  Non-Being  (which 
is  the  Void)  is,  or  has  Being —  wherein  the  doc- 
trine departs  from  the  Eleatics  (who  affirm  that 
Non-Being  is  not)  and  agrees  with  Heraclitus, 
whose  Becoming  the  atomic  principle  seeks  to 
explain. 

The  possibility  of  change,  being  excluded  from 
the  Atom,  is  restored  by  the  Void,  in  which  the 
changeless  Atoms  can  combine  mechanically  and 


168         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILO SOPHY. 

produce  nil  the  manifold  diversity  of  the  world. 
Herein  we  see  the  fundamental  purpose  of  Atom- 
ism: to  reduce  the  varied  multiplicity  of  Na- 
ture to  Atoms  for  the  purpose  of  knowing  it. 
Science  is,  according  to  the  Atomists,  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  quahtative  to  the  quantitative,  whereby 
it  can  be  counted  and  measured. 

We  have  obtained  the  Atom  and  a  place  for  it 
to  move  in ;  now  follows  the  question,  what  moves 
it?  Herewith  we  come  to  the  third  presupposi- 
tion of  Atomism  —  Motion. 

3.  The  Vortex.  Each  Atom  is  moving,  is  en- 
dowed with  motion  from  all  eternity,  and  cannot 
help  moving,  motion  being  itself  eternal.  Thus 
the  changeless  One  of  Nature  is  perpetually 
changing  its  place  in  the  Void,  making  new  com- 
binations and  producing  new  phenomena.  De- 
mocritus  seems  to  have  ascribed  weight  to  his 
Atoms,  so  that  they  were  moved  by  gravitation, 
thus  there  is  a  perpetual  fall  of  the  Atoms.  In 
this  fall  they  impinge  upon  one  another,  and  from 
the  collision  and  recoil  arises  the  grand  whirl  of 
the  Atoms  {dhios,  vortex),  the  circular  movement 
in  the  macrocosm  as  well  as  in  the  microcosm. 

In  this  atomic  maelstrom  there  was  no  design 
or  end,  for  Democritus  specially  opposed  the 
telism  of  Anaxagoras,  of  which  we  shall  speak 
later.  Hence  there  was  an  element  of  chance  in 
this  collision  of  the  Atoms.  Yet  also  an  element 
of   necessitv,   for  their  fortuitous  meeting   and 


■    COSMIC AL  ATOMISM.  169 

clashing  terminated  in  the  whirl.  Democritus 
uses  even  the  word  logos  (Eeason)  to  express 
this  overruling  necessity.  Still  the  grand  fact 
of  the  Cosmos  is  the  masquerade  of  the  Atoms, 
full  of  external  cai)rice  as  regards  movement, 
even  if  this  everlasting  mutual  jostling  turns  into 
the  universal  gyration. 

The  scheme  of  Cosmical  Atomism  would  seem 
not  to  be  well  adapted  for  Ethics,  still  Democ- 
ritus had  his  ethical  writings.  But  they  could 
liardly  have  been  an  integral  part  of  his  S3^stem ; 
he  was  the  cotemporary  of  Socrates  and  Phito 
whose  thought  was  so  strongly  ethical,  and  he 
naturally  responded  to  a  call  of  his  time,  even  if 
this  was  not  a  call  of  his  doctrine.  He  also 
speaks  of  the  Gods,  though  they  are  quite  abol- 
ished by  his  Philosophy.  But  he  is  not  the  only 
philosopher  who  injects  unassimilated  material 
into  his  system. 

The  soul  is  composed  of  Atoms  according  to 
Democritus,  of  the  fine,  smooth  and  round 
Atoms,  which  adjectives  pertain  to  no  inner 
quality  but  only  to  external  form  and  size.  In  fact 
the  soul's  Atoms  are  those  of  fire,  are  endowed 
with  motion  and  hence  able  to  produce  motion 
by  contact,  for  they  have  no  power  to  originate 
motion  in  themselves.  From  this  we  can  see 
the  ground  of  his  assertion  that  soul  was  imma- 
nent  in  all  things,  inasmuch  as  it  was  ultimately 
reducible    to    Atoms     with     their     movement. 


1 70         ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

Here  we  note  the  great  difference  between  him 
and  Anaxagoras,  who  phiced  a  transcendent 
power  {JSfous)  over  his  Atoms. 

In  general,  we  observe  that  there  are  three 
pre-suppositions  or  postulates  in  Cosmical  Atom- 
ism—  the  Atom,  the  Void,  and  Motion.  All 
three  are  assumed  as  original,  eternally  existent, 
uncaused.  Then  the  three  together  form  a 
triple  process,  which  is  the  atomic  whirl,  world- 
producing.  Creation  in  all  its  variety  is  the 
mechanical  concourse  of  Atoms;  to  see  this 
supersensible  mechanism  is  knowledge.  Atom- 
ism in  its  present  sphere  atomizes  the  Cosmos, 
reduces  it  to  the  irreducible  unit,  which  is  the 
cosmical  individual  (Atom). 

We  are  impelled  to  look  into  the  origin  and 
nature  of  this  Cosmical  Atom.  The  difficulty 
with  the  preceding  elemental  philosophies  was 
that  their  essence  or  principle  was  always  divis- 
ible, hence  manifold  and  changeable,  and  there- 
fore no  true  essence  or  principle.  But  now  the 
divisible,  through  division  reaches  the  indivisible 
(individual),  which  is  just  the  opposite  of  itself 
(as  element),  and  is  given  only  by  thought.  In 
Cosmical  Atomism,  therefore,  the  mind  begins  to 
create  its  own  principle  of  nature,  and  not  take  it 
as  already  given,  which  we  have  seen  to  be  the  case 
in  tlie  previous  elemental  stage  of  Philosophy. 
This  is  a  great  step  and  marks  a  very  important 
phange  in  the  movement  of  earlv  thinking. 


COSMICAL  ATOMISM.  171 

But  the  Atom  is  conceived  as  natural,  hence 
as  extended,  though  infinitely  small.  But  if 
extended  it  must  be  divisible.  Here  lies  the 
inner  contradiction  which  will  destroy  the  Cos- 
mical  Atom.  As  a  conception  it  has  two  differ- 
ent and  indeed  antagonistic  predicates.  Thus 
difference,  which  was  supposed  to  be  eliminated, 
lurks  in  the  Atom  and  tears  it  in  twain.  After 
all  it  is  twofold  and  self-opposed,  and  must 
cease  to  exist  as  Atom. 

Still  the  Atom  has  a  sphere  of  existence,  as  we 
shall  find  hereafter,  but  this  is  not  the  material 
world.  Only  the  Ego  can  be  self-separated  or 
self-opposed,  and  exist.  Its  very  essence  is  to 
divide  into  two  opposites,  subject  and  object, 
and  therein  be  one  and  a  process.  Such  is  the 
true  individual,  which  is  philosophically  not  yet 
born,  though  conceived.  For  the  Cosmical 
Atom  is  the  Ego  materialized,  externalized, 
thrown  outside  of  itself  into  matter,  or  rather  an 
image  of  matter.  And  the  process  of  Atomism 
is  the  Psychosis  made  material. 

One  of  the  peculiar  facts  about  the  atomic 
theory  is  its  revival  in  modern  times.  Ap[)areutly 
in  antiquity  Leucippus  and  Democritus  were  not 
regarded  with  much  favor,  their  system  was  dis- 
credited and  their  writings  were  allowed  to  per- 
ish. Certain  it  is  that  Plato  and  Aristotle  occu- 
pied substantially  the  philosophic  field  through 
the   ancient   and   medieval   periods.     But   after 


172        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

more  than  two  thousand  years  of  neglect  the  old 
atomists  come  into  favor  and  furnish  a  principle 
for  the  new  science  of  the  world.  That  is  a  long 
time  to  wait  for  recognition ;  it  may  look  as  if 
they  were  much  farther  in  advance  of  their  age 
than  PUito  and  Aristotle.  When  the  circling 
years  brought  man  around  to  the  study  of  nature 
once  more,  the  Atom  rose  from  its  long  sleep  and 
began  a  new  life  of  activity. 

The  mind  creating  and  orderin":  the  Atoms  is 
implicit  in  Leucippus  and  in  Cosmical  Atomism. 
But  that  mind  is  next  to  become  explicit,  sepa- 
rate from  the  Cosmos,  and  recognized  as  the 
moving  or  arranging  principle  in  the  Nous  of 
Anaxa2;oras,  which  is  thus  the  second  staoje  of 
the  atomistic  movement.  The  fortuitous  throw 
of  the  cosmical  dice  (Atoms)  by  Chance,  Neces- 
sity, or  even  by  the  God  of  Democritus,  is  now 
transformed  into  a  pre-ordering  and  purposeful 
act  of  the  World's  Reason  (iVb^.s). 

Before  leaving  his  Little  World,  we  gladly 
cast  back  a  glance  at  ancient  Leucippus,  whom 
we  must  deem  the  original  Atom  (Individual) 
determining  these  Atoms,  having  separated  them 
from  the  visible  Cosmos,  described  them  and  de- 
clared them  to  be  inseparable  within.  Yet  mark 
what  he  has  done :  the  atomic  Leucippus  has  per- 
formed the  act  of  ordering  these  Atoms,  wherein 
he  is  already  the  JSfous  of  Auaxagoras ;  still  fur- 
ther,  he  has  performed   the  act  of   separation, 


NOE  TIC  A  TO  MIS M.  ■  1  ?3 

which  must  finally  get  inside  the  Atom  so  that  it 
will  be  self-separating,  and  so  become  the  very 
Ego  which  now  produces  it  —  the  atomic  Ego. 
So  Leucippus,  in  creating  and  positing  the  Cos- 
mical  Atom,  has  to  go  through  implicitly  the 
whole  process  of  Atomism,  transcending  his  own 
principle  in  practice,  though  not  in  theory.  After 
all,  something  mightier  than  he  is,  has  hold  of 
him. 

B.  Noetic  Atomism. 

If  the  soul  of  all  Hellas  he  philosophizing  at 
this  time,  as  has  been  afiirmed,  and  uttering 
special  phases  of  itself  in  these  various  systems 
of  thought,  then  that  total  Hellenic  soul  must 
call  forth  out  of  itself  a  counterpart  to  the  one- 
sided view  of  Cosmical  Atomism.  Having  begot- 
ten the  Atoms  in  their  capricious  whirl,  it  must 
beget  next  the  Atom-compeller,  the  atomic  Zeus, 
who  will  transform  this  realm  of  Cosmical  Atom- 
ism into  a  Cosmos. 

Accordingly  the  stress  is  now  to  be  placed  upon 
the  one  controlling  Atom,  the  Atom  of  Atoms 
which  is  in  this  relation  called  Reason  {Nous, 
whose  adjective  is  JSfoetikos).  The  important 
point  is  to  find  and  to  formulate  the  governing 
principle  in  the  vast  whirl  of  Atoms  which  must 
be  something  other  than  blind  Chance  or  equally 
blind  Necessity,  one  of  which  seems  to  be  the 
final  arbiter  in  the  preceding  Cosmical  Atomism. 


1 74         ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

Consequently  a  new  form  steps  forth  with  great 
distinctness,  still  atomic,  yet  the  orderer  of  Atoms 
according  to  an  end  (telos).  This  was  the  work 
of  Anaxagoras  of  ClazomentB,  which  was  one  of 
the  Ionic  towns  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor,  not 
far  from  Miletus. 

His  birth  is  usually  assigned  to  the  year  500 
B.  C.  His  country  then  lay  under  the  absolute 
authority  of  Persia;  his  youth  must  have  seen 
the  great  invasion  of  Greece  by  the  Orient  as 
well  as  the  overwhelming  defeat  of  the  latter  at 
Salamis  and  PlatseaB.  When  he  was  about  forty 
years  old  he  came  to  Athens,  which  was  then  in 
its  bloom,  and  was  the  center  of  attraction  for 
the  aspiring  souls  throughout  the  Hellenic  world. 
Empire  as  well  as  Intellect  were  collecting  there, 
the  Atoms  from  all  Greece  were  moving  in  that 
direction.  Among  them  was  Anaxagoras,  who 
arrived  at  Athens  about  460  B.  C.  where  he 
remained  more  than  thirty  years,  giving  instruc- 
tion and  having  intercourse  with  the  distinguished 
men  of  the  city,  which  at  that  time  was  full  of 
artists,  poets,  philosophers. 

A  significant  fact  in  the  life  of  Anaxagoras  is 
his  friendship  for  Pericles,  the  great  statesman 
of  the  epoch,  and  its  typical  character.  As 
Athens  was  the  center  of  all  the  city-states  of 
Greece,  so  Pericles  was  the  center  of  Athens, 
with  its  mighty  whirl  of  democratic  Atoms,  each 
of  whom  was  in  a  way   self -controlling,  yet  also 


NOETIC  ATOMISM,  175 

controlled  by  the  central  Atom,  by  the  ISToiis  or 
Eeason  of  Pericles.  Particularly  did  this  Eeason 
of  Pericles  have  an  end  for  his  state,  and  in- 
stilled it  into  the  Athenian  people,  or  the  atomic 
mass  swirling  around  him.  Such  was  the  polit- 
ical phenomenon  which  Anaxagoras  had  before 
him  for  thirty  years  or  more,  and,  as  he  stood 
in  intimate  relation  to  its  central  individual,  he 
could  hardly  help  mirroring  the  situation  in 
his  Philosophy.  For  the  true  philosopher  is  not 
simply  blowing  bubbles  for  the  fun  of  the  thing, 
but  is  the  most  earnest  of  men,  seekinof  to  for- 
mulate  in  thought  the  profoundest  fact  of  his 
age  and  of  his  nation. 

We  may  now  see  why  Anaxagoras  could  not 
remain  satisfied  with  the  Cosmical  Atomism  of 
Leucippus.  It  is  reported  that  he  was  the  pupil 
of  Leucippus,  and  certainly  his  theory  has  its 
atomic  side,  as  we  shall  see.  On  the  border  of 
Hellas  at  Abdera,  the  Atoms  of  the  Greek  world 
just  after  the  Persian  War  might  seem  in  an 
everlasting  jostle  and  gyration ;  but  at  the  cen- 
tral city,  Athens,  there  was  an  ordered  movement 
consonant  with  a  great  purpose  in  all  the  bustle 
and  strenuous  activity  of  the  democratic  Atoms. 
In  them  was  manifested  particularly  during  this 
period  the  World's  Reason,  which  was  voiced  by 
the  eloquence  of  Pericles,  and  found  a  many- 
sided  expression  in  art.  It  should  be  remem- 
bered that  Socrates  was  a  younger  contemporary 


1 V 6        ANCIEKT  E  VBOPEAN  PHIL  OSOPH  Y. 

of  Anaxagoras,  and  must  have  begun  his  philo- 
sophic career  during  the  bloom  of  that  of  the 
latter.  The  two  could  hardly  help  meeting  each 
other,  and  the  junior  philosopher  may  well 
have  received  his  early  stimulus  from  the  senior, 
Anaxagoras  was  probably  the  first  to  bring 
Philosophy  to  Athens,  where  it  was  destined  to 
celebrate  its  proudest  triumph  immediately  after 
him,  and  in  a  line  of  succession  with  him.  It 
was  borne  thither  by  him  from  the  periphery  of 
Hellas,  on  which  we  have  seen  it  bursting  forth, 
as  it  were  all  around  the  horizon. 

Toward  the  end  of  his  life  he  was  accused  of 
impiety  and  compelled  to  leave  Athens.  He 
went  to  Lampsacus  where  he  died  about  428 
B.  C.  at  the  age  of  seventy- two.  The  Atom  had 
to  flee  from  the  center  back  to  the  border, 
whence  it  originally  came ;  the  controlling  J^ous 
(Pericles)  had  no  longer  the  power  to  protect. 
It  is  a  significant  fact  of  the  age,  a  change  is 
takinc^  place  which  is  otherwise  betokened  by 
the  Peloponnesian  War.  Anaxagoras  had  deliv- 
ered his  message  and  taught  his  generation.  And 
a  great  generation  it  was,  having  what  we  may 
call  a  noetic  character;  its  mighty  individuals 
seemed  to  participate  in  a  world-mastering 
Olympian  ])^ous,  as  if  of  Zeus  himself,  whereof 
we  may  still  catch  a  breath  in  the  Parthenon,  in 
the  statues  of  Phidias,  in  the  dramas  of  Aeschy- 
lus and  Sophocles. 


NOETIC  ATOMISM.  177 

Anaxiifforas  in  bis  doctrine  shows  connections 
with  the  preceding  elemental  philosophies  —  with 
the  Milesians,  with  Paruienidcs,  and  with  Em- 
pedocles.  But  his  most  immediate  derivation  is 
from  Leucippus,  from  whom  spring  both  De- 
mocritus  and  Anaxagoras.  Both  the  latter  are 
atomistic  philosophers,  each  in  his  own  way. 
The  system  of  each  has  the  same  general  outline, 
though  the  stages  are  differently  defined  and 
differently  emphasized.  This  we  may  observe  in 
the  following  sketch  of  the  Philosophy  of  Anax- 
agoras . 

1.  The  8perm.  Such  is  the  name  which 
Anaxagoras  gives  to  his  Atom  and  which  we 
shall  retain,  as  it  is  not  the  same  as  the  Democ- 
ritean  Atom  (from  sj^erma,  germ  or  seed). 
These  Sperms  are  infinitely  small  and  infinite  in 
number,  uncretited,  unchangeable,  hence  they 
cannot  perish ;  they  are  presupposed,  taken  for 
granted,  existent  from  eternity  to  eternity ;  they 
cannot  be  increased  or  diminished.  All  Becom- 
ing, all  birth  and  decay  is  simply  a  new  ordering 
of  the  Sperms.  Dislocation,  translocation,  col- 
location of  these  S[)erms  produce  the  phenomenal 
w^orld  with  all  its  qualitative  differences.  A 
well-known  •  f rao-ment  of  Anaxagoras  declares  : 
"  The  Greeks  do  not  think  aright  about  Birth 
and  Death.  Nothing  ever  becomes  or  perishes, 
but  all  is  compounded  on  the  one  hand  or  is 
separated  on  the  other,  from  things  already  ex- 

12 


178         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

istent  (Sperms).  The  correct  way  would  be  to 
call  Birth  a  commingling  and  Death  a  separating  ' ' 
(Anax.  Frag.  17,  Ed.  Mullach).  The  term 
"the  Greeks"  in  the  preceding  extract  doubt- 
less refers  to  former  Greek  philosophers,  not 
including  Lcucippus,  and  marks  the  distinction 
of  the  Atomists  from  the  Elementalists,  espe- 
cially the  later  ones. 

2.  The  Different.  So  far,  then,  the  Atom  of 
Leucippus  and  the  Sperm  of  Anaxagoras  are 
quite  alike.  Now  comes  the  difference.  First 
of  all,  the  Sperms  are  divisible  to  infinity,  as  is 
usually  supposed ;  division  in  their  case  does  not 
reach  the  indivisible,  it  would  seem.  Anaxa- 
goras thus  seeks  to  avoid  that  contradiction 
which  we  found  in  the  Leucippian  Atom,  namely 
to  be  extended  and  yet  to  be  indivisible.  Still 
further,  Sperms  differ  from  one  another  quali- 
tatively, and  hence  are  heterogeneous,  while 
Atoms  differ  from  one  another  quantita- 
tively (in  size  and  form),  and  are  homo- 
geneous. But  not  only  in  relation  to  one  an- 
other  are  they  of  different  kinds;  likewise  they 
have  different  qualities  in  their  composition. 
Finally  Anaxagoras  has  no  Void.  His  principle 
of  combination  is  a  commingling  of  the  quali- 
tatively different  Sperms,  whereby  comes  all  the 
diversity  of  the  world. 

It  is  manifest  that  Anaxagoras  takes  the  ob- 
ject, such  as  a  stone  or  bone,  as  the  starting- 


NOE  TIC  A TOMISM.  179 

point,  and  declares  it  to  be  infinitely  divisible, 
but  in  such  division  it  never  loses  the  quality  of 
the  object.  These  infinitely  small  particles  are 
the  Sperms  which  simply  require  to  be  mixed  in 
order  to  produce  things  as  they  are.  The  qual- 
ity is  immanent,  not  a  product  of  the  form  and 
arrangement  of  Atoms,  as  in  Cosmical  Atomism. 
On  the  other  hand  motion  is  not  immanent  in 
the  Sperm  (as  it  is  in  the  Atom)  and  hence  the 
ordering  movement  must  come  from  the  outside. 
An  organic  object  like  a  tree  determines  the 
Sperm,  while  the  Atom  determines  it.  Accord- 
ingly we  must  regard  the  Sperm  as  essentially 
passive,  while  the  Atom  is  active,  being  endowed 
originally  with  motion,  indeed  with  a  kind  of  self- 
motion. 

Very  plainly  do  the  Sperm  and  its  Mixture 
call  for  an  ordering  principle  from  the  outside, 
transcendent,  world-controlling.  So  we  pass  to 
that  which  is  altogether  the  main  principle  in  the 
system  of  Anaxagoras. 

3.  JVous.  This  is  one  of  the  most  important 
words  in  all  Philosophy  and  runs  through  the 
whole  history  of  it  like  a  thread  of  light.  It 
may  be  variously  translated  Reason,  Mind,  Intel- 
ligence, Spirit.  With  it  is  formulated  for  the 
first  time  a  spiritual  view  of  the  Universe.  The 
emphatic  testimony  of  Aristotle  is  that  the  phi- 
losopher who  first  declared  JVous  to  be  "  the 
cause  of  the  Cosmos  and  of  all  its  order  appeared 


180         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

like  a  sober  man  in  comparison  with  those  pre- 
viously talking  at  random"  (Met.  I.  3,  ad 
fiuem).  It  is  true  that  Anaxagoras  did  hardly 
more  than  speak  the  word,  without  applying  his 
principle  to  the  details  of  his  system.  But  to 
speak  the  word  was  to  start  the  conception, 
which  has  been  unfolding  ever  since. 

JSTous  is,  then,  the  world-ordering  principle 
which  is  given  from  the  beginning;  it  finds  the 
original  confusion  or  chaos  which  it  at  once 
begins  to  order,  and  its  work  is  not  yet  done  by 
any  means.  The  Sperms  are  separated  from 
the  mass,  and  the  JSTous  transforms  them  into 
the  Cosmos,  starting  in  them  the  whirling  motion 
which  we  already  saw  in  the  Atoms.  But  this 
whirl  is  imparted  to  the  Sperms  by  N'ous,  whereas 
the  Atoms  generated  it  by  their  collisions. 

The  power  of  knowing  all  things,  past,  present, 
and  future,  belongs  to  N'ous.  It  is  also  self- 
determined  (au(okmtes),  self -active  while  the 
Sperms  are  passive.  Fate  or  Necessity  has  no 
meanino-  for  N'ous.  It  is  conceived  as  transcend- 
ent,  though  it  also  exists  immanently  in  all  living 
creatures.  At  least  Anaxagoras  sometimes  takes 
the  latter  view  though  sometimes  he  talks  as  if 
everything  in  the  world  was  but  an  automaton 
mechanically  moved  by  Nous,  while  this  was  the 
self-moved,  self-determined,  self-active  One  in 
the  Universe  ordering  the  Many. 

Still  Anaxas^oras  never  succeeded  in  eliminating 


NOE  TIC  A  TOMISM.  1 8 1 

from  N'ous  its  atomistic  substrate.  He  reo-ards 
it  as  "  the  most  refined  of  all  things,"  a  kind  of 
etherealized  matter ;  he  could  not  wholly  get  rid 
of  the  material  hypostasis,  which  belongs  to  all 
the  philosophers  before  him,  in  spite  of  the  lofty 
spiritual  predicates  which  he  assigns  to  JSfous. 
It  is  indeed  the  most  subtle  of  Atoms,  veritably 
the  Atom  of  Atoms,  and  thus  is  connected  with 
Atomism,  being  therein  the  undivided  One  con- 
trolling all  division  in  the  universe. 

To  his  Rous  Anaxagoras  adds  the  conception 
of  end  (telos).  This  is  a  great  thought  and 
gives  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  JVoks. 
As  the  world-forming  energy  it  has  a  purpose 
which  means  order,  harmony,  the  Cosmos.  It 
is  pure,  unmixed,  just  the  opposite  of  the  com- 
mingled Chaos  which  it  is  to  arrange.  Still 
N'ous  has  to  divide  within  itself  and  to  place 
before  itself  its  end,  which  it  is  to  realize  in  the 
Cosmos. 

Anaxagoras  has,  therefore,  distinctly  uttered 
a  telistic  (often  called  teleologic)  view  of  world, 
which  will  never  p'lss  away  in  the  history  of 
thought.  The  universe  has  an  end  through 
which  and  into  which  it  is  developino-;  or  as 
Anaxagoras  would  say,  the  JSTqus  is  still  separat- 
ing and  ordering  the  migma  (mixture)  according 
to  its  telos  (end).  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle 
will  show  the  influence  of  this  thought  in  man- 
ifold ways.     The  last    and   greatest   instance  of 


182         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Nous  formulating  its  end  is  seen  in  Darwin- 
ism. The  fact  is,  in  the  whole  movement  of 
Philosoph}^  we  seek  the  teJos  which  is  working 
and  developing  throughout  the  many  successive 
systems  of  thought.  This  book  has  a  telistic 
object  as  already  declared ;  it  is  trying  to  unfold 
and  to  formulate  the  purpose  which  underlies 
and  calls  forth  all  philosophic  thinking  (the 
Pampsychosis). 

What  the  end  is,  Anaxagoras  does  not  dis- 
tinctly declare ;  but  he  does  say  that  there  is  a 
Xoits  building  the  Cosmos  according  to  an  end. 
He  was  criticised  by  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aris- 
totle because  he  did  not  consistently  carry  out 
his  principle.  Aristotle  says  that  "  Anaxagoras 
uses  his  Nous  for  world-making,"  but  only 
"drags  it  in"  when  he  is  in  straits  about  his 
causes;  otherwise  "  he  posits  as  causes  of  things 
arising  all  else  but  Nous."  But  a  similar  incon- 
sistency we  shall  find  in  Aristotle  himself  (see 
3IetapJn/sics,  I.  4.)  It  is  this  telistic  principle 
which  will  hereafter  develop  ethically  into  the 
Good. 

We  have  to  conceive  of  Nous  choosing  its  end 
by  its  own  prompting,  and  alsotakiug  what  means 
it  pleases  for  fulfilling  that  end.  The  Noetic 
Atom  is,  therefore,  capricious,  autocratic,  im- 
perial as  Atom-controller.  The  hegemony  of 
Notts  is  distinctly  asserted,  like  that  of  Athens 
over  the  other  cities  of  Greece,  like  that  of  Pericles 


NOETIC  ATOMISM.  183 

over  Athens.  Still  Anaxagoras  hardly  conceived 
of  Kous  as  person,  though  it  was  self-conscious 
and  self -active,  and  had  its  own  end.  Why  is 
this  not  a  person?  There  was  still  a  material  sub- 
strate, ISfous  was  still  an  Atom  not  yet  free  of 
its  Leucippian  heritage  of  matter.  JSfous  is  not 
called  a  God  by  Anaxagoras  who  was  rather  re- 
garded as  atheistic ;  still  his  Xous  is  a  kind  of 
Pallas  Athena,  the  tutular  deity  of  Athens, 
which  was  named  after  her,  with  her  Intellect 
abstracted  from  its  divine  incarnation,  and  looked 
at  philosophically,  as  it  is  in  itself,  as  the  essence 
of  the  world,  specially  of  the  Athenian  Cosmos. 
So  we  see  that  Anaxagoras  with  his  N'ous  helped 
to  transform  the  content  of  Athenian  Religion 
into  Philosophy. 

We  cannot,  then,  affirm  that  Anaxagoras  intro- 
duced the  Ego  into  the  history  of  thought,  though 
he  led  the  wa}^  to  it,  and,  so  to  speak,  compelled 
its  presence.  The  principle  of  N'ous  is  the  recog- 
nition that  mind  must  grasp  and  order  the  unseen 
realm  of  Atoms,  for  Atoms  are  supersensible  and 
demand  a  supersensible  orderer  —  JSFous.  Each 
of  these  categories  (the  Atom  and  Nous)  has 
separately  played  a  great  part  in  human  think- 
ing—  the  one  more  especially  in  Natural  Science, 
the  other  in  Philosophy  proper. 

But  now  they  are  to  come  together.  Each 
Atom  (or  Individual)  is  to  be  a  Nous  ordering 
the  world  according  to  its  own  particular  end. 


184         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Thus  N'ous  gets  inside  the  Atom,  going  back  to 
it  specially  and  making  it  in  itself  a  world-com- 
peller.     This  is  the  atomic  Ego. 

C.  Egoistic  Atomism. 

Already  the  JSFo^is  of  Anaxagoras  implies  Ego 
or  Person,  but  does  not  quite  express  it.  When 
we  say  mind  or  reason,  we  can  hardly  conceive 
it  apart  from  an  individual  Self.  But  Anaxagoras 
has  not  yet  reached  the  point  of  making  a  sharp 
distinction  between  personal  and  impersonal,  or 
between  material  and  non-material,  or  between 
the  immanence  and  the  transcendence  of  his 
N'ous  (Pantheism  and  Theism).  His  jSTous  is  the 
World-Reason,  not  distinctly  personalized ;  some- 
times it  might  be  regarded  as  elemental  from  his 
language,  but  then  it  has  an  end,  according  to 
which  it  orders  things.  Thus  it  in  a  manner 
thinks,  it  is  indeed  the  Cosmos  thinking,  the  one 
vastCosmical  Atom  asthinkino:.  The  true  Atom 
of  Anaxagoras  is  the  indivisible,  impenetrable, 
indestructible  N'ous,  the  one  Atom  or  Atom  of 
Atoms,  which,  however,  are  reduced  by  it  to 
Sperms,  these  being  passive  and  receiving  motion 
and  order  from  it,  the  thinking  or  Noetic  Atom. 

But  the  epoch  has  arrived  in  the  spiritual 
movement  of  total  Hellas  when  this  lof  t}^  solitary 
Nous  must  descend  into  the  Atoms  below  and 
incorporate  itself  in  each  of  them,  making   the 


EGOISriG  ATOMISM.  185 

same  an  Ego  with  an  inner  world  seeking  to  con- 
trol the  outer.  So  we  enter  the  realm  of  the  Ego 
grasping  itself  as  Atom  with  JVous  inside  of  it  — 
which  realm  we  name  Egoistic  Atomism. 

This  is  the  third  stage  in  the  process  of  win- 
ning   the    Individual    (Atom),  for   the  Individ- 
ual as  such  is  now  won.     We  have  reached  the 
'  Ego  in   this  movement  of  Individuation,  which 
started  with  Atomism  proper,  that  of  Leucippus. 
Or  it  might  be  better  to  say  that  Philosophy  in 
its    search  for  the    essence    of    all    things    has 
reached  the   Ego.     A  very   important   stage  of 
human    develo})nient  is  this,  since    the  Self  (or 
Ego)  has  found  itself  and  recognized  itself  to  be 
the    principle  of   the    universe.     The    worth  of 
man,    the    dignity    of    selfhood    has    now    truly 
dawned  upon  the  world,  and  will  pass  through  a 
marvelous    career  in  the    future.     The    modern 
Ego    begins  to  see  its    own    outline   in   this  its 
earliest  protot3'pe. 

In  Greek  Philosophy  the  present  sphere  is 
known  as  Sophisticism  wdiich  is  derived  from  the 
word  Sophist,  and  this  comes  from  sop)hos 
(wise).  A  great  many  people  of  very  diverse 
kinds  were  anciently  called  sophists  —  teachers, 
orators,  philosophers  of  all  sorts.  Still  there 
was  a  wider  and  narrower  usage  of  the  tei-m. 
There  was  a  distinctive  sophistic  Philosoph}^ 
though  every  philosopher  might  in  a  general  way 
be  named  a  sophist.     Moreover  an  evil  flavor  was 


180         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

givQii  to  the  epithet  sometimes,  which  we  may- 
still  hear  in  the  English  word  sophistry.  This 
taint  in  the  expression  is  due  particularly  to 
Plato,  who  was  the  great  enemy  of  the  sophist,  yet 
who  was  himself  often  designated  as  a  sophist. 

Our  preceding  philosopher  of  the  Xous,  An- 
axgoras,  was  also  called  in  a  general  way  a 
sophist,  as  well  as  Socrates,  who  is  our  suc- 
ceeding philosopher.  It  is  evident  that  Sophis- 
ticism  (or  the  Sophists)  is  not  a  good  designa- 
tion for  the  present  philosophical  ci)Och,  though 
this  desiirnation  is  the  one  currently  used  in  the 
Histories  of  Greek  Philosophy.  Or  if  we  em- 
ploy the  general  term,  we  may  also  use  along 
with  it  a  more  special  and  definite  expression 
for  the  philosophical  phase  of  Sophisticism. 
Hence  our  rubric,  as  above  given,  is  Egoistic 
Atomism,  Avhich  wording  strives  to  connect  the 
present  stage  with  the  total  atomistic  movement 
(of  which  we  deem  it  a  part  and  the  concluding 
part),  as  well  as  to  suggest  the  form  of  the 
Individual  (or  Atom)  which  is  attained,  namely, 
the  Ego  as  subject. 

Already  we  found  that  the  Cosmical  Atom 
was  a  conception,  was  a  purely  mental  product, 
being  made  by  the  Ego,  and  asserted  to  be  an 
Individual,  that  is,  indivisible  and  impenetrable. 
Now  the  Ego,  the  original  Atom-maker,  has 
found  itself  to  be  the  indivisible  and  impene- 
trable, to  be  itself  the  true  Individual  or  Atom 


EGOISTIC  ATOMISM.  187 

which  is  the  producer  of    Atoms.     The  Ego  is 
the  undivided,  yet  capable  of  dividing  itself,  and 
hence  capable  of  making  all  possible  divisions  in 
the  universe.     We  have  already  noted  that  Leu- 
cippus  strove  to  keep  division  out  of  his  Atom 
(cosmical),  and  yet  division  entered  and  tore  it 
in   twain.     But  now  the  Atom  is  self -dividing, 
and    also  self -uniting ;  it  is   the  undivided   One 
still,  yet  dividing  itself  from  within  and  return- 
ing to  unity  out  of  its  division.     All  of  which  is 
simply    a   description  of    the    Ego    in   its    self- 
conscious    action,    which    separates   itself    into 
subject   and  object,  and    then  makes    itself   one 
with  itself  just  in  that   separation.     Or,  to  use 
still  another  expression  taken  from  Psychology, 
the  Psychosis  has   here  appeared  in  its  earliest 
independent    form,    though    we    have    found   it 
working  implicitly  and    fermenting    m  the  pre- 
vious stages  of  Greek  Philosophy. 

While  thus  the  Sophists  represent  a  philosophic 
tendency,  and  hence  in  the  narrower  meaning  of 
the  word  maybe  deemed  a  certain  definite  school 
of  thought,  in  the  wider  sense  they  are  a  class 
including  many  persons  of  diverse  ways  of  think- 
ing, particularly  of  diverse  characters.  Sophis- 
ticlsm  becomes  the  culture  of  the  age,  and 
remains  not  merely  a  doctrine  of  a  few;  all 
Greece  seems  to  desire  the  new  enlightenment. 
European  historians  of  Philosophy  are  continu- 
tdly  comparing  the  sophistic  period  to  their  own 


188         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

18th  Century  with  its  Ilhmiination  (Aufklarung, 
Eclaircissement),  and  the  Sophists  are  supposed 
to  correspond  with  the  Eucyclopodists  of  France, 
whoah)ng  with  their  positive  merits  show  a  decided 
negative  tendency  cuhninating  practically  in  the 
French  Revolution,  So  the  age  of  Sophisticism 
may  be  deemed  to  have  reached  its  acme  in  and 
during  the  Peloponnesian  War,  in  which  the 
atomic  Ego,  specially  as  it  was  manifested  in  the 
Athenian  Democrac}^  broke  loose  from  all  its 
institutional  moorings,  even  from  the  control  of 
the  youK  of  Pericles  and  its  great  men,  and  gave 
itself  up  to  a  grand  revel,  till  it  was  suppressed 
from  the  outside.  For  such  a  result  the  Sophists 
are  often  blamed,  but  the  age  produced  them 
fully  as  much  as  they  produced  the  age.  They 
were  the  teachers  of  the  time,  but  the  time  called 
tlicni,  and  indeed  i)aid  them  beautiful  money  as 
tlieir  reward,  for  which  again  they  have  been 
severel}'  censured  by  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
not  to  speak  of  many  lesser  accusers.  But  the 
modern  schoolmaster  or  professor,  who  works 
for  pay  and  is  unfailingly  seeking  an  increase  of 
salar}^  will  defend  the  ancient  schoolmaster  on 
this  point  if  on  none  other.  In  fact,  the  taking 
of  pay  for  instruction  is  a  part  of  the  modernity 
of  Sophisticism,  which  it  shows  in  other  ways, 
particularly  in  its  assertion  of  the  right  of  the 
Ego.  The  Sophists  were  in  certain  respects 
more    modern    than    Plato    and   Aristotle,  more 


EGOISTIC  ATOMISM.  189 

modern  even  than  Rome  or  Medievalism.  It 
really  took  two  thousand  years  and  more  for  the 
world  to  digest  that  Ego  which  Greek  Sophisti- 
cism  threw  up  to  the  surface,  and  the  work  is 
by  no  means  yei  done.  The  modern  social  In- 
stitution begins  to  show  its  early  fermentation 
just  in  this  struggle  over  w^orking  for  hire  in 
spiritual  matters.  The  social  Whole  which  calls 
for  and  rewards  labor,  has  taken  a  considerable 
step  toward  its  coming  function  in  this  much- 
discussed  fact  pertaining  to  the  remuneration  of 
the  Sophists. 

The  Ego  now  performs  its  first  great  act  of 
self-emancipation,  which  undoubtedly  shows 
both  positive  and  negative  tendencies,  both  con- 
structive and  destructive  results.  It  questions 
everything  that  has  been  transmitted;  all  the 
past  with  its  customs  and  institutions  is  to  be 
subjected  to  this  new  scrutiny  of  the  sul)jective 
Self.  We  must  examine  what  has  hitherto  been 
taken  for  granted,  and  confirm  it  or  reject  it  by 
our  own  criterion.  Still  the  Ego  must  be  trained 
to  this  business,  the  uncultivated  man  does  not 
possess  the  intellectual  means  for  such  a  work. 
Hence  the  Sophists  w^ere  teachers  primarily, 
teachers  of  all  branches,  but  specially  of  the  art  of 
speaking.  They  examined  the  nature  of  human 
speech  and  began  to  organize  it  in  grammar, 
rhetoric,  and  even  in  logic.  Their  instruction 
had   doubtless  a   practical   end:  the    ability   to 


190         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

control  men  by  means  of  the  golden  gift  of 
eloquence.  Still  they  turned  the  mind  back 
upon  the  words  it  uses,  and  the  way  to  use  them ; 
that  is,  the  Ego  now  begins  to  examine  its  own 
categories.  We  have  already  seen  the  philos- 
ophers employing  philosophical  categories,  with 
little  or  no  scrutiny  of  them ;  the  Sophists  start 
this  work  which  culminates  in  Aristotle.  Not 
before  the  Ego  begins  to  look  at  itself  as  the  test 
of  all  things,  will  it  look  at  the  words  with  which 
it  utters  itself  in  the  act  of  testing. 

Freedom  of  thought  comes  in  with  the  Sophist 
and  is  taught  to  the  people  of  culture,  though 
unquestionably  this  freedom  was  exercised  by 
previous  philosophers  in  individual  cases.  But 
the  distinctive  right  of  the  subjective  Ego  to 
judge  the  world  for  itself  is  now  asserted.  In 
fact  it  is  the  chief  function  of  Sophisticism  to 
make  the  whole  Universe  pass  through  the  alem- 
bic of  the  subjective  Self  or  the  Egoistic  Atom. 
Much  will  be  gained  by  the  operation,  but  also 
much  will  be  lost.  Destroving  agencies  will  be 
let  loose;  selfish  motives,  ambition,  money,  fame, 
will  seem  to  rule  the  time,  since  each  Ego  claims 
the  privilege  of  reducing  all  to  its  particular  end. 
It  tears  itself  away  from  city,  state,  religion  and 
often  from  law,  from  everything  which  is  estab- 
lished and  which  it  deems  external  authority. 
Hence  it  comes  that  Sophists  were  so  often  wan- 
derers, a  vast  horde  of   Atoms  roving  through 


EGOISTIC  ATOMISM.  191 

Hellas,  whose  general  direction,  however,  was 
toward  the  center,  toward  Athens,  where  they 
found  the  widest  and  richest  field  for  their  en- 
deavors. Protagoras  of  Abdera,  Gorgias  of 
Leontini,  Prodicus  of  Ceos,  Hippias  of  Elis, 
were  born  aliens,  but  domiciled  in  Athens  at  least 
for  a  part  of  their  lives,  and  they  were  the  most 
famous  Sophists  whom  Greece  produced.  The 
centripetal  tendency  which  has  been  already 
desjcrnated  as  characteristic  of  the  whole  move- 
ment  of  Atomism  is  here  specially  observable. 

The  Sophist  greatest  in  name  and  loftiest  in 
character  was  doubtless  Protagoras,  who  was 
born  about  480  B.C.  and  perished  in  a  voyage 
to  Sicily  when  he  was  not  far  from  seventy 
years  old.  After  practicing  his  profession  in 
his  native  town  of  Abdera  as  well  as  in  Sicily 
and  in  Italy,  he  gravitated  toward  the  Athenian 
city  where  he  is  said  to  have  enjoyed  the  society 
of  Pericles  and  Euripides.  He  wrote  a  book 
about  the  Gods ;  on  account  of  it  he  was  charged 
with  atheism  and  had  to  leave  Athens,  after 
which  he  set  sail  on  his  fatal  voyage  to  Sicily. 
Thus  his  departure  was  somewhat  like  that  of 
Anaxagoras  above  described.  Plato  has  named 
one  of  his  dialogues  after  him,  in  which  the 
o-eneral  outline  of  his  appearance  and  character, 
as  well  as  of  his  doctrine,  is  given.  It  should 
also  be  added  that  the  life  of  Protagoras  largely 
coincides  with  that  of   Democritus,  also  of   Ab- 


192        ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

dera,  and  it  is  highly  probable  that  he  was  there 
a  pupil  of  Leucippus,  the  founder  of  Cosmical 
Atomism.  Again  we  should  note  that  this  third 
phase  of  Atomism  is  in  a  direct  line  of  descent 
from  the  first,  both  phases  being  connected 
through  Protagoras. 

The  most  famous  sophistic  maxim  is  *«  Man  is 
the  measure  of  all  things;  "  of  this  maxim  Pro- 
to^oras  was  the  author.  Man  is  here  the  indi- 
vidual,  the  Egoistic  Atom,  or  the  subject.  There 
is  no  truth  for  man  except  what  he  feels  and 
experiences.  And  each  man  has  his  own  feel- 
ings, and  also  standards  of  judgment;  what  is 
true  for  one  man  will  not  be  true  for  another, 
or  even  for  the  same  man  at  different  times. 
This  also  holds  of  the  Good.  In  other  words 
there  is  nothing  universally  valid,  only  individu- 
ally or  Egoistically.  This  view  will  again  arise 
and  become  the  characteristic  phrase  of  a  skep- 
tical age  which  will  declare  that  "  Man  cannot 
know  Truth." 

Culture  has  thus  attained  the  standpoint  of 
reo^ardino;  the  cultured  Ego  as  the  measure  of 
all  things,  or,  in  philoso^^hic  phrase,  as  the 
essence  of  Being.  Man  in  his  development  has 
reached  the  stage — and  it  is  an  advanced  one — 
in  which  he  is  to  be  put  under  the  training  of 
his  own  subjective  caprice.  The  human  world 
dissolves  itself  into  its  Egoistic  Atoms,  and 
starts  on  a  new  career.     It  will   be  found  not  to 


EGOISTIC  ATOMISM.  193 

be  an  easy  disci[)line,  though  a  necessary  grade 
in  the  great  university  of  civilization.  Mankind 
at  certain  times  has  to  be  sent  to  school  to  its 
own  caprice.  Thus  it  finds  out  the  meaning  of 
the  same  as  well  as  the  meaning  of  the  objective 
world  of  Law,  of  Institutions,  in  fine,  of  God 
himself.  Likewise  the  individual  in  his  per- 
sonal life  has  to  pass  through  a  similar  schooling 
of  subjective  caprice,  and  sometimes  he  never 
gets  out  of  it.  Every  person  at  some  period  in 
his  development  reaches  the  point  of  considering 
the  inner  movement  of  his  own  Ego  to  be  the 
true  movement  of  the  Universe.  Then  he  is  in 
the  school  of  the  Sophists,  who  are  training 
him  toward  freedom  and  self-determination, 
even  though  this  freedom  be   at  first  capricious. 

In  Greece  proper  Sophisticism  finds  the  Greek 
determined  more  or  less  externally  by  omens, 
oracles,  ancient  habits,  and  the  whole  routine  of 
social  and  religious  ceremonial.  It  was  a  step  in 
progress  to  liberate  him  from  these  outer  fetters, 
and  to  prepare  him  for  seeing  the  rationality  of 
Law  and  Institution,  which  was  a  part  of  the 
great  work  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  who  will  also 
assert  that  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things,  yet 
not  man  as  Individual  (egoistic  Atom)  but  man 
as  Universal. 

The  Sophists  largely  taught  the  Greek  to  be  a 
reflective  person,  and  not  imaginative.  The  wan- 
dering rhapsode  reciting  the  verses  of  Homer  and 

13 


194         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHTLOSOPHY. 

other  poets,  had  been  hitherto  the  chief  teacher 
of  the  people.  But  now  comes  the  wandering 
Sophist,  who  transmutes  images  into  thoughts, 
and  passes  from  poetry  to  prose,  which  he  cul- 
tivates with  as  much  care  and  uses  with  as  much 
skill  as  the  poet  does  his  verse.  Of  course  the 
age  was  ready  and  the  Spirit  was  calling.  Still 
we  may  say  that  the  Hellenic  consciousness,  being 
sent  to  and  through  the  school  of  Sophisticism, 
came  out  reflective,  the  previous  all-dominating 
imagination  being  curtailed  though  not  by  any 
means  destroj^ed.  That  school  prepared  both 
the  language  and  the  audience  for  the  coming 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  who,  notwithstanding,  des- 
perately assailed  their  own  generative  source,  as 
often  happens.  Just  the  Ego,  whose  nature  is 
to  turn  back  upon  itself  and  assert  itself  as  ab- 
solute, is  this  reflective  or  self-returning  process, 
which  was  first  distinctly  called  up  and  cultivated 
by  the  Sophists.  In  fact,  egoistic  Atomism 
deals  with  the  Atom  which  has  become  self- 
reflectinoj  or  Eo;o ;  it  is  the  Cosmical  Atom  turn- 
ing  back  upon  itself  and  seeing  itself  as  the 
principle  of  all  things.  This  makes  the  vortex 
internal,  the  Ego  within  itself  has  the  circular 
whirl  or  its  own  inner  movement  eternally  self- 
returning,  into  which  it  now  precipitates  all  things 
existent,  whereby  it  shows  both  a  negative  and 
a  positive  character.  If  it  a?*sailed  the  old  insti- 
tutional order  established  hy  law  and  custom  on 


EGOISTIC  ATOMISM.  195 

the  one  hand,  on  the  other  it  began  to  affirm  the 
lio-ht  of  the  inner  man  as  self-determined,  and 
so  started  the  science  of  Morals,  which  was  still 
further  developed  by  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aris- 
totle. Some  of  the  Sophists  were  distinctively 
moral  teachers,  as  Prodicus  of  Ceos,  and  it  ac- 
cords with  their  subjective  tendency  to  develop  a 
moral  view  of  the  world,  in  w^hich  the  individual 
sets  up  his  own  insight  or  conscience  as  the  guide 
of  conduct. 

These  general  facts  about  the  Sophists  we 
shall  put  together  in  the  following  statement, 
which  will  also  indicate  their  relation  to  the  total 
movement  of  Atomism. 

1.  The  Ego  as  Subject.  Such  is  primarily 
the  Ego's  individual  or  atomic  character:  it  is 
both  self-dividing  and  self-unifying  in  conscious- 
ness, thus  showing  the  total  process  w^ithin 
itself.  Man  as  the  atomic  Ego,  is  the  measure 
of  all  things,  having  within  himself  the  final 
criterion,  under  which  everything  is  to  be  sub- 
sumed directly.  The  individual  as  Self  is  this 
fundamental  process  without  doubt ;  but  finding 
the  objective  world  different  from  it,  that  is, 
from  himself,  he  turns  negative  to  the  same 
and  seeks  its  undoing. 

The  Sophists  as  individuals  will  show  very 
different  characters,  (a)  Protagoras  with  his 
sensism  regarded  everything  as  true  immediately. 
{b)     Gorgias     with    his     skepticism     regarded 


196         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY 

everything  as  false  immediately,  (c)  Other 
Sophists  hovered  between  these  extremes,  in 
manifold  shades  of  earnestness,  frivolity,  and 
personal  self -exploitation. 

2.  The  Ego  as  Destroyer.  That  there  is  a 
deeply  negative  side  to  Sophisticism  is  indicated 
in  the  preceding  statement  and  cannot  be  suc- 
cessfully denied.  The  atomic  Ego  had  also  its 
Void,  which,  however,  it  made.  In  its  new-born 
consciousness  of  selfhood,  the  subject  could  not 
endure  the  object  as  different  from  itself.  Such 
was  the  negative  manifestation  of  a  very  impor- 
tant stage  of  human  development. 

Sophisticism,  accordingly,  assails  and  under- 
mines the  existent,  the  established,  the  transmit- 
ted in  various  forms,  of  which  the  following  may 
be  noted.  («)  Religion,  the  old  foe  of  the 
philosophers,  receives  the  deepest  wound.  Pro- 
tagroras  affirmed  his  total  ignorance  of  the  Gods. 
(6)  Institutions  are  attacked.  Hippias  the 
Sophist  says  (according  to  Plato)  that  Law  is 
man's  tj^rant,  compelling  him  to  do  many  things 
against  Nature.  Here  rises  the  distinction  of 
Nature  versus  Law,  the  latter  being  unnatural. 
Tc)  Philosophy,  as  the  science  of  objective 
truth,  especially  in  its  antecedent  Greek  forms, 
is  rejected  by  the  Sophists,  notably  by  Protag- 
oras. 

3.  The  Ego  as  Builder.  To  the  foregoing 
negative  side  of  Sophisticism  there  is  a  positive 


EGOISTIC  ATOMISM.  197 

constructive  tendency.  In  general,  the  Sophists 
were  the  teachers  of  the  time,  giving  instruction 
in  those  branches  which  were  a  necessary  prepa- 
ration for  life.  Hippias,  according  to  Plato, 
taught  arithmetic,  geometry,  astronomy  and 
music.  But  their  special  field  was  rhetoric,  the 
art  of  speaking  and  writing.  They  were  the  in- 
troducers of  the  new  education. 

Their  positive  work  may  be  summarized  as 
follows,  (ff)  Grammar  and  rhetoric  they  culti- 
vated with  zeal,  and  made  men  conscious  of  the 
language  they  use.  Protagoras  distinguished 
himself  by  his  grammatical  investigations,  (h) 
Logic  goes  back  to  the  Sophists;  but  the  Dialec- 
tic, with  the  double-dealing  negative,  was  their 
special  favorite,  and  became  the  chief  source  of 
their  bad  name,  (c)  Ethics  they  (or  some  of 
them)  began  to  teach  and  the  virtues;  herein 
they  were  the  forerunners  of  Socrates,  as  well  as 
in  the  use  of  the  Dialectic,  which  is  the  basis  of 
the  Socratic  method. 

With  the  atomic  Ego  as  subject,  the  process  of 
Atomism  has  come  to  a  conclusion,  having  won 
the  Individual,  which  has  manifested  both  its 
positive  and  its  negative  phases.  It  asserts  itself 
against  the  object,  not  yet  knowing  that  its  pro- 
cess is  essentially  that  of  the  object.  Still  it  has 
a  presentiment  thereof,  or  a  feeling  which  is  to 
be  purified  into  thought,  whose  supreme  func- 
tion is  to  behold  the  process  of  the  Ego  in  all 


VJS         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

objectivity.  This  transition  to  thought  is  what 
carries  us  out  of  Atomism  to  the  next  higher 
stage  of  the  Hellenic  Period. 

Ohservaiions  on  Atomism.  If  the  preceding 
exposition  has  attained  its  purpose,  the  reader 
will  feel  that  he  must  appropriate  the  atomistic 
movement  as  an  integral  part  of  the  spiritual 
evolution  of  his  race.  It  rose  to  the  surface  and 
uttered  itself  in  ancient  Greece  and  has  ever  since 
filled  its  niche  in  the  development  of  the  universal 
spirit  which  every  individual  has  to  make  his  own 
in  order  to  be  fully  and  consciously  one  with  his 
kind.  Indeed  the  individual  (as  reader)  is  to 
realize  that  Atomism  is  just  the  process  of  win- 
ning the  Individual  in  thought,  which  fact  is 
affirmed  in  the  phrase,  the  essence  of  Being  is 
the  Individual.  Herein  he  beholds  the  conscious 
getting  of  himself,  the  first  assertion  of  the  Self 
on  principle  and  not  at  random. 

1.  Before  going  further,  it  may  be  well  to 
take  a  retrospect  of  the  three  forms  of  Atomism, 
as  they  have  unfolded  themselves  in  the  foregoing 
account.  A  brief  diagram  may  bring  out  the 
interrelations  of  the  different  parts,  as  follows :  — 

I.  Cosmical:  (1)  Atom;  (2)  the  Void;  (3) 
Vortex. 

II.  Noetic:  (1)  Sperm;  (2)  the  Different; 
(3)  Nous. 

III.  Egoistic:  (1)  Subject;  (2)  the  Nega- 
tive;  (3)  the  Positive. 


EGOISTIC  ATOMISM.  199 

The  movement  of  these  various  divisions  runs 
crosswise  as  well  as  lengthwise.  For  instance 
iJie  Atom  is  unconscious  and  indivisible,  the 
Sperm  is  unconscious  yet  divisible,  tlie  Subject  is 
conscious,  self -dividing,  and  producer  of  division. 
In  like  manner  the  Void  is  the  externally  or 
spatially  separated,  the  Different  is  the  internally 
or  qualitatively  separated,  the  Negative  as  Ego  is 
the  active  or  the  separating  principle.  Similarly 
we  may  follow  out  the  relation  between  the 
Vortex  or  the  immanent  whirl  of  the  Atoms, 
JSTous  or  the  transcendent  orderer  of  the  Sperms 
(or  Atoms),  and  the  Positive  as  creative  or  con- 
structive Ego,  which  iutroduces  the  new  order. 
And  the  reader  who  is  alert  in  spying  out  funda- 
mental analogies  in  diverse  systems  of  Thought 
will  trace  in  the  three  stages  of  Atomism  a 
monistic,  a  dualistic,  and  a  triune  tendency. 

2.  Moreover  with  Atomism  the  hypothesis 
enters  as  an  explanation  of  Being.  The  Atom 
of  Leucippus  is  a  purely  hypothetical  principle, 
a  principle  which  confessedly  cannot  be  proved 
by  its  own  method.  The  Atom  is  supposed  to 
be  material,  and  to  be  endowed  with  attributes 
of  matter,  yet  there  can  be  no  direct  experience 
of  it  as  matter.  The  Atom  is  at  first  the  ex- 
ternally posited,  assumed,,  hypothetical,  but  it 
must  travel  in  its  process  till  it  finds  the  Atom 
which  posits  it,  namely  the  Ego. 

3.  We  have  observed  that  Atomism  did  not 


200         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

originally  arise  from  the  needs  of  Natural  Science, 
which  employs  it  especially  to-da3^  Not  so  much 
a  i)hysical  as  a  metaphysical  origin  it  had  in  its 
old  Greek  form.  Atomism  springs  from  the 
search  for  the  essence  of  Being  (tlie  ousia  of  the 
on),  and  from  this  point  of  view  it  is  as  ontolog- 
ical  as  Parmenides  or  Plato.  It  deals  with  the 
supersensible,  even  if  this  is  supposed  to  be 
material.  Through  Atomism  Philosophy  makes 
one  of  its  most  important  transitions  —  from 
object  to  subject,  or  from  the  sense-world  to  the 
thought-world  as  the  essence  of  all  things.  We 
may  call  it  a  bridge  from  the  Real  to  the  Ideal, 
partaking  of  both,  indeed  being  on  both  sides  as 
a  bridge  must  be.  Through  Atomism  Philosophy 
passes  and  has  to  pass  in  order  to  evolve  out  of 
its  elemental  (or  elementary)  condition  into  its 
universal  stage. 

4.  In  Elementalism  we  observe  Greek  Philoso- 
phy starting  with  the  total  Cosmos  (Macrocosm) 
and  specially  regarding  the  heavenly  world  with 
Sun,  Moon,  Stars,  in  which  it  beholds  motion  as 
regular,  orderly,  and  cyclical.  This  seems  in 
marked  contrast  to  the  irregular,  capricious, 
partial  motion  which  is  manifest  everywhere  on 
earth. 

The  inner  movement  of  all  things  the  early 
Greek  began  to  have  a  presentiment  of  in  the  self- 
returning  bodies  which  make  their  daily,  monthly, 
yearly  revolutions  in  the  skies .    The  conception  of 


EGOISTIC  ATOMISM.  201 

a  World-Soul  producing  this  outward  manifesta- 
tion of  itself  in  the  cycles  of  the  heavenl}^  spheres 
goes  back  to  Anaximander,  if  not  to  Thales. 
The  old  philosophers  felt  the  working  of  the  all- 
pyschical  process  (Pauipsychosis)  in  the  Macro- 
cosm, and  gradually  developed  it  till  it  manifested 
itself  in  the  microcosm  through  the  movement 
of  Atomism,  whose  final  stage  is  the  human  soul 
or  Ego,  which  will  also  be  found  to  move  cycli- 
cally or  in  a  self -returning  process.  Again  we 
note  what  a  significant  place  in  the  unfolding  of 
man's  thought  is  occupied  by  Atomism,  which 
at  last  internalizes  the  external  movement  of  the 
visible  universe. 

5.  Here  we  may  add  that  Atomism,  being  the 
second  stage  of  a  Psychosis,  has  an  inner  relation 
to  all  preceding  second  stages,  such  as  Eleati- 
cism,  or  the  first  principle  of  Anaximander.  The 
student  who  is  eager  to  master  all  these  fine  and 
somewhat  intricate  threads  of  organization,  will 
be  able  to  trace  them  by  himself  from  the  sug- 
gestions already  given.  Thus  he  will  grasp  more 
distinctly  what  may  be  called  the  homologies  of 
this  vast  but  subtle  organism  of  Greek  Phi- 
losoph}^ 

6.  We  always  come  back  to  the  question: 
What  has  the  soul  of  total  Hellas,  philosophizing 
and  seeking  to  find  and  to  express  the  essence 
of  all  things  for  its  own  spiritual  satisfaction, 
gotten  out  of  this  Atomism?     It  has  at  least  set 


202         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

free  the  Individual  as  subject  from  the  trammels 
of  Elemeutalism,  and,  starting  with  the  Atom 
as  thought  or  conceived,  it  has  reached  the  Atom 
which  thinks — thinks  itself  as  atomic  or  indi- 
vidual. Thus  man  knows  himself  as  free  subjec- 
tively, and  he  shows  in  this  stage  all  the  positive  as 
well  as  the  destructive  consequences  of  freedom. 

It  is  plain,  however,  that  Hellas  as  atomic 
cannot  last.  The  land  is  full  of  atomic  cities 
which  can  be  sot  against  one  another;  each  city 
is  full  of  atoin'u'  persons  who  can  be  easily 
turned  into  mutual  iiostility.  Such  a  condition 
invites  or  rather  demands  the  external  conqueror, 
who  will  subject  them  all  anew  to  the  authority', 
not  their  own  but  alien.  The  people  who  once 
beat  off  the  Persian  will  call  in  the  Macedonian 
and  the  Roman,  who  will  subordinate  these  ca- 
pricious recalcitrant  Greek  Atoms.  Such  is  the 
political  outcome  of  Atomism. 

On  the  other  hand  the  soul  of  all  Hellas  cen- 
tering itself  at  Athens  and  still  philosophizing, 
will  rapidly  think  itself  out  of  Atomism  and  will 
carry  the  Individual  forward  beyond  Caprice  into 
the  realm  of  Reason  or  Thought,  which  is  to  be 
the  universal  inner  ruler  of  man.  Thus  an  em- 
pire of  Mind  will  be  erected  which  lasts  down  to 
this  day. 

7.  In  Cosmical  Atomism  the  Atom  has  to  be 
conceived  —  not  sensed  imjnediately  as  a  material 
object,  but  conceived  as  a  material  object;  hence 


EGOISTIC  ATOMISM.  203 

it  is  the  conception  which  materializes  the  Atom 
or  makes  it.  So  it  results  that  in  Atomism  the 
essence  is  really  not  the  Atom  as  material,  but 
the  Atom  as  concept  or  thought.  "When  the 
mind  becomes  aware  of  this  lurking  concept, 
separates  it  from  the  Atom,  and  makes  it  ex- 
plicit, then  we  htive  transcended  Atomism,  and 
the  formula  becomes  the  following:  the  essence 
of  Being  (tlie  ou.-iin  of  the  on)  is  the  concept  or 
the  Universal.  That  is,  Avhen  the  Ego  beholds 
its  own  process  as  that  of  the  object,  it  is  no 
longer  atomic  and  subjective  merel}^  but  it  has 
also  become  objective  and  universal,  seeing  the 
process  of  the  Universe  in  each  part.  This 
inducts  us  into  the  realm  of  Universalism. 


204        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


III.  Uniyersalism. 

By  this  designation  we  strive  to  suggest  the 
third  stage  of  the  First  or  distinctive]}^  Hellenic 
Period  of  Greek  Philosophy.  If  the  previous 
or  second  stage  took  for  its  fundamental  principle 
the  Process  of  Being  as  individual^  the  present 
stage  rises  to  the  point  of  beholding  the  Process 
of  Being  as  universal^  and  so  concludes  the 
Period,  which  is  the  greatest  in  Greek  Thought, 
since  it  grasps  and  formulates  just  this  Thought 
as  the  principle  of  all  things. 

Atomism  has  unfolded  the  character  of  individ- 
uation or  the  getting  of  the  Individual ;  Univer- 
salism  is  to  unfold  the  character  of  universalizing 
or  the  getting  of  the  Universal,  which  is  the 
creative  principle  or  Thought  of  every  object, 
hence  of  the  Individual  also.  Atomism  reached 
the  undivided  one  (the  Individual)  through 
division,  and  its  process  was  to  control  this 
division  (as  in  Egoistic  Atomism)  and  not  be 
controlled  by  it  (as  in  Cosmical  Atomism).  We 
have  just  seen  the  sophistic  Ego  regarding  every 
distinction  in  the  world  as  its  own  subjectively ; 
its  opinion  {doxa)  of  the  object,  and  not  the 
object  itself,  is  the  valid  thing.  But  now  in  this 
third   stage   the    object  is  to   come    to   validity 


UNIVERSALISM.  205 

and  is  to  manifest  the  process  of  Thought  which 
is  universal;  every  individual  has  within  itself 
Thought,  and  this  Thought  is  what  Philosophy 
is  next  going  to  take  up  and  elaborate. 

We  may  here  call  to  mind  the  topographical 
character  of  the  present  stage.  It  is  central  in 
contrast  to  the  atomic  stage,  which  was  centripe- 
tal, and  in  contrast  to  the  elemental  stage,  which 
was  peripheral,  if  not  centrifugal.  We  saw  that 
Elementalism  arose  and  flourished  in  the  Greek 
cities  of  the  border,  east  and  west,  which  were 
colonies,  or  colonies  of  colonies,  of  central  or 
continental  Hellas.  We  also  saw  that  Atomism 
started  on  this  border  in  the  north,  but  that  its 
tendency  as  a  whole  was  toward  Athens,  espe- 
cially in  its  noetic  form  (Anaxagoras)  and  in  its 
sophistic  form  (Protagoras  and  many  others). 
The  flight  of  the  Atoms  or  individual  Atomists 
to  the  center,  where  they  took  part  in  the  grand 
Athenian  vortex,  was  one  of  the  characteristic 
facts  of  that  age.  So  there  was  first  the  peri- 
pheral vortex,  or  whirl  (^dinos),  which  we  have 
noted  as  the  elemental  Psychosis  of  Greek  Phi- 
losophy ;  then  there  was  the  vortex  of  the  Atoms 
in  their  whirl  from  the  periphery  to  the  center  of 
Hellas,  also  in  the  form  of  a  Psychosis  (the  At- 
omic). But  now  we  have  reached  the  central 
vortex,  the  very  heart  of  the  maelstrom  of  Hel- 
lenic Philosophy,  which  will  also  be  found  to  be 
a  psychical   process,    but    confined   to    one   city 


206         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  TIULOSOPHY. 

which  has  shown  itself  imperial  not  only  in  In- 
tellect, but  also  in  Will,  in  the  deed.  So  we  may 
apply  the  thought  of  the  vortex,  so  dear  to  the 
early  Greek  philosophers,  who  saw  in  it  the  image 
of  their  own  selves  and  their  epoch. 

Thus  Philosophy  from  the  outside  of  Greece, 
from  its  border,  has  gotten  to  the  inside,  to  its 
heart.  The  movement  is  not  only  of  location 
but  also  of  mind,  passing  from  the  elemental  and 
sensuous  to  the  intellectual  and  spiritual.  Here- 
in we  may  observe  the  artistic  character  of  every- 
thing Greek,  which  always  has  an  outer  material 
manifestation  for  its  inner  soul.  The  sweep  of 
Greek  Thought  in  space  has  its  spiritual  counter- 
part in  that  Thought  itself.  Moreover  the 
Philosophy  of  Hellas  is  no  longer  colonial,  but 
has  come  back  to  the  starting-point  of  the 
colonies.  It  no  lons^er  tarries  on  the  outskirts 
of  the  Hellenic  world  but  has  penetrated  to  the 
original  source  of  that  world's  marvelous  expan- 
sion. We  have  noticed  that  in  orjo-in  all  Hellenic 
Philosophy  seems  to  be  Ionic ;  even  when  it  took 
a  Doric  bent  (as  in  Eleaticism  and  Pythagorean- 
ism),  its  founders  were  lonians.  The  only 
Doric  founder  of  a  Philosophy  in  a  Doric  city 
was  Empedocles  of  Agrigentum,  yet  his  prin- 
ciple showed  a  decided  reversion  to  Ionic 
elementalism.  The  creative  spirit  of  Greek 
Philosophy  may,  therefore,  be  said  to  be  Ionic, 
startins  in  Ionic  Miletus  of  Asia  Minor.     Now 


UNIVEBSALI8M.  207 

the  mother  city  of  lonism  was  Athens.  Miletus 
was  a  colony  of  Athens.  Hence  comes  the  in- 
teresting fact :  Philosophy  is  a  return  of  the 
Greek  spirit  to  its  fountain-head,  moving  back 
from  the  colony  to  the  original  seat  of  coloniza- 
tion, back  from  Miletus  the  daughter  to  Athens 
the  mother,  back  from  the  derived,  external, 
peripheral,  to  the  underived,  internal,  central. 
For  Athens  always  claimed  to  be  the  underived, 
autochthonous,  born  of  the  Attic  soil  itself,  even  if 
we  now  know  that  she  too,  in  her  forgotten  past, 
had  a  derivation  from  a  Pelasgian,  or  at  least 
from  an  Aryan,  ancestry. 

Nor  must  we  omit  to  notice  the  chronological 
aspect  of  the  present  stage,  its  movement  in 
time.  It  shows  three  phases  in  succession,  rep- 
resented by  three  colossal  geniuses,  Socrates, 
Plato,  and  Aristotle,  following  one  another  sub- 
stantially in  the  order  of  three  succeeding  gen- 
erations. From  the  birth  of  Socrates  (469  B.  C.) 
to  the  death  of  Aristotle  (322  B.  C),  is  a  period 
of  147  years ;  but  when  we  recollect  that  Soc- 
rates did  not  begin  his  full  philosophizing  career 
before  middle  life,  we  have  but  little  more  than 
one  hundred  years  for  the  present  epoch.  This 
succession  in  time  is  still  further  shown  by  the 
fact  that  Plato  was  about  forty  j^ears  younger 
than  his  master  Socrates,  and  Aristotle  more 
than  forty  years  younger  than  his  master  Plato. 
Very  marked,  then,  is  the  chronological  order  of 


208         ANCIENT  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

the  separate  stages  of  the  Athenian  movement. 
Now  note  its  difference  in  this  respect  from  the 
whole  preceding  movement  of  Greek  philosophy, 
which  was,  as  already  set  forth,  substantially 
contemporaneous,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Milesian  School.  But  the  Schools  of  Pythagor- 
eanism,  of  Eleaticism,  of  Heraclitus,  even  of 
Empcdoclcs  and  the  Atoniists  developed  quite 
simultaneously  in  the  middle  half  of  the  lifth 
century  B.  C,  even  if  their  founders  were  not 
all  born  together.  Thus  the  total  Hellenic  spirit 
was  philoso[)liizing,  and  burst  forth  almost  at  once 
into  different  stages  of  its  one  great  fundamental 
thought  at  different  places  on  its  territorial  rim. 
But  when  this  same  Hellenic  spirit  concentrates 
itself  at  Athens,  and  unities  itself  in  one  uni- 
versal formulation  (which,  by  the  way,  is  just 
the  formulation  of  the  Universal)  the  stages  are 
not  the  contemporaneous  fragments  of  the  one 
philosophic  Whole  struggling  to  express  itself, 
but  they  are  the  explicit  process  of  that  philo- 
sophic Whole  of  all  Hellenism,  not  now  thrown 
out  piecemeal  at  many  different  localities  but 
gathered  up  into  a  single  total  movement  in  one 
place.  While  this  Athenian  movement  was  going 
on,  it  was  all-comprehending,  and  no  other  philos- 
ophy of  any  importance  arose,  or  could  arise,  in 
Hellas,  though  the  other  philosophies  still  had 
their  followers.  And  after  the  great  Athenian 
cycle  every  new  philosophy  seemed  to  spring  out 


VNIVEBSALISM.  209 

of  it  as  the  oeneratino-  center  of  all  future 
thinking. 

In  such  fashion  we  bring  before  ourselves  the 
external  local  sweep  of  tlie  Hellenic  Period :  first 
and  outermost  it  is  peripheral ;  then  it  is  centri- 
petal, moving  from  without  to  within;  finally  it 
is  central,  unified  in  a  process  which  is  no  longer 
synchronous  but  successive  in  time,  and  localized 
in  one  point.  The  very  soul  of  the  Greek  race, 
after  a  wonderful  expansion  outwards  and  mighty 
manifestation  of  Will,  in  the  Persian  War,  re- 
turns into  itself  and  becomes  thereby  self- 
conscious,  not  only  thinking  but  knowing  itself 
as  thinking.  Very  suggestive  is  the  imago  of  the 
movement,  as  it  seems  to  break  forth  in  fitful 
flashes  around  the  edges  of  the  Hellenic  world ; 
then  these  flashes  turn  inward  and  unite  at 
Athens  into  the  one  central  sun  of  philosophy 
which  is  still  to-day  shining  in  its  primal  splen- 
dor. This  Hellenic  stage  appears  to  pass  actually 
out  of  Space  into  Time  —  out  of  Greece  particu- 
larized in  this  and  that  Greek  city  into  Greece 
universalized,  l)elono:ing  to  all  lands  and  to  all 
ages.  The  very  transition  from  Atomism  to 
Universalism  in  its  real  significance  is  the  transi- 
tion from  individual  Hellas  to  universal  Hellas, 
from  the  capricious  Greek  to  the  eternal  Greek, 
from  a  town's  Philosophy  to  the  world's  Philoso- 
phy. 

We  are  also  to  see  that  this  third  stage  of  the 

14 


210         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Hellenic  Period  returns  to  and  takes  up  the  first 
stage,  or  the  elemental,  of  course  throuiih  the 
second  stage  or  the  individual.  The  element 
as  such  was  divisible,  but  the  individual  is  now 
not  simply  divisible  or  indivisible,  but  self-divid- 
ing  within  itself,  and  also  self-uniting.  Thus  it 
is  elemental  and  objective  on  the  one  hand ;  and 
on  the  other  contains  the  process  of  the  Ego  as 
individual  and  subjective.  This  is  primarily  the 
Socratic  Concept,  which  however  is  to  receive  a 
full  discussion  later  on.  Still  we  may  here  em- 
phasize the  fact  that  this  present  stage,  called 
Universalism,  is  not  isolated  but  is  a  part  (the 
third)  in  the  total  psychical  movement  of  the 
Hellenic  Period. 

How  shall  we  organize  and  concretely  formu- 
late this  greatest  of  philosophical  epochs?  First, 
let  us  state  in  a  brief  summary  the  process  of  its 
Thought  as  manifested  in  its  three  supreme  per- 
sonalities. 

I.  Socrates:  Thought  as  Concept  or  the  con- 
ceptual stage,  in  which  Thought  is  in  its  imme- 
diate form,  is  directly  in  unit}"^  with  its  object,  yet 
is  the  essence  thereof. 

II.  Plato:  Thought  as  Idea  or  the  ideal  stage, 
in  which  Thought  separates  itself  from  the 
object,  and  makes  its  own  ideal  world  as  distinct 
from  the  })henomenal  world. 

III.  Aristotle:  Thought  as  Thought  of 
Thought  or  Thought  thinking  Thought,  which  is 


tJNIVERSALIS\f.  211 

the  real  stage,  wherein  Thought  returns  to  itself 
in  the  object  and  unfolds  itself  as  the  essence  of 
the  same. 

These  are  very  brief  designations  of  the  three 
summits  of  Greek  thinking,  which  are  neverthe- 
less to  be  seen  united  together  in  one  process. 
Through  Socrates  the  Ego  rises  out  of  its  subjec- 
tive attitude  in  Sophisticism  (Egoistic  Atomism) 
and  finds  itself  the  inner  creative  principle  of  the 
objective  world,  and  thereby  truly  conceives  the 
same.  This  is  the  Concept,  in  which  the  Ego 
asserts  itself  to  be  objectively  existent  in  the 
thing,  asserts  itself  to  be  the  universal  principle 
thereof,  orthe  very  universal  itself  both  as  knower 
and  as  known.  Plato  keeps  the  Concept  but 
separates  it  from  the  object,  whereby  the  Platonic 
dualism  comes  to  light,  which  divides  the  universe 
into  Idea  and  Appearance.  Plato,  therefore, 
belongs  to  the  second  or  separative  stage  of 
this  mighty  Athenian  Psychosis.  But  Aristotle 
returns  to  the  real  object  and  reunites  with  it  the 
Platonic  Idea,  thereby  reconciling  the  Platonic 
dualism  and  causing  the  world  of  Appearance  to 
vanish.  Aristotle  is  thus  a  return  to  Socrates 
through  Plato,  since  he  (Aristotle)  takes  the 
Concept  of  the  former,  which  is  the  unfolding  of 
the  Individual  into  the  Universal  and  restores  the 
Universal  to  the  Individual  after  the  two  had 
been  divorced  by  Plato.  Such  is  the  psychical 
process  with  its  three   stages,  each   of    which  is 


2 1 2         ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPH F. 

represented  by  oue  of  these  great  philosophical 
personages. 

Taking  \\\)  the  common  principle  of  Greek 
Philos()})hy,  which  is  the  essence  of  Being,  we 
may  apply  it  here.  All  three,  Socrates,  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  affirm  the  essence  of  Being  (the 
ousia  of  the  on)  to  be  Thought  —  not  the  ele- 
ment, not  the  atom,  which  are  the  fundamental 
categories  of  the  two  preceding  movements  re- 
spectively. Now  Socrates  affirms  the  essence  of 
Being  to  be  Thought  as  Concept,  or  as  the 
Universal  which  determines  and  creates  the 
objective  world.  Plato  affirms  the  essence  of 
Being  to  l)e  Thought  as  the  Idea  separate  from, 
the  objective  world  which  is  thus  reduced  to  an 
Appearance.  Aristotle  affirms  the  essence  of 
Beinoj  to  be  Thouijht  as  seif-thiukini' or  Thought 
thinking  Thought  (N^oesis  N'oeseos,  or  the  specu- 
lative Reason).  All  three  philosophers  take  for 
granted  that  Thought  is,  has  Being  or  is  one 
with  Being  as  the  essence  thereof.  That  is,  the 
Ego  with  its  process  is  one  with  the  process  of 
Beiuif ,  is  the  Universal  seizinor  and  formulatinor 
the  Universal  in  Beinof.  Thus  the  Eo^o  knows, 
and  comes  into  the  possession  of  science  which 
is  here  ontological  or  the  science  of  Beingr. 

Such  is  the  psychical  movement  of  the  pres- 
ent stage  whose  phases  are  embodied  in  the  three 
philosophers.  Next  we  come  to  the  fact  that 
each   of  these  is  doing  fundamentally  the  same 


UNIVERSALISM.  2 1 3 

thing,  has  fundamentally  the  same  content  in 
his  philosophizing.  In  a  general  way  this  content 
is  the  All,  the  Universe,  which,  however,  becomes 
now  distinctly  separated  into  its  three  grand 
divisions  —  the  Absolute  Being  (God),  Nature 
(the  Cosmos  or  the  World),  and  Man  (the 
human  Being,  who  is  a  natural  Being  sharing  in 
and  returning  to  the  Absolute  Being).  And 
these  three  divisions  constitute  likewise  a  process, 
which  is  a  Psychosis  of  the  All,  or  the  Universe, 
and  which  we  name,  accordingly,  the  Pampsy- 
chosis  (the  All-Psychosis) .  Each  of  these  stages, 
when  formulated  by  Thought,  has  its  own  desig- 
nation, and  they  together  form  the  sciences  of 
Metaphysics,  Physics  and  Ethics.  That  is,  each 
of  the  philosophers,  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aris- 
totle will  reveal  a  common  Norm  which  they 
more  or  less  implicitly  follow,  and  according  to 
which  their  work  divides  itself,  yet  in  such 
division  preserves  the  unity  of  the  process. 

The  principle  of  each  philosopher  is  distinct 
and  peculiar  to  him,  still  it  moves  through  the 
common  Norm  —  Metaphysics,  Physics,  and 
Ethics,  though  with  different  degrees  of  empha- 
sis and  excellence.  Socrates,  as  is  well  known, 
places  his  chief  stress  upon  the  ethical,  though 
he  is  not  without  the  metaphysical  and  even  the 
physical  side.  Thus  every  one  of  them  is  seek- 
ing to  grasp  and  to  formulate  in  categories  the 
Pampsychosis,  or  the  inner  psychical  movement 


214         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

of  the  Universe.  God,  Nature,  and  Man  are  the 
content  of  all  philosophizing  worthy  of  the 
name,  and  are  seen  by  it  to  form  a  process  to- 
gether, which  is  ultimately  psychical,  and  which 
must  at  last  be  made  explicit  through  Psychol- 
ogy. The  same  Universe  of  God,  Nature,  and 
Man  is  likewise  the  content  of  Religion,  as  well 
as  that  of  Philosoi)liy  and  of  Psychology, though 
the  expression  of  it  in  each  of  these  supreme 
Discii)liues  be  very  different.  (See  preceding 
Introduction,  pp.  10,  13,  16,  etc.) 

This  third  stage  we  may  derive  from  the  state- 
ment of  Protagoras,  Man  is  the  measure  of  all 
things.  Here  the  meaning  turns  uj)ou  the  defin- 
ition of  Man.  Does  the  above  statement  mean, 
man  as  individual  (feeling,  opinion,  subjective 
notion),  or  Man  as  universal,  as  Thought?  In 
the  first  case  it  signifies  Sophisticism,  in  the 
second  case  Uuiversalism.  Hence  Socrates  right- 
fully puts  such  stress  upon  Definition,  which 
is  the  Concept  expressed  in  its  proper  category. 
The  sentence  of  Protagoras  has  two  meanings 
quite  opposite  to  each  other,  involving,  as  it 
does,  the  Definition  of  Man  in  two  diverse  ways, 
as  subjective  and  individual  or  as  objective  and 
universal. 

So  we  are  now  to  consider  the  great  concen- 
tration of  Thought  at  Athens  which  expresses 
the  highest  height  attained  bv  Greek  Intellect. 
In  this  movement  three  supreme  liien  participate, 


UNIVEBSALISM.  215 

each  of  whom  is  to  be  considered  in  himself  first 
of  all ;  still  even  as  a  great  individual  he  must 
be  seen  to  be  a  \^^vt  or  member  of  a  still  greater 
process  which  concludes  the  Hellenic  Period  of 
Greek  Philosophy.  Accordingly  we  pass  to 
study  separately  the  three  exalted  personages 
who  compose  this  Athenian  Psychosis. 


216         ANCIENT  EUIiOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


I.  Socrates. 

The  mighty  protagonist  of  the  new  epoch  rep- 
reseuts  the  dawu  of  Thought ;  in  Socrates  the 
human  mind  l)ursts  fortli  into  knowing  itself  as 
thinking;  from  this  time  onward  man  is  to  be  a 
Thinker  in  his  highest  spiritual  manifestation, 
and  also  to  know  himself  as  Thinker.  As  al- 
ready stated,  the  philosophical  principle  of 
Socrates  is  the  Conee[)t  or  Thought  in  its  first  or 
immediate  form.  More  fully  formulated  it  is  this  : 
Socrates  holds  that  the  essence  of  Being  (the 
ousia  of  theo><)  is  Thought  as  Concept,  or  the 
Universal.  The  whole  significance  of  the  man, 
philosophical  as  well  as  ethical,  we  shall  find 
tiowing  out  of  this  proposition. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  Thinking  had  been 
done  before  Socrates,  though  more  or  less  im- 
plicitly. The  first  philosopher,  Thales,  when  he 
had  simply  asked  for  the  essence  of  Being,  had 
begun  to  think.  He  was  imiuiriug  after  the 
Thought,  Principle,  or  Concept  underlying  the 
world.  That  is,  his  Thought  had  unconsciously 
asked  for  the  Thought  of  all  things;  it  was  evi- 
dently in  search  of  itself.  But  it  did  not  find 
itself  till  Socrates  discovered  it  and  pointed  it 
out.     When  the    mind  of  Thales  declared   that 


SOCRATES,  217 

the  essence  of  Being  was  water,  he  was  thinking, 
yet  not  thinking  Thought  as  the  essence  of  Be- 
ing but  a  sensuous  element.  Then  Socrates 
arose,  and  his  Thought  affirmed  that  the  essence 
of  Being  was  not  an  element  but  Thought  itself, 
and  not  simply  his  individual  Thought  but 
Thought  as  universal,  as  the  immanent  creative 
principle  of  every  object  in  existence.  Thus 
what  Thales  implicitly  sought  for,  Socrates  ex- 
plicitly stated,  and  Thought,  going  forth  at  the 
beginning  of  Greek  Philosopliy  in  search  of  the 
essence  of  Being,  has  returned  home  after  a  long 
journey  and  found  just  there  the  object  of  its 
search.  Thus  not  only  Man  but  Philosophy  be- 
comes self-conscious,  and  Thought  not  only 
thinks  unconsciously  but  knows  itself  as  think- 
ing, or  as  the  creative  essence  of  all  objectivity. 
Such  is  the  return  of  Greek  thinking  upon 
itself,  which  constitutes  the  fundamental  psyclii- 
calfact  of  the  present  third  stage  (Universalism), 
which  is  opened  by  Socrates.  This  return  upon 
itself  is  the  deepest  internal  act  of  the  present 
Hellenic  Period,  and  rounds  it  out  into  a  Psy- 
chosis or  a  spiritual  cycle  of  the  absolute  Self 
(the  Pampsychosis).  Moreov^er  we  may  again 
note  the  external  correspondence  in  the  movement 
of  the  Philosophy  of  this  Period :  it  is  a  return 
from  the  rim  of  colonies,  specially  Ionic  colo- 
nies, to  the  main  center  of  their  origination, 
which  was  just  this   Athens.     The  spirit   which 


218         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

these  colonies  priinordially  took  from  their 
mother  city  in  an  unconscious  form  returns  to  it 
philosophizino;,  that  is,  asking  for  the  essence  of 
Being,  which  question  the  mother  will  now  pro- 
ceed to  answer  for  all  her  children,  yes,  for  all 
future  generations.  It  has  been  sometimes 
doubted  whether  Socrates  was  a  true  philosopher ; 
was  he  not  rather  a  moralist  or  preacher? 
Though  he  occupied  himself  in  })ublic  largely 
with  ethical  discussions,  as  we  see  by  his  picture 
in  Xenophon's  Memorabilia,  the  real  underlying 
principle  in  all  his  endeavors  was  the  formation 
of  Concepts,  which  is,  of  course,  a  philosophi- 
cal act.  Indeed  with  him  the  Concept  (philo- 
sophical) is  quite  the  same  as  the  Good  (ethical). 
"VVe  are  first  to  get  the  Concept,  then  we  have 
knowledge,  science;  then,  too,  we  can  act  virtu- 
ouslv.  Socrates  even  Avent  so  far  as  to  say  that 
all  virtue  is  knowledge,  is  the  Concept,  which  if 
we  once  possess,  virtuous  conduct  follows  neces- 
sarily. Hence  it  comes  that  the  primary  occu- 
pation of  Socrates  even  as  a  teacher  of  virtue 
was  the  clearing-up  of  Concepts  by  means  of  his 
famous  Socratic  method,  or  his  Dialectic. 

On  the  other  hand  we  are  never  to  forget  that 
the  philosophizing  of  Socrates  was  a  life  fully  as 
much  as  a  doctrine,  and  that  too  an  active 
life.  His  thinking  was  done  not  so  much  in  his 
closet  as  in  public;  he  unfolded  his  theoretical 
view  in  immediate  practical  contact  with  men  by 


SOCRATES.  219 

means  of  conversation.  Thus  his  Concept  was 
seldom  if  ever  separated  from  the  process  which 
was  forming  it ;  the  Dialectic  was  in  immediate 
unity  with  the  Concept,  though  the  latter  was 
the  end  toward  which  it  was  moving,  or  was  the 
soul  of  the  dialectical  procedure.  Later  the 
Concept,  the  Dialectic,  and  Ethics  will  all  be  sepa- 
rated, held  apart  and  considered  as  they  are  in 
themselves.  But  Socrates  had  them  all  and  all 
at  once,  they  being  immediately  united  in  the 
living  activity  of  his  conversation.  Thus  we  can 
see  that  Socrates  belongs  to  the  implicit  or  the 
first  stage  of  this  third  movement  of  the  Hellenic 
Period.  He  has  the  self -returning  Thoug-ht  or 
Thought  grasping  Thought  as  the  essence  of 
Being,  which  is  the  fundamental  characteristic  of 
this  third  movement ;  but  he  has  the  Thought  of 
it  as  immediate,  not  yet  developed,  as  the  Con- 
cept undifferentiated  from  its  dialectical  and 
ethical  relations,  both  of  which,  however,  are 
present  and  at  work,  soon  to  develop  independ- 
enth^  in  future  Philosophies. 

I.  The  birth  of  Socrates  is  usually  assigned 
to  the  year  469  B.  C,  his  death  to  the  year 
399  B.  C. ;  thus  he  was  70  years  when  he 
died.  In  early  life  he  was  a  sculptor;  it  is 
supposed  that  he  did  not  begin  his  vocation 
of  philosopher  till  somewhere  about  the  begin- 
ning of  the  last  half  of  his  life.  No  doubt  lie 
had  been  preparing  a  long  time  by  meditation, 


220         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

as  he  hiimmered  and  chiseled  away  at  his  marble, 
and  gradually  from  it  wroiiirht  out  his  concep- 
tion. One  may  trace  an  analogy  between  de- 
fining a  concept  from  the  mass  of  chaotic  opin- 
ion and  defining  a  shape  from  a  mass  of  stone. 
Wlien  lie  was  ready,  he  must  have  quit  his  trade 
and  l)egun  his  new  career.  Who  it  was  that 
extended  to  him  encouragement  and  possibly 
liiiancial  lu'l[),  lindiiig  him  i)hilosophizing  in  his 
worksliop,  is  hinted  in  a  few  brief  words  by  Di- 
ogenes Laertius  {Life  of  Socrafcs)  citing  a  state- 
ment tiiat  "  it  was  Crito  who  made  him  leave  his 
workshoj)  and  instruct  men,  out  of  the  admiration 
which  he  conceived  for  his  abilities."  Let  Crito 
then  be  honored,  whose  fidelity  to  Socrates  at 
the  last  moment  Plato  has  celebrated  in  a  well- 
known  Dialogue. 

Without  claiming  historical  accuracy  for  the 
declaration,  one  may  well  suppose  that  Socrates 
began  his  public  philosophizing  a  few  years  be- 
fore the  Peloponnesian  war.  An  important  pre- 
lude of  this  war  was  the  siege  of  Potidtea,  a  city 
in  Thrace  which  had  revolted  from  the  Athenians. 
Socrates  was  present  at  the  siege  as  a  heavy- 
armed  soldier  (432  B.  C),  where  he  is  said  to 
have  rescued  Alcibiades  —  then  or  afterwards 
one  of  his  pupils — from  death  at  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.  Again  in  424  B.  C.  Socrates  marched 
out  with  the  Athenians  against  the  Thebans,  and 
took  part  in  the  battle  of  Delium,  in  which  his 


SOCBATES.  221 

countrymen  were  badly  whipped  and  quite  lost 
their  military  prestige.  In  a  third  campaign 
two  years  later  Socrates  went  to  Amphi polls, 
where  again  he  saw  his  city  defeated.  Thus  he 
shared  in  the  repeated  humiliations  of  his  native 
land,  and  must  have  felt  her  gradual  decline. 
Such  an  experience  could  not  help  sharpening 
the  eye  to  the  need  of  a  radical  reform  in  the 
spirit  of  the  Athenian  citizens.  They  show  only 
opinions  about  public  affairs  which  they  transact ; 
they  must  rise  to  knowledge,  they  must  be 
trained  to  get  the  Concept  of  things,  and  this 
trainino'must  become  their  habit,  their  character. 
Accordingly,  Socrates  has  made  himself  the 
schoolmaster  of  Athens  ;  he  is  the  self-appointed 
teacher  of  the  whole  Athenian  people,  seeking  to 
save  it  from  its  coming  fall,  which  he  sees  but 
too  clearly,  by  a  complete  inner  regeneration. 
As  the  citizens  will  not  come  to  him,  so  he 
goes  to  them,  and  engages  them  in  talk  on  the 
market-place,  in  the  streets,  shops,  promenades, 
anywhere.  He  is  considered  a  nuisance  by  many, 
and  receives  insult,  buffetings,  blows,  it  is  said; 
but  that  does  not  swerve  him  from  his  purpose. 
His  person  is  not  attractive:  bald-pated,  snub- 
nosed,  corpulent  in  body,  with  projecting  goggle- 
eyes  which  roll  around  oddly  when  he  speaks,  he 
is  compared  to  the  arch  satyr,  Silenus,  by  both 
Xenophon  and  Plato,  his  most  devoted  friends 
and  pupils.     He  dressed  carelessly,  like  many  an- 


222         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

other  philosopher,  struck  awkward  attitudes  hid- 
eous to  the  beauty-loving  eyes  of  the  sculpture- 
trained  Greek;  he  "strutted  proudly  barefoot 
along  the  streets"  among  sandaled  gentlemen 
who  ridiculed  him,  and  still  "  you  hold  your  head 
above  us."  So,  at  least,  Aristophanes  com- 
plains, and  satirizes  him  in  a  famous  comedy, 
"The  Clouds." 

And  yet  this  man,  the  reverse  of  the  beautiful 
form,  possessed  the  power  of  rousing  the 
strongest  manifestations  of  love  in  many  of  the 
fair  and  high-born  youths  of  Athens.  How? 
By  the  inner  beauty  of  his  life  and  character; 
minds  holdino:  converse  w^ith  him  had  to  turn 
from  the  outer  shape  of  the  man,  and  regard  the 
perfection  of  the  spirit.  That  meant  a  great 
change,  indeed  it  meant  ultimately  the  transition 
out  of  the  art-world  of  Greece,  which  loved  so 
intensely  and  created  so  profusely  the  sculptured 
shapes  of  beauty.  But  a  new  Love  has  dawned 
which  Plato  has  celebrated  in  his  Symposium  as 
Eros  Pliilosophus,  and  which  turns  from  without 
to  within  for  the  object  of  its  devotion.  Thus 
the  ugly  body  of  Socrates  has  its  place  in  his 
teaching,  as  it  compelled  his  young  Athenian 
followers  to  relieve  their  eye-pain  by  beholding 
him  inwardly  and  there  communing  with  his  soul 
divested  of  its  inadequate  or  rather  lying  cor- 
poreal counterpart.  Above  all,  we  can  trace 
this  influence  in  Plato,  who  fled  to  the  pure  Idea 


SOGBATES.  223 

away  from  Appearance,  and  who  most  artistically 
reacted  against  the  art  of  Hellas,  Thus  in  the 
very  person  of  Socrates  lay  the  Platonic  dualism 
in  its  unseparated  or  implicit  form.  And  from 
the  particular  Socrates  manifested  in  the  pecu- 
liarities of  his  body  and  its  actions,  the  pupil  was 
forced  to  rise  to  the  universal  Socrates,  to  the 
inner  Concept  of  him,  in  order  to  find  the  essence 
of  the  man,  corresponding  herein  to  his  own 
philosophic  doctrine. 

II.  Socrates  is  more  widely  known  than  any 
other  character  in  Greek  History.  His  name  has 
been  heard  or  read  oftener  than  that  of  Homer 
or  Alexander,  who  are  probably  his  nearest  Greek 
competitors  in  popular  fame.  In  general  Soc- 
rates and  his  fate  are  known  to  the  people  of 
Christendom;  this  seems  to  spring  from  the  fact 
that  he  is  deemed  the  Greek  Christ.  Every 
thinking  Christian  will  compare,  secretly  or 
openly,  the  two  in  life  and  in  death.  He  will 
find  striking  differences,  and  also  surprising 
parallelisms.  The  Greek  and  the  Jew  —  both 
martyrs  of  the  spirit  —  have  come  down  time 
associated  together  not  only  in  the  minds  of  the 
learned,  but  to  a  degree  in  the  popular  imagi- 
nation. 

Twenty-three  centuries  have  joined  their  voices 
in  proclaiming  the  greatness  of  Socrates,  and  in 
placing  him  at  an  important  turning-point  in  the 
march  of  humanity.     Studious  men  to-day  more 


224         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ardently  than  ever  are  asking  themselves  the 
question :  What  did  he  do  that  he  should  take 
such  an  epoch-making  position  in  our  spiritual 
evolution?  Especially  every  student  of  Philos- 
ophy grapples  with  that  Concept  called  Socrates, 
which  has  in  many  cases  been  transmitted  to  him 
more  or  less  vaguely  from  childhood.  Sup- 
posing that  he  is  imbued  with  the  philosophic 
spirit,  he  has  reached  the  stage  of  seeking  to 
define,  formulate,  categorize  Socrates,  bringing 
the  same  out  of  a  shadowy,  semi-conscious, 
shifting  mass  of  indefinite  notions  into  a  clear, 
well-rounded,  and,  as  it  were,  plastic  outline 
of  a  Concept,  general  indeed,  but  distinct  and 
mentally  employ-able. 

Now  what  if  Socrates  be  just  the  person  who 
first  showed  mankind  how  to  extract  this  general 
Concept  (or  Universal)  of  an  object  out  of  the 
chaotic  multitude  of  fleeting  notions  which 
encompass  it  or  rather  bur}^  it  in  the  mind? 
What  we  here  propose  to  do  with  him,  he  first 
taught  the  race  to  do ;  his  own  procedure 
we  shall  seek  to  apph'^  to  him  who  started  it, 
bringing  back  to  him  his  own  deed,  subsuming 
him  under  his  own  thought.  Thus  every  thinker 
has  to  repeat  and  renew  Socrates  in  himself 
in  order  to  get  Socrates. 

Nor  is  it  merely  the  general  Concept  which 
lies  implicit  and  unborn  in  a  mass  of  indiscriminate 
images  and  opinions,  from  which  it  has  to  be  un- 


80GB  ATE  S.  225 

folded  and  extricated.  Processes  also  lie  thus  im- 
bedded, yea,  the  process  of  all  processes,  the  Psy- 
chosis itself,  which  is  fermenting  in  every  Religion 
and  in  every  Philosophy,  is  indeed  the  very 
principle  of  such  fermentation.  Now  and  then  it 
breaks  out  of  the  secret  abode  in  unexpected  spots, 
and  becomes  explicit  and  visible  for  a  time,  when 
it  passes  again  into  an  eclipse.  Such  is  the  ran- 
dom and  uncertain  manifestation  of  the  Psycho- 
sis throughout  European  Philosophy,  certainly 
alive  and  moving  in  the  womb  of  time,  and  oc- 
casionally lustily  struggling  there,  but  still  un- 
born. The  day  is  coming  (we  hope)  when  the 
Psychosis  will  come  forth  out  of  its  long,  long 
period  of  gestation  into  light,  definite,  visible, 
actually  existent  in  the  world,  being  parallel  in  its 
way  to  the  birth  of  the  Socratic  general  Concept. 

Under  the  image  just  presented,  Socrates 
conceived  his  vocation,  comparing  himself  to  his 
mother  Phsenarete  who  was  a  midwife.  In  like 
manner  he  was  to  help  to  birth  the  general  Con- 
cept conceived  in  the  brain  and  struggling  there, 
by  his  peculiar  art  of  mental  obstetrics.  So  Plato 
(in  Theoetetus  149,  A)  and  Xenophon  {Me7n. 
IV,  7),  make  him  talk  about  himself,  wherein 
he  shows  himself  conscious  of  his  procedure. 

We  may  also  draw  the  old  calling  of  his  father 
and  of  himself  into  the  illustration  of  this  his 
new  profession.  Socrates  was  in  early  life  a 
sculptor,  as  was  Sophroniscus  his  father.     Thus 

15 


226         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PniLOSOPHT. 

both  belonged  to  the  great  age  of  Greek  plastic 
art,  that  of  Phidias,  and  may  have  wrought  in 
the  latter's  workshop  or  under  his  guidance,  upon 
the  mar})les  of  the  Parthenon.  Young  Socrates, 
born  in  4G9  B.  C,  must  have  seen  this  supreme 
temple  of  the  world  gradually  rising  up  and  taking 
on  its  beautiful  form  from  the  brain  of  Ictinus 
the  architect  and  of  Phidias  the  sculptor.  The 
Parthenon  was  finished  about  438  B.  C,  and  its 
construction  is  said  to  have  lasted  some  twelve 
years  —  a  period  of  great  artistic  and  intellectual 
stimulation  at  Athens,  in  which  Socrates  must 
have  partaken.  He,  a  receptive  youth  of  nine- 
teen, sees  the  Parthenon  with  all  its  sculptur- 
esque decoration  at  the  beginning  of  its  birth 
into  time,  and  also  sees  its  completion  when  a 
man  of  thirtj'-one.  This  of  itself  would  bo  an 
education  unparalleled,  and,  as  before  said,  he 
may  have  had  a  hand  in  the  work.  At  least  he 
beheld  day  after  day  the  rough  blocks  of  marble 
transported  from  Pentelicus  and  changed  into 
shapes  which  were  called  divine,  and  which  made 
visible  the  creative  powers  of  the  universe. 
Truly  at  Athens  in  the  time  of  Socrates  there 
was  a  grand  epiphany  of  the  Gods  appearing  to 
the  senses  of  men  in  the  forms  of  Art.  Phidias 
at  this  period  made  the  chryselephantine  statue 
of  Oij'mpian  Zeus,  from  all  accounts  the  nearest 
visible  embodiment  of  the  Supreme  God  that  has 
ever  manifested  itself  upon  our  earth.     Socrates 


S0CBATE8.  227 

could  well  have  been  present  in  438  B.  C,  at  the 
dedication  of  the  colossal  standing  figure  of 
Pallas  Athena,  Goddess  of  Wisdom  and  the  pro- 
tecting deity  of  Athens.  Already  the  artist  was 
expressing  the  divinely  creative  Idea  in  shapes  of 
marble  and  bronze,  and  in  that  mighty  epoch 
poetry  sang  of  the  same  spirit  which  inspired  the 
heroic  deeds  of  Marathon  and  Salamis. 

Socrates,  then,  began  life  as  an  artist  —  his 
group  of  the  Three  Graces  was  pointed  out  in 
later  times  —  but  he  found  that  it  was  not  his 
calling  to  shape  the  Idea  or  Concept  in  the  forms 
of  sense.  From  an  outer  work  he  changed  to  an 
inner,  transmuting  the  rough  masses  of  human 
speech  into  clear-cut  terms,  which  also  gave  ex- 
pression to  the  Idea.  From  a  statuary  working 
in  stone  he  changed  to  a  statuary  working  in 
mind,  which  he  informed  anew  with  his  own  art 
and  that  of  his  age.  In  the  market-place  he 
opened  his  new  workshop  among  the  people, 
whose  words  he  began  to  trim  and  train  till  he 
made  them  expressive  of  distinct,  well-defined 
Concepts,  plastic,  too,  in  their  way.  As  he  once 
chiseled  off,  chip  by  chip,  the  marble-block  of 
rude  nature  till  a  beautiful  shape  came  forth  rep- 
resentmg  the  God,  so  he  now  by  his  new  art, 
which  is  the  so-called  Socratic  method,  removes 
one  after  another  the  wild  growths  of  man's  un- 
trained thmking,  till  the  clear  shajDely  thought 
appears  uttered  in  kindred  speech. 


228         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Ill  the  age  of  Socrates  sculpture  unfolded  its 
higlie.st  bloom,  attaining  an  excellence  which  it 
never  reached  before  or  since.  He  may  rightly 
be  connected  with  this  art,  because  he  belonged 
to  it  professionally,  and  from  it  received  his 
earliest  training,  but  especially  because  it  was 
the  most  direct  and  lofty  expression  of  the  age, 
in  which  he  as  the  child  of  his  time  profoundly 
participated. 

III.  But  Socrates  must  have  had  other  teach- 
ers, those  who  taught  him  something  of  Philoso- 
phy directly.  At  that  time,  during  the  age  of 
Pericles,  Athens  was  the  gathering  point  of  all 
thinkers,  sophists,  philosophers.  Among  others 
Anaxagoras  had  come  thither  during  the  boyhood 
of  Socrates,  and  is  said  to  have  remained  in  the 
cit}^  some  thirty  j^ears,  giving  instruction  and 
imparting  his  doctrines.  Here  certainly  was  an 
opportunity  for  Socrates  lasting  through  the 
whole  period  of  his  manhood.  One  may  well 
trace  in  his  work  the  influence  of  the  jV^ous  of 
Anaxagoras,  or  the  principle  of  Mind  as  the 
fundamental  principle  of  all  things.  The  general 
Concept  or  Idea  of  Socrates  is  related  to  N'ous, 
of  which  it  is  a  more  highh'  developed  form. 

Socrates  is,  however,  more  closely  connected 
with  the  Sophists  than  with  Anaxagoras.  Indeed 
he  is  a  Sophist  on  one  side,  but  on  the  other  side 
he  is  their  opposite,  their  declared  foe.  Of 
them,  through   them,  beyond   them,  were  steps 


SOCBA  TES.  229 

in  the  growth  of  Socrates.  With  the  Sophists 
lie  turned  inward  and  began  to  find  his  oracle 
there;  with  them  he  passed  from  authority,  from 
tradition,  from  the  established  to  the  realm  of 
individual  insight.  But  this  individual  insight  is 
to  be  employed  in  attaining  the  Universal,  the 
Concept,  whereby  the  subject  begins  to  know 
itself  as  objective.  This  is  the  line  on  which  he 
moves  out  of  the  negative  condition  of  the 
Sophists  to  a  positive  view  of  the  world. 

In  giving  an  account  of  the  education  of  Soc- 
rates, we  must  not  leave  out  his  greatest  teacher, 
Athens,  the  supreme  Hellenic  Commonwealth, 
which  was  in  this  period  building  itself  externally 
into  the  most  beautiful  city  that  ever  existed,  and 
even  more  wonderfully  was  building  a  group  of 
men,  a  set  of  human  characters,  the  like  of  whom 
have  not  often  a[)peared  since  or  before  on  our 
planet.  Prominent,  and  of  the  same  general 
mould,  among  these  stands  Socrates  himself,  nur- 
tured to  greatness  by  the  same  spirit  in  his  own 
peculiar  domain. 

The  overshadowing  power  of  Persia,  which  had 
threatened  the  Greek  world  for  two  generations, 
had  been  broken,  chiefly  by  the  might  of  Athens 
and  her  great  man,  Themistocles.  This  city  could 
well  say  that  she  had  saved  Hellas  from  the  Ori- 
ent, and  we,  looking  back  through  a  vista  of  more 
than  twenty-three  centuries,  can  say  far  more, 
namely,  that  she  saved  Europe  from  the  Orient. 


2;i0         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  spirit  which  had  done  such  a  deed  was  cen- 
tered in  the  one  small  city  and  its  citizens.  Soc- 
rates was  born  ten  years  after  the  battle  of  Pla- 
tiea,  his  daily  life  was  passed  among  the  victors 
of  Salamis  and  of  the  other  great  battles  by  sea 
and  land  during  the  Persian  War;  we  may  sup- 
pose that  hundreds  of  the  veterans  of  Marathon 
were  still  living,  and  w^ere  among  his  neighbors, 
each  one  of  whom  had  his  own  story  to  tell  of  the 
great  conflict.  On  such  memories  the  youth  was 
nourished,  and  grew  to  manhood,  which  also  saw 
his  native  city  the  acknowledged  political  leader 
of  the  Hellenic  world. 

Socrates  likewise  witnessed  the  outer  struggle 
of  the  Greek  city-states  with  the  foreigner  be- 
comins:  an  internal  conflict  amonoj  themselves, 
till  they  all  took  sides  and  began  the  long  civil 
conflict  known  as  the  Pelo})onuesian  war,  w^hich 
lasted  twenty-seven  years  (431-404  B.  C),  and 
ended  in  the  complete  humiliation  of  Athens. 
He  lived  through  this  slow  painful  undoing  of 
his  country,  passing  in  it  the  meridian  of  his  life 
(from  his  38th  to  his  65th  3ear).  Such  a  polit- 
ical struggle  among  those  refractory  units,  the 
Greek  city-states,  lies  in  the  background  of  his 
civil  life  and  also  of  hispliilosophizing;  the  strug- 
gling mass  of  individuals,  as  atoms,  notions,  ca[)- 
rices  or  men  he  would  bring  under  the  Universal, 
and  thus  have  a  ruling  ol)jective  principle  of 
order  in  the  world.  The  subjective  autonomy  of 


SOCEATES.  231 

the  man  and  correspondingly  of  the  city  has  its 
sphere,  but  also  there  must  be  an  objective  hege- 
mony of  the  Concept  as  well  as  of  the  State. 

The  conflict  and  disintegration  going  on  below 
among  Greek  men  was  also  taking  place  above, 
among  the  Greek  Gods,  who  now,  even  more 
than  in  Homer's  time,  formed  a  Pantheon  of 
many  recalcitrant  units.  Zeus,  the  chief  ruler 
of  the  Olympians,  if  not  exactly  dethroned,  had 
been  placed  in  the  background,  especially  at 
Athens,  which  worshipped  Pallas  Athena,  the 
Goddess  of  the  Mind,  the  divine  embodiment  of 
Nous.  Her  new  beautitul  temple,  and  her  new 
colossal  statue  have  been  already  noticed,  both 
being  erected  in  the  prime  of  Socrates'  man- 
hood, and  both  being  situated  high  upon  the 
hill  of  the  Acropolis,  overlooking  the  valley  of 
the  Ilissus  below.  Down  there  in  that  valley  lay 
the  unfinished  temple  of  Zeus,  begun  by  the 
tyrant  Pisistratus,  which  the  democratic  Athe- 
nians never  would  complete  even  for  the  Monarch 
of  Heaven.  Finally  the  Monarch  of  the  World, 
the  Roman  Emporer  Hadrian,  built  it  up  anew, 
more  than  six  hundred  years  after  the  laying  of 
its  first  foundation.  All  of  this  is  very  significant 
of  the  religion  of  Athens  during  the  present 
epoch  :  she  led  a  revolt  against  the  old  auto- 
cratic God  of  Hellas,  and  set  up  in  his  stead 
the  deity  of  Wisdom,  of  individual  Insight,  of 
Intelligence. 


232        ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPUY. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Socrates  shared  in  this 
great  spiritual  change  of  his  city  and  of  his  age. 
He  did  not  deny  the  Gods,  but  he  certainly 
transformed  them,  and  indeed  had  to  do  so. 
This  fact  was  so  well  known  that  his  enemies 
could  get  hiiu  ariaignod  before  the  Athenian 
dicastery  and  condemned  to  death,  chiefly  on  tlie 
ground  of  impiety. 

This  last  act  is  the  most  impressive  and  mem- 
orable one  in  his  whole  career,  enrolling  him 
among  the  martyrs  of  the  race  for  the  highest 
good  of  the  race.  And  yet  there  are  two  sides 
to  the  question  of  the  justification  of  his  death. 
The  real  interest  of  it  lies  in  the  fact  that  over 
Socrates  two  world-views,  the  outgoing  and  the 
incoming,  collided  sharply,  and  thus  gave  a 
most  striking  manifestation  of  their  existence. 
If  he  had  perished  through  a  brutal,  violent  exe- 
cution by  the  State  (say  at  the  hands  of  the 
thirty  tyrants,  whom  he  opposed),  his  death 
would  have  simply  been  a  lamentable  accident. 
But  as  it  is  recorded  by  Plato  and  Xenophon,  it 
shows  two  spiritual  powers  grappling  with  full 
intensity,  each  in  its  own  way  and  in  its  own 
right.  Thus  it  becomes  a  spectacle  for  all  time, 
a  veritable  drama  enacted  on  the  stage  of  the 
world.  Both  sides  have  to  be  present  in  full  pan- 
oplj',  assertmg  their  respective  principles  before 
the  two  arbiters,  one  of  which  is  that  trans- 
itory  Athenian   dicastery,  the  other  is  the  tri- 


SOCRATES.  2o3 

bunal  of  the  ages.  Before  the  former,  Socrates 
lost  his  cause  and  perished ;  before  the  hitter  he 
has  clearl}^  won  it,  and  still  lives. 

IV.  We  pass  next  to  consider  the  basic  maxim 
of  Socrates,  Know  thyself. 

"  Tell  me,  Euthydemus,  did  3'ou  ever  go  to 
Delphi?  "  asks  Socrates  (Xenophou's  Mem.  IV, 
2.24). 

"  Yes,  twice." 

"  Did  you  read  that  inscri})tion  upon  the  tem- 
ple, Knoio  thyself?  " 

"  Certainly." 

Whereupon  Socrates  proceeds  to  enforce  the 
deeper  signiticance  of  this  maxim  by  various  ex- 
amples. Self-knowledge  is  the  key  to  all  knowl- 
edge ;  only  by  knowing  yourself  or  the  Self,  can 
you  know  the  world,  and  thereby  pass  from  sub- 
ject to  object.  This  maxim  also  is  capable  of  a 
double  construction.  If  I  know  mj'-self  imme- 
diately, or  as  the  individual,  to  be  the  essence  of 
all  Being,  I  take  the  sophistic  standpoint  of 
Protagoras.  But  if  I  know  myself  as  thought 
to  be  the  essence  of  all  Being,  my  self-knowledge 
is  that  of  Socrates.  In  thought  I  recognize  the 
self -knowing  Ego  as  the  creative  principle  of  the 
objective  world.  The  Self  knowing  itself  sees 
this  process  of  self-knowledge  to  be  the  process 
of  all  things.  Hence  Aristotle  will  explicitly 
affirm  that  the  Thought  of  Thought,  or  Thought 
thinking   Thought  (noesis   noeseos)    is    the    true 


234         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PIIILOSOniY. 

realit>',  the  real  essence  of  Being.  So  it  conies 
tlijit  we  shall  find  in  him  from  this  point  of  view 
a  return  to  Socrates,  whose  implicit  Concept  or 
Thouirht  he  develops  to  its  full  expression. 

Know  tliijfidf  may  be  considered  the  germinal 
starting-point  of  Socrates.  The  self-knowing 
Ego  had  already  been  announced  by  the  Sophists 
who  made  it  purely  subjective,  and  hence  nega- 
tive also,  when  they  said  that  man  is  the  measure 
of  all  things.  But  Socrates  proclaimed  that  this 
self -knowing  Ego  knows  itself  likewise  as  object, 
as  tlio  principle  of  the  world,  in  which  man  is  to 
tind  himself  in  order  to  know  it.  Thus  Socrates 
reached  the  lofty  point  of  seeing  that  Thought  is 
objective,  that  the  world  is  Thought  which  hia 
Thought  must  recognize  in  order  to  obtain  true 
knowledge.  In  this  sense  Socrates  still  holds  to 
the  principle  that  man  is  the  measure  of  all 
things,  but  with  a  vast  new  meaning  different 
from  that  of  the  Sophists  who  made  the  particu- 
lar subjective  Ego  with  all  its  caprices  and  opin- 
ions to  be  the  measure  of  all  things.  Socrates  saw 
the  all-creating  Nous,  if  not  in  the  whole  universe, 
at  least  in  important  parts  of  it ;  his  own  Xous 
must  recreate  the  same  by  thinking  if  he  is  to 
know  the  truth  of  it.  This  objective  all-creating 
iVoM.s-is  what  the  Sophists  denied  or  left  out;  they 
were  subjective,  subjecting  creation  to  their  own 
Ego,  from  the  outside,  instead  of  identifying 
their  own  Eij;o  in  creation. 


SOCBATES.  2o5 

To  know  thyself  is  not  merely  to  know  this 
individual  Self  with  its  ever-changing  bubbles  of 
notions,  but  to  know  thyself  as  man,  as  human- 
ity, as  universal.  Not  simply  an  introspective 
act  is  this,  but  at  the  same  time  an  extrospec- 
tive  look  into  the  creative  soul  of  the  world, 
whose  process  is  that  of  truth  itself.  We  may  say, 
then,  chat  Socrates  saw  the  fundamental  Norm 
of  the  Universe,  but  he  saw  it  immediately,  and 
did  not  separate  it  fully  from  its  particular  em- 
bodiment, grasping  and  uttering  it  as  it  is  m 
itself.  This,  however,  makes  him  the  beginner 
of  the  movement  which  unfolds  the  philosophic 
Norm  of  human  Thinking  to  a  full  consciousness 

of  itself. 

Now,  this  self-knowledge  of   Secrates  has  its 
own  process,  whose  stages  we  shall  glance  at. 

1.  He  starts  with  an  act  of  faith,  which  is 
that  every  person,  even  the  humblest  Athenian 
laborer,  has  within  himself  implicitly  the  truth, 
the  universal  Concept.  But  it  is  covered  up  and 
intertwined  with  a  mass  of  opinions  and  notions 
from  which  it  must  be  sifted,  and  exposed  as  it  is 
in  itself.  So  he  goes  to  the  people,  in  whom  he 
believes  this  original  germ  to  be  existent,  though 
as  yet  potential  and  unconscious.  He  is  one  with 
them,  and  he  puts  every  man,  high  and  low,  who 
will  talk  with  him,  through  the  same  process 
which  he  has  experienced  within  himself. 

2.  He  separates  the  fleeting,  untrue,  insubstan- 


236         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tial  shreds  of  luiud  from  the  eternal  iiud  uDiversul 
element,  whereby  the  hitter  becomes  conscious 
and  explicit.  Tiiis  he  does  by  question  and  an- 
swer, by  his  peculiar  method  still  known  as  So- 
cratic,  which  is  the  pedagogic  method.  He,  too, 
wants  to  know  somewhat,  so  he  starts  to  interro- 
gate the  bystander  and  interweaves  him  into  a 
Socratic  dialogue  (dialor/os,  whose  end  is  the 
/070.S,  or  Ideaj.  The  general  movement  of  it  is 
to  make  the  interlocutor  contradict  his  own  inad- 
equate opinions,  to  make  him  negate  his  own 
negative  notions,  and  thereby  to  have  him  rise  to 
the  true  C(mcept  of  the  object.  Tiie  irony  of 
Socrates  is  to  assume  ignorance  himself  in  order 
to  convict  others  of  ignorance  and  thence  lead 
them   to  knowledge. 

3.  This  knowledge  was  the  becoming  con- 
scious of  the  general  Concept,  the  advance  from 
the  particular  to  the  universal  or  to  the  creative 
thought  of  the  object.  It  is  sometimes  called 
the  Dclinition  of  the  thing  under  consideration, 
as  of  Justice  or  the  Good.  We  may  deem  it 
also  a  criticism  of  the  terms  used  by  the  people, 
and  a  finding  of  their  essential  meaning.  Thus 
it  becomes  a  category ;  Socrates  calls  forth  out 
of  the  vague  notion,  the  detinite  category  —  a 
great  step  in  philosophy  which  now  becomes 
a  conscious  categorizing  of  the  universe.  Un- 
doubtedly Philosophy  has  moved  hitherto  in 
categories,  but  such  a  movement  has  been  largely 


SOCRATES.  ^37 

unconscious.  In  Socrates,  however,  Thought 
returns  upon  itself  and  formulates  itself  as 
Thought,  wherein  we  behold  the  third  or  self- 
returning  stage  of  this  whole  Hellenic  Psychosis, 
or  psychical  movement  of  the  Hellenic  Period 

As  Socrates  w^orks  up  from  the  particular 
to  the  general,  his  method  has  likewise  been 
called  inductive  (or  epagogic).  The  Sophist 
took  the  particular  subject  with  all  its  impulses, 
feelings,  fancies,  as  tlic  man  who  was  to  measure 
all  things ;  but  Socrates  purified  this  measuring 
man  of  his  subjective  caprices,  aud  elevated 
him  into  a  rational  or  universal  Self,  which 
was  Thought  as  reproductive  of  the  Universe. 
Not  simply  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things, 
but  man  as  thinker,  as  the  maker  of  the  Concept, 
is  the  measure  of  all  things. 

Connecting  the  work  of  Socrates  with  the 
fundamental  movement  of  Greek  Philosophy 
(which  is  the  grand  search  for  true  Being) 
w^e  see  that  his  message  is  that  the  Concept 
is  true  Being,  or  that  the  essence  (oima)  of 
Being  is  Thought,  or  that  Thinking  is  also 
objective,  not  simply  subjective.  All  these  terms 
express  the  one  supreme  fact  of  Socrates  as 
the  founder  of  the  third  or  Athenian  stage  of 
Hellenic  Philosophy. 

V.  A  skeptical  element  Socrates  had  in  con- 
nection with  the  preceding  movement  out  of 
skepticism.     He  did  not  adopt  the  w^hole  range 


238        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PIJILOSOrHV 

of  science  like  Plato  and  Aristotle;  there  were 
spheres  of  knowing  into  which  he  would  not 
carry  his  general  Concept.  On  this  side  he  was  not 
universal,  but  showed  his  limitation.  This  nega- 
tive phase  of  his  connects  him  with  the  Sophists, 
from  whom  he  inherited  it;  he,  too,  affirmed  the 
right  of  the  subjective  Ego  to  criticise  the  Estab- 
lished, and  even  to  deny  its  validity  in  certain 
cases.  But  his  effort  \vas  to  move  forward  out 
of  denial  to  the  new  future  order,  not  to  relapse 
in  terror  to  the  old  past,  which  seems  to  have 
the  principle  of  Aristophanes,  as  far  as  he  had 
any. 

1.  Socrates  particularly  eschewed  the  previous 
speculations  of  Greek  philosophers  on  Nature. 
He  would  rule  out  the  Ionic  and  the  Atomistic 
Schools  as  unworthy  of  being  known. 

2.  He  shunned  the  mathematical  views  of  the 
Pj'thagoreans. 

3.  The  metaphysical  subtleties  of  philoso- 
phers like  the  Eleatics  had  no  fascination  for 
him. 

He  was,  therefore,  negative  to  the  Philoso- 
phies before  his  time — physical,  metaphysical 
and  mathematical.  And  yet  he  stands  in  relation 
to  all  these,  he  is  indeed  their  direct  product  and 
outcome.  At  times  he  seems  to  have  felt  this, 
and  so  is  not  wholly  consistent  in  his  attitude 
toward  them.  More  will  be  said  upon  this  topic 
in  another  connection. 


SOCRATES.  239 

VI.  But  the  field  to  which  Socrates  turned 
with  singleness  of  purpose  was  the  ethical.  Hav- 
ing reached  his  general  Concept  by  induction,  he 
applies  it  to  human  conduct.  Hence  his  investi- 
gations pertained  almost  wholly  to  Virtue  and  the 
Good.  Savs  Aristotle:  "  Socrates  resrarded  the 
problem  of  Philosophy  to  be  the  seeking  for  the 
essence  of  Virtue."  But  Aristotle  also  attribu- 
ted to  Socrates  the  determining  of  general  Con- 
cepts. These  two  views  find  their  reconciliation 
in  the  fact  that  Socrates  investigated  the  Concept 
in  order  to  settle  the  nature  of  Virtue,  which  is  a 
general  Concept.  That  is,  having  gotten  the 
universal  Thought  as  such,  he  will  not  apply  it 
universally  to  all  objects,  but  simply  to  human 
actions. 

Under  the  head  of  Ethics  we  put  together  the 
most  distinctive  teachings  of  Socrates. 

1.  The  best  known  of  his  ethical  doctrines  is 
that  Virtue  is  knowledge,  which  he  affirmed  ap- 
parently with  all  its  consequences.  Hence  no 
man  does  WTong  knowingly ;  goodness  cannot  be 
truly  predicated  of  a  person  who  acts  instinc- 
tively; if  a  man  could  do  a  wrong  knowingly,  he 
would  still  be  better  than  one  who  did  it  io-no- 

c 

rantly,  since  the  former  lacks  only  goodness,  while 
the  latter  lacks  both  goodness  and  knowledge. 
Herein  Ave  see  how  emphatically  Socrates  asserted 
the  self-conscious  stage  of  spirit  against  tlie  un- 
conscious.    He  had  quite  reached  the  view  that 


240         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPnT. 

good  done  instinctively  is  no  good  iit  all.  The 
old  prescriptive  morality  of  Greece  was  to  be  sup- 
planted by  this  new  self-knowing  ethical  world. 
He  seeks  to  chano;e  the  Athenian  from  a  man  de- 
terniined  by  his  community  with  its  transmitted 
beliefs  to  a  man  self-determined  in  conduct ;  the 
inner  Universal,  the  thinking  Ego  is  to  take 
the  place  of  the  outer  Universal,  the  Law  and 
Institutions.  Socrates  does  his  thinking  in  the 
greatest  City-State  of  Greece,  passing  from 
the  instinctively  institutional  condition  to  the 
moral. 

Socrates  deserves  credit  for  seeing  that  all 
knowledge  has  a  moral  side,  and  is  followed  bv 
responsibility.  But  he  ignored  the  primacy  of 
the  AVill  in  Ethics,  and  assej'ted  the  primacy  of 
Intellect ;  to  know  was  to  be  good  in  his  view ; 
he  did  not  understand  how  a  man  could  know  the 
good  and  not  do  it ;  surely  the  evil-doer  was  igno- 
rant of  what  he  was  doing.  Thus  knowledge 
was  one  with  Virtue,  and  could  not  be  separated 
from  it.  To  know  the  good  was  immediately  the 
Will  to  do  the  good,  he  thought;  he  permitted  no 
division  of  Will  from  knowledge. 

Such  a  view  is  inadequate,  still  it  has  been  too 
much  neglected  by  modern  writers  on  Ethics, 
who  put  an  overwhelming  stress  upon  the 
motive,  without  a  sufficient  consideration  of  its 
basis  in  knowledge.  Socrates  rightly  held  that 
all  knowledixe  nmst  be  moralized;   his    mistake 


80GB  ATE  S.  241 

lies    in    maintaining  that  it  will    moralize  itself 
without  any  special  effort  of  Will. 

2.  Virtue,  being  a  general  Concept,  was  uni- 
versal, common  to  all  men,  hence  impartable  or 
teachable.  This  is  also  a  most  weighty  doctrine 
of  Socrates:  the  teachability  of  Virtue,  so  that 
it  can  be  given  to  the  rising  generation  by  in- 
struction. Previously  the  Virtues,  Temperance, 
Justice,  Heroism,  etc.,  existed  in  living  exam- 
ples, connected  with  many  other  qualities  of  the 
concrete  person  ;  Socrates  separated  or  abstracted 
the  single  Virtue,  defined  it  as  a  Concept, 
whereby  it  could  be  imi)arted  to  other  minds. 
The  value  of  this  service  to  mankind  can  hardly 
be  overrated ;  it  not  only  produced  but  planted 
moral  science  in  the  world,  where  it  has  never 
since  ceased  to  grow.  The  vocation  of  Socrates 
was  to  be  teacher  of  Ethics  far  more  than  of 
Philosophy,  which  with  him  was  the  handmaid  of 
Ethics.  All  Athens  was  his  School,  truly  a  pub- 
lic School,  starting  anywhere  or  at  any  time, 
on  the  street  or  in  the  market  place.  Every 
man  was  subjected  to  a  training  by  this  self- 
chosen  teacher,  the  end  being  first  to  know 
Justice,  for  example,  and  then  to  act  justly. 
The  whole  citizenship  of  Athens  was  to  pass 
from  impulsive  or  prescriptive  doing  to  self- 
conscious  doing.  Unquestionably  this  is  what 
led  him  into  collision  with  the  old  order  of 
things — the    old    religion,   the    old    state,    the 

16 


242         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

conservatives  generally  —  and  at  last  brought 
on  his  fate. 

3.  With  that  fact  is  also  connected  his  Demon 
or  Genius,  the  inner  Oracle  of  the  man,  which 
gave  him  warnings,  presentiments,  and  signs  of 
the  future.  Thus  Socrates  seems  to  fall  back 
into  a  kind  of  superstition ;  though  internal  it  is 
a  voice  speaking  to  him  with  authority.  The 
outer  Delphic  Oracle  has  gone  inside,  j^et  remains 
oracular.  Many  explanations  have  been  given  of 
it —  some  calling  it  a  devil  and  others  conscience. 
To  our  mind  it  is  the  Greek  counterpart  to  the 
Categorical  Imperative  which  has  such  an  impor- 
tant place  in  the  Ethics  of  Kant.  It  is  an  inner 
power  which  commands  imperatively,  usually  not 
to  do,  but  sometimes  to  do. 

Socrates  restores  the  Greek  unity  of  Being, 
which  he  places  in  Virtue.  The  latter  is  one,  or 
it  is  reducible  to  one  by  abstraction.  Virtue  is 
thus  the  true  genus,  the  general,  and  genetic  of 
character.  If  the  Idea  or  Concept  of  Virtue  be 
given,  it  will  transform  the  person.  General 
Concepts  once  entering  the  mind  have  a  tendency 
to  become  generative,  creative,  making  over  the 
man  in  their  image,  making  him  just  from  his 
conceiving  of  justice,  making" him  good  from  his 
conceivino^  of  the  2:ood.  So  Socrates  sets  out  on 
his  career,  seeking  to  impart  to  all  Athenians  the 
conception  of  Virtue  and  the  Virtues,  with  the 
hope  of  making  them  virtuous.     Moral  freedom 


SOCEATES.  243 

he  preached,  and  thus  he  heralded  the  dawn  of  a 
new  epoch.  But  here  lies  his  conflict  with  the 
old  prescriptive  morality  of  Athens,  and  out  of 
this  conflict  resulted  his  tragedy.  At  his  trial 
the  eye  which  beholds  the  true  reality  of  occur- 
rences, can  see  two  principles  in  a  death-grapple  : 
the  ancient  prescribed  order  and  the  new  con- 
sciousness of  inner  freedom.  This  tragedy  of 
Socrates  is  truly  Promethean  in  its  mighty  out- 
lines and  in  its  suggestive  prefiguring  of  the 
future. 

VII.  That  which  we  have  called  f/ie  ]\rorm  of 
philosophizing —  the  psychical  process  of  Abso- 
lute Being  (God),  Nature  (the  Cosmos),  and 
Man  — is  far  from  explicit  in  Socrates,  yet  im- 
portant phases  or  parts  of  it  are  present.  Out  of 
the  preceding  account  we  may  put  together  the 
philosophy  of  Socrates  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  Norm,  especially  after  the  manner  in 
which  it  showed  itself  in  later  Greek  thinking. 

1.  3Iefaphi/sics.  The  entire  elaboration  o/the 
Concept  as  well  as  the  Socratic  method  of  reach- 
ing it,  may  be  placed  under  this  head.  Funda- 
mentally the  work  of  Socrates  has  a  metaphysical 
stamp,  which  we  first  observe  in  his  favorite 
maxim  know  tliysdf.  The  passing  from  the 
Particular  to  the  Universal  as  Concept  is  done 
by  the  power  of  abstraction  and  is  a  metaphys- 
ical act.  Here  we  can  find  various  phases ;  — 
(a)  An    ontological  strand    in  the  investio-a- 


244         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tions  of  Socrates  is  noticed  even  by  Xenophon, 
who  had  little  aptitude  for  this  side  of  his  mas- 
ter's instruction.  We  read  in  the  Memora- 
bilia (IV.  6.  1)  that  "he  never  ceased  to  discuss 
with  his  companions  what  was  the  nature  of 
each  existent  thing,"  or  the  essence  of  Being  in 
every  particular  ol)jcct.  More  emphatic  are  the 
statements  of  Aristotle:  "Socrates  with  right 
reason  investigated  the  what  is,''  true  Being  (or 
the  ousia  of  the  on,  which  is  likewise  an  Aris- 
totelian phrase)  {Met.  XIII.  4;  1078,  b).  In 
the  same  passage  we  read:  "  two  things  may  be 
justly  ascribed  to  Socrates:  inductive  (epagogic) 
discourses  and  the  definition  of  the  Universal," 
the  former  leading  up  to  the  latter  which  is  the 
Concept  categorized.  Herewith  the  second  point 
is  suo^orested. 

(b)  The  method  of  Socrates,  which  is  the 
dialectical,  and  leads  up  to  the  logical,  has  been 
already  considered.  Xenophon  says  that  "  he 
made  his  companions  more  dialectical"  (Me?n. 
IV.  6.  1).  Socrates  reaches  the  Concept  by  his 
Dialectic,  by  the  development  of  the  Universal 
through  question  and  answer,  which  procedure 
is  based  upon  the  fact  that  all  division  and  defi- 
nition will  turn  oat  self-contradictory  when  ap- 
plied to  the  object  from  the  outside.  This  is  the 
true  content  and  purpose  underlying  the  play  of 
Socratic  irony.  But  when  the  object  is  seen  to 
posit  its  own  divisions  and  thus  become  the  Con- 


SOCBATES.  245 

cept  or  the  Thought,  it  can  escape  from  the  neg- 
ative power  of  the  Dialectic.  We  may  say  then 
that  the  Dialectic  is  the  process  of  negating  the 
Negative  (as  mere  Opinion,  Notion,  or  outside 
Reflection),  and  of  attaining  the  positive  genetic 
Thought  of  the  thing,  or,  more  completely  ex- 
pressed, the  creative  principle  of  the  Universe. 

(c)  The  Theology  of  Socrates  has  in  the  main 
been  considered.  In  one  sense  he  accepted  the 
old  Gods  of  his  people,  yet  he  certainly  trans- 
formed them,  he  put  into  them  the  new  Thought, 
though  he  called  them  still  by  their  former 
names.  Xenophon  seeks  to  defend  his  master's 
piety ;  his  defense  is  both  successful  and  unsuc- 
cessful. Socrates,  like  most  of  the  Greek 
philosophers,  seeking  the  one  principle  of  the 
Universe,  could  not  well  admit  a  fundamental 
plurality  of  the  Gods.  We  question  even  if  old 
Homer  is  always  a  polytheist. 

In  the  Mernorahilia  (I.  4)  we  find  the  doctrine 
of  Socrates  in  regard  to  the  world-order  whose 
controlling  principle  is  N^ous,  Intelligence,  Mind. 
"  Do  you  think  that  you,  by  a  stroke  of  luck, 
have  gotten  for  yourself  a  mind  which  is  nowhere 
else,  and  that  the  infinite  world  gets  its  order 
through  a  lack  of  mind?  "  asks  Socrates  of  skep- 
tical Aristodemus,  who  seems  inclined  to  fall 
back  upon  Chance  (Democritus).  It  is  manifest 
that  Socrates  affirms  here  the  N'ous  of  Anaxago- 
ras  and  a  teleological  view  of  the  world.     But  the 


246         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

physical  speculations  of  Anaxagoras  he  rejects  and 
ridicules,  according  to  the  report  of  Xenophon. 

2.  Physics.  Aristotle  declares  that  Socrates 
turned  from  the  investigation  of  Nature  as  a 
Whole,  and  herein  was  different  from  the  early 
Greek  philosophers.  Xenophon  emphasizes  the 
same  point  in  his  master.  Such,  indeed,  we  may 
deem  the  reaction  of  Socrates  against  his  prede- 
cessors in  Philosophy.  "With  him,  the  essence  of 
Being  was  no  longer  an  element  or  an  atom,  but 
the  Concept.  The  result  was,  he  felt  inclined  to 
throw  to  one  side  all  former  speculations  on  the 
Cosmos  and  its  origin. 

Still  he  did  not  and  could  not  wholly  desist 
from  them,  in  which  lay,  indeed,  his  origin. 
Xenophon  shows  him  looking  into  the  end  and 
purpose  of  all  creation  —  man,  animals  and  Cos- 
mos (Mtm.  I.  4).  Yet  the  same  reporter  de- 
clares elsewhere  that  "he  did  not  converse  on 
the  nature  of  the  All  "  (Mem.  I.  1.  11).  From 
these  contradictory  statements  we  may  infer  that 
the  aversion  of  Socrates  was  not  so  much  to  Na- 
ture as  a  subject  of  discourse,  but  to  the  physical 
theories  of  the  preceding  Greek  philosophers.  In 
dislikino;  Elementahsm  and  Atomism,  he  did  not 
need  to  dislike  Nature  herself.  He  belongs  to  a 
new  order  of  thinking,  and  is  well  aware  of  it; 
and  so  he  turns  away  not  only  from  the  old  meth- 
ods of  treating  a  theme,  but  in  a  certain  degree 
from  the  theme  itself. 


SOCBATES.  247 

Hence,  a  marked  deficiency,  though  not  a  total 
absence,  as  regards  Phj^sics,  must  be  acknowl- 
edged in  the  philosophizing  of  Socrates.  Herein 
he  shows  himself  not  all-sided,  and  the  reason  is 
his  intense  interest  in  the  human,  in  man  as  an 
ethical  being.  Socrates  recognizes  the  creator 
of  the  world  and  of  man,  and  that  he  has  mind 
{JSfous)  and  creates  with  an  end  in  view  (telos). 
He  calls  this  creator  a  demiourgos  (Mem.  I.  4. 
7),  a  word  which  plays  an  important  part  here- 
after. The  double  nature  of  man  he  assumes, 
the  physical  and  the  spiritual.  The  latter  is 
specially  developed  by  Ethics,  whose  function  is 
to  train  the  man  out  of  the  immediacy  of  Nature 
into  universality  of  conduct. 

3.  Ethics.  The  general  character  of  the  ethical 
teaching  of  Socrates  has  been  already  given. 
Here  we  wish  to  bring  it  into  connection  with  the 
philosophical  Norm  —  Metaphysics,  Physics  and 
Ethics  —  of  which  Norm  it  is  the  third  stage  in 
Greek  Philosophy.  By  means  of  Ethics  man 
rises  through  himself  to  the  Universal,  or  to  true 
Being,  or  even  to  God.  The  soul  as  embodied 
belongs  in  part  to  Physics,  but  it  also  has  reason, 
through  which  it  ascends  to  the  Concept,  whereby 
it  can  become  ethical.  The  individual  Self  has 
been  reached  and  unfolded  by  the  philosopher, 
and  therewith  the  power  of  overcoming  the  lower 
side  of  itself,  such  as  appetite  and  passion,  has 
been  attained.     Through  this  new  inner  power 


248         ANCIEN  T  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  O  SOPHY. 

Socrates  seeks  to  make  man  realize  true  Being, 
the  Universal,  in  life  and  conduct. 

Of  the  ethical  process  we  see  three  leading 
stages  manifested  in  Socrates,  though  not  in  an 
equal  degree  of  completeness. 

(rt)  The  conception  of  the  Good  he  has; 
though  not  very  distinctly  stated  in  his  utter- 
ances, it  is  substantially  one  with  the  Universal, 
and  is  the  great  object  of  ethical  attainment 
and  realization.  Such  a  general  end  for  man  he 
declares  to  be  happiness. 

(6)  Far  more  definite  and  detailed  anethe  Vir- 
tues in  the  discussions  of  Socrates.  Into  these 
manifold  Virtues,  the  Good  specializes  itself. 
His  common  topic  of  conversation  is  the  defini- 
tion of  some  particular  Virtue  whose  concept  he 
endeavors  to  bring  out  through  question  and 
answer.  (See  the  instances  in  Plato  and  Xeno- 
phon,  passim.')  But  no  ordering  of  the  Virtues 
into  a  system  can  be  found  in  Socrates,  who  dis- 
cussed whatever  single  Virtue  might  rise  to  sur- 
face on  the  occasion  of  meeting  some  man  in  the 
street. 

(c)  What  may  be  called  Institutional  Virtue 
is  for  Socrates  the  fundamental  and  all-inclusive 
Virtue,  the  ground  of  the  other  Virtues.  He 
believes  in  the  State,  obeys  the  Laws,  performs 
his  duty  as  citizen.  This  does  not  hinder  him 
from  seeing  defects  in  the  existent  State  and  its 
Laws,  and  trying  to  remedy  them.     Indeed  his 


SOCRATES.  249 

whole  scheme  of  training  in  Virtue  is  to  produce 
a  man  who  can  make  good  Laws,  and  so  estab- 
lish a  good  State.  What  is  piety?  he  asks.  Not 
a  blind  worship  of  the  Gods,  but  a  worship  of 
them  according  to  their  laws  and  customs,  which 
one  must  know.  That  is,  one  must  know  the 
law  of  the  thing,  the  time  of  mere  instinctive 
action  and  obedience  is  past. 

Many  matters  at  Athens  Socrates  did  not  like, 
for  instance,  the  ballot  by  lot,  the  pure  democ- 
racy. He  had  the  idea  of  the  philosophic  ruler; 
an  aristocracy  of  intellect  he  favored.  Still 
Socrates  did  not  apparently  despise  labor,  as  did 
Plato,  and  Aristotle,  and  Xenophon.  In  early 
life  he  was  himself  an  artisan  (or  artist),  as  was 
his  father  before  him.  In  fact  he  was  in  his  phil- 
osophic career  primarily  an  Athenian  missionary 
to  the  humble  mechanic,  tradesman,  and  laborer. 

It  is  the  chief  object  of  Plato  in  his  Crito  to 
exhibit  Socrates  supremely  as  the  institutional 
man.  He  could  not  be  persuaded  to  escape  from 
the  prison  to  which  the  laws  of  his  country  had 
consigned  him ;  he  would  rather  die  than  disobey 
them,  even  though  innocent. 

Thus  we  may  see  that  Socrates  has  the  triple 
philosophic  Norm  —  Metaphysics,  Physics,  and 
Ethics  —  though  in  its  iirst  undeveloped,  or  rather 
unequally  developed,  stage.  Hitherto  this  Norm 
had  been  seeking  a  partial  expression  among 
various  philosophers ;  now  it  is  beginning  to  con- 


250        ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PniLOSOPBY. 

ceutnite  itself  iu  one  philosopher,  and  this  con- 
ceutratiou  is  to  grow  more  and  more  decided 
after  Socrates,  till  the  Norm  becomes  fully  ex- 
pressed and  consciously  established.  This  com- 
plete recognition  reaches  beyond  Plato  and 
seemingly  Aristotle  also,  being  usually  ascribed 
to  Xeuocrates,  a  pupil  of  Plato.  Out  of  Socrates 
flow  many  streauis  of  philosophic  influence  which 
become  schools  of  more  or  less  importance.  The 
so-called  Socratic  Schools  —  Megaric,  Cynic, 
Cyrenaic  —  we  shall  consider  in  another  connec- 
tion. But  the  overtowering  successor  of  the 
master  and  the  chief  developer  of  Socraticism  is 
Plato.  We  must  regard  Socrates  as  a  great 
mind-fertilizing  genius  —  one  of  the  greatest  that 
the  world  has  ever  seen.  Very  diverse  are  these 
Schools,  and  of  very  diverse  characters  are  their 
founders,  Antisthcnes  the  ascetic,  Aristippus 
the  man  of  pleasure,  Xenophon  the  limited, 
Plato  the  unlimited,  were  all  fructified  by  Socrates 
and  produced  their  individual  work  after  his 
mould.  Thus  it  is  practically  manifest  that 
Socrates  was  himself  his  own  Universal,  his  own 
all-embracing  Concept,  out  of  which  went  forth 
so  many  special  f oruis  and  applications.  He  was 
the  One  which  was  creative  of  all  Difference ;  he 
could  impregnate  every  soul  with  his  Thought 
and  make  it  jDroductive.  Greek  Philosophy 
seems  to  center  itself  in  him,  preparatory  to  a 
new  evolution. 


SOCBATES.  251 

The  next  great  step  is  taken  by  Plato  who  sep- 
arates the  Socratic  Concept  from  its  wrappage  in 
the  object,  holds  it  apart  and  contemplates  it  by 
itself,  calling  it  the  Idea  as  opposed  to  the  world 
of  sense,  which  he  reduces  to  a  mere  Appearance, 
a  Show,  a  Lie,  in  fine,  to  non-existence.  More- 
over Plato  seeks  to  find  whenoe  came  this  Con- 
cept and  how  it  got  into  us  mortals.  What  he 
receives  united  in  the  Socratic  Concept,  he  sep- 
arates and  puts  through  a  long  process,  which 
doubtless  constitutes  the  most  influential  chapter 
in  European  Philosophy. 


252        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY, 


2.  ipiato. 

The  total  Plato  is  generally  considered  under 
three  aspects:  Iris  Life,  his  Writings,  and  his 
Philosophy.  The  first  gives  the  outer  circum- 
stances of  the  man  and  shows  him  acting  and 
reacting  within  his  local  and  temporal  environ- 
ment. The  second  indicates  the  form  of  his  self- 
expression  as  well  as  the  entire  body  of  his  liter- 
ary work,  in  which  his  thought  manifests  itself. 
The  third  is  the  system  or  scheme  of  thought 
which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  what  he  has 
written,  and  which  has  to  be  considered  by 
itself.  All  of  these  phases  of  the  total  Plato 
have  been  transmitted  to  us  with  a  relative  degree 
of  completeness. 

The  philosophic  life  of  Plato  is  doubtless  not 
so  original  as  that  of  Socrates,  but  it  is  far  more 
comprehensive.  The  vein  of  gold  is  not  so  rich, 
but  it  is  of  much  greater  extent.  Socrates  rather 
turned  away  from  all  previous  forms  of  philos- 
ophizing, genius  that  he  was ;  Plato  went  back  to 
them,  in  a  degree  fraternized  with  them,  and  took 
them  up  into  his  own  philosophic  movement. 
Thus  Plato  is  a  resumption  of  nearly  all  the 
Philosophies  before  his  time.  He  does  not  treat 
them   historically,  as  Aristotle  often  does,   but 


PLATO.  253 

works  them  over  after  his  own  manner,  puts  them 
together  and  weaves  them  into  his  thought. 

Having  gotten  the  Socratic  Concept  with  its 
power  of  abstraction,  he  will  proceed  to  get  the 
Concept  of  other  Philosophies,  till  he  attain  the 
supreme  Concept,  which,  in  his  own  Philosophy, 
is  the  Idea,  as  distinct  from  the  sensuous  world 
or  Appearance.  This  shows  the  Platonic  dual- 
ism, which,  more  than  any  other  one  thought, 
utters  the  essence  of  Europe.  The  Concept,  as 
distinct  from  and  independent  of  the  phenomena, 
is  the  separation  of  Plato  from  Socrates,  and 
gives  essentially  the  Platonic  Idea. 

I.  Plato's  Life. — This  is  first  to  be  con- 
sidered, as  it  furnishes  the  harmonious  and  sug- 
gestive setting  to  the  inner  development  of  his 
Writings  and  of  his  Philosophy.  The  external 
career  of  Plato  is  a  kind  of  index  to  his  spiritual 
unfolding;  his  first  stay  at  his  Athenian  home, 
his  separation  from  home,  and  his  final  return 
home,  are  not  simply  outward  epochs  of  his  life, 
but  have  their  correspondence  in  his  soul's  trans- 
formations. 

Since  our  philosopher  lived  to  the  age  of  eighty 
years  and  more,  and  as  these  years  were  full  of 
activity,  we  may  expect  to  behold  a  grand  human 
development,  which  only  a  long  life  of  highest 
endeavor  combined  with  supreme  genius  can  bring 
to  fruitage.  From  his  birth  till  his  decease,  we 
note  distinctly  three  periods,  a  beginning,  middle. 


254        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  end,  the  hitter  being  a  prolonged  fulfillment, 
the  plenteous  harvest  of  what  was  sown  in  the 
early  part  of  his  career.  He  remained  in  his 
city  from  infancy  to  mature  manhood,  then  came 
the  separation,  the  de})arture  from  home  and 
country  for  many  years ;  finally  the  return  fol- 
lowed, and  with  it  a  kind  of  self-restoration  which 
rounded  out  to  completeness  his  life  and  his  work. 

1.  Plato  at  home  in  Atlicns.  This  is  the  city 
in  which  he  was  born  about  427  or  428  B.  C. 
His  lineage  was  aristocratic ;  he  is  said  to  have 
been  descended  from  King  Codrus  and  from  a 
kinsman  of  Solon,  not  to  speak  of  his  sup- 
posed divine  ancestors,  Apollo  and  Poseidon. 
The  Athenian  Democracy  was  tiien  in  authority; 
Plato  by  birth  was  plunged  into  a  world  from 
which  he  felt  estranged  at  the  start ;  his  family 
and  his  class  wore  hostile  to  the  existing  popular 
government,  and  he  grew  up  in  a  state  of  separa- 
tion from  the  reality  about  Uini.  His  doctrine  of 
the  Idea  as  transcendent  over  the  world  of 
Appearance  lay  primarily  in  his  aristocratic  blood 
and  training.  High  above  the  vulgar  Demos  he 
stood  by  birth,  and  he  has  always  been  the  nour- 
isher  of  those  who  have  withdrawn  from  the 
common  herd,  and  dwelt  in  the  realm  of  the 
ideal.  In  Plato  we  see  Philosophy  asserting 
strongly  its  aristocratic  character. 

Still  men  of  high  family  could  become  at 
Athens  the  leaders  of  the  people.     It  seems  that 


PLATO.  2^^ 


Plato  in  early  life  had  political  aspirations,  pos- 
sibly to  be  the  leader  of  his  party.  The  govern- 
ment of  the  State  formed  a  very  important  part  of 
his  speculations  and  called  forth  his  masterpiece, 
the  Rtpuhlic.  Thus  while  estranged  from  the 
real  political  world,  he  was  always  endeavoring 
to  return  to  it  through  the  Idea. 

We  should  also  note  that  Plato's  youth  was  at 
a  period  of  decline  in  the  Athenian  Democracy. 
The  Pcloponnesian  War  had  been  going  on  for 
some  four  years  when  he  was  born,  and  it  lasted 
twenty-three  years  longer.  As  a  boy  twelve 
years  old  he  may  have  seen  the  Sicilian  expedi- 
tion set  out  from  the  Piraeus  with  the  highest 
hopes,  after  which  came  the  great  defeat  and 
humiliation.  As  an  Athenian  youth  he  would 
have  to  perform  military  service  at  the  age  of 
eighteen ;  thus  he  must  have  had  the  experience 
of  the  soldier.  Finally  came  the  destruction  of 
the  Athenian  fleet  at  the  battle  of  Aegospotami, 
followed  by  the  capture  of  Athens  itself,  with 
which    the    Peloponnesian    War    closed    in    404 

B.C. 

Plato  must  have  felt  himself  living  on  a  sink- 
ing ship  during  all  these  years  of  ardent  boyhood 
till  he  became  a  man,  when  the  ship  went  down. 
A  deep  distrust  of  Democracy  and  of  the  People 
was  thereby  ground  into  his  very  soul,  and  was 
reinforced  by  the  prejudices  of  birth.  On  the 
other  hand,  he   saw  the  triumph  of  the  Spartan 


250         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

iiristocracy  iu  the  long  struggle  with  his  country. 
The  result  was,  he  Dorized,  becoming  a  friend 
of  Doric  institutions.  Thus  the  dualism  of 
the  Greek  race  as  a  whole  went  into  him ;  he 
was  Ionian  in  blood  but  Dorian  in  spirit,  or 
largely  so.  This  dualistic  character  will  not  fail 
to  show  itself  in  his  Pliilosojjhy. 

After  the  close  of  the  Pcloponucsian  War  the 
so-called  Thirty  Tyrants  came  into  power  at 
Athens.  They  belonged  to  the  aristocratic  party  ; 
two  near  relatives  of  Plato,  Critias  and  Char- 
mides,  were  of  the  number.  In  one  of  Plato's 
letters  (if  it  be  genuine)  we  read  of  his  high 
hopes  of  the  reform  and  restoration  of  the  city 
under  the  new  order.  Bitter  was  his  disappoint- 
ment; he  found  his  own  chiss  to  be  more  blood- 
thirsty and  tyrannical  than  the  iierce  democracy, 
which  was  soon  restored  by  Thrasybulus,  against 
whom  both  of  Plato's  relatives  marched  out  and 
were  slain  in  battle.  Particularly  the  name  of 
Critias,  on  account  of  his  violence  and  cruelty, 
was  ever  afterward  abhorred  at  Athens,  and  cast 
a  cloud  over  Plato's  future,  contril)uting  also  to 
the  condemnation  of  Socrates,  of  whom  he  was 
declared  to  be  a  pupil.  Plato  was  apparently  not 
disturbed  by  the  restored  Democracy,  though  he 
saw  that  he  had  no  hope  of  political  preferment, 
since  in  his  ^■eins  ran  the  blood  of  the  tyrant  Critias 
on  his  mother's  side.  After  the  overthrow  of  the 
Thirty,    in  403  B.   C,  we  may  suppose  that  he 


PLATO.  257 

devoted  himself  to  Philosophy  with  a  renewed 
energy  till  the  death  of  Socrates  in  399  B.  C. 

Such  was  the  outer  political  environment  in 
which  Plato  grew  np  to  manhood  and  with  which 
the  ancient  Athenian  citizen  was  far  more  inti- 
mately ingrown  than  is  the  citizen  of  any  modern 
city.  Its  training  on  the  whole  we  can  sec  to  be 
productive  of  a  deep  alienation  from  the  real 
^vorld  —  democratic  and  aristocratic  —  and  a  flight 
to  the  inner  realm  of  the  Idea.  Of  course  he 
had  not  yet  fornudatcd  any  such  view,  but  the 
instinctive  groundwork  for  it  had  been  laid  by 
life.  The  utterance  of  that  which  the  social  and 
institutional  character  of  his  age  has  deposited 
deep  in  his  soul,  will  come  with  the  ripening 
power  of  time. 

Parallel  to  this  public  strand  of  his  life  runs 
that  of  his  private  education.  Of  a  robust 
physical  frame,  he  passed  through  the  regular 
training  in  gymnastics  with  distinction;  but  he 
also  cultivated  poetry,  lyric,  dithyraml)ic,  tragic, 
elegiac ;  a  number  of  his  epigrams  have  been 
preserved,  the  rest  of  his  poems  he  is  said  to 
have  burned  when  he  became  the  follower  of 
Socrates.  A  tetralogy  of  tragedies  he  is  re- 
ported to  have  composed  for  competition  at  the 
Dionysiac  festival,  while  Euripides  and  Sopho- 
cles were  still  composing  dramas.  The  Platonic 
dialogue  has  its  suggestion  in  the  drama,  though 
the  one  be  in  prose  and  the  other  in  verse. 

17 


258         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

But  the  great  event  in  the  education  of  Plato 
was  his  acquaintance  with  Socrates,  which  took 
place  in  his  twentieth  year  (407  B.  C).  After 
the  fall  of  city  and  the  defeat  of  the  Thirty 
Tyrants,  Plato,  abandoning  his  political  hopes, 
threw  himself  upon  Philosophy  without  reserve 
and  remained  in  intimate  intercourse  with 
Socrates  till  the  latter's  death  in  399  B.  C. 
This  seems  to  have  broken  the  last  tie  which 
connected  him  with  his  native  city  from  which 
he  now  takes  his  flight. 

It  is  reasonably  plain  why  Plato  took  so  readily 
to  the  Socratic  Philosophy.  This  rose  to  the 
Concept  out  of  the  external  and  real;  with  its 
keen  Dialectic  it  cut  to  pieces  the  appearance  of 
knowledge,  the  mere  opinion  of  the  unthinking 
masses.  Socrates,  though  a  man  of  the  people, 
did  not  favor  democracy,  nor  is  his  Philosophy 
democratic,  nor  is  any  Philosophy  strictly.  It 
is  probable  that  Plato  during  this  period  looked 
into  other  Philosophies,  in  which  Athens,  as 
the  center  of  Greek  culture,  abounded;  he 
could  easily  read  the  book  of  Anaxagoras,  which 
was  common,  and  report  states  that  he  stud- 
ied for  awhile  with  Cratylus,  a  follower  of 
Heraclitus.  But  not  the  phenomenal  Becoming 
but  the  Universal,  the  Concept,  with  its  suprem- 
acy over  all  particularity,  was  what  appealed  both 
to  his  innate  character  and  his  experience. 

2.  Plato  abroad.       So  the   separation   takes 


PLATO.  259 

place  from  his  native  city,  which  he  had  seen  all 
his  life  slowly  going  down  to  final  defeat  and  cap- 
ture. Then  his  own  party,  led  by  his  own  rela- 
tives made  itself  thoroughly  detested,  and  it  too 
was  defeated  and  ruined.  At  last  the  restored 
Democracy  brought  about  the  death  of  his  revered 
master,  Socrates.  Such  was  the  troubled  descent 
which  Plato  had  to  pass  through  in  the  first  period 
of  his  life. 

He  flees  to  the  neighboring  city  of  Megara, 
where  he  stays  for  a  time  with  Eucleides,  a  for- 
mer pupil  of  Socrates  and  founder  of  the  so- 
called  Megaric  School  of  Philosophy.  Here  it  is 
supposed  that  his  views  began  to  widen  and  to 
transcend  the  limits  of  pure  Socraticism,  through 
the  more  sympathetic  study  of  other  lines  of 
thought.  Particularly  he  seems  at  Megara  to 
have  studied  the  Eleatics  with  their  Pure  Beino- 
and  their  developed  Dialectic. 

From  Megara  he  proceeds  on  his  travels,  which 
must  have  been  quite  extensive.  He  is  supposed 
to  have  gone  to  Cyrene,  where  Theodorus,  a 
celebrated  mathemathician,  was  his  teacher  in 
Geometry,  which  has  a  Platonic  character.  The 
abstractions  from  the  real  object,  namely,  point, 
line,  and  surface,  are  purely  ideal,  and  are  the 
elements  of  geometrical  science,  which  is  thus 
a  supersensible  construction  of  forms.  Perhajjs 
from  Cyrene  he  passed  to  Egypt,  which  once 
was    supposed  to    have    been    a    chief   fountain 


260         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  his  wisdom,  but  recent  investigators  have 
largely  discredited  the  chiim.  A  far  deeper 
and  more  enduring  influence  than  that  of  Egjpt 
resulted  from  his  visit  to  Lower  Italy,  where  he 
l)ecanie  acquainted  with  the  society  of  Pythago- 
reans, particularly  with  Archytas,  their  greatest 
man  after  the  founder.  From  them  he  may  have 
acquired  some  additional  mathematical  knowledge, 
but  his  chief  gain  Avas  the  conception  of  the  or- 
ganized school  with  its  teacher,  which  conception 
he  was  to  realize  later  at  Athens.  He  witnessed 
the  Pythagorean  Askesis,  or  Life,  and  adopted  it 
with  such  success  that  the  Platonic  Life  with 
its  philosophic  school  extended  over  five  hundred 
3^ears  into  the  Christian  Era.  Thence  he  paid  a 
visit  to  Sicily,  where  he  became  acquainted  with 
young  Dion,  whose  mind  he  deeply  imbued  with 
his  idealism  (see  the  latter' s  life  by  Plutarch). 
Through  Dion's  influence  Plato  was  induced  to 
visit  the  elder  Dionysius,  tyrant  of  Syracuse, 
evidently  with  some  hope  of  realizing  through 
him  the  ideal  State.  But  Plato  used  his 
Athenian  freedom  of  speech  to  the  tyrant,  who 
drove  him  from  court  and  gave  him  to  the  Spar- 
tan embassador  Pollis,who  sold  him  into  slavery 
in  Aegina  —  to  what  other  use  could  a  Spartan 
put  a  philosopher?  A  C^'renean  by  the  name  of 
Anniceris  bought  him,  and  so  he  returned  to 
Athens,  after  having  had  quite  a  taste  of  Dorian 
experience  at    Syracuse,    Aegina,  and   with    the 


PLATO.  261 

Spartan  embassador.  His  Dorian  sympathies 
were  probably  satisfied  and  he  was  again  content 
to  live  in  his  native  city,  which,  in  spite  of  his 
well-known  affiliations,  made  no  objection  ap- 
parently to  his  opening  a  school  and  teaching 
his  Philosophy. 

Such  was  the  period  of  Plato's  separation  from 
his  city,  in  all  some  thirteen  years,  from  399  to 
386  B.  C.  An  outer  wandering  from  place  to 
place,  to  which  corresponded  an  inner  wandering 
from  doctrine  to  doctrine,  till  he  had  quite  com- 
passed the  experience  of  the  whole  Greek  world 
of  that  age,  both  in  space  and  in  thought,  we  may 
conceive  it  to  have  been.  It  is  possible  that  he 
may  have  visited  Athens  several  times  during  this 
period,  for  there  was  no  public  decree  of  banish- 
ment against  him,  but  he  did  not  and  could  not 
remain,  for  there  was  an  inner  decree  of  self- 
banishment  which  was  coercive.  Back  now  he 
comes,  with  forty  years  upon  his  head ;  having 
tasted  of  Dorian  slavery,  he  can  at  least  endure 
Athenian  freedom.  But  he  never  recants ;  the 
dualism  between  the  real  and  the  ideal  remains  to 
the  end. 

3.  Return  to  Athens.  About  the  year  38() 
B.  C,  Plato  formally  opens  his  School  in 
his  native  city,  where  he  will  remain  the  rest  of 
his  life,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  temporary 
journeys.  He  chose  a  place  outside  the  walls,  on 
the  road  to  Eleusis,  somewhat  less  than  a  mile 


2G2         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

from  the  citj^-gate  called  Dipyloii.  It  was  a  pub- 
lic garden  adjoining  the  sacred  precinct  of  a 
Hero,  with  shady  walks  and  a  gymnasium  for  ex- 
ercise. Near  by,  Plato  owned  a  small  dwelling- 
house  and  garden.  Such  was,  in  general,  the 
locality  of  the  famous  Academy,  which  Plato 
unquestionably  patterned  after  the  Pythagoreans, 
though  he  probably  improved  the  pattern. 

At  once  we  see  the  difference  from  the  manner 
of  Socrates,  whose  instruction  was  public,  upon 
the  streets,  in  the  market-place  or  in  the  shops. 
But  Plato's  School  is  esentially  private,  for  the 
few,  exclusive.  It  is  intellectually  aristocratic, 
it  is  again  the  Idea  withdrawn  into  itself  and  sep- 
arated from  the  world.  Now,  we  hold  that  Plato 
was  rio-ht  in  this  arrano^ement  if  he  wished  to 
attain  his  purpose.  For  the  mastery  of  Plato's 
Philosophy  a  select  company  was  necessary.  A 
long  training  could  not  be  dispensed  with,  both 
theoretically  and  practicall3\  Philosophy  itself 
is  mentally  aristocratic,  choosing  its  votaries  by 
a  Spiritual  Selection  far  more  remorseless  than 
any  Natural  Selection.  And  the  Philosophy  of 
Plato  is  the  most  aristocratic  of  all  Philosophies. 

In  other  respects  there  was  a  good  deal  of  the 
Socratic  method ;  particularly  instruction  was 
carried  on  through  question  and  answer,  or 
through  conversation.  In  the  guidance  and  un- 
folding of  such  conversation  lay  a  chief  part  of 
the  teacher's  skill.     The  Platonic  Dialogues  are 


PLATO,  263 

essentially  patterned  after  this  way  of  instruc- 
tion. From  Plato's  repeated  expression  of  dis- 
like for  long  speeches,  such  as  those  of  the 
Public  Assembly,  we  may  suppose  that  he  did 
not  give  formal  lectures  in  the  modern  manner. 
Nor  did  he  think  highly  of  the  written  word  as 
a  means  of  imparting  Thought,  in  spite  of  his 
own  example  to  the  contrar}^  The  interchange 
of  living  speech  was  the  method  he  preferred,  of 
which  he  must  have  recollected  many  striking  in- 
stances from  his  intercourse  with  Socrates. 

Still,  when  it  was  necessary,  Plato  could  pro- 
long his  discourse  into  a  dissertation.  Dis- 
courses of  this  sort  seem  to  be  mentioned  by 
Aristotle  and  others.  With  advancing  years  the 
conversational  tone  of  hisDialoo;ues  changes,  often 
dropping  to  a  mere  formalism  in  the  RepuhliG 
and  the  Laws.  Necessaril}^  as  his  system  grew 
more  explicit  and  dogmatic,  his  manner  took  the 
same  character. 

Some  of  his  early  Dialogues  are  hardly 
more  than  a  play  of  conversation  for  its  own 
sake,  the  speakers  being  intoxicated  with  their 
own  talk.  Also  he  had  the  common  meal  and 
banquet  for  his  pupils  and  disciples.  His  Phi- 
losophy was  to  be  not  simply  a  doctrine  but  a 
life,  a  training  of  the  total  individual  in  ethical 
practice  as  well  as  in  intellectual  theor}^ 

Thus  the  Pythagorean  and  Socratic  methods 
were  united  in   the  School  of  Plato,  doubtless  tq 


264         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  improvement  of  both,  and  were  made  the 
spiritual  possession  of  all  time.  The  School  of 
to-day  has  come  down  through  Plato,  though  it 
has  been  popularized. 

What  was  Plato's  new  relation  to  his  native 
cit}'?  It  should  be  noted  that  Athens  itself,  as 
well  as  Plato  had  undergone  a  considerable 
change  during  the  thirteen  years  of  his  absence. 
Wlion  lie  left  it  for  Megara  after  it  had  i)ut  to  death 
Socrates,  he  deemed  it  to  be  at  the  very  bottom, 
with  prestige  lost  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  with 
possessions  gone,  with  Long  Walls  destroyed, 
with  Democracy  again  in  the  saddle.  But  there 
had  been  a  new  rise  and  restoration  of  Athens, 
and  a  corresponding  decline  and  defeat  of 
Sparta.  In  395  B.  C.  Lysander,  the  great  enemy 
and  conqueror  of  Athens,  is  defeated  and  slain 
by  the  Athenians  at  Ilaliartus.  In  394  Conon, 
the  Athenian  admiral,  aided  by  the  Persians, 
overwhelms  the  Spartan  fleet  at  the  battle  of 
Cnidus  and  kills  its  commander.  In  393  Conon 
besius  to  restore  the  Lonu^  AValls  of  Athens, 
within  Avliich  the  city  again  feels  her  old  strength 
and  freedom.  A  great  step  forward  is  this,  which 
is  during  the  next  year  followed  by  the  surpris- 
ing victory  of  Iphicrates,  an  Athenian  general, 
who  with  his  light-armed  soldiei's  cut  to  pieces  a 
Spartan  division,  to  the  amazement  of  all  Hellas. 
This  broke  the  prestige  of  Sparta,  whose  harmosts 
or   governors    were  generally  expelled  from  the 


PLATO.  265 

Greek  cities.  At  last  in  387  came  the  peace  of 
Antalcidas,  with  Dorism  and  its  institutions  sunk 
to  the  lowest  ebb.  The  next  year  Pkito  is  back 
in  Athens  to  stay  for  the  rest  of  his  life,  doubt- 
less with  some  degree  of  restored  pride  and  love 
for  his  native  city  after  his  and  her  intervening 
experiences. 

Plato  had  a  strong  desire  to  realize  his  political 
Ideal,  which  could  not  take  place  at  Athens. 
After  the  death  of  the  elder  Dionysius,  he  was 
induced  to  make  the  voyage  to  Sicily  for  the 
purpose  of  winning  the  3'ounger  Dionysius  to  his 
scheme  of  government,  which  was  that  of  the 
philosophic  State.  But  he  was  unable  to  trans- 
form the  young  tyrant  into  the  philosopher  as 
ruler,  and  he  came  into  such  straits  that  he  was 
glad  to  get  back  to  democratic  Athens  once 
more,  and  to  his  Academic  groves.  This  second 
visit  to  Sicily  took  place  367  B.  C,  when  Plato 
was  sixty  years  old.  Still  in  spite  of  these  ex- 
periences he  was  persuaded  some  six  years  after- 
wards to  make  a  third  visit  to  Sicily  for  the  osten- 
sible purpose  of  reconciling  Dionysius  and  Dion, 
but  also  with  the  design  of  realizing  there  some 
new  hope  for  the  philosophic  State.  But  again 
he  had  to  flee  for  his  life  from  the  tyrant  back  to 
the  shelter  of  that  hated  Athenian  Demos,  which 
had  not  only  tolerated  but  protected  him  so  long, 
though  well  knowing  that  he  was  its  bitterest 
enemy.     In  fiiet  it  is  said  that  Plato  ^vould  have 


266        ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

surely  perished  this  time,  but  for  the  intervention 
of  powerful  friends,  the  Pythagoreans  who  were 
in  power  at  Tarentum.  From  this  time  on  he 
stayed  at  Athens,  occupying  himself  with  his  du- 
ties as  teacher,  till  about  the  year  347,  when  he 
died  at  the  age  of  eighty,  while  he  was  present 
at  a  wedding  feast,  it  is  said. 

Thus  Plato  separated  thrice  from  Athens  and 
thrice  returned.  To  ontablish  his  Ideal  he  may 
be  said  to  have  thrice  exposed  his  life  and  failed, 
having  to  hurry  back  to  the  Keal  for  cover. 
His  career  suggests  that  the  Ideal  is  already  in 
the  Eeal  and  nmst  be  sought  there.  This,  how- 
ever, means  the  transition  from  Plato  to  Aris- 
totle, who  in  these  last  years  did  separate  from 
Plato  and  founded  an  independent  school. 

Plato's  life  in  its  periods  and  their  general 
outlines,  has  found  expression  in  his  Writings, 
which  are  one  of  the  chief  literary  treasures  of 
the  world. 

II.  Plato's  Writings.  —  Though  Plato  dis- 
paraged the  written  in  comparison  with  the  spoken 
word,  he  owes  his  fame  and  his  influence  to 
his  writings.  No  human  being  has  wielded  the 
pen  with  greater  power,  very  few  with  as  great. 
He  has  been  and  still  is  the  favorite  philosopher 
of  Europe,  whose  dual  character  he  has  most 
adequately  represented  and  portrayed.  The 
Platonic  dualism  is  essentially  that  of  European 


PLATO.  2G7 

Spirit,  which  has  not  failed  to  respond  to  the 
best  picture  of  itself. 

Moreover,  Plato  may  be  considered  the  father 
of  Romanticism  with  its  flight  from  the  Real 
to  the  Ideal.  Epochs,  nations,  and  individuals 
fall  out  with  the  present,  with  the  world  as  it  is, 
and  betake  themselves  to  Atlantis,  to  Utopia, 
even  to  Heaven.  For  such  souls  Plato  furnishes 
the  most  delightful  and  soothing  refuge.  In 
recent  times  it  was  the  Romantic  Movement 
of  Germany  that  rejuvenated  Plato  through 
Schleiermacher.  The  discussion  is  still  going  on. 
Though  Plato  belongs  to  the  classic  world  and 
touches  the  age  of  Phidias  and  Sophocles,  the 
deep  scission  in  his  soul  is  essentially  romantic. 

In  the  School  of  Plato  we  have  found  that  he 
united  a  Socratic  and  a  Pythagorean  element. 
But  to  these  he  adds  now  a  contribution  of 
his  own,  namely  his  writings.  Socrates  did  not 
write;  the  Pythagoreans  composed  books  but 
these  seem  to  have  been  chiefly  read  by  their 
own  pupils.  At  least  they  had  no  books  like 
those  of  Plato,  for  a  great  public  and  for  all 
time.  The  unique  product  of  the  Platonic  School 
is  the  Platonic  writ.  The  teacher  Plato  could 
not  help  appearing  in  person,  but  the  writer 
Plato  sets  aside  his  own  personality  for  that 
of  another,  Socrates.  He  sacrifices  as  writer 
his  individual  Self  for  what  he  deems  the  universal 
Self,   and   thus   eternizes   his   own   instructiou,. 


268         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Plato  teaching  existed  in  a  small  bit  of  time,  but 
Plato  writing  exists  for  all  time.  There  can 
be  little  doubt  that  most  of  his  works  sprang 
from  his  conversation  with  pupils,  and  were 
written  down  to  make  permanent  his  work.  The 
word  as  spoken  is  transitory  and  phenomenal, 
the  word  as  written  is  the  voice  made  eternal. 
It  was  Plato's  deepest  need  to  write,  he  could 
not  help  himself;  he  had  to  turn  away  from 
the  momentary  Appearance  of  speech  to  its 
everlasting  Form  in  writ.  He  would  not  have 
been  Plato  if  he  had  not  done  this.  Still  with 
his  peculiar  inconsistency  he  puts  the  spoken 
before  the  written  word,  and  seems  unaware 
of  his  chief  glory  and  his  most  unique  gift. 
Nevertheless  he  wrote  and  kept  at  writing  through 
life  so  that  Cicero  says  of  him,  scrihens  mortuus 
est. 

The  large  mass  of  Platonic  Compositions  is  the 
product  of  his  whole  mature  life,  and  reflects  its 
various  stages.  The  number  is  usually  put  at  36, 
including  the  letters  as  a  single  work.  One  of 
the  chief  problems  which  has  busied  Plato's  com- 
mentators is.  What  is  the  order  of  these  works? 
In  antiquity  already  the  same  question  was  raised. 
Two  arrangements  were  given  by  Thrasyllus,  the 
dramatic,  composed  of  nine  Tetralogies,  and  the 
thematic,  which  divided  the  Dialogues  into  those 
of  Search  and  those  of  Exposition.  In  recent 
times,  especially  during  the   last  century,  many 


PLATO.  209 

writers  have  tried  their  hand  at  a  new  order- 
ing of  the  Platonic  material,  from  which  has 
sprung  an  extensive  literature,  particularly  in 
Germany. 

In  this  respect  there  is  a  striking  similarity 
between  Shakespeare's  Dramas  and  Plato's  Dia- 
logues. The  number  of  compositions  in  each  case 
is  about  the  same  ;  there  are  several  spurious  pro- 
ductions attached  to  the  genuine — productions 
generally  acknowledged  to  be  spurious.  Then 
recent  critics,  proceeding  from  internal  evidence, 
have  endeavored  to  prove  tlie  spuriousness  of 
certain  productions  (both  of  the  dramatist  and  of 
the  philosopher)  hitherto  accepted  as  genuine. 
With  these  questions  are  coupled  those  of  ar- 
rangement, of  inner  meaning  and  of  outer  rela- 
tions, not  to  speak  of  philological  and  historical 
details  in  both  cases. 

This  phase  of  Platonism  we  shall,  however, 
have  to  dismiss,  stating  simply  what  we  believe  to 
be  the  net  result.  Plato's  Writings  show  a  grand 
development  of  the  philosopher  through  quite 
sixty  years.  This  being  accepted,  we  wish  to  see 
the  main  stages  of  this  development.  There  is  a 
very  general  consensus  of  judgment  that  these 
stages  are  three,  though  there  is  a  great  differ- 
ence of  opinion  among  critics  in  regard  to  the  Dia- 
logues which  are  to  be  included  in  each  of  these 
stages.     Still  even  here  we  may  note  a  kind  of 


270         AKCIEKT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

undulatory  line  of  agreement,  fluctuating  up  and 
down  and  around  the  following  scheme. 

1.  The  First  Period  of  Platonic  Composition  is 
dominated  directly  and  immediately  by  the  doc- 
trine and  person  of  Socrates,  of  whose  conver- 
sations they  seem  to  be  ideal  transcripts.  There 
is  the  attempt  to  reach  the  Concept,  but  this 
Concept  is  usually  some  particular  virtue,  as  tem- 
perance (Charmides),  friendship  (Lysis).  There 
is  a  predominance  of  dramatic  effect  with  a  lack 
of  philosophic  content  in  these  early  pieces; 
often  the  whole  affair  ends  in  smoke.  One  is 
tempted  to  call  such  productions  the  first  sketches 
of  the  reporter  trying  to  put  into  writing  that 
marvelous  personality,  Socrates. 

The  Protagoras  may  be  taken  as  the  best  sam- 
ple of  this  First  Period.  The  Gorgias  seems  to 
be  a  Dialogue  of  transition,  since  in  it  the  Good 
as  real  and  objective,  makes  its  appearance,  being 
distinguished  from  the  particular  virtues  on  the 
one  hand  and  from  pleasure  on  the  other.  The 
conception  of  the  Good,  however,  is  still  Socratic. 

2.  The  Second  Period  corresponds  with  Plato's 
expatriation,  which  also  must  utter  itself  in  writ- 
ino-.  This  group  of  Dialogues  is  sometimes  called 
the  Megaric,  but  such  a  designation  is  too  nar- 
row. It  shows  Plato  passing  beyond  the  horizon 
of  Socrates  and  appropriating  other  Philosophies, 
movinof  out  of  his  strict  Athenian  limits  and 
becoming    truly     Hellenic,     by    taking    up   the 


PLATO.  271 

thought  of  all  Hellas,  east  and  west.  The  Ele- 
atic  doctrines  (Being  and  Non-Being)  the  Hera- 
clitic  category  (Becoming)  and  particularly 
Pythagoreanism  he  studied  largely  on  their  own 
original  ground,  and  from  their  own  best  exposi- 
tors, as  far  as  possible.  Thereby  he  was  broad- 
ened out  into  universality ;  the  Universalism  still 
implicit  in  Socrates,  becomes  explicit  in  Plato. 

The  inner  necessity  of  appropriating  and  sub- 
suming particular  Philosophies,  will  give  a  nega- 
tive, dialectical  cast  to  this  second  set  of  Platonic 
Dialogues.  Chiefly  by  means  of  Eleaticisni  he 
learned  the  play  of  the  Negative,  which  runs 
through  all  particularity,  and  it  never  left  him. 
Here  the  characteristic  work  is  the  Parmenides, 
though  this  Dialogue  has  been  placed  in  each  of 
the  other  periods,  and  has  even  been  suspected 
of  being  spurious  by  some  modern  German 
critics.  Still  the  consensus  of  the  best  holds  to  its 
genuineness  and  puts  it  into  the  present  place. 

The  great  dispute  over  the  position  of  the 
Phaedrus  in  the  total  scheme  cannot  be  entered 
into  here.  This  peculiar  Dialogue  has  marks  of 
all  three  epochs — youth,  middle  life,  and  old 
age.  We  once  heard  a  distinguished  philosopher 
say  that  a  recent  book  of  his  had  passages  in  suc- 
cession which  were  written  fifty  years  apart. 
Only  an  old  man  could  put  together  such  a  work, 
and  it  may  be  that  the  diversities  of  Phaedrus, 
both  in  style  and  thought,  are  explicable  in  some 


272         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

such  way.  So  it  would  in  a  manner  represent  all 
three  periods. 

3.  The  greatest  single  work  of  Plato  is  gener- 
ally considered  to  be  the  Bejyuhlic,  and  this  is 
the  culmination  of  the  Third  Period  which  began 
with  his  return  to  Athens  when  he  was  a  little 
over  forty  years  old,  and  lasted  nearly  forty 
years  longer,  till  his  death.  The  question  comes 
up,  What  works  shall  we  specially  assign  to 
this  long  Academic  Period?  And  the  larger 
question  rises.  What  was  his  literary  relation 
during  this  time  to  all  of  his  writings,  includ- 
ing those  which  belong  to  the  two  previous  Pe- 
riods? There  are  almost  no  faets  or  dates  to 
guide  us  in  such  an  investigation,  there  are  only 
the  works  themselves ;  the  evidence  is  essentially 
internal,  and  so  it  comes  that  the  two  extremes, 
unreasonable  skepticism  on  the  one  side  and  ar- 
bitrary conjecture  on  the  other,  show  themselves 
in  the  treatment  of  Plato's  writings.  Inner 
grounds  of  connection  are  for  the  most  denied 
by  Grote,  but  are  employed  with  unmeasured 
caprice  by  Schleiermacher  and  many  of  his  Ger- 
man  successors.  The  law  of  internal  evidence 
for  inter-relating  the  Platonic  compositions  has 
seemingly  not  been  discovered. 

This  long  Third  Period  necessarily  has  its  sub- 
ordinate stages,  to  the  last  of  which  probably 
belongs  the  Laws.  The  effect  of  the  journey 
to  Sicily  may  be  detected  in  Plato's  political  spec- 


PLATO.  273 

Illations.  During  the  Third  Period  he  probably 
edited  and  published  what  he  had  written  in  the 
former  periods.  Such  a  return  upon  his  earlier 
Self  in  his  later  years'is  not  only  likely  in  his  in- 
dividual case,  but  may  be  deemed  generally  a 
psychical  necessity.  The  parallel  case  of  Goethe 
suggests  the  fact;  Faust,  for  instance,  is  made 
up  of  many  periods  in  the  life  of  the  poet. 

It  is  highly  characteristic  of  Plato  that  he 
concludes  his  career  b}^  being  lawgiver.  This  fact 
is  in  deep  correspondence  with  the  philosopher 
Plato,  who  prescribes  obedience  on  the  part  of 
the  People  to  his  enactments.  Herein  we  see 
the  opponent  of  everything  like  civic  or  national 
self-government.  The  philosopher  is  to  make 
institutions,  all  that  the  rest  of  the  world  has  to 
do  is  simply  to  accept  them.  Thus  Plato  pushes 
the  autocracy  of  Philosophy  to  its  highest  point 
at  the  very  end  of  his  life,  and  in'  his  last  written 
production  probably  (the  Laws).  Before  him 
Greece  had  had  practical  lawgivers  like  Solon 
and  Lycurgus,  but  the  philosopher  now  appears 
and  puts  himself  theoretically  into  their  place 
asserting  his  right  to  make  laws  for  the  world. 
"We  hold  that  in  this  colossal  assumption  Plato 
is  true  to  the  ahsolutistic  character  of  all  Phi- 
losophy as  the  chief   European  Discipline. 

III.  Plato's  Philosophy.  —  In  Plato's  Writ- 
ings as  a  Whole  there  is  no  completely  developed 
formulation  of  his    Philosophy,   which  is  essen- 

18 


2  74         ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

tially  a  growth.  And  jet  this  growth  is  more 
and  more  toward  an  organized  system.  This  is 
one  of  the  instructive  facts  in  Phito's  Philoso- 
phy :  it  shows  the  unfolding  of  a  johilosophic 
system,  indeed  of  all  philosophic  systema- 
tization.  The  most  striking  instance  herein  is 
the  Repuhlic  with  its  psjchological,  ethical  and 
political  ordering.  Philosophy  learns  to  systema- 
tize itself  in  Plato,  it  becomes  conscious  that  it 
must  be  a  system,  though  our  philosopher 
does  not  fully  realize  this  consciousness.  But 
those  who  come  after  him  will  study  his  thought 
systematically,  and  can  only  reach  it  in  that  way. 

Accordingly,  in  the  mass  of  Platonic  Writings 
there  is  a  germ  unfolding,  and  seeking  to  come 
forth  into  tiie  light.  The  philosophic  Norm  it 
is  (see  preceding  pp.  1(3-25)  which  is  struggling 
in  this  seething  multitude  of  Dialogues  to  be  born. 
Yet  how  often  does  Plato  fall  back  into  the  relig- 
ious Norm,  particularly  as  expressed  in  the  M}'- 
thus !  We  are  to  see  that  he  is  making  the  grand 
separation  of  Philoso[)hy  from  Eeligion,  and 
cannot  easily  maintain  himself  on  the  pure  phi- 
losophic heights  of  his  Thought,  but  must  return 
for  support  and  recuperation  to  the  mythical  view 
of  the  Universe.  In  this  respect  Aristotle  will 
make  an  advance  upon  Plato,  and  quite  eliminate 
the  mythical  element. 

Still  Plato  is  the  philosopher  and  is  seeking  to 
grasp    and    utter   the   philosophic    Norm  of  the 


PLATO.  275' 

Universe  in  his  way.  His  fundamental  statement 
is  that  the  essence  of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the  on) 
is  the  Idea,  or  more  precisely,  is  the  Universal  as 
Idea,  and  that  this  is  opposed  to  non-essence  or 
non-being  (appearance).  Thus  he  posits  the  one 
supreme  autocratic  [Principle  or  Cause  as  over 
all  things,  and  shows  the  philosophic  Norm  ac- 
cording to  his  formulation. 

It  is  highly  characteristic  that  in  his  own  Dia- 
logues Plato  never  appears  in  person  as  one  of 
the  speakers.  Socrates  is  the  center,  is  the 
philosophic  autocrat  of  the  conversation  from 
start  to  finish.  At  least  such  is  the  case 
in  most  of  the  Dialogues.  Here  is  the  picture 
of  the  sovereign  Philosopher,  whom  Plato 
makes  the  actual  ruler  in  his  JRejiub/lc.  Still 
we  must  not  forget  that  it  is  really  Plato 
projecting  himself  as  the  world-governing  JSTous, 
even  though  he  hides  himself  behind  the  colossal 
figure  which  he  makes  of  Socrates.  That  is  a 
true  image  of  all  Philosophy,  in  fact  of  the  philo- 
sophic Norm  in  itself,  for  it  is  inherently  autocratic 
or  perchance  aristocratic.  We  must  note  too, 
that  the  Dialogue  has  its  select  group  of  persons 
around  Socrates ;  it  is  not  the  vulgar  crowd  upon 
the  street  and  marketplace,  such  as  the  real  Soc- 
rates sought.  It  is  a  chosen,  aristocratic  set  in 
the  main,  and  Socrates  himself  is  aristocratized 
not  only  in  doctrine  but  also  in  practice.  The 
Dialogue  brings   before  us  a  small  social  Whole 


276         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(as  was  Plato's  School)  with  its  own  monarch 
and  select  members.  The  talk  is  not  at  random 
but  is  secretly  governed  by  the  Thought  or  Con- 
cept, the  accidental  element  being  subordi- 
nated. Each  interlocutor  is  a  thinking  Self, 
who  is  presupposed  to  be  capable  of  reaching 
the  Concept  through  training.  Herein  lies 
one  of  the  chief  differences  l)etween  Plato 
and  Xenophon,  both  of  whom  in  their  writings 
show  Socrates  at  the  head  of  groups  of  persons, 
but  the  one  group  is  select  and  the  other  popu- 
lar for  the  most  part.  Diogenes  Laertius  says 
that  Plato  and  Xenophon  did  not  like  each  other, 
though  both  were  contemporaries  and  followers 
of  Socrates.  Hence  it  comes  that  they  make  no 
mention  of  each  other's  work  pertaining  to  their 
common  master. 

Phito's  use  of  the  Mythus  is  conscious  and 
purposed;  it  is  not,  therefore,  the  first  naive 
mvth-makiug  which  uncultivated  peoples  mani- 
fest. The  story  of  the  Gods  has  usually  with 
Plato  passed  through  the  alembic  of  Philosophy, 
and  is  intentionally  made  to  illustrate  some  doc- 
trine. Thus  we  may  call  Plato's  Mythus  by  the 
name  of  Paramyth,  having  been  constructed  or 
often  reconstructed  for  the  sake  of  the  new 
philosophic  meaning.  Still  Plato's  soul  has  in 
it  an  original  mvthical  strain  after  the  Hellenic 
pattern,  though  Philosophy  dominates  this 
strain,  as  it  does  all  else. 


PLATO.  277 

Our  object  iio\y  is  to  extract  Plato's  Philoso- 
phy oat  of  his  mtmifold  writings.  To  this  end 
we  must  find  and  unfold  in  them  the  Norm  which 
underlies  and  indeed  creates  all  Philosoph^^ 
This  Norm  manifests  itself  in  a  variety  of  ways, 
but  ancient  Thought  usually  expressed  it  (when- 
ever it  came  to  expression)  in  the  threefold 
division : — 

I.  Metaphysics. 

II.  Physics. 

III.  Ethics. 

In  this  triple  movement  we  shall  see  the  sec- 
ond fundamental  Discipline  (  which  is  Philosophy) 
formulating  the  process  of  the  Universe.  Plato 
will  show  his  own  peculiar  method  of  handliucr 
and  unfolding  this  Discipline.  Such  is  the  sub- 
ject of  our  present  study,  which  is  not  only  to 
reach  up  and  grasp  the  philosophic  Norm  as  just 
stated,  but  this  Norm  is  finally  to  be  seen  hold- 
ing the  second  place  in  the  process  with  the  two 
other  supreme  Disciplines,  Religion  and  Psychol- 
ogy.    (See  Introduction,  p.  10,  et  seq.) 

A.  Metaphysics. 

The  word  Metaphysics  is  not  found  in  Plato 
nor  in  Aristotle,  but  makes  its  appearance  amono- 
the  philosophers  succeeding  the  great  Athenian 
Period.  It  designates  in  a  geuf^ral  way  the 
first  stage  of  the  philosophic  Norm,  which  seeks 


278         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  rillLOSOPIlY. 

to  foriiiulato  directl}^  in  categories  the  csseuce  of 
Being  as  such,  in  distinction  from  Nature  and 
Man.  In  this  special  sense  it  is  the  primal  ut- 
terance of  Philosophy,  is  that  which  starts  the 
same  into  existence.  In  the  religious  Norm  its 
place  is  taken  by  the  Supreme  Person  creating 
all  things.  But  Greek  Philosophy,  as  we  have 
already  set  forth,  begins  hy  making  the  abstrac- 
tion of  Principle,  Cause,  Essence,  which  deter- 
mines the  All  apart  from  the  caprice  of  personal 
Will.  So  Metaphysics  is  the  science  of  this  first 
Principle  or  Cause. 

But  such  is  the  diversity  of  the  Platonic  system 
that  we  are  compelled  to  see  three  divisions,  or 
rather  a  process  in  its  Metaphysics.  The  first 
division  shows  the  genesis  of  the  Platonic  dual- 
ism, that  of  Essence  or  Idea  on  the  one  hand,  and 
of  Appearance  or  the  Phenomenon  on  the  other, 
which  dualism  underlies  all  Plato.  Then  these 
two  sides  divide  and  become  as  the  One  and 
Many,  negative  and  self-negative,  which  fact 
brings  out  Plato's  Dialectic.  Finally  all  the 
multiplicity  of  Ideas  unites  into  a  S3'stem  which 
we  may  call  Plato's  Ideology,  whose  final  out- 
come is  the  Idea  of  Ideas,  or  the  Good. 

1.  J7ie  Platonic  Dualism  Generated.  Already 
we  have  noted  what  the  dualism  is  :  Idea  and  Ap- 
pearance. The  Essence  of  all  Being  according 
to  Plato  is  the  Idea  as  opposed  to  the  phenomenal, 
transitory,  changeful.     This  is  the  dual  or  sepa- 


PLATO'S  METxiPHYSICS.  279 

rative  principle,  to  which  we  always  come  back, 
and  from  which  we  always  go  out  in  Plato. 

The  Socratic  concept  is  the  given  starting-point 
which  Plato  first  attained  as  a  pupil  of  Socrates. 
But  the  pupil^viU  come  to  ask  :  Whence  this  con- 
cept, this  universal,  which  we  reach  through  our 
thinking?  Such  a  question  the  master  Socrates 
hardly  asked,  being  satisfied  with  the  ethical  ap- 
plications of  his  concept  and  avoiding  metaphys- 
ical inquiries,  which  he  deemed  futile. 

Plato's  Dialogues   of  what  may  be  in  general 
called  his  second   period  show   him  going  back 
and   studying  the  older    philosophers.     A   very 
important  thought  may  have  come  to  him  from 
the  Pythagorean  school,  which  cultivated  speci- 
ally the  nrnthematical  field.      Geometry  became 
a  favorite  study  with  him  and  it  remained  a  lead- 
ing  discipline  in  his    school.     Its   fundamental 
elements,  such    as    surface,  line    and   point,  to- 
gether with  their  combinations  in  geometric  fig- 
ures, showed  him  the  pure  abstractions  of    mind 
from  the  material  world,  and  their  movement  in 
a  realm  of  forms,  entirely  apart  from  any  sen- 
suous embodiment.     Here  was  certainly  a  sug- 
gestion of  the  supersensible  realm  of  Ideas.     In 
a  certain  degree  it  maybe  said  that  the  method  of 
Plato  is  geometric  or  derived  from  geometry  and 
applied   to    all   Being.     Still    further,  he    could 
have  found  that  these  ideal  geometric  forms  are 
the  means  for  controlling  the  kingdom  of  matter. 


280         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  rillLOSOPnT. 

The  iiiiiul  deals  with  such  forms  as  existent,  as 
})ure  inluitious  of  Beinji;  in  its  essence;  we  be- 
hold them  directly,  intuitively,  by  an  inner 
vision.  iSo  Plato  must  liave  seen  Philosophy  to 
be  (leometr}'  universalized. 

The  eounterpart  to  these  ideal  shapes  of  pure 
Being,  eternal  and  unchanijeable,  is  found  in  the 
doctrine  of  the  Becoming  which  afKrins  that  all 
things  are  in  a  flux,  nothing  is  permanent  or  sub- 
stantial. Thus  a  plicnoiiu'iial,  changeful  world 
rises  u})  in  oi)position  to  the  realm  of  Ideas,  and 
Avill  be  a  perpetual  harassing  i)reseuce  to  the 
j)liilos()i)lu«r  of  Idealism.  It  is,  in  fact,  Plato's 
devil,  as  far  as  he  hail  any.  Such  was  the  con- 
tribution of  Ileraclitus,  which  is  now  made  to 
take  its  plaee  in  the  general  system  of  Plato, 
plaving  a  negative  part  there,  continually  denied 
vet  undenial)le,  always  being  jiut  out  of  the  uni- 
verse yet  forever  pop})iug  up  again,  not  without 
a  touch  of  Meiihistophelean  irony.  But  what  a 
labor  does  this  Satanie  fiend,  Appearance,  impose 
upon  our  philosopher  I 

Plato  also  goes  back  and  studies  the  doctrine 
of  Pure  Being  at  its  fountain-head  inEleaticism. 
Here  he  works  out  the  dialectical  relation  be- 
tween the  One  and  the  ]\Iany,  Being  and  Non- 
Being,  which  relation  is  substantially  identified 
with  that  of  the  actual  (ideal)  and  phenomenal 
worlds.  Still  Plato  affirms  that  the  One  is  not 
conceivable  without  the  Many,  or  the  Manv  with- 


PLATO'S  METAPHYSICS.  281 

out  the  One  (in  the  Parmenidts),  thus  making 
both  spheres  dialectical. 

In  a  general  way  we  may  now  see  the  origin 
of  the  Platonic  dualism.  The  Socratic  concept 
transformed  into  a  real  entity  in  its  own  realm 
he  could  get  from  the  Pythagorean  geometry; 
the  significance  of  the  phenomenal  realm  he 
could  receive  from  the  Heraclitic  Becomino;: 
the  dialectical  character  of  each  side  probabW 
dawned  \\\)m\  him  from  the  study  of  the 
Eleatics,  Parmcnidcs  and  Zeno.  Herewith  the 
dialectieal  j)roccdure  becomes  universal  with  him, 
he  applies  it  to  every  object  of  speculation, 
and  for  awhile  at  least  it  becomes  his  method, 
yea,  he  calls  it  his  Pliilosophv. 

2.  The  Dialect ic.  This  term  is  used  in 
several  senses  by  Plato.  He  sometimes  regards 
it  as  the  science  of  Being,  of  the  true  and 
abiding,  the  science  of  sciences,  which  would 
make  it  one  with  Philosophy.  Yet  more  often 
is  it  considered  a  branch  of  Philosophy,  and 
employed  somewhat  like  Logic.  It  is  what  brings 
the  many  to  unity,  what  brings  the  particular  to 
the  universal,  what  rescues  the  soul  from  Appear- 
ance and  conducts  the  same  to  true  Beins:. 
We  find  it  occupying  an  important  place  in 
the  educational  system  of  the  Rejmhlic.  The 
Overseers  or  Guardians  are  to  be  trained  in 
the  Dialectic  at  the  proper  period  in  order 
that  they  may    know    "the  nature  of    Beinir." 


2S2         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Such  instruction  is  declared  to  be  fundamental 
upon  whatever  subject  it  may  take  place.  "  The 
chief  test  is  of  dialectical  capacity;  the  person 
capable  of  becoming  an  Overseer  must  be  dialec- 
tical."  {EepuhUc  537  C.) 

At  the  same  time  Plato  does  not  conceal  the 
abuses  to  which  the  Dialectic  may  be  perverted  in 
improper  hands.  It  leads  to  logomachy,  to  love 
of  controversy,  especially  in  youths,  who  go 
about  the  city  exploiting  their  argumentative 
skill  on  every  one  who  will  listen.  Here  is  a 
picture  taken  from  life:  "  Young  fellows  who 
have  for  the  first  time  tasted  of  the  Dialectic, 
run  a])()ut  with  it  as  with  a  toy,  always 
em})loyiug  it  for  contradiction,  refuting  others 
as  they  have  been  refuted,  with  a  delight  like 
whelps  in  tearing  and  pulling  at  whoever 
may  come  near."  {EepuhUc  Book  VII,  chap. 
17,  near  the  end.)  This  sounds  very  nuu-li 
as  if  old  Plato  were  criticising  the  faults  of 
voung  Plato.  For  those  early  Dialogues  of 
his  are  mainly  a  display  of  dialectical  acuteness 
without  any  positive  conclusion  whatever.  The 
whole  thing  has  become  a  nuisance,  and  in 
this  ideal  State  of  his,  he  will  not  permit 
its  continuance.  We  can  see  that  even  Socrates 
is  henceforth  impossible  with  his  public  disputa- 
tions in  shops  and  on  the  streets.  The  Dialectic 
is  no  longer  for  all;  those  alone  are  allowed 
to  participate  iu  it  who  are  "  orderly  and  settled 


PLATO'S  ?IETAPIIYSIC'S.  283 

hy  nature."  Still  it  is  uckuowledgcd  to  be  a 
great  means  for  him  "who  wishes  to  behold 
the  truth  "  and  to  attain  unto  real  Being. 

In  general,  therefore,  the  Dialectic  must  be  re- 
garded as  a  method,  as  a  way  by  which  the  mind 
is  to  rise  to  the  Idea,  rather  than  the  Idea 
itself.  Already  we  have  noted  that  geometry 
moves  in  pure  forms  of  the  mind,  which  are 
seized  directly  and  intuitively,  and  which  may 
have  been  the  iirst  hint  to  Plato  concerning  his 
realm  of  Ideas.  But  these  geometric  forms  are 
relatively  imperfect,  as  they  stand  too  near  to 
the  material  object  from  which  their  elements, 
such  as  line,  point,  surface,  figure  are  immediate 
abstractions.  Hence  Plato  makes  the  striking 
transition  from  the  geometric  method  to  the  Dia- 
lectic, which  we  find  developed  in  the  Republic 
(Book  VI,  chaps.  20  and  21).  He;gives  his  two 
divisions  of  the  world,  ideal  and  phenomenal; 
the  former  he  calls  the  cogitable  {noeton) ,  t\iG 
latter  the  visible  {Jioraton).  Each  of  these  di- 
visions he  subdivides;  the  cogitable  realm  of 
thought  {Xous)  is  either  mathematical  or  dia- 
lectical, the  first  of  which  employs  figures  or 
images,  the  second  thoughts  or  ideas.  But  now 
for  the  main  point,  namely,  the  method  in  each 
case.  In  geometry  "  the  soul  is  compelled  to 
make  use  of  hypotheses  and  does  not  go  back 
to  the  beo-inning,  being  unable  to  transcend  these 
hypotheses"  with  which  it  starts.    But  Thought 


284         ANCIENT  E  U ROPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPII Y. 

ill  its  realm  proceeds  differently  :  tliouoli  it  starts 
with  an  hypothesis,  it  marches  up,  step  by  step, 
to  that  which  is  without  hypothesis,  thus  "  com- 
ing to  the  source  of  the  All,  and  hn'ing  hold  of 
it;"  then  from  this  height  Thought  follows  out 
what  proceeds  from  the  source  of  the  All,  "de- 
ceuding  to  the  end  without  having  employed  any- 
thiug  from  the  sensible  world,  but  simply  Ideas, 
which  arc  through  themselves  for  themselves." 
Evidently  the  geometric  method  has  but  the 
one  movement,  descendiug  from  its  primal  as- 
sumption to  what  is  derived  from  the  same.  But 
the  Dialectic  is  conceiv^ed  as  having  a  double  move- 
ment, the  ascending  as  well  as  the  descending ;  in 
fact,  its  movement  may  well  be  deemed  circular 
if  the  Idea  be  considered  as  producing  the  phe- 
nomenal world  (which  is  a  contested  point  in 
Plato),  for  with  this  world  the  rise  to  the  Idea 
bcoins.  Thus  the  Dialectic  Avould  return  to  its 
starting-point  through  the  Idea  ascending  and 
descending.  At  any  rate,  the  difference  between 
the  two  methods  is  manifest ;  geometry  assumes 
its  beginning  or  principle  (arche),  and  demon- 
strates only  what  is  derived  therefrom,  while  the 
Dialectic  demonstrates  its  beginning  or  principle 
which  then  becomes  the  source  of  derivation.  So 
Plato  in  passing  from  the  mathematical  to  the 
dialectical  method  moved  forward  from  an  im- 
mediate vision  of  the  Idea  to  the  mediated  thought 
of  it,  froui  his  Pythagorean  to  his  truly  Platonic 


PLATO'S  METAFHYSIGS.  285 

period.  He  saw  the  Idea  immediately  in  the  geo- 
metric form,  which  was,  however,  something 
assumed  and  derived;  l)ut  through  the  Dialectic 
he  is  to  mediate  the  Idea  and  hehold  it  not  only 
as  derived  but  also  as  the  fountain  head  of  all 
derivation,  not  only  originated  but  originating, 
as  the  acorn  originates  the  oak  and  then  the  oak 
originates  the  acorn. 

The  Dialectic,  accordingly,  shows  the  inner 
process  of  all  things;  still  it  too  must  rest 
ultimately  upon  an  insight,  a  presupposition, 
even  though  this  in  the  end  proves  itself.  The 
ground  of  the  Dialectic  is  the  inherent  self- 
contradiction  in  all  finitude.  The  sensuous 
world,  opinion,  and  often  the  concept  have 
in  themselves  the  limit,  and  hence  the  negative, 
which,  when  put  to  the  test  of  Thought,  will 
show  itself  negating  itself.  For  Thought  is 
universal,  and  so  when  the  particular,  the  sen- 
suous, in  general  the  finite  is  truly  thought, 
that  is,  universalized,  it  must  reveal  its  own 
limitation  and  insuificiency.  Now  this  process 
of  the  finite  world  when  subjected  to  Thought  is 
the  Dialectic.  It  is  thus  a  process  of  negation, 
of  undoing,  yea  of  self-undoing,  in  part  at 
least.  It  has  however  a  positive  end,  which 
is  the  Idea  as  explicit,  or  as  the  underlying 
Thought  made  manifest  in  its  own  form. 
In   fact   the    secret    moving    principle    of    the 


28fi         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Dialectic    from     the    start     has    been    the    Idea 
which  finally  becomes  real. 

Thns  the  Dialectic  l)y  making  the  transitory 
vani^-h,  by  compelling  the  fool  to  show  his 
follv,  by  forcing  the  finite  to  end  itself,  has 
an  inherent  cast  of  humor  which  flavors  most 
of  the  dialogues  of  Plato.  Such  is  the  native 
literary  qualit}^  of  the  Dialectic,  which  springs 
from  what  we  may  call  the  play  of  the  Negative, 
dramatic  and  often  comic  in  its  descent  to 
nothingness. 

We  shall  note  the  leading  stages  in  the 
employment  of  the  Dialectic  by  Plato,  since 
he  handles  it  variously  at  various  times. 

(1)  First  is  the  pure  play  of  the  Negative 
for  its  own  sake  apparently.  We  have  already 
observed  that  Plato  shows  the  influence  of  his 
master  in  his  earlier  works,  which  through 
question  and  answer  unfold  the  general  out  of 
the  particular.  Socrates  left  no  writings,  it 
is  said,  but  now  the  writer  has  appeared  who 
reproduces  his  method,  his  irony,  and  probably 
many  actual  details  of  his  conversation.  The 
dialectical  procedure  here  is  largely  negative, 
or  we  might  say  the  undoing  of  the  negative. 
The  finite,  inadequate  opinion  is  made  to  contra- 
dict itself.  But  not  always  after  the  negation 
of  the  negative  does  the  positive  appear  in 
the  form  of  the  Concept,  or  Universal;  hence 
manv  of  these  Socratic  dialogues  seem  to  have 


PLATO'S  METAPHYSICS.  287 

no  meaning  and  leave  the  reader  dissatisfied, 
with  a  sense  of  having  thrown  his  time  away 
in  reading  them.  Some  of  them  end  in  an 
intended  confusion,  and,  if  they  are  genuine, 
show  that  Pkito  must  have  had  not  only  his 
Socratic  but  even  his  Sophistic  period  — 
Sophistic  in  the  lower  sense  of  the  word.  Plato 
himself  learned  to  reprobate  this  kind  of  Dialec- 
tic, as  we  see  by  the  above-cited  passages 
from  the  Republic. 

(2)  The  second  kind  of  Platonic  Dialectic  is 
altoofether  more  serious  and  fundamental.  The 
play  of  the  Negative  still  continues,  but  for  a 
positive  end,  yea,  for  the  most  positive  of  all 
ends,  namely.  Truth  or  the  Idea.  The  finite 
opinion,  doctrine,  concept,  is  still  made  to  cancel 
itself  through  its  own  inherent  negativity,  but 
no  longer  just  for  the  fun  of  the  thing,  or  as  a 
juggling  sophistical  sport.  The  Dialectic  is  now 
employed  for  the  purpose  of  reaching  the  Uni- 
versal, the  highest  Concept,  in  fine  the  Idea,  and 
then  to  fasten  the  same  in  the  right  word  or  cat- 
egory. For  the  Dialectic  cannot  leave  out  the 
element  of  language;  in  fact  the  Dialogue,  with 
its  pros  and  cons,  with  its  undulatory  sweep  from 
this  side  to  the  other  and  back  again  is  the  true 
linguistic  setting  for  the  movement  of  the  Dia- 
lectic,  whose  finality  is  Thought  categorized, 
whereby  the  mind  can  handle  it  as  its  own. 

In  illustration  of  this  second  kind  of  Dialectic 


288         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PIIILOSOPH  Y. 

we  may  take  an  exaini)le  from  the  Protagoras,  a 
Dialogue  which  Phito  named  after  a  sophist 
(whom  he  may  have  heard  at  Athens  in  his 
youth),  whose  doctrine  was  that  all  knowledge 
consisted  in  sense-perception.  Man  was  the  meas- 
ure of  all  things,  and  each  individual  man  at 
each  moment  was  such  a  measure,  and  there 
was  no  other  kind  of  knowing.  Hence  there  could 
be  no  Universal,  no  Idea;  only  the  immediate 
sensation  or  impression  exists.  To  such  a  doc- 
trine Plato  applies  his  Dialectic:  Protagoras 
asserts  the  truth  of  his  doctrine,  yet  his  doctrine 
asserts  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  truth .  He  ar- 
gues with  me  against  the  validity  of  my  impression, 
yet  his  argument  affirms  that  my  impression 
must  be  just  as  valid  as  his  own.  In  fact  he, 
though  an  arguer  by  profession,  as  a  Sophist,  is 
o-uilty  of  self-contradiction  in  the  very  act  of  ar- 
guing for  his  doctrine.  The  negation  of  knowing 
he  declares,  yet  he  somehow  knows  this  negation 
and  tries  to  make  me  know  it  too.  Protagoras 
repeats  the  statement  of  Heraclitus  that  all  is  in 
a  flux,  or  all  changes;  if  so,  then  change  is  per- 
manent and  must  be  the  opposite  of  itself,  or  self- 
negative.  The  denial  of  truth  implies  the  truth 
of  denial,  and  thus  is  self-denying. 

Such  is  an  example  of  this  kind  of  the  Platonic 
Dialectic,  which  seizes  the  finite,  inadequate  neg- 
ative thought  or  doctrine,  and  turns  it  inside  out, 
making  it  undo  itself  through  its  own  inner  move- 


PLATO'S  METAPHYSICS.  289 

ment.  Often  this  Dialectic  is  mingled  with  ex- 
ternal arguments  and  reflective  repetitions  which 
render  it  impure,  disturb  the  clear  direct  flow  of 
its  otherwise  transparent  stream.  Then  inter- 
twined with  it  are  the  innumerable  excursions  and 
amplifications  in  the  form  of  myth,  story,  descrip- 
tion, seasoned  through  and  through  with  the 
excessive  palaver  of  Attic  etiquette.  Just  a  little 
too  much  urbanity,  for  one  reader  at  least,  who 
has  often  to  exclaim.  Our  Plato  is  a  wordy  fellow, 
why  can't  he  come  to  the  point?  Out  of  such 
an  exuberance  of  speech,  we  have  often  to  extract 
the  pure  process  of  the  Dialectic,  whose  essence 
we  have  sought  to  give  in  the  foregoing  state- 
ment. 

Thus  the  Platonic  Dialogues  give  in  their  di- 
versity, multiplicity  and  changefulness  a  picture 
of  the  outer  world  of  Appearance,  which  has, 
nevertheless,  an  inner  compelling  principle  which 
brings  forth  the  abiding,  the  eternal,  and  which 
is  manifested  in  this  Dialectic  of  Appearance  pre- 
cipitating the  pure  forms  of  Thought. 

(3)  But  these  pure  forms  of  Thought  are 
manifold  and  contradictory,  so  that  they  too  be- 
come dialectical  among  themselves.  This  shows 
us  the  third  kind  of  the  Platonic  Dialectic,  that 
of  abstract  concepts,  or  indeed  of  Ideas.  Cer- 
tain Dialogues  mingle  this  kind  with  the  pre- 
ceding. An  instance  is  the  Philehus  which 
begins  with  treating  of  pleasure,  and  hence  deals 

19 


290         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHIL O SOPHY. 

with  a  sensation  like  the  Protagoras.  But  from 
the  individual  fact  of  sense  it  rises  to  a  consider- 
ation of  the  Infinite  and  Finite,  wherein  lies  the 
universal  nature  of  the  Dialectic  itself.  For  the 
self-negating  character  of  all  fiuitude  is  just  the 
province  of  the  Dialectic,  as  already  said.  But 
now  it  must  be  seen  that  not  only  matters  of  sen- 
sation, but  also  concepts  are  limited  against  one 
another,  and  hence  finite  and  dialectical.  In  the 
Sophist es  we  may  note  the  same  general  proced- 
ure ;  Plato  aims  to  refute  the  sophistic  doctrine 
which  holds  that  all  is  feeling  or  individual  opin- 
ion, and  that  there  is  no  objective  standard  of 
truth,  nothing  which  may  be  called  Keason 
(^jSfous)  among  men.  But  from  this  stage  of  the 
discussion  Plato  advances  to  the  consideration  of 
Being  and  Non-Being,  which  constitute  indeed 
the  underlying  principle  of  the  argument.  These 
are  abstract  concepts  in  a  dialectical  movement 
with  each  other. 

But  the  c"hief  Dialogue  in  the  present  sphere  is  the 
Parmenides^  named  after  the  Eleatic  philosopher 
whose  work  has  been  already  considered  (p.  99). 
Here  Plato  enters  primarily  the  field  of  Eleati- 
cism  with  its  two  main  categories.  Being  and  Non- 
Beins:,  to  which  he  unites  a  dialectical  discussion 
of  the  One  and  the  Many.  The  main  point  now 
made  is  that  the  One  cannot  be  conceived  without 
the  Many,  nor  the  Many  without  the  One;  each 
taken  by  itself  and    thought    contradicts    itself, 


PL  A  TO' S  ME  TA  PH  YSICS.  291 

and  pusses  over  into  the  other  to  complete  itself. 
Ill  different  words,  each  alone  is  finite  and  self- 
annulling,  in  which  fact  we  behold  the  internally 
working  Dialectic  which  compels  the  one-sided, 
finite  concept  to  move  out  of  its  limitation  and  be- 
come universal  orthe  Idea.  This  of  course  annuls 
Eleaticism  proper,  with  its  exclusive  concept  of 
Being  (the  One)  and  its  denial  of  Non-Being 
(the  iSIanv);  or  rather  it  unfolds  the  Eleatic 
doctrine  bv  adding  the  complementary  side. 

In  the  Pannenides,  however,  the  positive  result 
is  not  given  except  by  im[)lication.  -  In  fact,  the 
deepest  consequence  of  this  Dialectic  of  the 
One  and  the  Many  is  hardly  implied  by  Plato. 
The  One  is  also  self-separating,  or  it  is  the 
self-division  into  the  many,  which  self-division 
returns  and  makes  itself  One.  Such  is  the 
process  underlying  all  this  dialectical  play  of  the 
One  and  the  Man},  which  process  Plato  does  not 
clearly  indicate ;  still  less  does  he  indicate 
that  this  process  is  just  that  of  Ego  w^ith  its 
three  stages  of  inner  unity,  self -separation, 
and  return.  Thus  Plato  has  an  intimation 
of  the  Psychosis  as  implicit  in  Being ;  we  shall 
find  that  the  later  Neo-Platonist  will  make  it 
consciously  explicit  in  Being ;  modern  Europe 
will  recognize  it  as  subject,  but  from  this  last 
European  stage  it  is  still  to  be  unfolded  as 
the  universal  process  of  science  both  subjective 
and    objective.      Such    a    marvelous    germ    we 


292         ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPH  Y. 

may  sco  hudding  iii  this  Platonic  Dialectic  of 
the  One  and  the  Man3^ 

Unfolding  the  metaphysical  Plato,  we  have 
now  reached  the  result  of  his  dialectical  proced- 
ure, and  we  have  no  longer  to  deal  with  his 
Method,  but  with  the  outcome  or  the  product  of 
his  Method.  The  Dialectic  as  the  play  of  the 
Negative  deals  with  separation,  division,  in  gen- 
eral with  the  tinitude  of  the  world  and  of  think- 
ing. But  the  Dialectic  is  not  to  end  in  a  result 
merely  negative  (which  was  largely  though  not 
wholly  the  casein  8()i»liisticisni)  ;  it  is  likewise 
to  negate  its  own  negation  and  to  rise  to  a  posi- 
tive realm. 

3.  Ideoloriy.  AVe  have  now  reached  the  Idea 
as  mediated  by  the  Dialectic,  which  as  Method 
has  made  it  a  conscious  possession.  Previously  in 
the  first  stage  of  Platonic  Metaphysics  we  looked 
at  it  (the  Idea)  as  immediately  given,  as  it  is  in 
the  forms  of  geometrj^  which  may  be  deemed 
the  simple,  intuitive  state  of  the  Idea.  But  out 
of  this  undeveloped  implicit  condition  the  Idea 
has  become  explicit  with  its  process  through  the 
Dialectic. 

We  are,  then,  to  return  to  the  Idea  as  it  is  in 
itself,  separated  from  the  material  world.  AVe 
take  up  again  the  Platonic  dualism — the  cleav- 
age of  the  universe  into  the  ideal  and  material 
worlds.  The  former  is  conceived  as  the  pattern 
of  the  latter,  as  a  supersensible  realm   of  forms 


PLATO'S  METAPHYSICS.  293 

with  its  own  life.  These  Phito  conceives  to  be 
derived  not  inductively  from  sense-perception 
(us  did  Socrates),  but  to  be  pre-existent  in  the 
mind,  though  latent  till  roused  by  some  external 
stimulation  of  the  senses.  This  process  of  recall- 
incr  the  Idea  throusfh  the  outward  stimulus  is 
named  Eeminiscence  bj  Plato.  Through  it  the 
soul  returns  upon  its  essence  which  is  the  Idea. 
For  the  Idea  is  the  priuiary  original  endowmeut 
of  the  Soul,  the  essential  principle  of  its  Being. 
The  external  world  simply  rouses  the  Soul  to 
look  upon  its  own  essence,  the  Idea,  and  this 
activity  is  the  Platonic  Reminiscence. 

Of  course  the  question  arises,  How  did  these 
Ideas  originally  get  into  the  Soul?  Plato's  the- 
ory (in  the  Phaedrus)  is  that  before  its  earthly 
life  the  Soul  beheld  these  ideal  forms  in  their 
native  incorporeal  world  where  it  could  see 
them  by  some  kind  of  ideal  sense-perception. 
Then  when  the  embodied  Soul  perceives  the 
corporeal  shapes  of  these  Ideas  in  the  Sense- 
world,  it  remembers  them  in  their  purity,  as 
they  existed  in  the  other  world,  and  is  seized 
with  a  longing  to  dwell  with  them  continually 
in  the  present  life.  This  is  philosophic  love 
(eros),  love  of  the  Idea,  whereby  we  may  here 
and  now  return  to  the  ideal  pre-existent  world 
out  of  which  we  were  plunged  into  flesh.  The 
relation  of  this  thought  to  Christian  eschatology 
will  be  evident  to  the  reader. 


294         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

To  this  conception  of  the  Idea  Phito  seems 
to  have  come  through  mathematics.  In  the 
Meno  he  shows  that  the  knowledge  of  the 
Pythagorean  theorem  is  evolved  not  out  of 
sensc-pcrceiDtion,  but  that  the  latter  stirs  the 
mind  to  recall  what  is  already  existent  within  it 
implicitly,  and  causes  it  to  recognize  an  essential 
content  of  itself.  Here  again  Ave  may  note  the 
influence  of  geometry  in  leading  Plato  to  his 
doctrine  of  the  Ideas.  It  is  well  known  that 
the  Pythagoreans  generally  claimed  him  as  a 
disciple  of  their   master. 

Having  now  our  world  of  Ideas,  we  ask 
what  is  its  organization,  what  is  its  process 
within  itself?  Such  is  the  central  question  of 
Platonic  Ideology.  It  must  be  understood  at 
the  start  that  we  are  not  to  expect  a  thorough- 
going detailed  system,  consistent  and  finished  in 
every  part.  On  the  contrary  we  come  upon  big 
gaps,  great  uncertainties,  and  not  a  few  inner 
contradictions.  Still  we  can  see  a  general  out- 
line which  will  show  tlie  Idea  as  Essence,  the 
Idea  as  Hierarchy,  and  the  Idea  as  the  Good. 
A  few  words  upon  each  of  these  points. 

(1)  The  Idea  as  the  essence  of  Being  in 
Plato  has  been  already  often  declared  and  im- 
plied. Here  we  may  emphasize  it  as  wholly  dis- 
tinct and  separated  from  the  phenomenal  world, 
and  as  having  its  own  inherent  process  (or  Psy- 
chosis) within  itself.     It  is  [)rimarily  the  univer- 


PLATO'S  METAPHYSICS.  295 

sal,  the  genus  or  class;  as  distinct  from  the 
individual  object  it  is  the  general  concept;  on  the 
one  hand  it  is  innate,  intuitive,  regulative  of  our 
sensuous  knowledge,  but  not  derived  from  it;  on 
the  other  hand  it  is  objective,  existent  in  its  own 
right,  the  eternal  and  imnmtable  essense  of  all 
Being:,  dwellin"'  in  a  world  all  its  own.  It  is  the 
common  principle,  the  universal  Eeason  in  us 
and  in  the  universe  outside  of  us  —  the  princi- 
ple by  which  our  mind  cognizes  or  rather  recog- 
nizes the  mind  (or  Nous)  in  all  things. 

Every  object  is  what  it  is  by  virtue  of  the 
Idea,  which  is  thus  its  Idea.  If  we  can  truly 
think  anything,  it  must  be  an  Idea  in  order 
to  be  thought.  The  result  is  a  vast  multi- 
plicity  of  the  Idea  which  thus  reveals  itself  as  a 
world  of  Ideas.  Whatever  can  be  designated 
by  name,  as  bed,  table,  dirt,  has  its  corre- 
sponding Idea,  its  supersensible  counterpart. 
Sometimes  Plato  seems  inclined  to  put  a  limit 
upon  this  universal  a]e[)lication  and  consequent 
degradation  of  his  ideal  world,  for  it  would  have 
tocontain  all  ugliness,  meanness,  wickedness,  and 
even  his  great  enemy,  the  lying  Appearance,  in 
fine,  the  opposites  of  the  True,  the  Beautiful 
and  the  Good.  But  this  negative  Element  he 
naturally  shuns,  though  now  and  then  it  unpleas- 
antly pops  up  its  head  and  puts  in  a  word  from 
the  mouth  of  one  of  his  characters. 

(2)  So  we   come   to  a  division   of   the   Idea 


296         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

into  a  very  numerous  multitude,  about  wliich 
we  at  once  ask:  Is  there  any  order  here?  This 
brings  us  to  what  may  be  called  the  Hierarchy 
of  Ideas,  for  Plato,  true  to  his  aristocratic 
feelings,  has  not  permitted  his  Ideas  to  have 
democratic  equality.  That  would  be  too  much 
like  the  Athenian  Demos  for  hun.  As  it  is 
the  universal  element  in  the  Ideas  which  distin- 
guishes them  from  the  phenomenal  world,  there 
will  be  a  gradation  in  them  according  to  the 
degree  of  their  universality,  for  this  we  may 
conceive  as  having  degrees.  Or  we  may  say 
that  in  proportion  as  they  share  in  the  universal, 
they  are  ranked  in  an  ascending  order  toward 
the  highest  Being,  or,  on  the  contrary,  in  a 
descending  scale  to  the  lowest.  Higher  than 
the  Idea  of  the  piece  of  marble  is  the  Idea  of 
the  statue  made  from  it,  higher  than  the 
statue  is  the  Idea  of  the  Beautiful  embodied 
in  it,  higher  seemingly  than  the  Beautiful  is 
the  supreme  Idea,  the  Good. 

But  now  appears  a  great  difficulty.  By  what 
criterion  shall  we  test  this  enormous  mass  of 
heterogeneous  Ideas  for  the  purpose  of  grading 
them?  How  shall  we  discover  their  relative 
values?  They  can  not  be  ordered  after  the 
manner  of  the  Aristotelian  logic,  for  that  implies 
that  the  lower  concept  be  explicitly  contained 
in  the  hioher,  whereas  the  Platonic  Idea  in 
its  self-contained  separation  re-acts  against  any 


PLATO'S  METAPHYSICS.  297 

such  sul)sumpti()n.  For  the  same  reason  thej 
are  not  to  be  conceived  as  evolving  themselves 
one  out  of  the  other  through  an  inner  trans- 
formation ;  surely  that  would  introduce  change 
into  the  unchanging  Idea.  Plato  passingly  speaks 
of  the  lower  sharing  in  the  higher,  but  such 
a  conception  makes  their  impassable  limits  pass- 
able. Hence  only  one  way  is  possible :  the 
Hierarchy  of  Ideas  must  be  ordered  somehow 
from  the  outside,  by  a  power  lying  back  of  them. 
So  we  have  projected  behind  our  phenomenal 
world  a  world  of  Ideas,  but  behind  this  world  of 
Ideas  with  its  order  we  have  to  project  an 
orderer,  for  certainly  these  eternal,  changeless, 
self-subsistent  units  (like  atoms)  will  not  order 
themselves  through  themselves. 

Plato  has  not  undertaken  to  give  anything  re- 
sembling a  detailed  system  in  his  Hierarchy  of 
Ideas.  He  has  no  consistent  ground  of  their 
inter-connection;  passages  here  and  there  maybe 
found  which  seem  to  impW  a  dynamic  activity  in 
them,  and  once  he  attributes  to  them  creative 
power.  But  in  general  they  are  shown  as  static, 
separate  from  one  another,  and  from  the  phe- 
nomenal realm,  the  atoms  of  the  inmiaterial 
world.  i\Iany  commentators  have  tried  to  relieve 
them  of  this  lonely  and  inactive  condition,  but 
on  the  whole  without  success.  They  have  been 
made  sulijective  as  the  Ideas  of  our  mind  ;  they 
have  been  made  objective  as  the    Ideas    of  the 


2"J8         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Divine  Mind.  But  Plato  insists  upon  tlieir  self- 
subsistent  distinct  Being,  solitary  and  homeless, 
all  in  an  ideal  home  of  their  own.  Still  Plato 
places  them  in  a  Hierarchy,  and  thus  demands 
an  orderer  from  the  outside.  The  result  is  we 
have  one  Idea  as  supreme  and  autocratic,  the 
only  Idea  gifted  with  causal  energy,  herein  dis- 
tinct from  and  even  opposite  to  all  other  Ideas, 
but  still  an  Idea.  This  brings  us  to  the  third 
stage  in  the  process  of  the  ontology  of  the  Idea, 
in  which  the  separative  charactor  of  the  second 
stage  just  given  is  overcome,  and  the  grand  mul- 
tiplicity of  Ideas  subjected  to  a  principle  of  uni- 
fication. 

(3)  Such  is  the  Good,  the  Idea  of  all  Ideas, 
placed  at  the  head  of  their  hierarchical  order, 
the  Pope  of  this  ideal  world.  The  first  fact  to 
be  emphasized  is  that  the  Good  is  here  metaphysi- 
cal rather  than  moral  (the  latter  is  to  appear 
later  in  Ethics),  it  is  still  regarded  as  an  Idea  in 
the  sense  of  the  essence  of  Being,  hardly  as  a 
norm  of  human  conduct. 

In  the  Bepithlic  (517  C.)  we  read:  "  In  the 
realm  of  the  known,  the  Idea  of  the  Good  is  ulti- 
mate, though  difficult  to  be  seen;  but  l)eing  seen 
it  compels  us  to  think  it  the  cause  of  all  things 
right  and  beautiful,  for  all."  Here  the  Idea  of 
the  Good  is  directly  called  the  cause  (aifia)  of 
what  is  often  put  with  it,  namely,  the  beautifu' 
and   the    right,  which    are    also  Ideas  in  Plato. 


PLATO'S  METAPHYSICS.  299 

Still  further  in  the  same  passage :  "In  tne  visible 
world  it  (the  Idea  of  the  Good)  is  the  Light  and 
the  begetter  of  the  ruler  of  Light,"  which  at 
least  ascribes  a  creative  power  (teJcousa)  to  this 
Idea.  Again:  "In  the  thought-world  it  (the 
Idea  of  the  Good,)  is  itself  the  ruler  and  the  pro- 
vider of  truth  and  thought  "  to  the  one  thinking. 
Finally  we  have  a  touch  which  indicates  its  eth- 
ical connection:  "It  behooves  the  man  who 
intends  to  act  wisely  in  private  or  in  public  to 
behold  this  Idea  of  the  Good."  The  position, 
character  and  function  of  the  Idea  of  Good  are 
thus  briefly  but  distinctly  outlined :  It  is  supreme, 
it  is  cause,  it  has  a  sphere  of  creativity,  and  it 
furnishes  Truth  and  Thought  (as  objective)  to 
the  thinker. 

This  last  item  we  may  expand  a  little  by  the 
aid  of  another  passage:  "The  Idea  of  the  Good 
is  what  gives  Truth  to  things  known,  and  fur- 
nishes the  capacity  to  know  them  to  the  knower," 
hence  it  is  the  source  both  of  the  knower  and 
the  known,  "  being  the  cause  of  both  Truth 
( o))jcctive)  and  Knowledge  (subjective) .  Though 
both  these  are  excellent,  you  will  consider  their 
cause  (the  Idea  of  the  Good)  as  3'et  more  excel- 
lent," indeed  the  most  excellent  of  all. 

The  present  thought  of  the  Idea  of  the  Good 
lacing  Ixy  ond  Truth  and  Kuowledge  Phito  ilhis- 
trtites  by  an  example  taken  from  the  Sun: 
"  Just  as  we  rightly  connidcr  the  light  (object) 


300         ANCIENT  EUltOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  the  vision  (subject)  to  be  of  the  Sun, 
though  not  the  Sun  itself,  so  we  rightly  con- 
sider Truth  and  Knowledge  to  be  of  the  Good 
though  not  the  Good  itself."  {Republic  508, 
E.)  Still  again:  "  The  Sun,  you  will  say,  also 
imparts  genesis,  growth,  increase  (to  the  mate- 
rial world)  without  being  itself  agenesis."  So 
it  is  with  the  Good:  "  The  essence  of  all  things 
comes  from  it,  without  its  being  that  essence;  " 
which  thought  we  shall  find  reappearing  in  Aris- 
totle's Moving  Not  Moved.  But  now  consider 
the  following  sentence:  "The  Good  is  not  es- 
sence, but  still  beyond  essence,  surpassing  the 
latter  in  dignity  and  power."  (^Repuhlic  509,  E. ) 
A  mighty  future  lies  in  this  expression,  for  it 
gives  the  germ  of  Neo-Platonism  and  there- 
with of  Christian  Mysticism.  Indeed,  a  marvel- 
ous fecundity  in  coming  philosophies  character- 
izes all  these  passages. 

The  Idea  of  the  Good  is  thus  the  grand  unifier 
and  ruler  of  the  ideal  world,  transcendent,  auto- 
cratic, of  it,  yet  over  it.  This  supreme  Idea  is 
endowed  with  power,  will,  and  with  an  intelligence 
that  is  above  intelligence  \JSfous)  subjective  and 
objective.  Seemingly  it  is  a  person,  but  the  very 
notion  of  personality  Plato  shuns,  at  least  for 
his  pure  Ideas.  Can  this  Good  be  other  than 
God  himself?  It  is  said  that  only  once  has  he 
been  found  to  identify  the  Good  with  the  Divine 
Mind.     Some  commentators  explain  his  silence 


PL  A  TO' S  3IE  TA  PII YSICS.  30 1 

by  saying  that  the  distinction  between  the  per- 
sonal and  the  impersonal  was  not  definitely  pres- 
ent to  his  thinking.  Plato  then  has  no  outolog}^ 
of  God,  which  was  such  a  dominating  thougiit  in 
the  Middle  Ages.  Plato's  faith  may  have  had  a 
God,  but  not  his  philosophy.  Thus  faith  was 
not  a  very  exalted  mental  activity  with  him.  He 
often  speaks  of  God  and  of  the  Gods,  but  it  is 
a  transmitted  mythological  matter. 

Such  is  in  outline  Plato's  grand  message  to  the 
future  —  the  doctrine  of  Ideas,  which  has  been 
the  nourisher  of  all  romanticism,  ideahsm,  other- 
worldliness,  autocratism,  both  personal  and  po- 
litical. We  may  call  it  the  Platonic  Pauideon, 
in  striking  contrast  to  the  Greek  Pantheon,  from 
which  the  philosopher  re-acted,  evidently  seeking 
to  get  rid  of  the  caprice  of  the  Gods  of  popular 
mythology,  and  to  find  an  eternal,  unchangeable 
principle  in  the  Universe..  In  like  manner  Plato 
trains  us  away  from  the  phenomenal  world  with 
its  mutability,  and  also  from  the  subjective 
Ego  which  is  likewise  capricious,  enticing  us  to 
dwell  in  his  Panideon  or  extra-mundane  temple 
of  Ideas.  It  may  be  rightly  said  that  to  his  call 
a  greater  mass  of  humanity  has  responded  than 
to  that  of  an}^  other  philosopher. 

Such  is,  then,  the  metaphysical  (or  ontological) 
portion  of  Plato's  Philosoph}-.  It  treats  of  the 
essence  of  Being  as  the  Idea  in  its  own  separate 
realm,  which  shows  a  triple  process:   The    Idea 


302         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  FHILOSOPHY. 

as  immediate  or  conceptual  (unfolding  out  of  the 
Socratic  concept);  the  Idea  as  dialectical;  the 
Idea  of  the  Good,  or  the  Idea  of  Ideas.  But  now 
the  Good,  in  order  to  be  the  Good,  must  some- 
how impart  itself  and  get  out  of  its  seclusion ;  or 
the  Idea,  if  it  be  truly  universal,  must  be  made 
creative,  if  not  through  itself  then  from  the  out- 
side. The  latter  is  what  happens;  anew  power 
enters  the  Panideon,  bearing  forth  its  ideal  con- 
tents and  through  them  constructing  the  Cosmos. 
This  brings  us  to  a  new  stage  of  Plato's  philo- 
sophical Norm. 

B.  Physics. 

This  portion  of  Plato's  Philosophy  has  been 
possibly  more  influential  than  the  metaphysical 
portion,  though  it  be  much  less  in  quantity,  and 
chiefly  confined  to  one  composition  (the  Timceus). 
In  it  Plato  shows  that  he  has  become  to  a  certain 
extent  conscious  of  the  difficulty  with  his  theory 
of  the  Idea  in  its  total  separation  from  the  phe- 
nomenal world,  and  in  its  lack  of  creative  power. 
Still  he  will  not  abandon  it,  but  will  introduce  a 
third  principle,  which  has  to  make  the  Idea  ap- 
pear, and  assign  to  it  a  place  in  the  Cosmos.  This 
new  principle  is  known  as  the  Demiurge,  or  in- 
deed the  God,  who  now  is  given  something  to  do 
in  Plato's  Universe. 

The  present  sphere  is  the  second  main  division 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS.  303 

of  Platonic  Philosophy  as  a  whole.  We  name  it 
Physics,  following  precedent,  though  in  a  num- 
ber of  ways  the  word  conveys  a  wrong  impression 
to  the  modern  mind.  It  is  very  different  in  pro- 
cedure and  in  content  from  what  is  called  Physics 
at  the  present  time.  It  must  be  regarded  as  the 
Philosophy  of  Nature,  but  it  includes  the  soul, 
in  fact  we  shall  find  a  soul  at  work  through  all 
its  stages.  Thus  it  is  really  physio-psychical; 
the  physical  world  is  shown  as  created  or  con- 
trolled by  the  physical.  Also  the  title  of  it  is 
sometimes  given  as  Cosmology,  but  the  distinc- 
tion between  Cosmology  and  Psychology  is  not 
definitely  drawn  by  Plato.  Nature  is  regarded  as 
having  a  soul,  as  being  a  living  thing,  and  its  pro- 
cesses are  essentially  manifestations  of  the  soul 
in  various  gradations. 

Here  we  may  note  that  each  of  the  subdivi- 
sions has  its  own  special  soul,  so  that  there  are 
witnessed  three  souls  in  a  descending  order :  the 
demiurgic  Soul  (God),  the  cosmical  Soul  (World- 
Soul),  and  the  human  Soul  (man).  Each  of  the 
three  is  always  a  mediating  (or  third)  power  be- 
tween the  two  extremes  of  the  Platonic  dualism : 
the  Idea  or  Archetype  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
Matter  or  Body  on  the  other.  Here  lies  the 
great  difference  between  the  present  (physio- 
psychical)  and  the  former  (metaphj'sical)  portion 
of  Plato's  Philosoph}';  the  world  of  Ideas  is  no 
longer  allowed  to  be  apart  by  itself,  but  has  to  be 


304         ANCIENT  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

phenomenalized,  has  to  enter  into  the  material 
realm  and  there  build  another  empire  after  its  own 
ideal  pattern.  Thus  Phenomenality,  Appearance, 
the  World  of  Manifestation,  which  was  former]}^ 
cast  aside  as  quite  nothing,  is  now  compounded 
with  the  Idea  on  one  side  and  Matter  on  the  other. 
This  twofoldness  we  shall  find  running  through 
the  entire  sphere  of  Platonic  Phj^sics,  and  making 
it  truly  the  second  stage  in  the  total  process  of 
Plato's  Philosophy. 

It  ^vas  probably  not  a  very  congenial  task  for 
our  philosopher  to  make  this  transition  out  of  his 
pure  ideal  realm  into  that  of  the  senses,  and  he 
hardly  attempted  it  till  late  in  life  (in  his 
TimcBus),  and  then  not  very  completely.  It 
could  not  have  been  altogether  pleasant  to  him 
to  phenomenalize  the  Idea.  It  was  making  the 
perfect  imperfect,  it  was  contaminating  the  pure 
with  the  impure,  it  was  reducing  the  self-subsis- 
teiit  to  a  kind  of  dependence.  A  fall,  a  lapse 
he  cannot  help  regarding  it,  and  we  shall  find 
him  making  the  movement  of  it  a  descending 
one  from  the  original  archetype  down  to  the  hu- 
man soul  incarnate.  In  fact  what  need  of  an 
imperfect  real  world  when  there  is  already  a  per- 
fect ideal  world?  Why  should  the  good  make 
the  bad  with  the  certainty  of  its  damnation? 
Moreover  the  original  unity  of  idealism  is  now 
dualized,  it  recognizes  the  material  principle, 
compromises  with  it,  goes  into  partnership  with 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS.  305 

it;  verily  the  sons  of  the  Gods  now  intennarrj 
with  the  children  of  mortals. 

So  much  from  the  standpoint  of  a  strict  ex- 
clusive idealism ;  but  from  another  view  this  en- 
tire sphere  of  Physics  must  be  regarded  as 
greatly  broadening  Plato's  Philosophy.  In  fact 
it  furnishes  us  with  the  middle  link  of  the  sys- 
tem and  makes  the  same  a  philosophic  totality 
which  will  dominate  the  coming  ages.  From  pure 
ontology  he  now  passes  to  the  ontology  of  Na- 
ture including  the  soul.  He  makes  his  ideal  real 
and  thus  truly  universal;  at  least  such  is  his 
effort  in  a  marvelous  new  stretch  of  his  spirit. 

There  is  a  striking  symmetry  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  various  movements  of  this  Platonic 
Physio-psychology.  Already  we  have  alluded  to 
the  three  souls  in  its  three  stages  (or  sub-di- 
visions) ;  each  of  these  three  stages  begins  with 
a  primal  noumenal  principle  (or  Idea)  which  is 
followed  by  its  opposite,  namely  a  material  or 
corporeal  element,  and  these  two  antagonistic 
principles  are  mediated  by  a  third  which  is  a 
soul. 

The  whole  we  shall  consider  as  three  processes. 
First  is  the  creative  process  considered  in  and  by 
itself,  with  its  three  interacting  principles — the 
Archetype,  Matter,  and  the  Demiurge.  Second  is 
the  cosmical  process,  by  which  creation  manifests 
itself  in  the  total  physical  Cosmos.  Third  is 
the  human  process,  which  deals   with  the  origin 

20 


306         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  nian,  ending  in  the  rise  of  the  soul  incor- 
porate. 

1.  The  Creative  (Formative)  Process.  Plato's 
pure  ontology,  which  we  have  unfolded  hith- 
erto, is  essentially  uncreative ;  the  Idea  does  not 
create  the  phenomenon,  nor  does  the  supreme 
Idea  create  the  other  lesser  Ideas.  On  the 
whole  creativity  was  excluded  from  the  Idea, 
for  thus  it  would  be  moved  within  itself  and 
separated  inside,  which  would  destroy  its  fixed 
and  changeless  character.  But  now  we  must 
have  a  creative  ontology,  the  Idea  must  be 
made  somehow  to  produce  the  phenomenon  or 
Nature.  This  is  accomplished  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  a  specially  self-active  creative  principle, 
namely  God.  We  iiave  already  noted  the  fact 
that  God  with  his  creation  of  the  world  is 
banished  from  the  pure  realm  of  Platonic  Ideas. 
Here,  however,  he  appears,  yet  with  decided 
limits  to  his  creative  power;  he  is  properly  the 
demiurge  or  world-former  who  finds  already  at 
hand  both  the  ideal  and  the  material  for  his  work, 
not  having  to  create  them,  but  to  mould  them  into 
his  cosmical  product. 

Thus  we  have  in  this  creative  process  three 
principles  brought  in  from  the  outside,  presup- 
posed and  taken  for  granted.  These  are  the 
Archetype,  Matter,  and  the  Demiurge.  They 
should  be  placed  in  this  order,  for  thus  we  see 
their  inter-relation  as  a  threefold  psychical  move- 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS.  307 

ment  (Psychosis).  There  is  the  primal  Idea  as 
immediately  given;  then  there  is  its  absolute 
opposite,  Matter,  which  is  also  a  thought,  yea  an 
Idea  on  its  reverse  side ;  thirdly  is  the  divine 
maker  who  returns  to  the  primal  Idea  and  incor- 
porates it  in  Matter.  Such  is  the  creative  pro- 
cess of  the  present  sphere,  the  whole  of  it 
noumenal  or  ideal,  being  the  process  antecedent 
to  and  creative  of  the  cosmical  reality  or  the  vis- 
ible universe. 

(1)  The  Archetype  is  the  term  by  which  we 
may  designate  the  Idea  in  its  present  creative 
relation  to  the  phenomenal  world,  though  it 
is  not  of  itself  creative.  With  the  Archetype, 
then,  we  make  the  connection  with  the  pure 
ideal  realm  of  Plato;  it  is  the  highest  Idea,  the 
Idea  of  the  Good  itself  as  pattern  {paradeigma) 
for  the  creation  of  the  Cosmos.  It  was  to 
this  pattern  that  the  divine  artificer  looked 
when  he  made  the  world.  He  did  not  take 
a  created,  changeful,  finite  pattern,  but  the 
eternal,  unchangeable  one,  namely  the  Idea 
and  the  Highest  Idea,  which  is  the  Good.  So 
his  work,  which  is  the  world,  is  likewise  good. 
"  For  the  work  of  the  artist  who  always  looks  to 
the  eternal  and  unchangeable,  and  who  designs 
and  moulds  his  work  after  such  a  pattern, 
nmst  of  necessity  be  beautiful  and  perfect  " 
(  Timaeus  28,  A). 

The  Archetype,   then,  after  which  the  Cosmos 


308         ANCIEN T  E UBOPEAN  PHIL OSOPHY. 

is  copied,  is  the  Good,  which  we  have  ah*eady 
found  to  be  for  Plato  the  supreme  essence 
of  Being.  Evidence  of  the  fact  is  seen  not 
only  in  the  excellence  of  the  created  world 
but  also  in  the  excellence  of  the  creator  who 
is  "the  best  of  causes,"  and  who  must  have, 
therefore,  "  looked  to  the  eternal  for  his  copy  and 
original."  Hence  this  Archetype  was  in  the 
mind  of  God,  "for  he  was  good,"  and  this 
is  the  reason  why  he  made  the  universe. 

Such,  then,  is  the  first  stage  in  the  primordial 
creative  process  of  the  world  —  the  Archetype 
which  is  the  Idea  of  the  Good.  But  this  Idea 
is  not  creative,  it  cannot  realize  itself  without 
a  material,  which  is  the  very  opposite  and 
counterpart  of  itself. 

(2)  Here  we  come  to  Matter  which  must  be 
thought  as  pure  Matter  and  not  any  particular 
form  thereof.  Plato  himself  confesses  this  sub- 
ject to  be  dark  and  difficult.  For  Matter  in  itself 
is  the  embodiment  of  self-contradictory  predi- 
cates ;  it  is  the  non -Being  which  is,  but  especially 
it  is  the  Idea  which  is  the  opposite  of  the  Idea, 
for  it  is  declared  to  be  non-material.  So  we  have 
to  put  together  the  conception  that  Matter  is 
immaterial,  indeed  ideal,  though  the  opposite  of 
the  Idea.  Matter  as  such  is  bodiless,  though  it 
may  be  made  to  take  on  body  through  the  form- 
ing activity  of  the  Demiurge  working  after  his 
pattern.     It  is    the  source  of    all  separation  and 


PLATO'S  PIJYSICS.  309 

change,  though  it  is  itself  eterual  —  Matter 
is  eternal  in  Plato,  not  created.  It  is  the 
ground  of  all  Appearance,  though  it  docs  not 
appear,  being  an  invisible  thing.  It  is  the  unde- 
termined, the  unlimited  (apeiron),  the  formless 
(^amorphon)  which  is  to  be  determined,  limited, 
formed.  In  one  passage  Plato  calls  it  space, 
"  providing  a  home  for  all  created  things  " 
(Timceus  52  B).  But  in  other  passages  of  the 
same  dialogue  (see  49,50)  he  regards  Matter  as 
the  mother  or  maternal  principle  of  the  Cosmos, 
"  in  which  the  begotten  becomes,"  she  being  the 
universal  recipient  of  the  seeds  of  all  forms. 
"  Eeceiving  all  things,  she  never  ceases  from  her 
own  nature,  and  never  in  anyway  or  at  any  time 
adopts  a  form  like  the  things  which  enter  into 
her,  "  being  the  unformed,  the  eternal  and  un- 
changeable as  pure  Matter.  "  We  may  compare 
the  receiving  principle  (Matter)  to  a  mother,  the 
source  (Demiurge)  to  a  father,  and  the  middle 
nature  to  a  child"  which  is  the  Cosmos  (^Timceus 
56).  So  we  have  here  a  gleam  of  the  domestic 
trinity  applied  to  the  creation  of  the  world, 
which  thought  is  to  be  developed  later. 

Thus  Matter  is  the  Idea  as  the  complete  other 
of  itself,  its  own  negation,  yet  still  as  itself. 
Aristotle  also  will  deal  with  this  conception  of 
Matter,  and  will  call  it  h>/Ie,  whose  essence  he 
designates  as  separation  or  deprivation  (fiftresis). 
On  account  of  this  dual  and  contradictory^^  na- 


;^10         ANCIF.NT  EUROPE  \N  PHILOSOPHY. 

ture  of  Matter  historians  of  philosophy  divide 
into  two  opposite  camps  in  describing  it.  The 
one  set  say  that  Phito's  Matter  is  corporeal,  tlio 
other  that  it  is  incorporeal.  (See  the  two  sides 
partially  listed  in  Zeller,  Phil,  der  Griechen  II.  s. 
609,  Di^iffe  Aitjlage.)  Of  course  this  refers  to 
pure  Matter,  that  out  of  which  the  world  was 
created  by  the  Demiurge. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  this  conception  of 
Matter  seems  absurd,  and  one  seeks  the  ground 
of  such  a  contradictory  view.  The  Ego  is  self- 
separating,  and  becomes  twofold  within  itself  in 
the  second  stage  of  its  process  which  is  just  that 
of  self-consciousness.  The  fact  is  Matter  is  the 
second  stage  of  the  Idea  in  its  world-creating 
process,  and  thus  corresponds  to  the  movement 
of  the  Ego.  But  for  Plato  the  Idea  is  not  Ego, 
not  a  Self,  not  creative,  and  still  the  world 
must  somehow  be  gotten  out  of  it,  or  patterned 
after  it.  Hence  he  has  to  take  Matter  for 
granted,  as  something  entirely  separate  from  the 
Idea,  though  really  it  be  the  second  stage  of  the 
process  of  the  Idea  as  creative  Ego.  So  Matter 
stands  divorced  from  its  proper  place  in  the 
process  to  which  it  belongs  and  can  give  no  ac- 
count of  itself  except  the  self-contradictory  and 
absurd  one:  I  am  Matter  which  is  immaterial,  a 
bodiless  Body,  a  Being  which  is  non-Being,  an 
Idea  which  is  the  opposite  of  the  Idea.  Plato's 
Matter,  thus  thrown  outside  of    the  process  of 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS.  311 

the  objective,  world-creating  Keason,  can  only  ap- 
pear irrational  to  our  Reason. 

Still  we  are  not  to  forget  that  Plato  is  seeking 
to  set  forth  the  spiritual  movement  of  the  world. 
But  he  separates  the  spiritually  connected  stages 
of  this  movement.  And  yet  Plato  has  intima- 
tions of  something  beyond  his  view.  He  speaks 
of  the  Idea  communicating  itself  to  its  other, 
to  Matter,  whereby  the  phenomenal  world  may 
take  part  in  true  existence,  which  is  the  Idea. . 
These  are  momentary  exceptions  which  contra- 
dict his  permanent  conception  of  the  Demiurge, 
whose  function  is  to  make  the  world  by  patterning 
it  in  Matter  after  the  archetypal  Idea.  But  the 
Demiurge  too  is  picked  up  from  the  outside  and 
so  pre-supposed,  being  the  third  assumption  in 
Plato's  creative  process. 

(3)  Of  this  Demiurge  we  have  already  had  a 
good  deal  to  say  in  the  preceeding  exposition,  as 
it  is  difficult  to  separate  him  from  the  Matter  in 
which  he  works  and  the  Archetj^pe  which  he 
copies.  Moreover  he  is  the  Platonic  God,  who 
now  first  distinctly  appears  and  performs  his 
part  in  the  universe;  previously  in  the  realm  of 
Ideas  his  presence  was  very  questionable.  He  is 
conceived  rather  as  the  artist  or  artificer  than 
the  creator;  we  feel  like  calling  him  the 
divine  sculptor  in  his  workshop  shaping  his 
given  block  of  marble  which  is  pure  Matter, 
after  an  ideal  pattern  of  the   Good   which   is  in 


312         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

his  soul  on  the  one  hand  and  is  the  essence  of 
all  Beinff  on  the  other.  The  Cosmos  itself  is  a 
work  of  art  and  God  is  the  artist.  Plato  univer- 
salized Phidias,  and  transformed  the  whole 
world  into  a  sculptor's  atelier;  Phidias,  the 
shaper  of  the  God,  is  now  supplanted  by  the 
God  himself  who  is  shaper  of  Phidias  and  all 
men  and  things. 

Why    is    it    that    Plato    will    have    nothing 
to  do    with  a   divine  Creator  of  the    Universe? 
It    is   his  reaction    against    the    Greek   religion 
as  portrayed  by  the  Greek  poets  (specially  Homer 
and   Hesiod),  who    make  the  Gods  the  authors 
of   evil,    and  ascribe    to   them  human  passions 
and  weaknesses.  Particularly  does  this  fact  come 
out  in  certain    passages  of  the  Republic    (379, 
380).      "God,    if    he    be    good,    is    not    the 
author    of    all   things    as    many    declare,     but 
only  of  a  few   things  in  men's  lives."     So  God 
must  be  dethroned  from  his  universal  creativity, 
for  "  the  Good  is  to  be  attributed  to  God  alone, 
the   cause   of   evil   is    to   be   sought   elsewhere 
and  not  in  Him."    Such  is  the  emphatic  duahsm 
like  Zoroastrianism,  here  declared.     Hence,  too. 
Homer   and    the   poets    must    be   put     out   of 
the  ideal  State. 

Plato  will  also  probe  down  to  the  reason 
why  God  made  the  world :  because  ' '  He  was 
good  and  without  envy."  Being  artist  he  must 
produce,    and    being    good     he    must   produce 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS  313 

the  good  work  and  beautiful,  and  ])eing  free 
from  envy  "  he  wishes  that  all  things  should 
be  like  himself."  (Timoeifs  29  E).  Herodotus 
and  other  Greeks  held  that  the  Gods  were 
envious  of  mortals,  if  the  latter  became  sfreat 
and  successful.  Hence  Nemesis,  the  divine 
leveller,  goes  forth  and  abases  the  exalted,  as  she 
did  Xerxes  the  Great  King  in  his  invasion 
of  Greece.  Every  such  God  Plato  would  fling 
out  of  his  Pantheon,  for  his  God  is  only  good 
and  the  author  only  of  good. 

2.  The  Oosmical  Process.  The  product  of 
the  preceding  creative  Process  is  the  Cosmos, 
which  also  has  its  Process.  The  Demiuro;e  or 
God  puts  the  world  into  its  existent  shape, 
which  is  an  appearance  in  Space  and  Time. 
It  manifests  the  twofoldness  which  we  already 
noticed  in  the  conception  of  Matter:  it  is  the 
Idea  showing  itself  through  the  opposite  of 
the  Idea,  or  the  Idea  in  its  creative  process 
made  real.  It  is,  therefore,  the  primal  artistic 
product  which  reveals  the  spiritual  in  a  sensuous 
form  on  the  grandest  scale  possible,  unrolling 
before  us  the  whole  physical  universe  as  a  work 
of  art,  or  rather  as  the  one  work  of  art, 
prototype  of  all  others.  And  the  Demiurge, 
as  already  suggested,  is  the  one  artist  with 
his  one  work,  truly  a  panorama  all-including. 
The  Greek  was  essentially  an  artist  and  took 
an  artistic  view  of  life  5  Plato  is  also  an  artist, 


314         ANCIENT  EUUnp::,AN  PIIILOSorHY 

thouol)  llic  i)hil()soplier  and  uiiiversaiizer,  and 
so  he  brings  before  us  the  artist  as  world- 
creating,  truly  universal,  and  hence  the  pattern 
of  all  artists.  For  art  at  its  best  always  creates 
a  new  world,  in  which  its  shapes  arise  and 
abide,  copied  after  some  ideal  exemplar  —  the 
world  of  Shakespeare,  of  Michel  Angelo,  of 
Phidias.  Containing  these  and  far  greater  than 
them  all  is  the  world  of  the  Demiurge,  the  Cosmos, 
Avhich,  if  we  are  to  see  with  Plato's  eyes,  we 
must  look  at  artistically.  We  may  here  add 
that  this  thought  want  deep  into  Schelling,  from 
whom  it  passed  to  Hegel,  who  has  elaborated  it  so 
fully  in  his  AestJieiilt. 

On  another  side  Plato  contemplates  the  ))iith 
of  the  world.  The  Demiurge  he  calls  the  fatlier 
as  well  as  the  maker;  Matter  is  the  mother  prin- 
ciple, and  their  son  is  the  Cosmos.  This  Sou  of 
God  with  prophetic  suggestiveness  is  called  the 
only-begotten  (^monogenes),  the  God  that  is 
to  be  (^esomenos),  the  visible  God  who  is 
image  of  the  invisible  God  (Tlmceus  29,  31, 
34).  Very  surprising  do  these  words  seem  com- 
ing from  a  heathen  philosopher  nearly  four  cen- 
turies before  Christ.  Repeatedly  Plato  declares 
that  the  Cosmos  is  a  God,  "  a  blessed  God,"  yet 
also  the  Son  of  a  God.  Divine  fatherhood 
invisible  and  divine  sonship  visible  are,  then, 
Platonic  conceptions. 

Accordingly,  Plato  endowed  his  Cosmos    with 


FL  A  TO' S  PIl  YSICS.  3 1 5 

a  soul,  though  he  hardly  conceived  it  as  a  per- 
son. A  huge  living  thing,  an  animal  (zoon)  he 
calls  it,  with  life  in  it  from  center  to  circumfer- 
ence. Such  a  world  must  indeed  have  a  world- 
soul,  a  thought  which  other  philosophers  before 
him  had  broached. 

Putting  these  statements  together,  we  grasp 
Phito's  Cosmos  as  a  work  of  art  which  is  divine 
and  alive  or  is  a  living  God.  From  this  point  of 
view  we  may  regard  Plato  as  reconstructing 
Homer's  Olympus.  Rejecting  Homer,  he  be- 
comes his  own  Homer,  for  he  is  truly  a  poet 
(Poiefes,  Maker),  and  he  is  here  building  the 
world  as  it  ought  to  be  built.  So  Plato  is  really 
the  God-making  Demiurge  in  this  whole  work, 
he  makes  the  God  who  makes  the  Cosmos  and 
man  too,  including  Plato  the  maker.  To  be 
sure  he  seems  not  conscious  of  the  part  which  he 
plays  in  this  business  of  world-creating,  nor  is 
any  European  philosopher  apparently.  Indeed 
all  Philosophy  is  inclined  to  leave  out  the  philos- 
opher constructing  it. 

In  the  present  portion  of  Platonic  Physics 
which  we  have  above  called  the  Cosmical  Pro- 
cess, are  to  be  found  three  special  phases  which 
we  shall  first  consider  separately  and  then  in 
their  united  movement. 

(1)  Here  again  we  begin  with  the  archetypal 
Idea,  but  as  working  in  and  through  the  God  or 
Demiurge,     who     is     now     distinctively     called 


3 1 6         ANCIENT  E UROrEAN  rillL 0 SOPHY. 

the  Creator  (in  the  Timoeus).  He  is  thus  the 
active  principle  of  the  Good,  which  he  seeks  to 
reaHze  in  the  creation  of  the  Cosmos.  Hence  he 
has  an  end  (felos)  which  is  his  own  self-reaHza- 
tion  in  the  workl,  which  world  he  will  make  like 
to  himself.  Thus  the  principle  of  teleology, 
which  we  have  already  found  in  the  JVous  of 
Anaxagoras,  enters  and  subjects  to  itself  all  other 
ends  or  causes.  The  living  embodiment  of  the 
Idea  of  the  Good  is  the  ultimate  end,  or,  as  it 
is  often  called,  the  final  cause  of  the  Cosmos  ac- 
cording to  Plato. 

The  world-creatino;  God,  with  his  Idea  of  the 
Good  which  ho  is  to  realize  in  his  creation,  is 
the  all-dominatino;  fio-ure  in  Plato's  account  of 
this  creation  (in  the  Tiniceus).  "  Such  was  the 
scheme  of  the  eternal  God"  (34),  that  is,  he 
had  a  pre-conceived  plan,  or  as  we  still  sa}'^  an 
Idea.  ^^He  iu/ended  that  the  animal  (Cosmos) 
should  be  as  near  as  possible  perfect;  "  thus  his 
intention  is  repeatedly  emphasized.  "  God  de- 
sired that  all  thino's  should  be  o-ood  and  nothinij 
bad;  "  the  Idea  of  the  Good  is  in  many  pas- 
sages, one  with  God,  who  is  one  and  alone  till  he 
creates  some  other  gods,  such  as  the  stars. 

So  Plato  represents  his  creative  God  or  Demi- 
urge as  creating  immediately,  by  fiat,  out  of 
Matter,  and  incorporating  the  Good  in  the  Cos- 
mos. But  Plato  also  represents  this  same  Creator 
shaping    certain   things    mediately,  by  means  of 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS.  317 

given  or  fore-ordained  patterns,  namely,  mathe- 
matical elements  such  as  numbers  and  geometric 
figures.  This  fact,  notable  in  the  Timceus,  would 
seem  to  indicate  a  change  towards  Pythagoreanism 
in  Plato,  since  he  relegates  mathematical  Ideas  de- 
cidedly to  a  second  place  in  the  Republic.  But  now 
they  seem  to  determine  the  Demiurge  more  de- 
cidedly than  the  Pure  Ideas  which  have  become 
almost  a  part  of  him,  he  himself  being  the  Good 
(in  the  Timceus).  As  Plato  grew  old,  his  pref- 
erence for  Pythagoreanism  appears  to  have  re- 
turned, or  rather  to  have  fully  developed  itself, 
so  that  in  the  Laws  (usually  supposed  to  be  his 
last  book),  Mathematics  quite  supplant  Philos- 
ophy as  the  chief  discipline  for  the  ruler. 

(2)  We  come  next  to  consider  the  Cosmical 
Body  as  the  product  and  counterpart  of  the  Cos- 
mical Archetype  just  considered,  or  as  the  ex- 
ternal manifestation  of  this  Archetype  in  matter. 
What,  then,  will  be  the  Appearance  of  the  Cos- 
mos? 

In  the  first  place  God  "  made  the  world  round 
and  smooth  as  from  a  lathe,  in  every  direction 
equally  distant  from  the  center  to  the  extremes, 
the  sphere  being  the  most  perfect  and  the  most 
like  unto  itself  of  all  figures."  It  also  "  compre- 
hends within  itself  all  other  fio-ures ' '  which  can  be 
unfolded  out  of  it.  It  needs  no  senses,  no  eyes, 
ears,  hands,  members,  as  it  has  all  that  it  re- 
quires within  itself.     "  For  the  Creator  conceived 


318         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PlIILOSOPnY. 

that  a  being  which  was  self-sufficient  would  be 
more  excelleut  than  one  which  lacked  some- 
thing" which  would  have  to  be  supplied  outside 
of  itself  (  Timceus  33.) 

But,  secondly,  into  this  one  Cosmos  difference 
enters  through  creation.  Primarily  the  God  cre- 
ates Time,  the  absolutely  separative  and  divis- 
ible, yet  eternally  continuous,  hence  "the  image 
of  eternity,"  though  not  eternity  itself  which 
"  rests  in  unity  "  and  is  uncreative  as  the  Pure 
Idea.  The  Heavens  with  Sun  and  Moon  and 
Stars  were  created  along  with  Time  which  they 
measure  by  day,  month  and  year.  Yet  here,  too, 
the  God  makes  a  division  into  Fixed-Stars  and 
Planets,  according  to  their  motion.  Still  further 
Plato  considers  all  the  Fixed-Stars  and  Planets 
(to  these  he  reckons  Sun  and  Moon)  to  be  dei- 
ties, and  thus  he  returns  to  a  kind  of  Greek 
Polytheism,  with  its  divinization  of  nature,  spec- 
ially of  the  heavenly  bodies.  Moreover  they  are 
the  highest  and  best  of  all  created  beings;  the 
Fixed-Stars  especially  "  are  divine  and  eternal, 
ever  remaining  and  revolving  on  the  same  spot," 
while  the  Planets  being  wanderers  (so  they 
seemed  to  Plato)  are  less  excellent.  A  new 
Olympian  world  dawns  on  us  from  the  skies,  and 
it  is  also  represented  as  determining  man  to  a 
more  stable  and  natural  life,  but  chiefly  "  from 
this  source  (the  vision  of  the  Cosmos)  we  obtain 
Philosophy,  than  which  no  greater  good  has  been 


PLATO'S  niYSICS.  319 

or  will  be  given  by  the  Gods  to  mortal  men" 
(  Timceus  47). 

Here  Plato  brings  into  his  cosmical  process  the 
four  elements,  which  have  such  an  important 
})lace  in  early  Greek  philosophy,  especially  that 
of  Empedocles.  "  God  placed  water  and  air  in 
the  middle  between  fire  and  earth,  since  solid 
bodies  must  be  united  by  two  middle  terms,  not 
by  one  alone,"  Moreover  the  Creator  forms 
material  objects  out  of  the  elements  according  to 
mathematical  patterns — numbers  and  geometric 
figures.  God  fashioned  them  (the  four  elements) 
by  form  and  number.  Moreover  "  all  solids  must 
be  contained  in  surfaces"  which  consist  ulti- 
mately of  triangles,  and  "  these  triangles  are 
originally  of  two  kinds,  the  right-scalene  capa- 
ble of  infinite  forms  and  the  right-isosceles  capa- 
ble of  only  one  form ' '  (  Timceus  53-54) .  Plato, 
like  a  true  Greek,  proceeds  to  select  the  most 
beautiful  of  all  these  triangular  forms,  which  he 
maintains  to  be  "  that  which,  being  doubled 
makes  the  equilateral  triangle."  The  reason  for 
this  Avould  be  "  long  to  tell  "  and  so  he  does  not 
tell  it. 

But  what  is  strange,  an  atom  appears  in  Plato's 
cosmical  Process,  an  atom  not  of  an  irregular 
shape,  but  geometric,  chiefly  triangular.  Out 
of  these  atomic  forms  the  four  elements  are 
composed — =the  Earth  of  Cubes,  Fire  of  Tetra- 
hedrons, Air    of  Octahedrons,  Water  of  Icosa- 


320         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PIIILOSOPH  Y. 

hedrons.  Here  the  stress  is  upon  the  primal 
geometric  form  of  the  atoms  out  of  which  the 
manifold  geometric  shapes  of  the  Cosmos  are 
produced.  Thus  Plato  on  this  side  wheels  into 
the  line  of  his  cosmical  construction  another 
antecedent  philosopher,  Democritus,  not  a 
little  changed  it  is  true,  but  very  perceptible  in 
outline.  He,  too,  along  with  Empedocles  and 
Pythagoras,  as  well  as  Parmenides  and  Herac- 
litus  must  take  his  place  in  the  system  which  is  a 
resumption- of  all  previous  philosophies. 

(3)  The  third  principle  in  the  cosmical  Pro- 
cess is  the  Cosmical  Soul,  better  known  as 
the  "World-Soul,  or  the  animate  principle  of 
the  World,  the  Soul  of  the  Cosmical  Body. 
Already  the  fact  has  been  noted  that  Plato 
believed  the  whole  universe  to  be  alive,  and 
he  often  calls  it  a  living  animal.  Evidently 
this  Cosmical  Soul  is  the  mediating  element, 
which  unites  the  Cosmical  Archetype  with  tho 
Cosmical  Body,  returning  to  the  former  and 
harmonizing  it  with  the  latter,  in  fact  being 
itself  the  harmony  of  the  inner  and  outer, 
of  the  spiritual  and  material,  of  the  Idea  and 
the  Appearance  in  the  Cosmos.  Such  is  in 
general,  the  function  of  the  Soul  in  Plato: 
it  partakes  of  the  two  opposites.  Idea  or  Reason 
(N'ous)  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the  Body 
or  the  Phenomenon  on  the  other;  it  communicates 
between  the  two,  mediates  them  and  thus  over- 


PLATO'S  riTYSIClS.  321 

coines  tho  Plntoiiic  dualism  (or  dissonance) 
])\'  a  world-hanuoiiy.  Very  signiticant  there- 
fore, is  the  position  of  the  World-Soul  in  Plato's 
s}stcni. 

The  Demiurge  is  the  Creator  of  this  World- 
Soul,  and  his  method  was  to  "put  Reason 
into  Soul,  and  then  to  put  Soul  into  Body," 
wherel^y  he  "framed  the  Cosmos  to  be  the 
fairest  work  in  the  order  of  Nature."  So  the 
whole  World  is  more  beautiful  than  an}'  part 
of  it,  and  the  AVorld-Soul  is  more  excellent 
than  that  of  any  individual  (^Timoeus  30).  In 
this  creative  work  of  the  Demiurge,  we  behold 
the  triple  process :  the  Idea  or  Reason,  Matter, 
and  the  Soul  which  is  made  to  inform  Matter  and 
to  produce  the  living  Body  of  the  Cosmos. 
The  World-Soul  is  incorporeal  like  the  Idea, 
yet  is  a  created  thing,  like  the  corporeal;  it 
shares  in  the  multiplicity  of  the  latter  and 
in  the  unitv  of  the  former,  showing  itself 
the  permanent  in  the  transitory,  the  law  in 
all  change.  In  Plato's  language  it  unites  the 
Same  and  the  Other,  or  identity  and  difference, 
whereby  it  maintains  uniformity  of  motion 
(in  the  Fixed-Stars)  and  di^■ersity  of  motion 
(in  the  Planets),  thus  transferring  its  inner 
nature  to  the  outermost  sphere  of  the  Cosmos. 

The  World-Soul,  though  created  by  the  fiat  of 
the  Demiurge  (whom  Plato  in  this  connection 
calls  (lod),  has  its  own  function,  which  is  chiefly 

21 


322         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

regulative ;  it  keeps  iu  order  and  under  law  all 
the  diverse  movements  of  the  Cosmos.  It  goes 
of  itself  within  its  sphere  after  being  created  and 
started;  it  is  self -moved  yet  not  capricious,  obey- 
ing the  Idea  or  Reason,  which,  in  connection 
with  it  as  united  with  Matten,  becomes  mathe- 
matical. For  Mathematics  is  the  mediating 
principle  between  the  sensuous  and  the  ideal 
realms,  participating  in  both.  Now  this  is  just 
the  position  and  character  which  are  assigned  to 
the  World-Soul  in  Plato ;  it  mediates  between 
the  Cosmical  Archetype  and  the  Cosmical  Body. 
Accordingly  the  most  immediate  fact  of  the 
World-Soul  is  that  it  is  mathematical,  employ- 
ing number  and  form  (arithmetic  and  geometry) 
to  regulate  the  Cosmos.  Mathematics  is  not 
simply  the  means  of  the  World-Soul,  but  the 
very  Self  of  it,  its  primal  original  Self  as  imme- 
diate. This  Self  is  expressed  from  the  center  of 
the  Cosmos  to  the  circumference  in  the  harmo- 
nious proportion  of  things,  which  is  especially 
heard  in  terrestrial  music,  and  is  seen  most  com- 
pletely in  the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies. 
Both  Pythagoras  (from  whom  this  thought  is 
derived)  and  Plato  had  the  conception  that 
Mathematics  rule  the  material  world,  that  all 
Nature  must  be  reduced  to  number  and  form, 
and  thereby  controlled  by  Reason.  In  their  way 
they  are  the  precursors  of  modern  Natural 
Science,  giving  a  forecast  of  it  in  an  imaginative 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS.  323 

flight,  without,  however,  any  demonstration. 
On  this  side  of  demonstrated  Science  the  present 
age  is  far  in  advance  of  these  old  philosophers, 
many  of  whose  statements  are  so  wildly  fantas- 
tic ;  but  in  another  respect  the  future  has  still  to 
realize  their  thought.  For  they  believed  in  and 
tried  to  outline  a  Cosmical  Psychology,  a  sci- 
ence which  exists  not  to-day  but  which  is  yet 
to  be.  Their  doctrine  is  that  Nature  is  primarily 
psychical,  having  a  Soul,  yea  a  World-Soul  for  its 
order  and  government,  while  the  Psychology  of 
the  present  time  is  getting  to  doubt  that  even 
man  has  a  soul,  not  to  speak  of  the  Cosmos. 
To  be  sure,  Cosmical  Psychology,  when  its 
period  arrives  again,  must  be  scientific  in  the  best 
sense,  and  not  imaginative,  though  science  does 
and  must  employ  the  imagination  in  its  search 
for  truth,  as  a  famous  scientist  has  told  us. 

But  this  first,  immediate  phase  of  the  World- 
Soul,  the  mathematical,  is  not  the  only  one;  on 
the  contrary  Plato  shows  the  element  of  separa- 
tion in  it,  whereby  it  becomes  a  process  within 
itself  having  three  stages  which  are  grasped  by 
Plato  as  the  Indivisible  and  the  Original  (One), 
the  Divisible  and  the  Derived  (Manj^),  and  their 
unity  as  one  movement  (World-Soul).  In  this 
labor  the  procedure  of  the  Demiurge  is  given  as 
follows:  "He  creates  her  (the  World-Soul) 
out  of  the  unchangea])le  and  indivisible,  and 
also  out  of  the  divisible  and  corporeal  principles. 


324         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

constituting  hor  u  third  intermediate  prlnci{)le, 
which  partakes  of  the  Same  and  of  the  Other  or 
Different"  (Tinueus' 35  A).  What  is  darkly 
fermenting  in  Phito's  mind?  He  sees  the  psychi- 
cal process  of  the  World-Soul  in  its  three  stages 
and  formulates  them  after  his  metaphysical 
fashion.  It  is  indeed  a  ^reat  thought,  nothing 
less  than  the  thought  of  the  Cosmos  as  a  Psv- 
chosis.  But  Plato  does  not  conceive  the  World- 
Soul  as  person,  still  less  as  self-conscious  Eg). 
Such  a  conception  belongs  not  to  him,  nor  to 
Greek  Philosophy,  though  it  is  unconsciously 
struo-ffliiiS  I'll  both,  and  often  breaks  out  irregu- 
larly  to  the  surface.  The  Ego  is  not  yet  defi- 
nitely separated  from  Being,  and  seized  as  it  is 
in  itself,  in  its  own  self -knowing  process.  It  is 
still  ontological  supremely,  though  psj'cholog}^ 
is  working  within  and  underneath  all  this  ontol- 
ogy. For  instance,  the  formula  (the  Undivided, 
the  Divided,  and  the  One)  is  not  the  self-ex- 
pression of  the  Soul,  but  is  alien,  having  been 
derived  from  ontology.  It  is  a  Psychosis,  but 
not  recognized  as  such.  The  Soul  in  Greek  is 
Being,  but  Being  is  not  Soul,  at  least  not 
completely. 

Still  further,  Plato  represents  the  World-Soul 
as  self-returning;  "it  turns  within  itself"  and 
from  this  produces  the  self-returning  motion  of 
the  Cosmos,  the  circular.  The  circular  move- 
ment   of  the  heavenly    bodies    comes    from   the 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS.  325 

inner  self-returning  process  of  the  World-Soul, 
which  brings  us  to  its  next  characteristic,  the 
final  and  highest  one  of  it,  the  self -moved. 

The  third  phase  of  the  World-Soul  is  then 
that  it  moves  itself  from  within,  it  is  a  self-de- 
termined entity  inside  its  sphere.  This  is,  in  a 
general  way,  involved  in  the  fact  already  stated 
that  the  Cosmos  is  alive,  is  an  animal,  and  so 
has  a  soul.  But  the  definite  grasping  of  the 
World-Soul  as  self-moved  is  a  decided  step  in 
the  development  of  its  thought.  In  the  P!t(e- 
di'iis  (245  D)  the  declaration  is  made  that  "  the 
beginning  (or  the  principle)  of  all  motion  is 
what  moves  itself;"  the  corporeal  or  the  Cosmi- 
cal  Body  can  be  moved  only  by  the  self-mover, 
and  "  this  self-mover  is  nothing  else  but  the 
Soul."  Here  again  we  have  the  thought  of  the 
self-return  as  the  essence  of  the  Soul's  move- 
ment. For  Body  is  the  moved,  but  when  the 
moved  turns  back  and  takes  up  within  itself  its 
mover,  it  is  the  self-moved  and  the  self-moving 
too.  This  self-moving  principle  as  distinct  from 
the  moved  is  the  Soul. 

3.  3Ian  (The  Human  Process).  We  have 
reached  the  third  stage  or  principle  of  Plato's 
Physics,  or  rather  Cosmical  Psychology,  to  which 
the  human  being  also  belongs  by  virtue  of  his 
Body  and  his  Soul.  In  fact  the  whole  sweep  of  the 
Cosmos  from  its  befrinnino-  to  its  end  is  to  brino- 
forth  Man,  in  whom  is  the  conclusion  of  the  de- 


326         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  FIlILOSOrilY. 

scent  from  above  and  the  starting-point  of  the 
ascent,  or  return  upward.  Man  is  regarded  as 
an  epitome  of  the  Cosmos,  a  Microcosm  in  him- 
self; implicitly  he  contains  the  entire  creation 
of  the  world.  From  this  point  of  view  we  may 
see  that  he  is  a  going  back  and  a  taking  up  of 
the  total  creative  process,  as  hitherto  set  fortli ; 
he  is  the  Archetype,  the  Matter  and  the  Dem- 
iurge in  small;  he  is  the  little  Demiurge  who 
really  creates  the  big  one,  for,  after  all,  it  is  a 
man,  the  philosopher,  who  has  produced  this 
whole  scheme  of  creation,  or  at  least  repro- 
duced it. 

The  great  function  of  the  Demiurge  is  to  make 
whatever  is  immortal,  but  he  hands  over  the 
making  of  mortality  to  the  Gods  whom  he  has 
made.  For  Plato  will  not  have  the  perfect  make 
the  imperfect  immediately,  but  through  another; 
the  Creator  will  not  create  the  mortal  but  creates 
the  creator  of  it.  Plato's  scruple  in  this  matter 
transferred  itself  to  Christian  theologians,  to 
whom  it  gave  no  end  of  trouble,  since  the  creat- 
ive  nature  of  God  the  Father  as  distinct  from 
that  of  the  Son  seems  to  be  chiefly  derived  from 
the  heathen  philosopher. 

So  it  comes  that  in  the  creation  of  Man  two 
sorts  of  creators  participate,  the  uncreated  and 
the  created.  The  latter  produces  the  perishable 
part,  the  former  the  imperishable,  which  is  the 
Soul.     Of  these  Souls  the  number  corresponded 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS.  327 

to  the  Stiir.s,  on  each  of  which  there  was  pUiced 
a  Soul  as  on  a  chariot,  iu  order  that  it  mijiht 
watch  from  such  a  lofty  station  the  heavenly 
order  and  make  the  same  its  own  ere  the  time 
came  for  it  to  be  born  into  the  flesh.  Still  while 
in  this  corporeal  existence  the  Soul  has  a  memory 
(reminiscence)  of  what  it  beheld  in  its  former 
existence,  namely  the  Pure  Ideas. 

(1)  From  this  view  of  Man's  creation  spring 
Plato's  three  leadins;  doctrines  in  regard  to  the 
Soul.  First  is  its  pre-exist e7ice ,  its  Star-life  ere  it 
became  incorporate,  which  has  apparently  given 
rise  to  the  conception  that  the  Soul  has  also  still 
a  sidereal  body.  Second  is  post-existence,  or 
immortality  proper,  which  Plato  has  dwelt  upon 
with  peculiar  fondness  in  several  dialogues,  spe- 
cially in  the  PhcBdo.  But  the  entire  discussion 
always  goes  back  to  one  fundamental  statement, 
which  in  dogmatic  form  is,  that  God  created  the 
Soul  immortal.  This  proposition  you  must  be- 
lieve, for  Plato  himself  did  not  think  that  he  has 
proved  immortality,  which  he  declared  to  be  only 
probable,  as  something  which  is  reached  by 
faith.  This  principle  of  faith  occupies  a  far 
lower  place  in  Plato's  scheme  than  in  the  Chris- 
tian. That  which  is  truly  immortal  according  to 
Plato,  is  the  Reason  (Nous)  in  Man,  or  the  Idea; 
he  who  cultivates  the  Idea,  the  philosopher,  is 
the  surely  immortal  one,  and  will  return  to  his 
star-life  of  contemplation  forever.     Truly  Plato 


328         ANCIENT  EUBOFEAN  PIIlLOSOniY. 

is  the  aristocrat  of  Philosophy,  which  soiciicj  is 
by  its  very  nature  aristocratic ;  a  member  of  the 
Athenian  Demos  can  hardly  possess  immor- 
tality. 

Of  greater  interest  to  the  ordinary  mass  of 
humanity  (the  Demos)  is  the  doctrine  of  rc/iiu- 
iscence,  as  it  pertains  not  so  much  to  Man  pro- 
existent  or  post-existent  as  present  here  and 
now.  The  thought  arose  probably  in  con- 
nection with  the  Socratic  question:  Can  virlua 
be  taught  to  anybody?  No,  it  can  ouly  bo 
recalled,  for  it  is  already  something  given  in  the 
Soul,  though  implicit  there  till  it  be  roused  and 
made  explicit.  For  the  soul  is  not  a  blank  sheet 
of  paper  (tabula  rasa)  on  which  the  external 
world  writes  itself,  but  it  is  potentially  this  world. 
The  object  of  sensation  provokes  or  stimulates 
the  Soul  to  call  up  out  of  itself  the  Idaa  of  which 
the  object  is  the  material  copy.  For  the  Soul  is 
the  microcosm  in  which  there  is  a  part  corre- 
sponding to  ever}^  part  of  the  macrocosm. 
Thinking  (eiinoesis)  is  still  higher,  since  through  it 
the  Soul  rc]n'oduces  the  Idea  creating  the  object 
instead  of  the  image.  Roally  this  is  the  process 
of  all  intellection:  tha  Soul  reproduces  out  of 
itself  the  object  which  is  and  thus  knows  it,  hav- 
ino-  identified  it  with  itself.  It  is  inept  however 
to  deem  sui-h  an  act  to  1)3  one  of  memory  and  to 
connect  it  with  pre-existcnce. 

(2)  After  the  creation    of  the    human    Soul 


PLATO'S  niYSICS.  329 

Plato  takes  u})  the  huiuau  Body  upon  whose  pro- 
ductiou  and  })urpose  he  spends  a  good  deal  of 
effort.  His  physiology  is  far  removed  from  that 
of  to-da}'  and  seems  largely  a  fantastic  sport 
which  he  himself  deems  ouh'  proha])le.  The  head 
is  round  as  it  is  the  seat  of  Eeason  and  so  it  is  of 
the  most  perfect  form,  the  circular  or  self- 
returning,  which  is  also  the  form  of  the  Cosmos. 
The  nobler  passions  are  located  in  the  breast, 
being  placed  under  the  head  or  Eeason.  In  the 
abdominal  region  lie  the  sensuous  appetites ; 
lower  in  place  and  hence  under  the  control  of  the 
nobler  passions  and  the  Eeason  above.  In  the 
liver  is  the  seat  of  divination,  and  he  gives  a 
ground  why  the  intestines  are  so  long  and  lie 
in  a  coil :  food  must  not  pass  through  the  bod}^ 
too  rapidh',  otherwise  man  would  be  entirely 
occupied  with  eating  and  evacuating,  and  "  the 
whole  race  would  become  an  enemy  to  music  and 
philosophy."  And  nuich  more  of  the  same 
sort  in  the  later  portions  of  the  Tinueus.  Of 
course  this  is  Phito  just  about  at  his  worst;  it  is 
enough  to  cast  a  passing  glance  at  him  in  this 
aspect.  ■  Though,  we  grant  that  the  end  of  nature 
be  to  produce  a  com})lcte  man  wlio  would  be  the 
philosopher  in  Plato's  opinion,  the  structure  of 
the  human  being  does  show  such  an  end  immedi- 
atdij.  A  te]eoh)gy  of  tiiis  sort  ])ecomes  purely 
fantastic. 

(o)  The  human     Soul   is  endowed  by    Plato 


330         ANGIKNT  EUROPEAN  PIJILOiSUI'IIY. 

with  three  main  activities,  each  of  which  he  evi- 
dently regards  as  an  activity  by  itself,  yet  also 
as  a  stage  or  phase  of  the  total  activity  of  the 
Soul.  First  and  highest  is  the  rational  principle, 
in  correspondence  with  the  Reason  (Nous  or 
Idea)  in  the  physical  and  metaphysical  realms; 
second  is  Desire  or  the  material  sensuous  prin- 
ciple, which  is  the  man  determined  by  his  Body; 
third  is  the  tltymos,  variously  translated  as  pas- 
sion or  impulse,  but  it  means  properly  the  ele- 
ment of  Will,  the  activity  of  the  Soul  whereby 
the  individual  externalizes  himself,  or  puts  that 
which  is  within  him  outside  of  himself.  This 
third  element  (fhi/mos),  returns  to  the  preceding 
for  its  content,  which  hence  may  be  sensuous 
Desire  or  ideal  Reason.  Herein  we  observe  the 
fact  with  which  Platonic  Ethics  begins,  the  orig- 
inal dualism  which  it  seeks  to  overcome  in  Man. 
Thus  Plato  sees  the  threefoldness  of  the  hu- 
man Soul,  its  three  stages  or  activities  which 
make  one — one  Soul.  This  triple  movement 
has  been  at  work  all  along,  though  often  unex- 
pressed ;  it  lies  in  every  attempt  to  mediate  the 
Idea  and  the  Appearance  by  some  third  princi- 
ple sharing  in  both.  How  many  times  this  has 
occurred  in  the  preceding  exposition,  the  reader 
himself  can  count.  Note  the  primal  division 
of  the  philosophical  process  into  Metaphysics, 
Physics,  and  Ethics;  the  triplicate  of  ideal, 
material  and  mathematical  realms,  which,  being 


PLATO'S  PHYSICS.  331 

taken  up  bj  the  Intellect,  correspond  to  Reason 
(noesis),  Understanding  (^dianoia)  and  Sense- 
perception  (aist/iesis),  producing  Science  (ejns- 
teme),  mathematical  Knowledge,  and  Opinion 
(doxa).  In  the  Republic  we  shall  lind  this 
psychical  triplicate  to  be  the  ordering  principle 
of  the  virtues,  of  the  classes,  and  of  the  State 
generally. 

We  have  now  reached  the  foot  of  the  ladder  of 
descent,  which  ladder  starts  from  the  very  apex 
of  the  upper  world  with  the  Idea  of  the  Good,  and 
passes  down  through  the  Cosmos  to  the  human 
Soul,  which  is  the  bottom  of  the  movement  of 
Physics,  or  better,  of  Cosmical  Psychology. 
And  then  lurking  in  this  Soul  we  have  found  a 
Psychosis,  which  is  not  only  the  bottom  of  the 
preceding  descent,  but  also  is  the  basis  for  a  new 
superstructure,  for  the  rise  of  the  future  ethical 
world. 

That  which  we  have  above  called  the  descent 
of  the  human  Soul  was  somewhat  differently 
stated  bv  Plato  durino;  his  lono-  life.  In  an 
earlier  work  (PhcBdrus)  the  birth  into  flesh  is 
regarded  as  a  lapse  which  must  have  happened 
while  the  Soul  was  a  star.  But  this  fall  of  Man 
from  his  heavenly  sphere  is  softened  in  the 
Timceus  (42)  to  a  kind  of  ])robation;  if  the 
born  Soul  stands  the  test,  it  returns  to  its  star ; 
if  not,  it  has  to  come  back  to  earth  in  the  form 
of  a  woman  —  evidently    a    degradation    in   the 


332         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

eyes  of  Plato.  But  if  the  Soul  fails  on  this 
second  trial,  it  is  compelled  to  become  a  brute 
"  which  resembles  him  in  his  evil  ways."  Nor 
would  these  transformations  cease  till  he  changed 
to  the  pursuit  of  the  Idea,  which  seems  to  be 
Platonic  repentance. 

But  with  this  repentance,  which  results  through 
Will,  leadino-  to  a  chano:e  of  life,  we  come  into  a 
new  field,  the  ethical,  which  is  the  third  of  the 
grand  divisions  of  Plato's  Philoso[)hy. 

Before  leaving  the  present  field,  however,  we 
may  observe  tliat  the  preceding  cosmical  con- 
struction of  the  Universe  with  its  Demiurge  has 
a  great  future  before  it.  Here  is  the  point 
at  which  the  Greek  and  the  Jew  begin 
to  come  together.  The  cosmogonies  of  the 
Timceus  and  of  the  book  of  Genesis  were 
harmonized ;  Plato  was  declared  to  have  derived 
his  thought  of  the  creation  from  the  Hel)rew 
Bible;  it  was  said  he  was  "Moses  atticising." 
The  Demiurge,  wholly  separate  from  the  world 
which  he  created,  and  transcendent,  was  easil}^ 
identified  with  Jahveh,  while  the  lesser  created 
Gods  might  be  the  ousted  pagan  deities  of  the 
Greek  Pantheon.  In  this  work  of  Hebraizing 
Plato  the  Jewish  exegete  Aristoboulus  ( 150  B.C.) 
became  famous.  Thus  the  Timceus  was  a  kind 
of  bridge  from  Polvtheism  into  Monotheism,  and 
a  means  of  uniting  Oriental  Eeligion  with  Euro- 
pean Philosophy.     But  the  mighty  fact  of  this 


PLATO'S  ETHICS.  333 

movement  was  its  influence  upon  Christianity, 
into  which  flowed  both  these  streams,  Jewish  and 
Greek,  which  had  been  ah-eady  united  at  Alex- 
andria long  before  the  birth  of  Christ. 

C.  Ethics. 

In  general,  the  purpose  of  the  Ethics  of  Plato 
is  to  show  the  return  of  man  out  of  his  separation 
through  Nature  to  his  origiual  spiritual  home  in 
the  Idea.  The  soul  is  to  get  back  and  repossess 
its  lost  heritage  by  means  of  an  ethical  life. 
Through  birth  and  the  dip  into  flesh  it  has  be- 
come alienated  from  its  primal  high  estate,  and 
the  science  of  Ethics  makes  the  path  back  to 
restoration.  For  this  reason.  Ethics  forms  the 
third  stage  in  the  total  philosophic  Norm  in  which 
the  soul  returns  to  the  essence  of  Being,  to  the 
first  stage  of  the  Norm,  or  the  Platonic  Idea. 

In  Ethics,  therefore,  the  fundamental  concep- 
tion is  that  of  a  rise  and  restoration  after  a 
descent  and  lapse.  The  rise  to  wdiat?  To  the 
Idea,  which  now  is  regarded  as  definitely  the 
(lood,  the  great  end  to  be  attained.  The  essence 
of  Being  is  this  Idea,  according  to  Plato;  man  is, 
therefore,  to  realize  in  himself  True  Being,  or 
the  essence  of  Being;  thus  through  Ethics  he 
first  gets  to  be  in  truth.  In  this  way  we  can  see 
that  all  Philosophy,  particularly  the  Philos- 
ophy     of     Plato,      finds     its    culmination    and 


334         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

final  purpose  iu  Ethics,  which  is  man's  way 
of  salvation  in  the  scheme  of  our  philosopher. 
Greek  Philosophy  hitherto  has  sought  for  the 
essence  of  Being  rather  through  the  Intellect 
and  has  found  it  to  be  some  form  of  the  Univer- 
sal .  But  now  man  is  to  be  transformed  into  this 
Universal  in  his  life  and  conduct  by  Ethics, 
whereby  Philosophy  reaches  its  true  end  and  be- 
comes practical. 

If  Ethics  shows  something  of  the  nature  of  a 
restoration,  a  previous  state  is  supposed  which 
existed  before  the  descent  or  separation.  Plato 
seeks  in  various  ways  to  formulate  this  pre-existent 
condition.  The  Ideas  were  pre-existent  ere  they 
manifested  themselves  in  the  world  of  Appear- 
ance ;  the  soul  was  pre-existent  before  it  descended 
into  flesh;  metempsychosis  is  a  pre-existent  fact 
or  state  which  is  intended  to  account  for  such  a 
descent  of  the  soul.  Ethics  is  the  practical 
counterpart  to  these  theoretic  views;  the  ethical 
ascent  of  man  through  himself  or  his  Will  over- 
comes the  antecedent  descent. 

1.  The  Good  as  Idea.  We  have  already  con- 
sidered the  metaphysical  Good  under  its  appro- 
priate head.  Butthe  present  Good  is  in  a  different 
relation,  it  is  the  ethical  Good,  toward  and  through 
which  is  the  rise,  and  which  is  to  possess  and 
transform  the  man  inwardly.  The  metaphysical 
Good  is  in  one  sense  the  same  as  the  ethical ;  yet 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  that  from  which  the  de- 


PLATO'S  ETHICS.  335 

scent  has  taken  place.  Thus  the  ethical  Good, 
even  if  still  the  essence  of  Being  taken  by  itself 
or  metaphysically,  is  to  be  re-embodied  by  man 
through  his  Will ;  by  means  of  it  he  is  to  be  born 
anew,  and  this  second  birth  is  of  his  own  effort, 
if  not  creation.  We  saw  in  Physics  the  Demi- 
uro^e  creating  the  world  and  causing  the  descent 
till  man  was  made  flesh.  But  in  Ethics  man 
wheels  about  and  transforms  his  nature  through 
attaining  the  Good  as  Idea. 

(1)  The  Good  in  itself  is  declared  by  Plato  to 
be  existent  and  indeed  visible ;  the  sight  of  it  is 
all-persuasive,  compelling  pursuit,  when  the  soul 
is  sufficiently  puriQed  to  have  such  vision,  or 
knowledge.  Here  lies  the  rational  part  of  man, 
whose  content  is  the  Good. 

(2)  But  the  Good  has  an  opposite,  which  in 
the  world  is  Matter,  and  in  man  is  appetite, 
passion,  the  descending  or  degrading  portion 
of  himself.  Thus  rises  a  conflict  between  the 
Reason  and  Appetite  or  the  lower  and  higher 
forms  of  the  soul. 

(3)  The  Good  as  Idea  may  become  reconciled 
with  Matter  and  embody  itself  therein.  Where 
such  a  union  takes  place  we  have  the  Beautiful. 
Plato  was  too  much  of  a  Greek  not  to  show  many 
indications  of  his  love  for  sensuous  beauty.  Still 
it  tends  with  him  to  become  non-material  and 
to  vanish  into  the  Good.  The  sensuous  manifest- 
ations of  the  Beautiful  both  in   poetry  and  art 


336         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

he  subjects  to  ;i  rigid  censoi*slii[)  in  the  ReiiuhJic. 
But  he  is  not  at  one  with  himself  on  this  subject. 
Sometimes  he  would  l)anish  pleasure  (artistic  as 
well  as  other  kinds)  as  the  great  incumbrance  to 
attaining  the  Good;  sometimes  he  regards  it  as 
one  of  the  constituents  of  the  highest  Good. 
The  general  trend,  however,  of  the  Platonic 
Philosophy  is  a  reaction  against  Greek  Art. 

But  the  Good  as  Idea  is  to  be  realized  in  the 
living  man,  and  is  to  irradiate  his  actions  and  his 
life.  Thus  we  come  to  Plato's  conception  of 
Virtue  which  is  the  most  universal  theme  of  his 
Dialogues. 

2.  The  Good  as  Virtue.  The  Good  realized 
in  the  human  soul  and  made  the  mainspring  of 
every  human  activity,  is  the  general  notion  of 
Virtue,  which  is  the  cause  of  all  real  happiness. 
Vice  calls  forth  misery ;  to  follow  appetite  and 
passion  is  to  return  to  aniniality.  He  who  pur- 
sues the  Good  and  fills  his  life  with  it  has  the 
only  true  satisfaction.  Virtue  is  an  end  in  it- 
self. We  should  cultivate  it  for  its  own  sake, 
not  for  some  ulterior  advantage ;  it  is  with  Plato 
its  own  reward.  Virtue  is  also  a  habit  or  dis- 
position whereby  the  soul  unceasingly  subordi- 
nates its  lower  nature.  The  Good  as  Idea  indi- 
vidualized and  made  active  is  Virtue  ;  the  Good 
by  itself  is  general,  but  man  filkul  with  it  in  his 
doing  has  the  ]:)articular  Virtues. 

(1)  Plato     inherited    directly    from    Socrates 


PLATO'S  ETHICS.  337 

this  search  for  Virtue  as  Avell  as  for  some  adequate 
detinition  of  it.  In  his  earlier  Dialogues  the  con- 
versation turns  largely  upon  fixing  the  meaning 
of  some  particular  Virtue.  So  there  was  the  per- 
sistent effort  to  grasp  and  formulate  the  essence 
of  Virtue,  to  separate  it  from  its  concrete  mani- 
festations and  to  seize  it  as  it  is  in  itself.  Thus 
the  special  Virtues  were  abstracted  and  discussed 
in  various  waj's,  and  finally  their  number  began 
to  require  some  kind  of  order  among  themselves. 
This  process  of  separating  the  abstract  Virtue 
from  its  embodiment  in  the  manifold  activities 
of  life  was  a  great  step  in  moral  education,  and 
was  what  rendered  Virtues  as  such  teachable. 
The  old  instinctive  morality  is  thus  transformed, 
and  man  becomes  conscious  of  his  conduct  when 
Virtue  can  be  defined.  Plato,  having  done  a 
good  deal  in  the  way  of  defining  single  Virtues 
in  his  earlier  writings,  will  in  his  Republic  move 
forward  to  a  new  stage. 

(2)  This  is  the  organization  of  the  many  Vir- 
tues into  a  system,  which  has  had  a  marvelous 
life  and  currency.  The  first  and  most  elevated 
single  Virtue  is  Wisdom  according  to  Plato,  and 
has  its  corresponding  faculty  in  the  Soul  (Reason) 
and  its  corresponding  Class  in  the  State  (Guard- 
ians). The  second  Virtue  is  Courage  which  has 
also  its  parallel  in  the  Soul  ((hf/inos,  will)  and  in 
the  State  (the  Warriors).  The  third  Virtue  is 
Temperance  corresponding  to  Desire  in  the  Soul 

22 


338  ANCIEN T  EUE O PE A  V  PIIILO SOPHY. 

and  to  the  Workmen  in  the  State.  Pkito  deems 
that  these  Virtues  underlie  and  indeed  produce 
the  social  and  political  order ;  on  the  other  hand 
the  State  is  to  look  out  for  them  and  produce 
them  in  turn.  Hence  the  importance  of  educa- 
tion in  the  training  to  Virtue,  upon  whose  teach- 
ability the  social  structure  reposes. 

(3)  There  is  the  fourth  Virtue  belonging  to 
Plato's  system,  Justice;  yet  he  regards  it  in  a 
different  light  from  the  other  three,  hence  it  is 
to  be  classified  apart.  Justice  in  Plato  is  the 
universal,  all-pervasive  Virtue;  a  man  cannot  be 
just  without  being  at  the  same  time  wise,  cour- 
ageous, and  temperate.  But  the  just  man  is 
more  than  this :  he  is  the  one  who  has  most  ad- 
equately realized  in  his  own  soul  as  well  as  in  his 
own  life  the  Idea  or  the  Universal.  He  is  the 
living  embodiment  of  the  essence  of  Being,  or 
the  Truth  in  its  highest  character;  he  is  the 
philosopher  who  is  to  be  ruler.  The  just  man  is 
really  the  only  man  who  is  tit  to  administer  In- 
stitutions, specially  the  State  ;  through  him  alone 
can  Justice  become  sovereign  and  govern  the 
world. 

Virtue  thus  rises  to  its  institutional  sphere; 
Justice  indeed  may  be  called  the  institutional 
Virtue.  Courage,  Temperance  and  Wisdom  are 
the  moral  or  more  directly  the  individual  Virtues, 
though  they,  too,  have  their  social  side;  Justice, 
while  individual  also,  must  be  exalted  into  its  in- 


PLATO' ii  ETHICS.  339 

stitutional  sphere.  These  two  very  different 
significations  of  Justice  are  noticed  by  Plato  — 
the  one  pertaining  more  to  the  individual  and 
moral  life,  the  other  to  the  universal  and  insti- 
tutional. 

Hence  we  come  to  the  fact  that  every  man  is 
to  realize  in  his  spirit  the  idea  of  Justice,  whose 
content  is  Institutions,  specially  the  State  and  its 
Laws.  This  brings  us  to  the  last  great  effort  of 
Plato :  he  will  build  a  Commonwealth  and  estab- 
lish Laws  whose  end  is  to  realize  Justice  in  the 
class  and  in  the  individual.  Such  is  the  object 
of  the  two  great  works  of  the  later  period  of  his 
life,  the  JRepnbh'c  and  the  Laws,  which  indicate 
an  important  transition  in  his  philosophizing. 

3.  The  Good  as  Institution.  Plato  saw  that 
man  alone  cannot  realize  the  Good  or  True  Being 
even  in  himself ;  he  must  have  Institutions  for 
that  purpose.  Now  the  great  Institution  devel- 
oped in  Plato's  time  was  the  State,  particularly 
in  its  two  forms  at  Athens  and  Sparta.  The 
State  is  accordingly  the  third  and  highest  mani- 
festation of  the  Good,  whose  object  is  to  make 
men  virtuous  or  to  realize  the  Good  in  the  soul. 
Yet  Plato  conceives  the  State  itself  to  be  a 
Good,  or  capable  of  becoming  such.  The  State 
is  the  Good  made  actual  as  an  existent  entity  in 
the  world,  whose  end  is  to  realize  the  Good  in 
man.  Plato  deems  the  State  to  be  the  individual 
"writ  large;"     it   is   the    big    individual  whose 


340         ANCIENT  EVROrEAN  PHILOSOPnY. 

function  is  to  make  the  little  individual  (man) 
virtuous. 

But  it  does  not  perform  this  function  at  pres- 
ent (so  thought  Plato),  hence  it  must  be  recon- 
structed. What  is  the  essential  point  which  has 
to  be  met  in  such  a  reconstruction?  The  indi- 
vidual had  broken  with  the  existent  prescriptive 
order;  he  had  largely  fallen  out  with  his  State, 
and  for  good  reasons.  Both  individual  and  State 
must  be  built  up  anew;  in  fact,  they  must  be 
both  built  up  together,  since  the  State  is  the 
great  means  of  making  the  individual  virtuous. 
Plato  himself  had  o;one  through  each  of  these 
stages  of  alienation ;  liis  studies  of  the  Virtues 
in  his  earlier  Dialoijues  had  given  him  the  moral 
Idea.  But  he  was  also  deeply  estranged  from 
his  own  State,  Athens ;  hence  this  too  he  must 
make  over,  at  least  for  himself  and  his  followers. 

The  problem,  as  grasped  by  Plato,  was  to  sub- 
ordinate, and,  if  possble,  extirpate  the  individual- 
ism which  was  most  distinctively  represented  by 
the  Sophists.  Chiefly  for  such  a  purpose  he 
organizes  his  State,  which  is  thus  a  return  or 
perchance  a  relapse  to  the  old  instinctive  mor- 
ality of  the  Greeks.  A  very  brief  outline  of  this 
political  organism  we  may  hero  present :  — 

(1)  The  division  of  the  people  into  three 
separate  classes  is  fundamental  in  the  Platonic 
State.  The  first  and  lowest  class  is  that  of  the 
Laborers,  composed  chiefly  of  artisans  and  agri- 


PLATO'S  ETHICS.  341 

culturists,  who  are  to  supply  the  physical  Avants 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  commonwealth.  These 
are  nearly  without  rights,  and  are  to  work  at  the 
behest  of  others.  The  second  class  is  that  of 
the  Warriors,  for  the  defense  of  the  State.  The 
third  class  is  that  of  Guardians  or  Rulers,  who 
have  absolute  authority  in  their  hands  and  who 
are  to  receive  special  training  for  their  vocation 
through  Philosophy.  Thus  the  aristocratic  Plato, 
evidently  more  proud  of  his  Intellect  than  of  his 
Birth  —  his  family  having  produced  such  detested 
specimens  as  Critias  and  Charmides  —  transfers 
his  aristocracy  from  Birth  to  Intellect,  and  in 
})articular  deems  his  own  class  or  indeed  himself 
to  be  the  right  ruler  of  the  State.  In  fact,  what 
else  could  he  do?  Certainly  the  maker  of  the 
new  State  ought  to  be  its  director.  These  classes 
of  Plato  are  still  realities  in  Europe,  which 
seemed  to  develop  them  specially  in  the  medieval 
period.  Plato  is  supremely  the  Philosopher  of 
Europe,  and  Philosophy  here  again  shows  itself 
aristocratic. 

(2)  The  Platonic  State  has  a  very  decided 
negative  element,  directing  its  destructive  blows 
particularly  against  the  individual,  who  is,  first 
of  all,  to  be  put  into  his  Class  by  the  Guardians 
without  any  choice  of  his  own.  The  Family  is 
set  aside  ;  the  individual  relation  of  love  between 
man  and  wife  is  regarded  as  antagonistic  to  their 
devotion  to  the  State,    which    furthermore  takes 


342         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

charge  of  the  children  who  are  to  have  no  rec- 
ognized parents.  Thus  the  whole  emotional 
nature  of  the  individual  is  to  be  absorbed  into 
the  State,  which  still  further  takes  away  all  in- 
dividual ownership  of  property,  wherein  the 
social  Institution  is  made  to  vanish  into  the  polit- 
ical. Thus  Plato  sought  to  cut  up  by  the  roots 
the  destroj'ing  influences  which  he  saw  at  work 
in  the  Greek  world  about  him. 

(3)  The  object  of  Plato  is  to  get  back  to  the 
old  condition  of  things,  to  that  immediate,  in- 
stinctive oneness  of  the  individual  with  his  State, 
with  which  he  lived  in  an  unbroken  unity.  But 
that  time  is  gone,  never  to  return.  The  breach 
is  made,  the  separation  has  taken  place,  man  can- 
not restore  his  unconscious  Paradise  when  he  has 
become  conscious.  This  is  the  ideal  or  rather 
chimerical  element  in  Plato's  Republic.  He  will 
negate  progress,  destroy  evolution,  turn  the 
stream  of  time  backward  and  try  to  make  it  run 
up  hill.  For  Plato's  ideal  commonwealth  is  really 
the  village  community  which  Greece  has  trans- 
cended; it  is  therefore  a  relapse  to  the  past 
instead  of  a  forecast  of  the  future.  Still  the 
coming  time  will  suiprisingly  adopt  some  of  its 
provisions,  especially  the  Christian  Church  will 
show  numerous  simihirities  to  Plato's  State.  The 
Village  Community,  particularly  of  the  less 
advanced  pco[)lcs,  has  been  investigated  exten- 
sively in  the  last  tifty  years,  and  it  would  furnish 


PLATO'S  ETHICS.  343 

one  of  the  best  coiiiinentaries  upon  the  Platonic 
Commonwealth. 

In  the  matter  of  government,  Plato  had  before 
himself  the  two  chief  political  tendencies  of  the 
Greeks  manifested  in  Athens  and  Sparta,  whose 
excellence  he  would  combine  in  a  new  arrang-e- 
ment.  The  great  product  of  Athens  was  the 
philosopher,  namely  Plato  himself,  and  he  was 
the  only  fit  ruler,  though  he  could  not  rule  in 
a  democracy.  But  Sparta  produced  no  philoso- 
phers, it  generated  rude  might  and  a  strict  obedi- 
ence to  formal  law,  which  law  was  supposed  to 
have  been  once  introduced  by  Lycurgus,  the 
Spartan  lawgiver,  whose  part  Plato  is  to  re- 
enact  in  the  new  Commonwealth.  So  we  witness 
the  Athenian  philosopher  made  the  ruler  over 
Spartan  institutions,  though  with  important 
changes  in  order  to  make  them  more  rational. 
Plato  had  seen  the  failure  of  the  Spartan  gov- 
ernors (harmosts)  who  were  placed  over  many 
Greek  cities  after  the  Peloponnesian  War.  The 
caprice  and  self-will  of  democracy  had  likewise 
caused  the  defeat  of  Athens.  So  Plato  en- 
deavors to  make  a  new  synthesis  derived  from 
the  experience  of  his  time.  Of  Spartan  tyranny 
and  of  Athenian  individualism  he  will  set  the 
Greek  world  free,  and  so  back  he  goes  to  the 
long-past  age  of  the  Village  Community  with 
its  absorption  of  the  individual  into  the  com- 
munal life. 


344         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Such  is  the  third  stage  of  the  philosophic 
NorminPkito,  showing  the  ethical  return  of  man, 
out  of  his  descent  through  Nature,  to  the  Idea 
which  he  is  to  appropriate  anew  and  thereby  at- 
tain the  Good.  Thus  we  may  conceive  the  cycle 
to  1)0  completed  when  the  soul  has  gotten  back  to 
the  beginning  and  re-possesses  the  primal  Idea 
which  man  realizes  in  himself.  It  is  a  process  of 
self -restoration  on  the  one  hand,  through  Will, 
and  on  the  other  through  Institutions,  specially 
the  State.  Herein  a  former,  pre-existent  con- 
dition of  the  soul  is  assumed,  to  which  the  ethical 
return  has  to  be  made  after  the  descent  or  lapse. 

But  this  Platonic  State,  as  the  cuhninatiou  of 
Ethics,  makes  the  individual  a  good  man  by  sup- 
pressing if  not  destrojdng  his  individuality. 
Such  is  the  deep  contradiction  in  it,  splitting  it 
to  the  very  bottom.  Plato  expects  man  through 
freedom  to  annihilate  freedom;  man  is  to  reach 
by  his  Free-Will  (Boulesis)  the  Good,  which  is 
the  undoing  of  his  Free-Will.  That  the  State 
is  itself  Free-Will  actualized  whose  end  is  to 
secure  Free-Will  through  the  Law  is  a  concep- 
tion of  the  State  far  removed  from  Plato.  He 
grants  that  the  individual  can  become  good  only 
through  Free-Will,  yet  his  State  must  substan- 
tially eliminate  this  Free-Will  of  the  individual. 
Atleastit  can  be  exercised  only  by  a  few  Guard- 
ians, and  by  them  only  in  a  circumscribed  way. 
So  the  Platonic  dualism  asserts  itself ;  or  rather  it 


PLATO'S  ETHICS.  345 

is  the  duiilism  of  all  Philosophy  which  is  sure  to 
break  asunder  on  the  question  of  freedom,  since 
it  is  inherently  aristocratic  or  even  autocratic,  de- 
manding of  the  free  individual  to  give  up  his 
freedom  and  follow  its  behest  or  formula.  The 
movement  of  History  will  reverse  the  Platonic 
State  in  this  respect  —  transforming  all  Institu- 
tions into  safeguards  of  freedom. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Plato  has  a  noble  end 
in  view:  he  will  cast  out  of  the  State  of  his  time 
caprice  and  tyranny.  But  in  his  effort  to  get 
rid  of  capricious  Will,  he  cuts  up  Will  itself  by 
the  roots.  Hence  his  Eepublic,  from  this  point 
of  view,  is  not  a  return,  which  is  the  way  of 
evolution,  but  is  a  relapse,  which  is  the  way  of 
retrogression.  In  fact,  with  Plato  generally, 
the  pre-existent  is  the  excellent  —  the  pre-exist- 
ent  soul,  the  pre-existent  realm  of  Ideas,  the  pre- 
existent  State  as  Village  Community.  So  it 
comes  that  his  ethical  cry  is.  Back  to  the  pre- 
existent  Good,  let  us  get  out  of  this  present 
sensuous  world,  if  need  be,  by  destruction. 

Thus  Plato  concludes  his  Ethics  in  a  separation, 
if  not  opposition  between  the  moral  and  the  in- 
stitutional. Morally  man  can  use  his  freedom 
to  rise  to  True  Being,  putting  down  appetite  and 
his  lower  nature  generally.  But  all  this  moral 
freedom  he  nuist  subject  to  an  Institution 
which  does  not  secure  his  Free-Will  whereby 
he   has    become    moral,    but    which    suppresses 


316         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

if  not  destrcn's  it.  Such  opposition  between 
the  moral  and  institutional  is  a  phase  of  the 
European  dualism,  for  Europe  has  never  been 
able  to  reconcile  the  moral  law  with  the  law 
of  the  institution.  Many  of  her  best  thinkers 
say  that  the  two  are  irreconcilable,  and  it 
must  be  confessed  that  Philosophy  as  such 
cannot  harmonize  this  ethical  dualism,  for  it 
labors  under  the  same  dualistic  difficulty.  Not 
till  the  Self,  which  is  the  source  of  the  moral 
sphere,  be  also  made  the  source  and  the  end 
of  Law  and  Institution,  can  the  outer  behest 
be  brought  to  correspond  with  the  inner.  But 
this  is  a  step  far  beyond  Plato,  beyond  all 
Greek  Philosophy,  even  beyond  Modern  Euro- 
pean Philosophy  in  its  very  latest  manifestation, 
though  such  a  step  with  its  thought  is  the 
inner  lurking  motive  power  which  is  propelling 
Philosophy  toward  its  end  from  its  beginning  in 
ancient  Miletus.  Yet  Philosophy,  as  such,  cannot 
harmonize  this  deep  scission  and  separation  in 
Human  Spirit  which  it  has  begotten,  or  at 
least  unfolded:  a  new  Discipline  is  necessary 
with  a  new  Norm. 

But  now  we  are  to  consider  the  next  philosopher 
who  comes  just  after  Plato  and  in  a  direct 
line  Avith  him,  who,  conscious  of  the  Platonic 
dualism,  at  least  iu  part,  will  seek  to  over- 
come it  by  bringing  the  Idea  l)ack  to  Reality,  by 
restoring   the   Universal   to  the   Individual.     A 


PLATO'S  ETHICS.  347 

mighty,  herculean,  world-encompassing  effort 
it  is  on  the  part  of  one  of  the  greatest  intel- 
lectual giants  that  the  ages  have  brought  forth, 
wielding  anew  the  philosophic  Norm  with  the 
miofht  of  a  Titan  in  order  to  win  the  loftiest 
Olympian  peak  of  abstract  Thought.  Wherein 
he  succeeded  in  his  colossal  attempt,  and  wherein 
he  failed  must  now  be  recorded  in  a  chapter 
of  culminating  importance  for  Greek  Philosophy. 


348         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


3,  Hristotle. 

There  are  many  similarities  between  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  not  only  in  the  matter  of  doctrine,  but 
also  in  the  development  of  their  lives.  Equally 
manifest  is  it  that  the  differences  between  them 
are  numerous  and  striking.  They  belong  to- 
gether in  one  great  historic  period,  in  one  su- 
preme philosophic  movement,  in  one  mighty 
manifestation  of  national  genius.  We  must  dis- 
tinguish them  carefully,  but  we  must  unite  them 
with  equal  care.  First  of  all,  we  make  the  same 
divisions  of  the  total  Aristotle  as  we  did  of  the 
total  Plato,  since  each  of  them  passed  through 
an  outer  temporal  career,  wrote  many  books  in 
which  is  contained  a  system  of  Thought.  Accord- 
ingly, we  shall  look  at  Aristotle  also  under  three 
leading  heads:  his  Life,  his  Writings,  and  his 
Philosophy. 

I.  Aristotle's  Life. — It  is  generally  accepted 
that  our  philosopher  was  born  in  384  B.  C.  at 
Stagira,  a  town  of  the  Thracian  Chalcidice,  and 
died  in  322  B.  C.  at  the  city  of  Chalcis  in  Eu- 
boea.  Father  and  mother  were  both  Greeks,  so 
that  he  was  not  a  half-Greek,  as  some  have 
called  him ;   but  his  birthplace  was  a  Greek  col- 


AtilSTOTLE.  349 

onv,  in  what  may  be  considered  the  Hellenic 
borderland  on  the  North.  Still  the  center  of 
his  philosophic  discipline  was  Athens,  in  which 
he  first  obtained  his  universal  culture,  from 
which  he  separated  for  a  time,  and  to  which  he 
returned  for  his  crowning  work  in  his  School. 
From  this  statement  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Life 
of  Aristotle  falls  into  three  main  periods,  all  of 
which  turn  upon  his  relation  to  Athens,  the  cen- 
tral philosophic  light-point  of  the  Hellenic  world. 
He  is  first  drawn  thither  for  a  long  preparation 
and  instruction;  he  is  next  driven  thence,  inter- 
nally, if  not  externally,  and  betakes  himself  to 
his  Northern  borderland,  where  he  obtains  sig- 
nificant new  experiences  very  needful  for  his 
complete  self-realization ;  finally  he  must  go  back 
thither  to  bring  to  fruitage,  in  teaching  and 
writing,  the  work  of  all  his  years. 

The  reader  will  be  interested  and  instructed  by 
comparing  the  life  of  Plato  with  that  of  Aris- 
totle. There  it>  the  same  general  outline  in  both, 
though  the  fillino-in  be  different  as  to  the  events 
and  the  number  of  years.  Both  have  to  get  their 
first  training  at  and  through  Athens,  both  have 
to  quit  Athens  after  a  time  of  such  training, 
both  have  to  return  to  Athens  for  the  last  har- 
vest. These  three  periods  w^e  may  set  down  as 
follows :  — 

1.  The  young  man  and  his  years  of  prepara- 
tory discipline  —  the  Apprenticeship(iye//;7c//^/•e). 


350         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

2.  The  middle  period  of  separation  from 
Athens  with  travel  and  experience  in  other  lands 
(  Wander j alire) . 

3.  The  last  period,  which  embraces  the  return 
to  Athens,  and  which  shows  the  perfect  mastery 
of  philosophy  and  the  grand  fulfillment  of  his 
1  i  f e '  s  work  (  Meiaterjahre  ) . 

Goethe's  great  novel,  Wilhelm  Meister,  which 
shadows  forth  the  movement  of  human  life  in 
its  universal  outlines,  suggests  by  its  titles  these 
three  divisions  (^Apprenticeship,  Travels,  Mas- 
ter), they  being  stages  in  the  life  of  the  German 
artisan.  The  same  mighty  sweep  we  may 
observe  in  the  two  epics  which  herald  the  birth 
of  the  Greek  world,  for  the  Iliad  shows  the  long 
separation  from  home  and  country  with  the 
multifarious  experiences  of  foreign  war,  while  the 
Odyssey  has  as  its  all-comprehensive  theme  the 
return  to  home  and  country,  which  name  it 
especially  gives  itself  («os/os),  being  thus  con- 
scious of  its  own  purpose.  Particularly  in  the 
latter  poem  it  is  the  return  of  the  one  Greek 
hero,  Ulysses,  who,  however,  may  be  said  to 
represent  typically  all  the  others. 

Thus  the  great  poets  and  artists  have  not  failed 
to  see  and  to  set  forth  the  universal  movement  of 
a  completed  human  life  which  we  may  trace  in 
both  Plato  and  Aristotle.  The  Litter's  career 
we  shall  now  designate  briefly  iu  accord  with  the 
preceding  outline. 


ABISTOTLE.  351 

1.  Aristotle's  First  Period.  He  was  the  son 
of  Nicomachus,  a  surgeon  in  the  employ  of  the 
Macedonian  king  Amjntas,  The  father's  pro- 
fession was  hereditary,  and  we  may  well  suppose 
that  the  son  was  both  trained  in  Natural  Science 
and  inherited  a  taste  and  aptitude  for  it  from  his 
ancestors.  There  is  a  statement  by  Galen  that 
the  so-called  Asclepiad  families,  or  those  belongiug 
to  the  medical  profession,  trained  their  boys  in 
reading,  writing,  and  dissection  (anatemnein). 
Thus  we  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  early  source  of 
Aristotle's  scientific  attainments.  Moreover  this 
dissection  or  analysis  will  be  also  a  mental 
characteristic  of  his  to  the  end.  We  may 
also  suppose  that  young  Aristotle  made  some 
acquaintance  with  tiic  Macedonian  court  and 
people  through  his  father,  which  will  not 
be  without  important  results  in  his  later 
life. 

But  the  great  fact  of  this  early  period  is 
what  we  read  in  Diogenes  Laertius  (  Vita 
Arist.),  namely  that  Aristotle  came  to  Athens 
at  the  age  of  seventeen  and  joined  the  School 
of  Plato,  where  he  stayed  twenty  years,  till 
Plato's  death,  being  then  thirty-seven  j^cars  old 
and  more  (347-G  B.  C).  With  what  did  he 
occupy  himself  during  all  these  years?  Plato, 
it  is  supposed,  at  the  time  of  the  arrival  of 
Aristotle  (367-6  B.  C.)  was  absent  in  Sicily, 
seeking  to  realize  the  ideal  ruler  of  his  Republic 


352         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ill  the  tyrant  Dionysius.  It  is  known  that 
Aristotle  studied  rhetoric  under  Isocrates,  which 
he  may  have  combined  with  his  first  lessons 
in  Philosophy.  The  attractions  of  rhetorical 
study  for  a  young  man  at  this  time  must 
have  been  very  strong ;  it  was  the  period  of 
the  great  Attic  orators,  whom  our  j^outh,  though 
he  was  a  foreigner,  might  have  heard  addressing 
the  people  assembled  in  the  Pnyx  with  brilliant 
displav  of  eloquence.  Demosthenes  was  there, 
whose  life  ran  quite  parallel  in  years  with  that  of 
Aristotle.  However  this  may  be,  Aristotle  never 
lost  his  theoretical  interest  in  rhetoric,  which 
Plato  was  inclined  to  despise,  though  the  writings 
of  the  latter  are  splendidly  rhetorical,  while 
those  of  Aristotle  are  not. 

It  is  likely,  however,  that  with  the  return  of 
Phito,  Aristotle  quite  exclusively  devoted  himself 
to  Philosophy,  since  there  is  evidence  that  the 
rhetorical  school  of  Isocrates  afterwards  regarded 
him  as  a  kind  of  apostate.  He  pro])ably  found 
enough  to  do  in  mastering  former  Greek  philos- 
ophers, and  specially  in  grasping  the  develop- 
ment of  Plato,  who  was  at  this  time  over  sixty 
years  old.  Doubtless  he  saw  his  true  vocation 
to  be  Philosophy,  which  was  the  universal  Disci- 
pline, or  which  was  to  become  such  in  his  hands. 
But  he  must  have  made  extensive  studies  in  art 
and  poetry,  for  which  Athens  offered  specially 
good      opportunities,     though     the     period     of 


ARISTOTLE.  353 

their  greatest  originality  bad  passed.  Athens 
had  become  critical,  reflective,  philosophical,  a 
citj  of  culture,  no  longer  creative  except  in  ora- 
tory and  philosophy.  Very  necessary  were  these 
refined  linguistic  studies  for  the  alien  youth,  who 
came  to  Athens  with  bis  provincial,  if  not  rude 
dialect,  a  shade  of  which  seems  to  have  remained 
to  the  end  in  the  lisp  which  is  noted  by  Timo- 
theus  the  Athenian  (Diog.  La.  V.  A.),  as  the 
Athenian  was  very  sensitive  to  any  mispronunci- 
ation of  his  Attic  Greek.  It  was  well  that  be 
should  study  rhetoric  first;  even  if  bis  parents 
were  educated,  he  could  bardl}^  help  bringing  to 
Athens  a  colonial  accent. 

But  what  was  the  institutional  background  of 
Hellas  during  these  twenty  years?  We  have  the 
right  to  suppose,  from  his  many  works  pertain- 
ing to  the  State,  that  the  political  interest  of 
Aristotle  was  always  strong.  He  saw  the  decline 
of  the  third  Hegemony  of  the  Greek  City-State, 
the  Theban,  after  the  battle  of  Mantinea  in  362 
B.  C.  Athens  had  risen  to  a  second  supremacy, 
l)ut  her  power  was  undermined  afresh  by  the  re- 
volt of  her  dependencies  in  357  B.  C.  Thus  Aris- 
totle, looking  out  upon  the  Greek  cities  from  the 
central  one,  could  see  them  all  in  a  condition  of 
mutual  separation,  hostility,  weakness ;  there  was 
no  doubt  of  their  decadence,  the  Greek  City- 
State  had  run  its  course.  Still  he  had  hopes ; 
as  we  see  by  his  later  work   on  Politics,  he  was 


354         ANCIENT  EVBOPEAK  PHILOSOPHY. 

not  ready  to  draw  the  full  conclusion  of  the 
time,  though  he  drew  it  in  part. 

But  let  us  look  to  the  North,  in  the  direction 
of  Aristotle's  home.  In  Macedon  a  man  of 
power  had  arisen  and  was  king,  Philip,  who  as- 
cended the  throne  in  359  B.  C.  He  forms  the 
Macedonian  phalanx,  conquers  the  neighboring- 
nations  and  in  355  B.  C.  he  begins  to  interfere 
in  Greece,  arraying  one  city  against  the  other. 
In  348  B.  C.  he  captures  Olynthus,  the  ally  of 
Athens.  The  eloquence  of  Demosthenes  was 
exerted  to  rouse  the  Athenians  against  the  man 
of  destiny  who  had  evidently  appeared.  These 
must  have  been  warm  days  for  Aristotle,  whose 
connection  with  Macedon  Avas  known ;  at  last  it 
must  have  gotten  too  warm  for  him,  so  he  quits 
Athens  in  347-6  B.  C.  and  goes  northward  to 
Atarneus,  whither  he  had  been  invited  by  the 
tyrant  Hermias,  a  philosophical  friend  of  his. 

At  this  time  another  cause  co-operated.  Plato 
had  just  died  and  his  nephew  Speusippus  had 
been  appointed  his  successor  in  the  school. 
Other  reasons  for  his  departure  are  mentioned, 
but  are  more  doubtful.  At  any  rate,  Aristotle 
leaves  Athens,  his  long  apprenticeship  ends,  and 
a  period  of  change  of  places  with  varied  new 
experiences  begins.  He  was  thirty-seven  years 
old  when  he  was  thus  shaken  loose  from  Athens, 
in  preparation  for  a  greater  work  to  be  accom- 
plished when  he  returned. 


ARISTOTLE.  355 

2.  Aristotle  Abroad.  Two  tendencies  had  ap- 
peared in  Hellas :  one  was  the  complete  lack  of 
unity  among  its  cities,  and  the  other  was  the 
rise  of  a  new  united  autocratic  power  in  the 
North,  with  which  power  Aristotle  was  connected 
by  various  ties.  It  is  said  that  during  his  stay 
at  Athens  (in  348  B.  C.)  he  had  sufficient  influ- 
ence with  Philip  to  cause  the  latter  to  restore 
his  native  town,  Stagira,  after  its  capture,  appar- 
entW  during  the  Olynthian  war.  The  Athenians 
would  hardly  look  with  favor  upon  such  a  great 
influence  with  their  enemy,  though  Aristotle  is 
said  to  have  interceded  for  them  too. 

The  death  of  Plato  may  have  been  one  ground 
for  Aristotle's  quitting  Athens,  but  the  deeper 
reason  lay  in  the  Macedonian  attitude  toward 
Greece.  He  must  have  seen  the  struofgle  rising; 
between  Philip  and  Athens,  and  have  heard  the 
sound  of  danger,  if  in  no  other  way,  at  least  in 
the  thunder  of  Demosthenes.  Aristotle's  pru- 
dence is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  whole  time  of 
his  absence  was  a  continued  conflict  between 
Macedon  and  Athens.  When  this  conflict  was 
over,  Aristotle  returned  to  Athens. 

Meanwhile  we  must  glance  at  his  career  during 
the  present  period.  With  Hermias  at  Atarneus 
he  remained  three  years,  evidently  in  philosophic 
quiet  and  study,  as  Hermias  had  been  once  a 
member  of  Plato's  school.  But  Hermias  was 
slain   by  treachery,    and  Aristotle  went  to  Mi- 


35G         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tylene.  About  this  time  he  seems  to  have 
taken  a  wife,  Pytheas,  the  sister  or  niece  of 
Ilermias.  A  good  many  variations  on  this  love 
affair  of  the  philosopher  have  been  handed 
down,  some  of  them  mal-odorous ;  but  let 
them  be  dropped,  and  let  us  hasten  to  the 
next  important  event,  when  Aristotle  went  to 
Macedon  by  invitation  and  became  the  instructor 
of  the  son  of  Philip,  young  Alexander,  in  343-2 
B.  C,  then  thirteen  years  old.  Three  years 
later  the  youthful  prince  was  appointed  regent 
by  his  father  and  took  an  active  part  in  military 
campaigns.  Of  these  we  shall  here  notice  only 
the  one  terminating  in  the  battle  of  Chseroneia 
(338  B.  C),  in  which  the  Macedonians  utterly 
defeated  Athens  and  Thebes.  All'Greece  now 
lay  at  the  feat  of  Philip.  Athens  made  peace 
with  him  and  became  submissive.  In  335  B.  C. 
the  Greeks  appoint  Alexander  their  general-in- 
chief,  and  the  next  year  he  starts  on  his  conquest 
of  Asia.  At  this  time  and  under  such  protection 
Aristotle  returns  to  Athens,  after  an  absence  of 
some  twelve  years. 

With  what  had  he  occupied  himself  during 
these  years,  making  quite  a  large  slice  out  of  the 
best  part  of  human  life?  Externally  he  had 
swept  around  the  North-eastern  horizon  of  Greece 
from  Mitylene  to  Pella,  the  Macedonian  capital ; 
he  had  loved  and  o:otten  married  —  somethino'  of 
an  experience    for    a    philosopher    or  any  other 


ARISTOTLE.  357 

man ;  he  had  helped  mould  the  mind  of  the  future 
conqueror  of  the  world ;  he  had  become  an  edu- 
cator of  vast  outlook ;  he  must  have  acquainted 
himself  with  the  policy,  purposes  and  resources 
of  the  Macedonian  kings.  Internally  he  had 
much  leisure  to  digest  his  mental  stores  acquired 
at  Athens,  and  to  order  his  thought.  We  may 
fairly  conclude  that  he  substantially  completed 
his  system  during  this  period. 

3.  Return  to  Athens.  Aristotle  was  now  forty- 
nine  years  old,  with  the  central  principle  of 
his  Philosophy  matured  and  gathering  about 
it  all  his  accumulated  knowledge.  He  felt  the 
need  of  formulating  his  work  and  of  propagating 
it  in  other  minds.  Indeed  he  must  have  known 
that  unless  he  planted  his  work  in  the  rising 
generation,  it  would  be  likely  to  perish.  Macedon 
was  no  place  for  such  an  enterprise;  intel- 
lectually its  people  were  backward,  and  its  rulers 
were  too  much  occupied  with  their  grand  plans 
of  conquest.  Macedon  was  full  of  Will,  Athens 
was  full  of  Intellect;  to  Athens,  Aristotle  had  to 
return  from  Macedon,  if  he  would  fulfill  his 
philosophic  destiny.  That  city  was  the  intel- 
lectual center  of  the  civilized  world,  which  could 
be  moved  from  it  and  from  it  alone.  Political 
conquest  might  proceed  from  the  outlying  uncor- 
rupted,  but  rude  Macedon ;  philosophic  conquest 
must  proceed  from  Athens, 

Moreover    Aristotle    could    feel    a    personal 


358         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PBILOSOPET. 

security  there  which  he  never  felt  before,  even 
in  his  first  period.  Athens  was  at  this  time 
controlled  by  leaders,  such  as  Demades  and 
Phocion,  in  the  interest  of  Macedon,  under 
whose  protecting  supremacy  the  philosopher 
could  freely  do  his  work.  Had  not  Alexander, 
his  pupil,  been  chosen  generalissimo  of  all  the 
Greeks?  Antipater,  the  regent  during  the 
absence  of  Alexander  in  the  East,  was  the  friend 
of  Aristotle,  as  we  see  by  the  latter' s  will 
(in  Diogenes  Laertius  Vita  Ar.).  Antipater's 
son,  Cassander,  was  a  pupil  in  the  School  of 
Aristotle,  who  was  the  State  philosopher,  some- 
what as  Hegel  was  regarded  at  Berlin  as  the 
State  philosopher  of  Prussia. 

So  Aristotle  opens  his  school  in  the  Lyceum, 
which  was  a  gymnasium  attached  to  the  temple 
of  Apollo  Lyceios  in  the  suburbs  of  the  city. 
It  had  shady  walks  (peripatoi)  where  our  philos- 
opher was  in  the  habit  of  conversing  with  his 
followers,  who  were  hence  called  the  peripatetics. 
Besides  these  walks  and  talks  he  probably  had  a 
fixed  place  forgiving  lectures  to  a  larger  audience. 
During  a  dozen  years  and  more  he  continued  his 
School.  Suddenly  the  news  comes  that  Alexan- 
der is  dead.  All  Greece  begins  stirring  to  throw 
off  the  Macedonian  yoke.  Athens  again  became 
too  hot  for  Ail.totlc,  he  fled  to  Chalcis  (323  B. 
C.)  where  the  next  year  he  died.     The  great  op- 


ARISTOTLE.  359 

ponent  of  Macedon,  Demosthenes,  ended  his  life 
shortly  afterwards. 

Aristotle  left  his  School  in  the  hands  of  Theo- 
phastus,  who  transmitted  it  to  the  later  schol- 
archs.  The  master  had  imparted  to  it  so  much 
of  his  spirit  that  it  remained  a  great  philosoph- 
ical influence  for  many  generations. 

II.  Aristotle's  Writings.  —  The  need  of  ex- 
pressing himself  by  the  written  word  was  quite 
as  strong  in  Aristotle  as  in  Plato,  though  he  never 
disparaged  it,  as  Plato  did.  On  the  contrary, 
Aristotle  studied  language  in  all  its  forms,  and 
made  the  linguistic  side  of  science — such  as 
Ehetoric  and  Poetic,  along  with  Grammar  and 
Logic  —  an  integral  part  of  his  encyclopedic 
knowledge.  Doubtless,  as  a  provincial,  he  had 
to  cultivate  specially  the  Attic  style  of  Hellenic 
speech.  This  turned  the  philosopher's  attention 
to  the  nature  and  forms  of  language  in  general, 
which  necessity  was  never  felt  by  Plato,  a  born 
Athenian,  and  a  born  stylist  in  addition.  Thus 
there  is  a  reflective  and  studied  element  in  Aris- 
totle's use  of  words,  different  from  the  native  and 
spontaneous  flow  of  Plato,  who  artistically  scouts 
the  artist,  and  poetically  rejects  the  poets. 
Aristotle  on  the  other  hand  very  unpoetically 
treats  of  poetry,  and  very  undramiJtically  shows 
his  love  for  the  drama. 

It  is  the  grand  function  of  Aristotle  to  strip 
the     mythus   and    the   image  froiu   Homer   and 


360         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PUILOSOFHY. 

Plato,  and  to  present  Greek  spirit  in  the  pure 
forms  of  thought,  or  in  abstract  categories. 
Often  he  seems  to  phiy  at  making  categories,  for 
the  mere  pleasure  of  the  exercise,  so  easy  it  is  for 
him,  and  so  hard  for  the  reader.  He  refines  and 
divides  and  distinguishes,  and  then  he  may  say 
that  some  of  these  distinctions  are  of  little  ac- 
count. He  starts  (in  the  Metaphysics)  with  four 
causes,  then  reduces  them  to  two,  and  still  later 
he  uses  three.  We  feel  in  him  often  the  very 
riot  of  abstraction,  which  is  by  no  means  favor- 
able to  clear  exposition.  So  Aristotle  likewise 
has  his  Greek  exuberance,  that  of  colorless  cate- 
gorizing, while  Plato  luxuriates  in  imagery  and 
dialectical  fireworks  of  many  hues. 

Still  Aristotle,  just  through  this  characteristic, 
has  been  one  of  the  great  educators  of  the  hu- 
man race.  The  pure  movement  of  Thought,  or 
Thought  grasping  Thought  as  the  creative  prin- 
ciple of  the  Universe,  is  what  he  has  brought 
most  distinctively  to  the  consciousness  of  man. 
Moreover  in  him  the  great  movement  of  Hellenic 
Philosophy  has  become  explicit,  and  formulated, 
and  partly  organized;  the  essence  of  Being 
(the  ousia  of  the  on)  has  reached  the  Universal 
in  conscious  statement,  having  been  hitherto  im- 
plicit. He  sees  the  genetic  Thought,  the  Uni- 
versal, in  the  oliject,  and  proceeds  at  once  to  pre- 
cipitate it  into  a  category,  whereby  others,  in 
fact  all  the  future,  may  think  it  too.     For  with 


ARISTOTLE.  361 

the  category  we  think;  it  is  a  Thought  which 
compels  us  to  re-thiiik  the  Thought  which  made 
it  as  the  expression  of  the  essence  of  Being. 
Thus  every  true  category  contains  Thought 
thinking  Thought.  The  world  is  Thought  pri- 
mordially,  but  this  must  be  categorized,  or  made 
over  into  speech  whioh  compels  Thought  to  think 
'Thought  as  the  essence  of  the  creative  principle 
of  the  world. 

In  this  respect  Aristotle  is  the  counterpart  to 
Homer.  We  have  already  noted  that  Pliiloso- 
phy  began  in  a  reaction  against  a  personal  capri- 
cious Will  as  the  creative  essence  of  the  world, 
which  it  affirmed  to  be  principle,  element,  law, 
in  fine  some  category  posited  l)y  Thought.  Hence 
arises  the  realm  of  the  Categories  in  contrast 
with  the  realm  of  the  Gods  —  a  Pancatagoreou 
of  Philosophy  over  against  a  Pantheon  of  Greek 
Poetry  and  Religion.  And  if  we  call  Homer  a 
Polytheist,  Aristotle  can  well  be  named  a  Poly- 
categorist.  Marvelous  is  this  Hellenic  mctamor- 
pilosis  of  deities  into  principles,  of  images  into 
abstractions,  which  we  have  been  tracing  under 
the  name  of  Philosophy  till  the  process  reaches 
its  culmination  in  Aristotle.  Before  us  passes  a 
vast  and  intricate  play  of  Gods  in  the  Poet,  and 
an  equally  vast  and  intricate  play  of  Categories  in 
thePhilosopher.  Butthereis  one  supreme  God, 
Zeus,  in  Homer,  and  there  is  one  supreme  Cate- 
gory, Thought  thinking  Thought,    in   Aristotle. 


362         ANCIEXT  EUROPEAN'  PHILOSOPHY. 

Both  sIlo^Y  an  Upper  World  ruling  a  Lower;  but 
Homer's  world  is  the  epos  of  the  Gods,  interfer- 
ing, capricious,  partisan ;  while  Aristotle's  work  is 
the  epos  of  the  Categories  eternally  the  same, 
motionless  and  emotionless. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  here  to  undertake  the 
huge  task  of  listing  and  ordering  all  the  writings 
of  Aristotle.  A  general  outline  of  his  literary 
labors  may,  however,  be  traced.  Many  of  his 
works  have  perished,  wherein  again  there  is  a 
contrast  to  Plato,  all  of  whose  compositions  seem 
to  have  come  down  to  us,  even  those  which  were 
left  unfinished.  This  difference  in  the  literary 
fate  of  the  two  philosophers  is  very  significant. 
Moreover  we  possess  writings  of  Plato  belonging 
to  all  three  of  his  periods,  which  cover  his  entire 
philosophic  life,  while  of  Aristotle  we  have  com- 
plete treatises  of  only  one  of  his  periods,  the 
last,  though  there  are  fragments  belonging  to  his 
first  period,  and  possibly  to  his  second.  A  brief 
summary  of  these  three  periods  may  be  here 
given. 

1.  During  Aristotle's  first  stay  at  Athens 
(lasting  twenty  years,  till  he  was  thirty-seven) 
he  had  to  learn  to  speak  and  write  correctly  first, 
and  then  wnth  precision  and  elegance.  Undoubt- 
edly he,  a  boy  of  seventeen,  brought  from  home 
a  fair  primary  education,  but  this  was  by  no 
means  sufficient  at  Athens,  particularly  if  he  was 
going  to  speak  and  write  for  an  Athenian  public. 


ABI8T0TLE.  363 

which  w:is  hideed  just  his  ambition.  Hence  his 
earl}^  rhetorical  studies  with  Isocrates  probably ; 
but  he  soon  must  have  become  wholly  absorbed 
in  Plato,  for  reasons  which  we  can  easily  see  if 
we  but  compare  the  writings  still  extant  of  the 
rhetor  with  those  of  the  philosopher.  Then 
came  a  long  period  of  study  and  imitation  and 
appropriation  of  Plato,  as  must  be  expected  from 
the  circumstances  —  Aristotle  a  young  man  just 
passing  into  the  twenties  (let  us  say)  and  Plato 
moving  through  the  early  sixties,  in  the  very 
plenitude  of  his  personal  power  and  literary 
achievement.  From  the  fragments  and  titles  of 
works  still  remaining  we  can  tind  some  traces  of 
his  hibor  during  this  period. 

(1)  Dialogues  he  wrote,  evidently  copying 
Plato  both  in  matter  and  manner.  They  have 
perished  except  a  few  fragments.  A  surprising 
fact  about  them  is  the  praise  lavished  upon  them 
by  ancient  critics  for  the  richness  and  sweetness 
of  their  style —  qualities  which  certainly  cannot 
be  predicated  of  any  of  Aristotle's  Writings  now 
extant. 

(2)  Popular  essays  seem  to  be  indicated  by 
some  titles,  as  "  On  Kingship,"  "  On  the  States- 
man," "  On  Education,"  "  On  the  Good,"  etc. 
This  sounds  somewhat  like  Emerson,  wdio  also 
studied  Plato  and  transformed  him  into  the  essay. 

(3)  Studies  on  antecedent  })hilosophers  (Dem- 
ocritus,  the  Eleatics,  etc.);  also  on  cotemporaries 


3G4         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(Spcusippus,  Xenocrates).  Here  wc  may  see 
that  he  has  already  begun  to  look  back  upon  the 
History  of  Greek  Philosophy. 

(4)  There  is  evidence  of  his  making  excerpts 
from  Plato's  Works,  especially  from  the  Timceus 
and  the  Laws. 

(5)  Orations  were  ascribed  to  him,  some  of 
which,  doubtless,  fell  into  this  first  period  when 
he  was  trying  his  hand  at  rhetoric  and  at  differ- 
ent kiuds  of  st3de.  Poems  and  letters  of  his 
were  known  anciently,  of  which  there  are  still  a 
few  remains. 

Such  were  some  of  his  works  during  his  years 
of  learning  and  preparation,  in  which  we  see  a 
great  activity  not  only  in  acquiring  knowledge 
but  also  in  testing  himself  in  many  kinds  of 
composition,  particularly  of  the  popular  (exo- 
teric) sort. 

Did  he  discover  his  true  bent  in  all  these  ex- 
periments? There  is  evidence  that,  toward  the 
latter  part  of  his  stay,  he  began  to  branch  off 
from  the  School  of  Plato,  and  to  differ  from 
the  master,  especially  in  regard  to  the  doctrine 
of  Ideas.  His  development  from  imitation  to 
independence  has  been  traced  in  the  difference 
between  two  of  his  Dialogues  —  \]iq  Eudemus, 
which  was  mainly  a  copy  of  Plato's  Phcedo,  and 
a  later  Dialogue  on  PJiUosoplnj,  in  which  he 
assailed  Plato's  theor}''  of  Ideas,  and  affirmed 
the    world  to  be   without   beginning  as   well  as 


ARISTOTLE.  365 

without  end.  Anecdote  and  fable  have  also 
handed  down  in  their  way  the  separation  of  Aris- 
totle from  Plato  before  the  death  of  the  latter. 
So  the  inference  is  that  Aristotle  had  broken 
through  Platonism  and  had  entered  his  phil- 
osophic world  at  the  time  he  left  the  School. 

To  this  inner  change  were  added  important 
external  changes  which  determined  the  future 
course  of  Aristotle.  Plato  died  and  gave  by 
will  to  Speusippus,  his  nephew,  the  headship  of 
the  School,  though  all  must  have  known  —  Plato 
certainly  knew  —  that  the  intellectual  supremacy 
belonged  to  Aristotle.  The  latter  might  indeed 
have  started  another  School.  But  this  was  pre- 
vented by  the  political  situation  which  was 
already  of  menacing  proportions.  The  struggle 
between  Philip  of  Macedon  and  Athens  had 
reached  the  acute  stage,  and  the  Macedonian 
connection  of  Aristotle  made  it  prudent  for  him 
to  withdraw  from  the  city.  So  the  Aristotelian 
School  cannot  open  now ;  a  new  and  significant 
period  of  discipline  must  be  passed  through  ere 
the  final  philosophic  fruit  can  mature. 

2.  We  have  already  spoken  of  Aristotle 
abroad,  and  of  what  he  did  during  the  dozen 
years  of  his  absence  from  Athens.  "What  he 
wrote  during  this  period  is  not  known,  but  there 
is  no  doubt  that  he  was  active.  Self-expression 
in  writing  had  become  a  prime  inner  necessity  to 
him.     We  may  also   suppose  that  he   could  look 


366         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN-  PHILOSOPHY. 

forward  to  his  return  to  Greece,  considering  the 
strong,  vigorous  power  of  Macedon  on  the  one 
hand  and  on  the  other  the  dissension  and  wealv- 
ness  of  the  opposing  Greek  cities.  It  was  not 
hard  for  him  to  forecast  the  result.  But  in 
Macedon,  the  realm  of  Will,  was  little  chance 
for  philosophizing ;  he  must  wait  till  he  can  get 
back  to  Athens,  which,  quite  paralyzed  in  Will, 
has  become  the  city  of  the  Intellect.  When  the 
segis  of  Macedon  is  once  held  firmly  over  all 
Hellas,  which  event  is  now  in  process  of  fulfill- 
ment, the  philosopher  will  place  himself  under  it, 
and  live  and  labor  with  security  on  that  spot 
where  lies  the  hope  of  his  heart. 

In  a  certain  degree  we  can  conjecture  the 
spiritual  effect  of  this  separation  from  Athens 
with  all  its  advantages  and  stimulations.  He 
was  thrown  back  upon  himself  and  found  there 
his  fresh  task.  He  could  not  have  had  in  his 
new  situation  the  same  opportunity  for  reading 
books,  for  conversing  with  learned  men,  for 
hearing  discourses  of  all  kinds,  from  the  popular 
address  of  Demosthenes  in  the  Assembly  or 
Dicastery  to  the  lecture  of  Plato  at  the  Academy. 
The  Destinies,  though  seemingly  harsh,  were 
really  propitious  to  him  in  forcing  his  flight 
from  the  home  of  learning.  He,  with  his  om- 
nivorous tendency  in  acquiring  knowledge,  would 
probably  have  become,  if  he  had  remained,  a 
mere    puff-ball    of    erudition,  an    enormous  en- 


ABISTOTLE.  3G7 

cyclopedia  on  two  legs,  such  as  is  mau}^  a 
learned  Professor  still  in  these  days.  But  would 
he  have  digested  and  ordered  his  stores?  At 
any  rate  the  Destinies  banish  him,  or  rather 
scourge  him  forth  to  a  changeful  career  from 
place  to  place,  with  little  or  no  access  to  books, 
to  philosophic  conversation,  or  external  means  of 
culture.  He  could  not  help  turning  inward  and 
setting  in  order  his  manifold  accumulations. 
Now  he  has  to  commune  w^th  himself,  he  is 
forced  to  think. 

Such,  we  conceive,  was  the  general  trend  of 
Aristotle's  inner  life  during  this  second  period 
embracing  his  absence  from  Athens.  Undoubt- 
edly he  had  many  other  experiences  connected 
with  Atarneus  and  Macedon,  and  the  North  sen- 
erally.  But  he  had  much  solitary  leisure;  he 
could  look  inward  and  sj^stematize  all  his  acqui- 
sitions more  or  less  separated  hitherto,  turn  them 
over  and  over  many  times  in  his  mind,  and  finally 
co-ordinate  them  under  a  central  thought.  Now 
he  is  ready  and  so  is  Time,  which  strikes  the 
hour  for  his  return  to  Athens. 

3.  All  of  the  writings  of  Aristotle  which  we 
possess  in  anything  like  a  state  of  completion, 
belong  to  the  third  period,  lasting  some  thirteen 
years  (335-322  B.  C).  These  works  are  great 
in  variety  as  well  as  in  quantity,  not  to  speak  of 
their  profundity.  A  peculiar  fact  about  them  is 
that  no  evolution  can  be  traced  in  them,  they  are 


368         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

finished  and  inter-related,  no  succession  of  one 
treatise  after  another  can  be  distinctly  made  out. 
In  Plato's  writings  there  is  a  development  from 
beginning  to  end  through  all  his  periods.  But 
in  Aristotle's  books  no  such  development  can  be 
found,  except  possibly  m  the  fragments  of  his 
first  period,  in  which  he  seems  to  unfold  out  of 
Platonism  by  degrees.  We  have  to  infer  that  he 
brought  with  him  back  to  Athens  his  system 
quite  fully  wrought  out,  though  perhaps  not  fully 
written  out.  Accordingly,  Aristotle's  Philos- 
ophy gives  us  a  sense  of  completeness  very  differ- 
ent from  Plato's;  it  can  not  be  chronologized 
into  epochs  but  is  all  at  once,  everywhere  and  all 
the  tmie.  The  whole  philosopher  utters  himself 
in  every  part,  the  Universal  particularizes  itself  in 
every  thought  quite  without  regard  to  the  when. 
All  of  Aristotle's  treatises  seem,  therefore,  syn- 
chronous, and  this  impression  is  still  further 
heightened  by  the  fact  of  the  cross  references 
found  in  them.  That  is,  the  various  books  often 
refer  to  one  another,  backward  and  forward; 
for  instance,  the  AnaJi/tics  repeatedly  cites  the 
Topics,  and  the  Topics  repeatedly  cites  the  Ana- 
lytics. Which  was  written  first?  As  a  whole 
neither;  they  doubtless  grew  to  their  present 
shape  together,  like  all  the  members  of  a  plant 
or  any  organism.  In  like  manner  there  are  cross 
references  between  the  Politics  on  the  one  side 
and  the  Rhetoric  and  the  Poetics  on    the  other, 


ABISTOTLE.  369 

and  also  between  the  Metaphysics  and  some  of 
the  treatises  on  PJiysics.  Aristotle,  teaching  in 
his  School,  and  giving  several  courses  each  year 
on  different  branches  of  his  total  system  for  a 
dozen  years  and  more,  gradually  wrote  out  the 
whole,  perhaps  as  we  now  have  it. 

In  like  manner  the  literary  style  of  these 
writings  of  the  Third  Period  is  surprisingly  the 
same.  Abstract,  colorless,  it  is  the  reflective 
style  supremely,  and  it  undoubtedly  corresponds 
to  Thought  thinking  Thought,  the  very  expres- 
sion thereof  in  fact.  We  find  scarceh'  a  reminder 
of  that  sweetness  and  grace  which  are  said  to 
belong  to  the  works  of  his  First  Period,  when 
he  so  successfully  imitated  Plato  and  the  rheto- 
ricians. This  reflective  cast  of  style  he  must 
have  brought  back  with  him  from  the  deep  med- 
itations of  his  Second  Period,  when  he  was  far 
away  from  the  temptations  of  Attic  eloquence, 
and  when  his  Pure  Thouoht  sloui^hed  off  all  the 
external  ornament  of  diction.  We  hold  also  that 
this  reflective  style  was  more  native  to  him  than 
the  ornate,  more  easily  a  product  of  his  deepest 
mental  character  when  he  had  found  himself  out. 
Still  further,  it  is  less  difiicult  for  the  cultivated 
foreigner  to  acquire  the  reflective  part  of  a  lan- 
guage than  the  immediate,  idiomatic,  sensuous 
part.  Aristotle  speaking  and  writing  Attic  was 
not  Attic-born,  ho  came  a  young  man  to  Athens 
from  a  provincial  Greek  town,  and  then  in  mid- 
24 


370         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPnY. 

die  age  a  second  long  separation  from  Athenian 
speech  took  phice.  So  when  he  again  came  back 
to  Athens  it  was  easier  and  more  natural  for  him 
t©  use  reflective  Greek,  as  well  as  altogether 
more  consonant  with  his  Thought  which  is  now 
to  be  told  in  its  unrobed  purity,  categorically. 

In  all  the  various  works  of  Aristotle,  then, 
we  find  essentially  one  and  the  same  system, 
world-view  and  style.  It  is  the  whole  man  now 
complete  in  his  development  uttering  his  whole 
work  in  its  wholeness  as  far  as  possible.  Herein 
lies  a  striking  similarity  to  the  first  general 
movement  of  Hellenic  Philosophy,  whose  unfold- 
ing and  expression  in  its  numerous  systems  wc 
have  already  found  to  be  mostly  contemporane- 
ous. A  little  more  than  fifty  years  gave  us  all 
the  Philosophies  originating  between  the  Milesian 
and  the  Athenian  Schools.  (See  preceding  pp. 
72,  73.)  As  entire  Greece  was  then  philoso- 
phizing so  now  the  total  philosopher,  Aristotle, 
is  philosophizing,  he  being  the  concentration  in 
one  individual  of  all  those  previous  philosophers. 

The  various  extant  treatises  of  Aristotle  can 
be  thrown  into  three  main  groups  which  corre- 
spond to  the  general  movement  of  his  Philosophy. 

(1)  Metaphysical  and  logical  works,  which 
we  classify  together  under  the  general  head 
of  Metaphysics. 

(2)  Physical   and    psychological  works  which 


ABISTOTLE.  371 

are  placed  in  close  relation  by  Aristotle  in  his 
scheme  of  Natural  Science. 

(3)  Ethical  and  political  works,    with   which 
are  joined  the  Rhetoric  and  the  Poetics. 

It  is  manifest  that  in  this  division  lurks  the 
philosophical  Norm  as  already  often  given  — 
Metaphysics,  Physics,  and  Ethics.  Aristotle, 
himself,  has  no  working  division  of  his  writings, 
one  which  he  clings  to  throughout.  In  his 
Topics  he  has  a  division  which  is  nearly  the 
same  as  the  preceding,  but  he  makes  no  further 
use  of  it.  Then  he  gives  several  other  divisions 
in  the  course  of  his  works.  We  have,  therefore, 
to  think  that  Aristotle  was  not  yet  fully  con- 
scious of  the  best  way  of  dividing  his  own 
writings,  the  way  which  came  into  use  soon 
after  his  time  and  which  has  continued  down 
to  the  present.  Though  he  wrought  after  the 
philosophical  Norm  it  was  not  yet  fully  explicit 
in  his  mind.  Probably  his  most  frequent  division 
of  Philosophy  is  into  theoretical  and  practical 
(to  which  he  appends  the  artistic  or  i\\Q  jjoiefic). 
His  library  along  with  his  School  was  left  to 
Theophrastus,  evidently  his  favorite  pupil. 
There  is  a  famous  story  told  by  Strabo  and  by 
Plutarch  about  the  loss  and  the  recovery  of 
Aristotle's  writings.  At  the  death  of  Theo- 
phrastus they  passed  to  his  heir,  Neleus  of  Scep- 
sis, whose  desceudants  stowed  them  away  in  a 
damp    cellar   where   they    remained    nearly    200 


372         AXCIENT  EVBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

years,  till  they  were  discovered  by  Apelicoii  of 
Teos,aud  brouglit  back  to  Athens.  Soon  after- 
ward (86  B.  C.)  Athens  was  captured  by  the 
Romans  under  Sulla,  who  carried  them  to  Eome 
as  spoils  of  war.  There  they  passed  into  the 
hands  of  Tyrannion  and  Andronicus  who  pre- 
pared a  new  edition.  This  story  has  been  sub- 
jected to  a  good  deal  of  criticism,  and  has  met 
with  only  a  partial  credence. 

III.  Aristotle's  Philosophy. —  It  is  evident 
from  the  preceding  that  the  threefold  philosophic 
Norm  is  more  easy  to  extract  out  of  Aristotle's 
works  than  out  of  Phito's,  which  are  stretched 
along  a  chronological  line  of  development  quite 
through  the  author's  literary  life.  But  the 
writings  which  contain  Aristotle's  Philosophy 
belong  in  their  present  state  to  one  period  of  the 
author's  life,  the  last  and  ripest.  The  result  is, 
they  appear  to  be  composed  almost  at  one  heat, 
mutually  related  and  self-consistent.  They  can- 
not well  be  ordered  according  to  the  time  of 
origin ;  as  this  is  not  known  we  are  forced  to 
order  them  according  to  their  thought,  which 
unfolds  on  all  sides  into  one  system.  To  be  sure 
such  a  sj'stem  could  not  spring  up  in  a  day,  nor 
ill  a  year,  nor  in  ten  years.  It  is  really  the  fruit 
of  his  whole  philosophic  life,  of  all  his  periods. 
Still  the  growth  of  this  fruit  in  its  various  stages 
we  do  not  behold,  particularly  in  its  last  period. 
It  appears  before  us  fully  ripe  and  ready  to  pluck. 


ARISTOTLE.  373 

The  whole  philosopher  utters  himself  as  a  whole, 
in  one  mighty  outpour,  after  having  gathered 
himself  up  for  forty-nine  j^ears.  Herein  he  is 
the  Hellenic  spirit  concentrating  itself  in  its 
philosophizing.  Previously  this  spirit  shot  forth 
into  individual  philosophies,  or  rather  into  indi- 
vidual phases  of  one  great  Hellenic  Philosophy, 
which  we  have  already  noticed  raying  out  on  the 
border  and  at  the  center  of  the  Greek  world. 
But  now  the  same  total  Hellenic  spirit,  after 
struggling  so  often  and  in  so  many  places  for 
expression,  has  expressed  itself  in  the  Athenian 
philosopher,  and  especially  in  Aristotle.  His  is 
the  universal  Philosophy  since  it  is  distinctively 
and  consciously  the  Philosophy  of  the  Universal. 

It  is  true  that  Socrates  already  sought  for  the 
Concept  or  the  Universal,  and  often  formulated 
it  in  a  category  or  definition.  Now  the  object  of 
Socrates  was  to  apply  his  result  to  the  particular 
case,  usually  ethical.  But  Aristotle  elaborates 
the  Universal  in  itself,  in  its  own  right,  and 
thus  elevates  it  into  the  knowino;  of  itself.  The 
Concept  as  creative  (the  genus,  the  Universal) 
is  in  Socrates,  but  it  is  notyet  conscious  of  itself 
as  the  actual  essence  of  all  things,  such  as  we 
find  it  in  Aristotle.  Socrates  makes  the  abstrac- 
tion of  the  Universal ;  Aristotle  not  only  makes 
it  but  is  conscious  of  making  it,  and  formulates 
the  process. 

All  Philosophy  must  have  categories  from  its 


374         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PniLOSOPHY. 

beginning,  though  at  first  they  bo  tal^en  at  r;m- 
dom  and  unconsciously.  Socrates  through  his 
Concept  showed  the  method  of  making  categories, 
though  he  did  not  sift  and  orderthem  when  made. 
It  is  Aristotle  who  is  not  only  thecategorizer,  but 
the  categorizer  of  categories,  criticizing  and  ar- 
ranging quite  all  of  those  which  had  been  em- 
ployed before  him  in  the  antecedent  Philosophies. 
This  is  what  he  largely  puts  into  his  First  Philos- 
ophy, being  really  an  organized  Pancategoreon, 
or  Temple  of  all  the  categories,  with  the  supreme 
one  placed  over  the  rest  on  its  Olympian  height. 

Of  course  we  do  not  mean  by  the  categories  of 
Aristotle  merely  the  ten  w^hich  he  names  in  his 
treatise  on  the  Categories,  or  even  the  thirty 
terms  which  he  defines  in  his  Metaphysics  (Book 
IV". )  Any  concept  expressing  the  Universal  in 
the  Particular  by  an  abstract  word  may  in  a  gen- 
eral way  be  deemed  a  category.  Aristotle  himself 
is  not  very  consistent  in  his  use  of  this  term, 
and  yet  he  is  the  grand  categorizer.  Though  he 
makes  essence  a  category,  and  being  too,  he  ap- 
parently does  not  see  that  category  is  itself  a  cat- 
egory. 

Aristotle's  Philosophy,  from  the  very  fact 
of  its  being  a  Philosophy,  must  show  itself 
dividing  according  to  the  philosophic  Norm  into 
Metaphysics,  Physics,  and  Ethics,  which  we  may 
freely  render  as  the  sciences  of  God,  Nature, 
and  Man,  constituting  the  scientific  encyclopedia 


ARTSTOTLE.  375 

of  the  Universe.  Aristotle  has  this  encjclopedio 
character  both  in  his  mind  and  in  his  works. 
The  All  in  its  fundamental  process  is  distinctly 
working  in  him  and  through  him,  the  Parapsy- 
chosis is  what  he  sees  and  voices,  in  his  way  and 
for  his  time.  Yet  with  such  truth  and  com- 
pleteness has  he  done  this  task  that  he  belongs  to 
all  time;  he,  the  individual  thinker,  has  spoken 
to  men  the  thought  of  the  Universal,  and  so 
upon  the  temporal  has  stamped  the  impress 
of  the  eternal.  It  is  Aristotle  who  has  ffiven  us 
more  explicitly  than  any  former  philosopher 
the  concept  and  the  vocable  called  the  Universal, 
which  can  only  be  derived  from  a  vision  of 
the  process  of  the  Universe.  Of  this  process 
the  philosophic  Norm,  with  its  threefold  division 
before  mentioned,  is  the  fundamental  ors^anic 
expression. 

We"  may  add  here  that  Aristotle  puts  far 
more  stress  upon  the  process  in  general,  than 
Plato  who  sought  to  remove  his  Idea  from 
all  connection  with  the  material  world.  Accord- 
ingly, this  fact  should  be  strongly  emphasized 
in  the  exposition  and  comprehension  of  Aristotle, 
being  a  deeper  insight  into  and  derivation  from 
the  soul  moving  in  all  things.  His  philosophic 
Norm,  both  in  itself  and  in  its  sub-divisions, 
l)egins  to  reveal  more  decidedly  the  common 
underlying    process    which    the     whole    History 


376         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  Philosophy  is  seeking  to  make  explicit  in 
its  end.  This  Norm  of  Aristotle  we  shall  now 
elaborate  in  its  general  outlines. 

A.  Metaphysics. 

It  has  been  already  noted  that  this  word  is  not 
of  Aristotle's  own  coinage,  as  far  as  is  now  known, 
but  bclono;s  to  the  time  after  him.  His  term 
for  the  present  sphere  is  The  First  Philosophy 
or  the  Philosophy  of  what  is  First  (  To  Proto7i) 
of  Principles,  Beginnings,  Causes.  The  corre- 
sponding Second  Philosophy  is  Physics,  which 
philosophizes  Nature,  the  world,  the  realm  of 
the  sensible,  this  being  regarded  by  Aristotle  as 
well  as  Plato  as  the  secondary,  the  derived  (in 
part  at  least).  Thus  Metaphysics  gives  the 
first  stage  or  division  of  the  philosophic  Norm, 
which  stage  is  called  variously  God,  the  Absolute 
Being  or  Essence  or  Cause.  We  may  note  that 
Aristotle  has  the  habit  of  designating  several  of 
his  most  important  categories  as  first  and  second, 
for  instance  he  has  a  first  and  second  Essence 
(^ousia),  and  a  first  and  second  Matter  (ht/Ie), 
which  terms  suggest  the  relation  of  original  and 
derived  —  also  he  has  a  first  and  second  Entelechy . 

Philosophy  is  called  by  Aristotle  the  universal 
science,  which  is  the  science  of  the  universe  as 
such.  His  First  Philosophy  (Metaphysics) 
seeks  to  think  and    express  the    universe   in  its 


ARISTO TLB' S  ME TA PH YSICS.  377 

pure  process,  and  this  process  is  what  hovers 
continually  before  him  as  the  Universal,  which 
is  the  abstract  form  of  it  given  by  thought  and 
formulated  in  a  category.  We  may  repeat  that 
the  unfolding  of  the  Universal  is  the  work  of 
Hellenic  Philosophy  in  general ;  in  Aristotle  it 
has  developed  to  the  point  of  being  separated 
and  grasped  in  itself  as  a  Thought,  yea  as  a 
Thought  which  thinks  itself.  The  essense  of  Be- 
ing is  still  the  Universal,  as  it  was  at  the  start, 
but  it  is  now  the  Universal  as  Thought  thinking 
Thought. 

Still  there  are  various  stages  of  this  metaphys- 
ical process.  These  are  also  to  be  conceived  as 
processes  which  we  name  (1)  the  ontological, 
(2)  the  logical,  and  (3)  the  theological.  All 
these  together  form  the  distinctively  metaphys- 
ical movement  in  Aristotle,  yet  each  of  them 
will  be  found  to  have  its  own  special  movement. 
It  is  worth  while  for  the  reader  to  note  that  in 
the  names  of  these  divisions  the  faci  of  the  pro- 
cess is  to  be  strongly  emphasized. 

I.  The  Ontological  Process.  —  This  deals 
directly  with  the  essence  of  Being  (the  ousia  of 
07i)  which  has  now  become  explicit  and  formu- 
lated. Hitherto  we  have  found  this  phrase  with 
its  thought  implicitly  lurking  in  the  preceding 
l)hilosophies.  When  Thales  said  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  all  things  was  water,  he  was  in  search  of 
the   ousia   of  the  on,  or   the  essence  of  Being. 


378         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  manifold  principles  of 
all  things  (air,  fire,  the  atom,  etc.),  which  have 
been  promulgated  between  Thales  and  Aristotle. 
It  is  evident  that  here  is  a  line  of  categfories, 
each  of  which  is  affirmed  to  be  the  essence  of 
Being.  What  is  their  value?  This  can  only  be 
ascertained  through  having  a  criterion  by  which 
we  may  judge  them.  Such  a  criterion  is  the  final 
category  which  must  order  all  the  others  and 
itself  too. 

Now  this  order  of  philosophical  categories 
will  be  a  science  which  will  be  designated 
after  its  fundamental  principle  —  the  essence  of 
Being  —  as  ontology,  literally  the  science  of 
Being.  Hence  Aristotle  at  the  start  (in  his 
first  Book  of  Metaphysics)  gives  a  brief  account 
of  preceding  systems  of  thought,  to  a  certain 
extent  arranged  and  adjudged  according  to  his 
principle.  Ontology  is,  therefore,  the  science 
of  "Being  as  Being,"  or  of  the  essence  of 
Being. 

Now  what  will  this  science  consist  of?  Sub- 
stantially of  an  examination  of  the  categories 
which  may  claim  to  express  the  essence  of 
Being.  Here,  however,  Aristotle  overwhelms  us, 
and  it  is  not  always  easy  to  find  his  arrange- 
ment. The  following  is  the  way  in  which  we 
shall  construe  the  somewhat  chaotic  mass  of 
his  categories :  — 

i.    The  Heal    Thing.     The    starting-point    of 


ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  379 

Aristotle  is  his  assertion  of  the  immanence 
of  the  Universal  or  genus  in  the  individual 
object.  Plato  had  separated  the  Idea  from  the 
Appearance,  the  Universal  from  the  Particular ; 
Aristotle  returns  to  the  Particular  with  the  Idea, 
and,  so  to  speak,  inserts  the  same  in  the  latter. 
Thus  that  which  is  phenomenal  or  unreal  in 
Plato  becomes  real  in  Aristotle,  or  the  Real 
Thing. 

This  is  a  significant  point  in  the  Philosophy 
of  Aristotle.  It  shows  his  turn  to  the  individual 
object,  and  toward  the  study  of  Nature,  away 
from  the  pure  Ideas  of  his  master  Plato  which 
were  abstractions  from  the  reality.  It  is  the 
reality  to  which  Aristotle  will  return,  yet  with 
the  Idea,  not  as  separate  from  it  but  immanent 
in  it.  This  is  a  going  back  to  the  World,  from 
which  Plato  had  estranged  Greek  Philosophy 
by  insisting  upon  the  pure  Universal  apart  from 
aU  manifestation.  Aristotle  reconciles  Thought 
with  the  physiocentric  starting-point  of  the 
Hellenic  Period.  He  will  not  leave  out  Nature, 
the  Particular,  the  Appearance,  but  gives  to 
this  side  of  the  Universe  its  due  validity.  Hence 
the  debt  of  Natural  Science  to  him  is  great. 

It  is,  therefore,  no  wonder  that  Aristotle  be- 
gins in  his  first  Book  of  the  Metaphijsics  his  po- 
lemic against  Plato's  Ideas,  and  ends  it  only  with 
the  end  of  the  whole  work.  So  it  may  be  said 
that  this  work  commences  and  concludes  with  the 


380         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

refutation  of  the  Ideal  Theory,  accom})anied  by 
numerous  iuterveuhig  thrusts.  For  this  reason 
it  has  often  been  declared  that  a  personal  feeling 
of  hostility  existed  in  the  pupil  against  the  mas- 
ter. Possibly  ;  still  the  difference  in  the  point  of 
view  is  sufficient  to  explain  the  warmth  and  the 
persistence  of  Aristotle's  attack. 

The  general  objection  of  Aristotle  to  Plato's 
Ideas  is  their  separative,  isolated  character.  They 
are  in  fact  but  abstractions  of  the  mind  from  par- 
ticular objects  and  hence  are  particular  and  mani- 
fold themselves.  They  are  called  Archetypes, 
Syecies,  Ideas,  etc. ;  yet  they  are  hardly  more 
than  another  set  of  particular  objects.  Plato 
has  not  given  any  clear  or  consistent  account  of 
the  relation  between  Ideas  and  their  real  counter- 
parts. The  two  sides  are  generally  held  in  com- 
plete separation,  though  sometimes  things  are 
said  to  participate  in  their  Archetypes. 

Now  Aristotle  evidently  deems  it  his  prime 
philosophical  task  to  unite  these  two  sides,  to 
overcome  this  separation  which  he  finds  in  Plato. 
So  he  brings  back  to  the  particular  thing  the 
Universal  or  the  Idea  from  which  Plato  had  di- 
vorced it,  reducing  it  merely  to  a  shadow  or  an 
appearance.  Also  he  returns  to  Socrates  who 
always  started  with  the  individual  object  and 
sought  to  find  in  it  the  essence,  the  concept  or 
the  Universal.  Still  further,  he  returns  to  the 
reality  of  Nature  with    which  Greek  Philosophy 


ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  381 

started.     Hence  his   strong  statement  is  of  the 
Real  Thing. 

Still  Aristotle  does  not  at  all  propose  to  do 
away  with  the  Idea  or  the  Genus,  only  it  does 
-not  exist  apart  from  the  particular  thing.  In 
fact  the  onh' object  of  science  is  the  Universal, 
the  true  essence  of  the  thing  is  the  Genus  which 
is  just  what  we  know.  The  ousia  of  the  o)i  is 
with  him  also  the  Universal,  the  Concept  or 
Idea.  But  what  now  about  the  particular  thin o- 
in  which  the  Universal  or  the  Concept  was  im- 
manent? Strictly  it  cannot  be  known  in  itself, 
for  only  the  Universalis  the  object  of  knowledge. 
Thus  again  a  separative  dualism  enters  the  object 
itself  in  spite  of  all  of  Aristotle's  attempts  to  get 
rid  of  it.  The  result  is  a  doubling  of  certain  cat- 
egories peculiar  to  Aristotle. 

2.  Pairs  of  Categories.  At  this  point  we 
have  to  consider  the  trend  in  our  philosopher  to 
duplicate  his  terms  in  reference  to  the  object 
which  he  has  found  to  have  both  a  particular  and 
a  universal  element.  He  spends  a  good  deal  of 
effort  in  this  attempt,  and  it  must  be  confessed 
that  some  of  it  seems  superfluous.  It  has  its  an- 
alogy to  earlier  Greek  philosophers,  for  instance 
to  the  Pythagoreans,  who  arranged  principles  in 
pairs  of  opposites.  Still  we  may  regard  it  as  a 
stage  of  the  total  ontological  process,  which  is 
first  the  unity  of  the  Idea  and  the  Appearance 
in  the  Real  Thing;  but  the  latter  is  now  dualized 


382         AXCIEKT  E  UR  OPE  AN'  PltlL  OSOPH  Y. 

into  various  forms  of  the  Universal  and  the 
Particuhir. 

(a)  The  first  pair  may  be  placed  under  the 
head  of  Cause  and  Effect.  The  thing  (the  Real 
Thing)  is  the  effect  of  which  the  cause  is  sought 
[arche,  aitia).  Here  again  we  observe  that 
Aristotle,  having  united  Plato's  Idea  and  Phenom- 
enon into  his  Real  Thing  tries  to  get  back  of 
the  latter  and  find  its  cause  or  source,  which  he 
will  also  call  sometimes  Idea,  by  its  Platonic 
name.  Thus  he  cannot  altogether  shai^e  off  the 
spell  of  his  master  in  spite  of  his  struggles. 

Accordingly,  the  doctrine  of  Causes  is  to  be 
considered  of  which  Aristotle  mentions  four 
{Met.  1.1,  8).  For  instance  a  statue  has  a 
material  Cause  in  the  stone  of  which  it  is  made, 
a  formal  Cause  in  the  pattern  or  conception 
after  which  it  is  made,  an  efficient  Cause  in 
its  maker,  a  final  Cause  (or  End)  in  the  actual 
statue  when  made.  Aristotle  uses  these  four 
Causes  in  his  criticism  of  former  Philosophies 
all  of  which  sought  the  Cause  (or  Essence) 
of  Being  in  common,  but  found  for  it  different 
kinds  of  Causes.  For  example,  Thales  had 
a  material  Cause  (water)  which  in  the  foregoing 
account  we  have  called  elemental.  The  grand 
instance  of  the  final  Cause  is  in  the  Nous  of 
Anaxagoras. 

But  these  four  Causes  Aristotle  reduces  to 
two:   the  final  Cause  or  End,  and  the  material 


ARISTOTLE' S  METAPHYSICS.  383 

Cause;  thus  we  come  to  the  second  pair  of 
categories  which  he  names  Form  and  Matter. 
The  four  Causes  above  mentioned  plaj^ed  a  great 
part  in  Schohistic  Philosophy  and  have  appeared 
in  modern  writers  as  a  basis  of  philosophic 
exposition.  But  with  Aristotle  we  may  pass 
on  to  what  he  has  evolved  out  of  them.  The 
material  Cause  suggests  matter;  but  matter 
itself,  especially  in  this  particular  form  of  a 
material  Cause,  must  be  determined  by  something 
else  behind  it.     Hence  the  followins:. 

(6)  Form  and  Matter  may,  then,  be  taken  as 
the  next  pair,  being  directly  suggestive  of  Plato's 
Idea  and  Appearance.  Form  (eidos  or  morphe) 
is  inherent  in  the  thing,  inseparable  from  it 
except  by  the  abstraction  of  thought.  Form 
is  the  essence  or  the  Idea,  yet  this  Idea  is 
not  like  Plato's,  existing  apart  from  the  individual 
object.  The  latter  is  determined  by  it,  receiving 
from  it  not  simply  the  outward  shape,  but  all 
other  qualities. 

What  is  then  left  for  Matter  {hyU),  which 
also  belongs  to  the  individual  object?  It  cannot 
do  without  the  Idea  or  Form,  as  the  latter 
cannot  do  without  it.  It  is,  therefore,  the 
absolutely  formable,  and  so  it  too  can  have 
no  existence  outside  of  the  mind.  Thus  the 
Real  Thing  of  Aristotle  is  made  up  of  two 
abstract  elements  which  are  not  real,  except 
in    their    unity.     Through    the    conception    of 


384         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPUW 

Matter,  however,  he  is  led  to  form  iinother 
})air  of  categories. 

(c)  These  are  llie  Potential  and  the  Actual. 
As  ah-eady  stated,  Matter  is  supremely  the 
Formablc,  the  capacity  for  Form,  but  neither 
Form  itself  nor  the  Formed.  Matter  is  not 
]Non-Being,  as  Plato  and  the  Eleatics  declared, 
it  is  the  Being  which  is  not  yet  but  may  be. 
Thus  it  is  not  merelj^  the  Negative,  but  the 
seed,  the  germ,  the  Potential. 

For  example,  the  wood  is  the  potential  table, 
the  possibility  of  it,  while  the  table  is  the  poten- 
tial made  actual.  Yet  it  can  be  said  that  the 
wood  or  the  tree  is  the  potential  seed  made  actual. 
So  the  particular  thing  may  be  both  potential 
and  actual  according  to  the  way  it  is  regarded  by 
the  mind.  The  thing  as  formed  Matter  becomeis 
sim[)le  Matter  to  a  higher  Form ;  it  is  both 
potential  and  actual.  Still  in  both  directions 
there  is  an  extr'^me;  in  one  way  lies  the  first 
(or  })ure)  Matter,  in  the  other  the  first  (or  jnire) 
Form,  though  these  two  likewise  seem  upon  anal- 
ysis to  coincide.  This  first  Matter  Aristotle 
conceives  as  the  substrate  of  every  determinate 
object,  being  without  determination  or  predicate 
itself.  It  is  eternal,  the  changeless  in  all  change, 
the  abiding  element  which  underlies  all  becom- 
ing. Matter,  therefore,  corresponds  to  the  Po- 
ential,  yet  the    latter  is  something  more,  since  it 


ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  385 

implies    the  process  of  which  the    Actual    is   the 
completion. 

But  what  makes  the  Potential  move  into  Actual- 
ity? Here  Aristotle  iutrockices  a  third  assumed 
element:  Motion,  which  mediates  the  Potential 
and  Actual.  But  if  the  two  latter  are  simply 
held  asunder,  or  even  used  as  correlated  opposites, 
they  are  quite  the  same  as  Matter  and  Form. 
The  two,  however,  the  Potential  and  the  Actual, 
are  now  conceived  as  constituting  a  process 
through  the  mediating  third ;  this  process  must 
therefore  have  a  name  of  its  own,  as  it  shows  a 
new  stage  of  the  present  thought.  With  this 
process,  also,  w^e  have  moved  out  of  the  forego- 
ing twofoldness  which  expressed  itself  in  pairs  of 
categories. 

Of  these  pairs  three  have  been  given,  showing 
a  connection  between  themselves.  Aristotle  hav- 
ing asserted  the  Real  Thing,  seeks  next  to  find 
its  Cause ;  but  this  Cause  is  found  to  have  a  ma- 
terial form,  in  which  a  new  pair  appears  (Form 
and  Matter)  ;  to  bring  these  two  together  a  third 
pair  (Potential  and  Actual)  is  introduced  which 
pass  finally  into  the  process  of  Entelechy.  In  all 
this  we  see  Aristotle's  desperate  struggle  with  the 
Platonic  dualism,  transcending  it,  yet  always  fall- 
ing back  or  forward  into  it  again. 

3.  Entelechy.  The  object  is  grasped  as  having 
the  total  process  within  itself,  and  is  no  longer 
either  twofold  or  simple.     Entelechy  is  the  true 

25 


386         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

actuality,  in  which  the  Actual  is  not  held  in 
opposition  to  the  Potential  but  takes  it  up  into 
itself  and  unites  with  it  in  the  process  of  true 
Being.  The  sculptor  not  working  is  potential, 
but  makino;  a  statue  he  is  continually  actualizing; 
his  potentiality,  which  constitutes  him  an  actual 
sculptor  (^actus).  It  is  the  process  which  makes 
him  actual;  without  it  he  is  not,  but  may  be. 

Very  important  is  this  thought  of  Entelechy. 
With  it  Aristotle  grasps  and  formulates  the  onto- 
logical  process  or  the  inner  movement  which  is 
the  essence  of  all  Being.  Form  is  not  now  at  rest, 
as  is  the  Idea  of  Plato,  but  is  perpetually  becom- 
ing Form  out  of  Matter  which  is  the  Formable ; 
it  is  an  eternal  energy  or  rather  energizing. 
Entelechy  is  the  Universal  as  the  process  of 
Being. 

Aristotle's  ontology  has  as  it  were  gone  back 
to  the  Real  Thing  with  which  it  began,  and  has 
unfolded  in  the  same  its  process  of  Entelechy. 
The  etymology  of  the  word  would  seem  to 
have  some  such  purport,  suggesting  that  which 
has  its  own  end  (telos)  working  within  it  and 
making  it  actual.  It  is  the  Becoming  of  Herac- 
litus  not  as  external  change  or  the  flux  of  all 
things,  but  it  is  the  Becoming  as  Entelechy 
or  the  inner  process  of  Being.  This  we  may 
also  consider  the  Psychosis  as  purely  ontological, 
not  yet  as  psychological.  It  is  indeed  the  Ego 
of   Aristotle  which    projects  out    of    itself    this 


ABIS TO  TLE'  S  ME  TA  PHYSICS.  387 

Entelechy,  but  does  not  recognize  in  the  same 
its  own  threefold  process,  which  is,  as  it  were, 
stamped  upon  Entelechy. 

Entelechy,  however,  is  the  process  of  sub- 
sumption,  not  that  of  creation.  For  the  first 
stage  (Matter,  the  Potential)  is  something 
given,  yea  eternal;  the  last  stage  (Form  or 
the  Actual)  is  also  given;  so  is  Motion  or 
the  mediating  stage.  Thus  the  pr©cess  of 
Entelechy  is  the  subsumption  of  the  Potential 
under  the  Actual  through  the  mean  or  middle 
term.  Entelechy  is  not  the  positing  of  the 
Potential  through  its  own  act,  whereby  the 
whole  is  a  creative  process.  We  may  call 
Entelechy  imperial,  the  commanding  and  sub- 
ordinating principle  which  brings  a  disordered 
world  into  a  universal  system.  It  is  the  empire 
of  Alexander  which  puts  all  the  scattered  nations 
(as  potentialities)  into  the  one  process  with 
itself.  Thus  the  world  remains  no  longer  in 
its  potential  stage,  but  the  lowest  is  mediated 
with  all  in  an  ordered  whole. 

The  next  step  in  the  movement  of  Aristotle's 
thought  is  to  make  this  inner  process  of  Entelechy 
external  in  speech,  to  express  its  movement  in 
categories,  which  show  the  forms  of  all  Thinking. 
These  forms  were  implicit  in  Entelechy,  but 
are  now  to  be  made  explicit  and  shown  in 
their  outer  relations  to  one  another.  Here  we 
pass  from  the  ontological  to  the  logical  Process 


388         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  Aristotle.  lu  the  latter  the  outolosical 
Process  of  Being,  which  was  immanent  in  the 
object,  is  separated  from  the  same,  and  is 
taken  bj  itself,  being  developed  in  its  own 
sphere  and  expressed  in  its  own  terms. 

II.  The  Logical  Process.  —  This  is  usually 
placed  first  in  expositions  of  the  Aristotelian 
Philosophy,  of  which  it  is  supposed  to  be 
the  instrument  (^organon).  The  implication 
here  is  that  the  Logical  Process  prepares  the 
terms  and  the  method  which  are  to  be 
applied  in  all  the  other  sciences.  According 
to  this  we  should  expect  to  find  in  Logic  the 
categories  already  unfolded  and  the  procedure 
already  set  forth  in  which  Ontology,  for  instance, 
develops  into  a  system.  But  such  an  expectation 
is  completely  groundless,  the  fact  is  altogether 
different.  Aristotle  does  not  use  his  Logic  in 
his  exposition  of  Ontology,  which  on  the  whole 
has  its  own  set  of  categories  and  its  own  pro- 
cedure. And  when  we  look  into  the  other 
scientific  expositions  of  Aristotle,  for  instance, 
the  Ph3^sics,  we  find  that  it  is  rather  the  onto- 
loo'ical  Process  than  the  logical  which  furnishes 
the  terms  and  the  method.  This  fact  alone 
is  sufficient  to  call  up  a  decided  doubt  in  regard 
to  the  propriety  of  putting  Logic  first  in  the 
Aristotelian  system  wntli  the  express  or  implied 
doctrine  that  it  is  the  ordering  principle  of  the 
whole  Philosophy. 


ABISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  -389 

Still  further,  in  the  work  on  Metaphysics 
as  it  lies  before  us,  we  find  that  the  discussions 
are  mainly  ontological,  but  in  the  Fourth  Book 
there  is  an  exposition  of  categories  among  which 
are  the  main  ones  set  forth  in  the  logical 
treatise  "  On  the  Categories."  Without  putting 
too  much  stress  upon  this  fact,  we  can  regard 
it  as  suggesting  that  Logic  interlinks  with 
Ontology  and  that  the  point  of  such  inter- 
linking is  hinted,  especially  as  both  are  made 
to  start  with  the  same  Category  of  Essence 
(^ousia). 

We  may,  therefore,  reasonably  infer  that 
Aristotle  himself  did  not  consider  his  Logic 
as  an  instrument — he  nowhere  calls  it  his 
Organon  —  for  ordering  the  sciences,  but  rather 
he  regarded  it  as  an  integral  co-ordinate  part 
of  his  system  with  its  own  scientific  right  in 
its  own  sphere.  How  then  has  the  misconception 
about  it  arisen?  We  learn  from  Waitz  (Org. 
IL  293)  that  no  Greek  commentator  till  the 
sixth  century  A.  D.  applies  the  term  Organon  to 
the  logical  treatises  of  Aristotle,  though  they 
were  previously  called  organic  in  the  sense  of 
being  an  organic  part  of  the  Avhole  sjstem 
of  Philosophy.  This  is  in  our  judgment  the 
right  view  of  them  —  not  an  instrument  of  the 
other  parts  but  an  organic  part  of  the  whole. 
Not  till  Theology  got  hold  of  Aristotle's  Logic 
and  made  this  an  instrument  for   its  purposes, 


390         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

makiug  at  the  same  time  all  Philosophy  a 
handmaid  (ana'Ua)  or  an  instrument,  did  the 
name  and  idea  of  Loo;ic  as  an  Oro^auon  become 
current.  From  this  medieval  usage  the  term 
has  descended  to  our  own  time.  I  have  given 
these  details,  since  in  the  above  ordering  of 
the  Logical  Process,  I  felt  myself  compelled 
to  run  counter  to  the  chief  historians  of  Greek 
Philosophy,  as  well  as  to  the  leading  expositors 
of  Aristotle. 

The  function  of  Logic  is  to  show  Thought  pass- 
ing over  into  Speech,  or  the  process  of  mind 
uttering  itself  in  the  process  of  language.  The 
Entelechy  now  clothes  itself  in  words  which  show 
its  movement.  Logic  seeks  for  and  expresses  the 
connecting  process  between  Thought  and  Speech. 
It  is  not  Grammar  which  proceeds  from  the  side 
of  language,  taking  up  the  same  as  a  fact  and 
classifying  it  in  parts  of  Speech  and  their  rela- 
tion. But  Logic  proceeds  from  the  side  of 
Thought  (or  from  the  Ontological  Process),  which 
it  unfolds  into  lano;uaoe.  Can  we  see  Thought 
moving  into  and  though  Speech  and  revealing 
therein  its  forms?  Or  can  the  ontological  Pro- 
cess  be  made  to  externalize  itself  into  a  kind  of 
skeleton  of  words,  and  thus  bring  out  what  are 
often  called  the  Pure  Forms  of  Thought?  These 
are  said  to  constitute  the  content  of  logical 
science. 

Here,  too,  we  have  to  begin  with  the  essence 


ABISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  391 

of  Being,  which  is  the  Universal  as  the  supreme 
category  of  the  Logical  Process,  often  named  its 
summiim  genus.  Now  this  Universal  in  Logic 
subsumes  the  Particular,  quite  as  we  found  the 
Entelechj  in  Ontology  subsuming  Matter  or  the 
Potential.  Still  further,  this  subsumption  is 
made  through  a  Mean  or  Middle  Term  in  Logic 
(corresponding  to  Motion  in  the  process  of  En- 
telechy).  Thus  we  reach  the  kernel  of  the 
Logical  Process:  the  Particular  is  subsumed 
under  the  Universal  through  a  mediating  term. 
Such  is  the  hierarchical  order  of  Log-ic  in  which 
can  be  seen  the  spiritual  character  of  the  Middle 
Ages. 

On  the  other  hand  Aristotle  has  also  the 
counterpart  to  this  deductive  movement,  namely 
the  inductive  or  epagogic  movement  from  the 
Particular  to  the  Universal,  which  he  inherited 
from  Socrates,  whose  rise  to  the  Concept  or 
Universal  has  been  already  given.  Medieval 
Scholasticism,  however,  naturally  put  its  stress 
upon  the  hierarchical  side  of  Loofic,  makino- 
the  same  largely  its  mental  discipline,  till  Bacon 
in  the  Eenascence  restored  the  inductive  prin- 
ciple, which  was  really  a  restoration  of  the 
total  Aristotelian  process  of  Logic.  It  was  also 
a  restoration  of  the  right  of  the  Particular 
to  help  make  the  Universal  which  subsumes  it. 
Nor  should  we  omit  to  note  that  this  same 
movement  is  correlated    with    the    right  of    the 


31)2         ANCIENT  EUIiOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

human  iudividual,  which  likewise  asserted  itself 
anew  at  the  Renascence. 

Still  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  deductive 
side  of  Aristotle's  Logic  is  the  more  emphatic, 
and  is  what  has  made  its  great  fame,  as  well 
as  given  to  it  its  importance  as  a  pedagogical 
discipline.  It  shows  w^hat  is  complete  demon- 
stration, formally  at  least;  it  is  the  t3q)ical 
movement  of  all  proof  through  its  process  of 
subsumption.  Thus  it  gives  a  basic  form  for  all 
classification  of  details;  it  runs  a  thread  of 
unity  through  the  infinite  mass  of  particulars 
that  always  keeps  flowing  in  upon  us  from 
the  outside  world.  Undoubtedly  the  mind  sub- 
sumes and  classifies  instinctively,  but  it  was 
Aristotle's  great  merit  to  make  the  mind  con- 
scious of  its  own  method  in  this  regard,  which 
method  thereby  becomes  a  scientific  acquisition 
for  us  all. 

While  Logic  may  be  called  the  science  of  the 
Forms  of  Thought,  we  must  not  consider  this 
Thought  to  be  merely  subjective.  With  Aris- 
totle as  with  the  Greeks  generally.  Thought  and 
Being  were  so  completely  one  that  there  is  little 
or  no  separate  elaboration  of  the  subjective  side 
of  Thinking.  Hence  the  Forms  of  Thought  are 
just  as  well  the  Forms  of  Being,  separated  in- 
deed from  immediate  Being  whose  process  we 
have  found  to  be  Entelechy.     The  stages  of  the 


ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  393 

latter  fall  asunder  and  find    verbal  expression  in 
this  separation  through  the  Logical  Process. 

The  central  facts  of  this  Process  are  three, 
Concept,  Judgment,  Syllogism.  Each  of  which 
again  has  its  stages. 

1.  The  Concept.  This  is  expressed  in  a  cate- 
gory, in  which  the  ontological  and  logical  pro- 
cesses are  immediately  united.  This  primal  cate- 
gory is  the  essence  of  Being  (^ousia  of  the  ow)  in 
both  cases.  Moreover,  the  fundamental  statement 
of  Logic  must  be  the  same  as  that  of  all  Philos- 
ophy: the  essence  of  Being  is  the  L^niversal. 
But  Logic  begins  when  we  think  of  this  essence 
(oM.sv'rt)  as  subsumed  under  the  Universal,  whereby 
the  former  becomes  subject  ''and  the  latter 
predicate.  Or  we  may  say  the  Particular  is  (sub- 
sumed under)  the  Universal.  The  part  in  paren- 
theses is  present  but  as  yet  implicit.  The  move- 
ment of  Logic  is  to  make  it  (the  subsumption) 
explicit.  For  instance,  in  the  sentence  John  is 
a  man,  John,  the  subject  or  the  particular  one, is 
explicitly  subsumed  under  the  Universal,  man. 
The  Concept  man,  however,  has  the  subject  still 
implicit,  yet  present  and  seeking  to  become  ex- 
plicit in  a  sentence — which  event  has  now  taken 
place. 

2.  Judgment.  So  is  named  the  second  stage 
of  the  Logical  Process,  which  shows  tlie  subject 
Of  the  Particular  as  explicitly  placed  under  the 
Universal  by  the  Copula.     But    there    is  a  vast 


394         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

multiplicity  of  judgments,  the  world  is  full  of 
them  —  the  world  without  as  well  as  within. 

Logic  proceeds  to  harmonize  this  div^ersity  and 
separation,  by  developing  the  Copula,  which  was 
an  immediate  joining  together  of  the  Subject  and 
Predicate,  into  a  Middle  Term  mediating  the 
extremes.  Thus  three  terms  appear,  and  with 
•them  three  judgments,  which  now  take  the 
name  of  Premises,  Major,  Minor  and  the  Con- 
clusion. So  the  act  of  subsumption  which  was 
implicit  in  the  simple  Judgment  becomes  explicit 
itself  in  a  Judgment  uniting  two  separate  Judg- 
ments by  a  Middle  Term  which  is  both  Subject 
and  Predicate. 

3.  Sj/JJogism.  This  is  the  name  of  the  scheme 
of  the  three  Judgments  just  mentioned,  which 
are  seen  to  form  a  process  together.  This 
process  (the  syllogistic)  is  the  completely 
actualized  Logical  Process,  which  started  with 
the  Concept  in  which  both  Subject  and  Copula 
were  implicit  (or  potential)  ;  then  it  unfolded 
into  Judgment,  which  made  the  Subject  explicit, 
the  Copula  being  stilt  implicit;  finally  in  the 
Syllogism  all  three  are  explicit  and  uttered  in 
words.  Thus  the  movement  of  subsumption 
has  completed  itself. 

Still  of  this  explicit  subsumption  there  are 
various  methods  which  are  called  the  Figures 
of  the  Syllogism,  properly  three,  though  a 
fourth  has  been  unnecessarily  added.     The  first 


ABISTOTLL'S  31ETAPHYSWS.  395 

Figure  is  so  ordered  that  the  conclusion  is 
both  affirmative  and  universal,  the  second  can 
have  only  a  negative  conclusion,  the  third  a 
particular  conclusion.  The  first  Figure  gives 
the  perfect  form  of  Demonstration,  hence 
Aristotle  shows  the  ways  of  converting  the  other 
Figures  of  the  S3'llogism  into  the  first,  which 
process  of  conversion  thus  indicates  the  return 
of  the  negative  and  particular  into  the  positive 
and  universal.  These  matters  our  philosopher 
has  wrought  into  numerous  details  which  we 
shall  here  omit. 

It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  Aristotle 
by  no  means  subjects  all  knowledge  to  the  Log- 
ical Process.  There  is  a  realm  above  it,  jSTous 
or  the  Intellect  proper ;  also  there  is  a  realm  be- 
low it.  Sense-perception,  which  is  immediate  and 
can  not  be  proved.  Logic  is  the  realm  of  medi- 
ate knowledge  or  science  (ejnsfeme). 

According  to  Aristotle  there  can  be  no  Lowic 
of  Sense-perception ;  also  the  intuitive  Intellect 
(jV^ous)  gives  a  kind  of  knowledge  which  tran- 
scends the  Logical  Process,  yet  upon  which  this 
Process  depends,  for  instance,  the  summum 
genus.  Thus  Logic  lies  between  two  unprovable 
realms  of  knowledge  which  it  has  to  take  for 
granted. 

The  Syllogism  is,  therefore,  the  subsumption 
of  all  particularity  of  the  world  under  the  Uni- 
versal or  the  Supreme  Genus.     But  what  or  who 


396         ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

performs  this  act  of  subsumption?  I,  perchance, 
for  one,  am  performing  it  now.  But  this  sub- 
sumption  is,  has  Being,  is  objective,  and  existed 
long  before  me  and  without  me.  Who,  then,  is 
the  universal  subsumer  behind  this  subsumption 
of  Being? 

The  Universe  is  a  Syllogism,  let  us  say;  but 
who  is  its  syllogizer?  With  these  questions  we 
begin  to  rise  to  Aristotle's  conception  of  God, 
and  to  see  that  over  or  behind  his  Logical  Pro- 
cess, there  must  be  the  Theological  Process  upon 
which  it  really  depends.  God  syllogizes  the 
Universe,  and  I  re-syllogize  it  after  Him,  think- 
ing his  creative  thought  of  it  syllogistically. 
Loo;ic  is  the  externalized  Form  of  Divine  Think- 
ino- — the  machine  as  it  were  of  the  Universal 
Eeason  (hence  often  called  Eeasoningor  Eatioci- 
nation).  But  the  machine  is  not  the  machine- 
maker  or  the  machine-mover. 

The  formal  Syllogism  must  take  its  premises 
from  the  outside,  and  so  is  unable  to  prove 
them  within  itself,  and  above  all,  is  not  able 
to  prove  itself  internally  or  externally.  Given 
its  supreme  premise,  it  can  subsume  every 
premise  less  than  itself  under  itself ;  but  whence 
this  supreme  premise?  Given  this  logical  or 
hierarchical  order  of  the  world,  how  does  it 
ofet  to  be?  Here  ao;ain  Aristotle  shows  that 
his  Phitonic  training  is  really  the  deepest  fact 
of    his    philosophizing.     The    dualism    of    Plato 


ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  3'J7 

comes  to  Yisht  in  his  need  of  finding;  the  Idea 
which  lies  behind  and  determines  this  outer 
h)o;ical  realm.  But  such  an  Idea,  having  come 
u})  for  ex[)ositiou,  will  not  be  wholly  set  off 
by  itself,  in  the  Platonic  fashion,  but  will  be 
treated  in  Aristotle's  manner,  which  is  to  give  it 
some  power  in  the  world,  if  not  all. 

Accordingly  we  find  the  theological  element 
more  developed  in  Aristotle  than  in  Plato  in 
spite  of  the  hitter's  mythical  tendencies,  and 
also  in  spite  of  the  suggestion  of  Proclus  (who 
calls  one  of  his  treatises  a  Platonic  Theology). 
Perhaps  we  may  say  that  Aristotle  has  more 
Theology,  and  Plato  more  Religion.  We  must 
not  fail  to  observe  also  that  Aristotle  has  a  Theol- 
ogy which  is  not  fixed  in  one  category,  but  which 
shows  an  inner  process  through  three  of  them. 

III.  The  Theological  Process.  —  The  Aris- 
totelian Philosophy  rises  to  Theology  or  the 
science  of  the  Supreme  Being.  This  we  maj' 
well  deem  its  highest  point  as  well  as  its  greatest 
service  to  mankind.  Greek  Philosophy  started 
in  an  anti-theistic  tendency,  seeking  for  a  fixed 
principle  of  all  things  as  against  a  creative  arbi- 
trary Will.  But  it  has  reached  Theism  in  its  on- 
going development  through  Aristotle,  who  does 
not  fail  back,  as  Plato  often  does,  into  a  mythical 
view  of  the  world.  On  the  coutrarj^  Philosoph}'' 
in  Aristotle  becomes  thcistic  by  evolution  and 
not  by  relapse.     Hence  it  has  a  great  future  be- 


398         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

fore  it  in  forming  the  rational  foundation  of 
Christian  Theology.  Herein,  too,  the  pupil  Ar- 
istotle makes  his  most  distinctive  and  original 
step  beyond  his  master  Plato,  even  if  lie  often 
drops  back  into  the  latter,  and  in  some  cases 
deepens  the  Platonic  dualism. 

When  the  medieval  period  used  Aristotle's 
Logic  to  rise  to  Theology,  it  was  giving  the  best 
interpretation  of  the  philosopher's  Logic,  and  was 
putting  it  into  its  right  place  in  his  system.  This 
is  the  place  to  which  we  have  assigned  it  in  the 
preceding  exposition,  differing  from  the  modern 
commentators  generally.  But  time  is,  after  all, 
the  best  expositor,  and  to  its  voice  the  individual 
student  or  teacher  may  well  pay  some  heed. 

Aristotle's  Theology  is  chiefly  contained  in  the 
same  book  — the  Metaphysics  —  as  the  Ontology, 
to  which  it  is  a  return  and  of  which  it  is  a  fulfill- 
ment. The  ontological  Process  externalized  itself 
in  the  logical  Process,  whose  final  form  was  the 
Svllogism.  But  the  Syllogism  in  its  turn  callsfor 
the  Syllogizer,  as  the  real  essence  of  itself  as  well 
as  of  all  Being,  which  has  become  syllogized. 
Thus  the  process  of  Being  is  no  longer  imme- 
diate as  in  Ontology,  but  is  mediated  through  the 
Divine  Process.  Ontology  may  treat  of  the  es- 
sence of  Motion  —  but  what  starts  this  motion? 
who  is  the  First  Mover?  Again,  it  is  Ontology 
which  unfolds  the  Entelechy  in  Being  ;  but  there 
is    something    behind  this   Entelechy  —  what  is 


ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  399 

the  Entelechy  of  Entelechy?  As  before  un- 
folded, this  Entelechy  is  the  pure  process  of 
Being  (potentiality,  energy  cand  actuality)  ;  but 
whence  this  process  and  how  did  it  get  to  be? 
Only  through  another  process  (or  Entelechy) 
which  is  the  process  of  all  processes  — Absolute 
Being,  God. 

Aristotle's  Theology  is,  accordingly,  a  return 
to  his  Ontology,  whose  categories  it  elaborates 
anew,  whereby  they  are  transformed  and  applied 
to  Absolute  Being  or  God.  These  we  shall 
glance  at  in  this  new  conception. 

1.  The  First  Mover.  Or  we  can  say  also,  the 
First  Cause.  Eunning  back  through  the  chain 
of  causation,  we  find  the  primeval  cause  is  de- 
rived from  motion.  The  world  before  us  is  full 
of  motion,  which  comes  from  another  motion  or 
moving  object,  and  this  from  another  still ;  what 
is  the  source  of  it?  The  First  Mover,  is  Aris- 
totle's answer,  for  a  chain  has  to  hang  on  some- 
thing. But  mark,  this  First  iMover  is  not  moved, 
else  it  would  be  involved  in  the  finitude  of  Mo- 
tion, and  become  a  part  or  a  link  in  the  chain, 
and  not  its  source  or  cause,  since  it  too  would  l)e 
caused.  Hence  there  is  the  following  process  in 
the  thought  of  the  First  ]\Iover :  — 

(a)  It  is  the  unmoved  and  uncaused,  within 
itself  the  undivided. 

{h)  It  moves  the  world,  determinos  the  same 
to  all  motion. 


400         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(c)  It  is,  then,  the  moving  not  moved  {kinoun 
oil  Mnoumcnon,  movens  non  mofiim).  This  last 
becomes  a  very  important  thought  for  the  future, 
running  throuo;h  all  the  later  Greek  and  Medieval 
Philosophy  as  well  as  Theology. 

Undoubtedly  at  this  point  a  question  comes 
up :  How  can  the  First  Mover  move  anything 
without  being  moved  itself  (or  himself)?  Aris- 
totle has  his  answer  ready:  The  thing  imperfect 
desires  God,  but  He,  the  perfect,  does  not  de- 
sire it  for  his  perfection.  The  First  Mover 
affects  us  and  moves  us  like  a  work  of  art,  which 
is  itself  not  affected  or  moved.  The  statue  of 
Zeus  stirs  the  beholder,  but  it  is  not  stirred  itself. 
It  shows  me  the  Divine  Ideal  toward  which  I 
strive  and  move,  but  it  moves  not  toward  me. 
All  the  world  seeks  the  perfection  of  the  First 
Mover,  who  cannot  change  or  move  without  be- 
coming imperfect.  The  First  Mover  can  have 
no  Feeling  or  Will,  since  both  Unitize  him  through 
Motion.  Aristotle's  God  is  the  ideal  statue  of  the 
Supreme  Being  of  the  Universe,  immovable  and 
causeless,  yet  moving  and  causing  all;  we  may 
consider  Him  the  Phidian  Zeus  philosophized 
and  made  into  a  category.  Thus  in  that  Greek 
Avorld  the  act  of  worship  is  becoming  an  act  of 
thought,  and  Religion  is  turning  to  Theology. 

The  unmoved  Mover  suggests  a  mechanical  re- 
lation to  the  world  as  moved,  the  latter  being 
determined  to    Motion   from  the  outside.     But 


ATtlSTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  401 

now  arises  the  fnct  that  it  is  also  determined  to 
its  Motion  from  the  inside ;  the  work!,  in  order 
to  respond  to  the  first  Mover  has  to  be  prepared, 
pre-disposed,  pre-formed  to  such  a  movement; 
it  has  to  move,  though  He  does  not,  it  has  to  de- 
sire, though  He  does  not.  Whence  does  it  get 
this  peculiar  character,  and  who  formed  such  a 
world? 

2.  Pure  Form.  The  Absolute  Being  is  Pure 
Form,  conceived  as  separate  from  the  formed  world, 
whose  Idea  or  Archetype  it  is,  independent,  self- 
existent,  immaterial,  since  it  is  the  negative  of  all 
matter.  Here  the  Platonic  Idea  makes  itself  de- 
cidedly felt  again.  Moreover  it  is  the  Highest 
Good,  the  end  toward  which  all  things  aim ;  their 
Form  in  itself  strives  toward  the  Pure  Form,  the 
Idea,  God,  who  is  thus  in  the  things  of  the 
world  (immanent)  and  also  above  them,  dis- 
tinct from  them  and  in  Himself  (transcend- 
ent). He  is  their  order  and  their  orderer,  just 
as  the  character  of  the  school  must  be  in  the 
mind  of  the  schoolmaster  and  in  his  school.  God 
as  Pure  Form  reflects  the  principle  of  organiza- 
tion in  the  Cosmos,  which  is  the  real  ground  of 
its  moving  through  itself  toward  the  First 
Mover.  God  as  Pure  Form  is  both  immanent 
and  transcendent,  or  rather  the  unity  of  the 
two  in  a  process  —  the  one  Infinite  Form  and 
Form  of  all  Forms. 

Here  rises  the  fact  that  there  are  also  many 
26 


402         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Forms,  indicating  something  opposite  to  Pure 
Form  which  enters  into  it  —  Matter.  This  is 
the  absence  of  Form,  which  is  nevertheless  to 
be  formed;  it  is  privation  (sferms),  the  Nega- 
tive. Yet  only  through  it  can  the  individual 
object  be  obtained  from  Pure  Form,  whose  op- 
posite or  counterpart  Aristotle  seems  to  consider 
as  Pure  Matter  {eschate  hyU).  Now  Pure  Form 
is  the  unformed  or  formless  (as  the  First  Mover 
is  moveless)  ;  also  Pure  Matter  is  unformed  or 
formless ;  thus  the  two  opposites  or  extremes 
are  one  and  the  same  according  to  Aristotle, 
{Met.  1045  h.  18,)  who  also  speaks  of  a  First 
Matter. 

But  this  unity  of  Pure  Form,  and  Pure  Matter 
is  not  a  negative  result  as  might  seem,  but  a 
process  with  new  categories,  namely.  Form  as 
the  actual  and  Matter  as  the  Potential,  and  their 
unity  as  the  complete  process  (Potentiality, 
Energy,  Actuality)  which  is  Entelechy.  This 
category,  which  we  have  also  met  with  in  On- 
tology, is  next  to  be  theologized,  as  we  have 
already  seen  in  the  two  cases  of  Cause  (or  the 
First  Mover)  and  of  Form  (the  Pure  Form  as 
Idea  or  the  Good),  both  of  which  have  been  ele- 
vated into  categories  of  God. 

3.  Pure  Entelechy.  The  Absolute  Being  is 
Pure  Entelechy,  the  Divine  Process  of  all  exist- 
ent Processes,  the  Entelechy  of  all  Entelechies, 
which  now  divides  within  itself  and  beholds  itself 


J 


ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  40.1 

as  the  absolute  Process  or  Pure  Entelechy  (called 
also  Pure  Actuality).     This  brings  before  us  the 
most  perfect  Being,  God,  whose  thought  must 
be  of  himself,  namely  of  the  most  perfect  object. 
God  cannot  be  the  thought  of  the  world  which  is 
imperfect.     He  can  only  be  the  thought  of  Him- 
self, if  He  be  perfect.     He  can  pay  no  attention 
to  the  world   or  to  man  who   loves  Him ;  if  He 
loves  in  return.  He  has   a   finite  content   to  His 
love  and  is  in  so  far  imperfect.     In  like  manner 
His  thought  can  be  a))out  nothing  finite,  other- 
wise He  finitizes  Himself  in  his  thinking.     Still 
less  can  He  be  the  creator  of  a  realm  of  finitude 
without  reducing  Himself  to  imperfection.     He 
has   perfect   blessedness,    which  can  only  come 
from  His  occupying  Himself  wholly  and  exclus- 
ively with   what  is   perfect,  namely,  with  Him- 
self.    God    is    never-ceasing   self-contemplation 
{theoria).     He  divides   into  subject  and  object, 
the  seeing  and  the  seen,  but  is  one  and  the  same 
in   both.     Thus  He  is  self-consciousness  as  di- 
vine ;  not  only  does  he  think  but  He  is  Thought 
thinking  Thought,  and  can  be  nothing  else.    An- 
axagoras  had   N'ous  (Thought,  Eeason),   which 
ordered  the  world ;  but  here  N'ous  is  doubled  and 
turned  back  upon  itself  {Noesis  JVoeseos).       The 
dualism  of  Form  and  Matter  is  overcome  in  the 
fact  that  the  Form  is  now  its  own  IMatter  or  Con- 
tent, and  the  immanency  of  Form  in  Matter  has 
become  complete  transcendency. 


404         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

From  this  point  of  view  God  is  called  often 
Pure  Actuality  or  Pure  Entelcchy,  or  the  most 
YQixl^QiVL^  (^eiis  realissimum^.  He  is  the  abso- 
lute Process  beholding  itself  as  absolute.  This 
Process  we  can  trace  in  Him  as  the  self-conscious 
act  of  the  Universe,  eternally  self -separating  and 
self-returning  in  thinking  itself.  It  may  be 
doubted  if  Aristotle  conceives  of  God  as  Person, 
as  Ego,  even  though  He  be  self-conscious,  for  He 
is  without  Will  and  without  Love  or  Feeling. 
He  is  still  Being  whose  essence  is  now  Thought 
thinking  Thought;  that  is,  all  Being,  the  Uni- 
verse is  just  this  Noetic  Process.  Aristotle  is 
not  dealing  with  the  individual  subject  like  you 
and  me.  With  him  the  All  is  self -consciousness, 
Thought  thinking  Thought. 

We  may  see  that  the  Syllogism,  reaching  up  to 
the  summum  gemis,  which  subsumes  all  else, 
yet  is  itself  the  unsubsumed,  corresponds  to  the 
First  Mover,  the  unmoved  one  who  moves  all 
else,  and  likewise  to  the  Thought  thinking 
Thought  as  the  process  of  all  processes.  Logic 
thus  is  the  counterpart  of  Theology  which  by  its 
very  nature  expresses  itself  syllogistically,  sub- 
suming the  world  under  itself  in  a  hierarchic 
fashion.  The  medieval  union  of  Logic  and  The- 
ology lies  in  the  character  of  both  and  goes  back 
to  Aristotle.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  God 
syllogizes,  in  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  Him. 

In  this  connection  it  is  significant  to  note  the 


ARISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS.  405 

inherently  triune  movement  which  runs  through 
the  Syllogism.  It  has  three  Terms,  three  Prop- 
ositions (Premises  and  Conclusion)  three  Fig- 
ures, each  of  which  has  three  subsumptions.  As 
seen  by  Aristotle,  God  syllogizes  in  trinities, 
which  make  up  all  Being,  and  which  man  has  to 
re-construe  after  Him,  in  order  to  think  His 
Thought  in  His  way. 

So  we  put  together  the  three  categories  —  the 
Fn-st  Mover,  Pure  Form,  and  pure  Entelechy  — 
and  seek  to  order  them  into  a  Process,  naniino-  it 
the  Theological  Process.  This  order,  however,  is 
not  to  be  found  in  the  extant  works  of 
Aristotle.  He  has  the  three  mentioned  cate- 
gories and  elaborates  them  more  or  less  fully, 
but  his  elaboration  of  them  is  not  consecutive 
and  not  connected  together  and  not  always  con- 
sistent. This  may  be  owing  to  the  imperfect 
condition  in  which  his  writings  have  come  down 
to  us.  Still  we  can  see  in  them  that  psychical 
movement  (the  Psj'chosis)  which  we  have  so 
often  found  secretly  determining  the  thought 
and  the  development  of  all  Greek  Philosophy-, 
and  which  is  ultimately  to  evolve  its  own  com- 
plete self-conscious  expression. 

As  this  Theological  Process  has  been  the  most 
effective  and  influential  part  of  Aristotle's  philos- 
oi)hy,  reaching  down  through  Europe  to  the 
present  tiuie    in    ([uite    every  form  of  Ghristian 


400         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Theology,  we  can  well  afford  to  look  back  at 
it  and  giasp  it  in  a  summaiy. 

The  First  Mover  is  transcendent  immediately, 
quite  mechanically,  over  the  physical  world,  and 
is  the  source  or  cause  of  all  Motion,  which  is  the 
essence  of  Nature,  according  to  Aristotle  (see 
his  Physics,  passim).  The  First  Mover  has 
also  his  inner  Process :  (1)  the  unmoved,  (2)  the 
mover,  (3)  the  unmoved  mover. 

Pare  Form  is  immanent  in  the  material  world, 
yet  also  is  conceived.as  in  itself,  separated,  trans- 
cendent. Hence  the  twofolduess  of  this  stage 
of  thought.  The  necessity  of  the  immanence  is 
seen  in  the  fact  that  the  First  Mover  could  not 
move  the  world  unless  the  latter  had  the  capacity 
or  immanent  power  (desire)  of  moving  toward 
Him.  This  power  is  of  God,  or  is  God  as  Pure 
Form.  But  ao;ain  Form  cannot  be  manifested 
without  Matter,  which  is  given  and  unformed. 
So  here  also  we  have  an  inner  process:  (1)  Pure 
Form,  (2)  Pure  Matter,  (3)  their  unity,  which 
has  to  be  conceived  as  the  immanence  of  Pure 
Form  or  God  in  the  world  which  desires  Him  as 
transcendent. 

Pure  Eiitelechy  (or  Pare  Actuality)  is  again 
transcendent,  not  now  immediately  (  as  the  First 
Mover)  but  mediately  through  the  Process, 
ultimatcl}^  through  the  Process  of  the  Thought 
which  thinks  Thought,  The  total  sweep  may  be 
seen  iii  the    following  movement:    (1)  The   im- 


ABISTOTLE'S  METAPHYSICS  407 

mediate  or  outologicjil  Process:  («)  Potenthil- 
ity,  {h)  Energy,  (c)  Actuality.  (2)  The 
Process  separating  within  itself  and  making  itself 
the  object  of  itself,  the  second  stage  of  self- 
conscious  Being.  (3)  The  unity  of  the  two 
sides,  in  which  the  Process  returns  into  itself 
through  itself :  which  fact  may  be  fully  formu- 
lated as  follows:  Thought  (the  Process)  thinks 
(the  Process)  Thought  (the  Process).  Such  is 
the  explicit  derivation  of  the  oft-cited  formula : 
Thought  thinking  Thought.  This  is  the  highest 
point  reached  by  Hellenic  Philosophy  and  is  the 
touchstone  by  which  it  is  to  be  tested.  It  de- 
clares that  Being  is  ultimately  self -knowing,  that 
the  essence  of  Being  (the  ousia  of  the  on)  is 
self-conscious  Thought.  Science  can  now  be 
seen  to  be  possible,  the  Universe  can  be  known, 
and  even  man  through  vision  (as  shall  be 
set  forth  later)  can  share  in  the  Divine  Pro- 
cess. 

Such  is  the  completed  movement  of  Aristotle's 
Metaphysics,  with  its  three  main  Processes  — 
ontological,  logical  and  theological.  How  these 
are  intimately  connected  together,  we  need  not 
further  repeat.  Having  thus  developed  the  first 
stage  of  the  philosophical  Norm  of  Aristotle  we 
may  proceed  to  the  second  which  pertains  to  the 
World,  to  the  Cosmical  Order. 


408  ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

B.  Physics. 

Of  Aristotle's  writings,  the  Physics  or  the 
Philosophy  of  Nature  forms  the  largest  part, 
while  in  Plato  this  division  is  the  smallest. 
Such  a  fact  is  highly  characteristic  of  the  ten- 
dencies of  the  two  men :  the  one  turning  away 
from  the  phenomenal  world  and  the  other  turn- 
ing towards  it.  Yet  Aristotle  carried  over  into 
this  world  the  Concept  or  Idea,  and  so,  while  he 
does  not  neglect  experience  by  any  means,  his 
construction  of  Nature  is  on  the  whole  a-priori. 
This  presupposes  Metaphysics  and  its  categories, 
which  are  to  be  applied  to  Physics,  which  science 
goes  back  to  the  metaphysical  concept  of  God 
as  the  unmoved  Mover.  For  that  which  he 
moves,  though  motionless  himself,  is  the  phys- 
ical world ;  hence  Motion  arises  and  the  Aris- 
totelian Physics  may  be  called,  in  the  last 
analysis,  the  science  of  Motion,  including  all 
bodies  which  are  subject  to  Motion.  On  the 
other  hand,  Metaphysics  is  the  science  of  the 
unmoved,  culminating  in  Theology  which  treats 
of  the  unmoved  who  is  the  Mover  (see  Met. 
V.  1,  1026,  a.  19),  and  so  the  Divine,  whose 
science  is  the  highest  and  most  worthy. 

We  must  consider  it  a  great  advance  of  Aris- 
totle beyond  Plato,  that  the  latter  elevates  the 
conception  of  God  from  the  physical  sphere  (in 
which  the  former  makes  Him  the  world-shaping 


ARISTOTLE'S  PHYSICS.  409 

Demiurge)  to  the  metaphysical  sphere,  in  which 
He  is  expressly  Thought  as  uuiversal.  In  Plato 
the  Idea  seems  to  be  apart  from  and  above  God, 
the  creator  of  the  world.  Still  Aristotle  does 
not  hold  God  to  be  the  creator  of  the  world 
through  His  Will.  Nothing  can  be  made  of 
nothing.  Matter  exists  primordially  for  Aristotle 
as  well  as  for  Plato ;  and  just  this  is  one  of  the 
points  at  which  the  former  passes  again  into  the 
Platonic  dualism  after  all  his  struo-o-les  to  rise 
out  of  it,  Aristotle,  however,  has  strongly 
asserted  his  deity  to  be  a  self-conscious  Being, 
and  thereby  has  started  Theology  as  a  science. 

The  transition  from  Metaphysics  to  Physics 
lies  in  the  fact  that  God,  being  desired  by  the 
material  world,  produces  Motion.  This  takes 
many  forms  as  birth  and  decay,  qualitative  and 
quantitative  change,  finally  change  of  place,  the 
latter  being  regarded  as  the  universal  form  of 
Motion. 

The  physical  works  of  Aristotle  constitute  a 
vast  mass  of  dissertations  which  are  not  con- 
nected together  by  their  author.  Their  scattered, 
disorganized  condition  seems  to  repel  all  attempts 
at  ordering  them,  still  a  principle  of  organization 
is  soon  found  running  through  them  and  putting 
each  i)art  into  its  place.  The  whole  is  a  Philos- 
ophy of  Nature  or  of  the  physical  world;  that  is, 
the  philosophic  Norm  is  to  ))e  applied  to  that 
part    or   element  of    the  Universe  which  we  call 


410         AN  CI  EN  T  EUR  OPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPIl  Y. 


nature  or  the  world,  and  is  to  reduce  the  same  to 
science.  But  in  this  science  all  three  elements 
of  the  Universe  —  God,  World,  and  Man  —  have 
each  a  share,  constituting  the  basis  of  its  three 
divisions,  which  here  follow. 

First  is  the  Formative  Process  taken  by  itself, 
in  which  the  World,  separated  from  God  and 
hence  material,  longs  for  the  First  Mover  and  so 
produces  Motion,  the  active  forming  principle. 
Second  is  the  Cosmical  Process,  which  deals  in 
general  with  the  formed  world  and  its  move- 
ments—  the  physical  Cosmos  as  such.  Third  is 
the  Human  Process,  which  treats  of  the  rise  of 
the  soul  of  man,  which  is  the  returning  principle 
of  the  Cosmos  out  of  the  primal  separation  of 
matter. 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  formulary  of  Physics 
has  much  in  common  with  that  of  Plato  whose 
general  outhne  is  followed.  Still  there  are  im- 
portant  differences.  Both  of  course  connect 
their  physical  science  with  the  antecedent  Meta- 
physics, though  Plato's  point  of  connection  is  the 
archetypal  Idea  after  which  the  Demiurge  pat- 
terns the  Cosmos,  while  Aristotle's  point  of  con- 
nection is  the  First  Mover  whose  perfection 
Matter  (which  is  given  from  the  start)  desires 
and  so  produces  the  movements  of  the  Cos- 
mical Order.  The  one  Process  of  Physics  dis- 
rupting itself  into  three  divisions  which  are  also 


AJtIS  TO  TL  £"  S  PII YSI CS.  4 1 1 

Processes  we  ui:ij  see  in  the  following  ex[)ljina- 
tions. 

1.  The  Formative  Process.  This  can  hardly 
be  called  the  Creative  Process  (as  it  may  be  in 
the  corresponding  place  of  Plato's  Physics) 
since  there  is  here  no  world-forniino-  Demi- 
urge  as  person  patterning  Matter  after  the  Idea. 
Of  him  Aristotle  has  gotten  rid  in  the  physical 
realm,  which,  however,  longs  for  the  perfection 
of  God  as  the  unmoved  IMover,  and  so  moves 
toward  Him,  really  in  order  to  get  rid  of  Motion 
(or external  determination).  The  Cosmos  longs 
to  be  God,  the  moveless  Mover,  or  better  still. 
Thought  thinking  Thought,  self-conscious  Be- 
ing. But  there  is  the  alienation  or  separation, 
(steresis)  pure  Matter  (hi/Ie),  which  is  eternal 
and  thus  eternally  persists  in  producing  Motion. 

(1)  Already  we  have  considered  the  Supreme 
Being  as  He  (or  It)  is  in  Himself,  that  is, 
metaphysically.  But  He  has  also  a  physical 
relation  as  the  source  of  Motion.  (2)  Matter 
is  that  which  is  moved  in  Aristotle,  not  directly 
that  which  is  formed  by  the  Demiurge  as  in 
Plato.  It  is  the  potential  whose  essence  it 
is  to  become  actual,  whereby  we  again  come 
to  Motion  as  (3)  Entelechy  or  the  poten- 
tiality of  matter  realized.  Hence  Aristotle  in 
his  technical  way  considers  Motion  to  be  the 
Entelechy  of  Matter  or  the  process  of  Matter 
manifested.     Accordingly,    in  Phj^sics  we   have 


412         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  keep  in  miud  the  first  Mover,  the  first  Moved, 
and  that  which  partakes  of  both  the  Mover  and 
the  Moved  —  the  Cosmos,  Nature. 

God,  the  unmoved,  does  not  seem  to  mean 
that  He  is  not  moved  from  within,  but  that  He 
is  not  determined  from  without.  If  He  be 
self-conscious  and  thinks  Himself,  He  has  to 
have  so  much  inner  movement.  But  He  deter- 
mines what  is  outside  of  Him,  the  material 
world  which  desires  Him,  yet  is  itself  eternally 
separated  from  Him.  This  is  the  dualism  of 
Nature  which  shows  itself  just  in  Motion — the 
world  externally  determined  yet  seeking  to  be 
self-determined  or  self-conscious.  The  forma- 
tive Process,  be  it  of  generation  and  destruction, 
of  qualitative  or  quantitative  change,  is  the  Entel- 
echy  or  the  potential  becoming  actual,  and  there- 
fore lies  in  the  object,  in  its  nature  or  character. 
Motion  is  the  desire  of  the  outer  to  be  inner,  and 
forms  the  world  in  the  effort. 

2.  The  Cosmical  Process.  We  have  just  seen 
the  Cosmos  produced,  but  as  a  thing  produced  it 
also  must  have  its  Process,  which  keeps  it  going. 
Its  essence  is  still  Motion.  But  it  is  Motion 
embodied  in  its  own  distinct  world,  which  is  not 
controlled  directly  by  the  will  of  the  Demiurge, 
but  through  material  objects  themselves  in  their 
desire  for  the  First  Mover.  But  here  enter 
secondary  relations,  name]}',  those  of  the  mov- 
ing  objects   to  one   another,  for  they  both  im- 


AEIS  TO  TL  E'  S  PIl  YSICS.  4 1 3 

part  to  others  and  receive  from  others  the 
original  Motion  coming  from  the  First  IMover. 
Thus  a  principle  of  conflict  enters,  since  the 
Motion  sprung  of  their  desire  may  collide  with 
the  INIotion  of  some  other  object. 

Still  out  of  these  conflicting  materials  the 
cosmical  Process  brings  forth  order,  the  Cosmos. 
A  brief  outline  of  this  varied  field  mav  be  mven. 

(1)  The  cosmical  Process  as  embodied  has 
certain  underlying  ideal  elements,  which,  how- 
ever, Aristotle  conceives  with  a  sensuous  sul>- 
strate.  He  defines  space  as  "  the  limit  of  the 
surrounding  body  "  {PJiys.  TV .  6)  which  body 
is  thus  conceived  as  containing  a  space  which  is 
always  the  same.  Space  is  not  regarded  as  in- 
finite by  Aristotle ;  it  does  not  circumscribe  the 
world,  but  the  world  circumscril>es  it,  limits  it 
to  itself.  Time  is,  however,  infinite  in  Aristotle, 
but  potentially  so,  as  the  infinite  can  only  be 
potential,  not  actual.  Time  is  the  measure  or 
number  of  Motion,  which  is  Time  actualized  in 
Space.  But  the  infinity  of  Time  can  be  fully 
actualized  only  in  the  Cycle,  which  is  the  self- 
returning  movement;  thus  the  total  Cosmos 
revolves  upon  itself  forever.  Nature  in  the 
day,  the  month  and  the  year,  suggests  these 
ever-returning;  cvcles  of  Time  in  bodies  movinoj 
through  Space. 

(2)  These  moving  bodies  form  the  visible 
Cosmos,  which  may  be  called  real,  in  contrast  to 


414         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PBILOSOniY. 

the  previous  ideal  or  abstract  elemeDts  —  Space, 
Time,  the  Cycle  —  which,  however,  are  not  con- 
ceived by  Aristotle  in  their  pure  abstraction  (the 
modern  way)  but  with  a  material  substrate.  The 
real  or  embodied  Cosmos  consists  of  the  First 
Heaven,  which  supports  the  Fixed  Stars  and 
revolves  as  a  solid  vault  on  its  axis,  being 
attracted  immediately  by  the  First  Mover.  This 
sphere  of  the  Fixed  Stars  communicates  its 
motion  to  the  lower  Spheres,  hence  it  is  double, 
both  moving  and  moved.  But  these  lower  or 
planetary  Spheres  (the  Second  Heaven)  are 
many,  each  having  its  own  Sphere  and  Motion, 
and  they  revolve  about  the  Earth  as  their  center, 
which  is  the  center  of  the  Cosmos.  Still  they 
also  have  their  own  movement  in  opposition  to 
the  o-eneral  movement.  Here  enters  the  fact  of 
individuality,  or  special  capacity  of  each  body, 
which  it  asserts  ao;ainst  being  moved  from  with- 
out  by  the  moved  Mover,  the  sphere  of  the  Fixed 
Stars.  Finally  is  the  central  sphere,  the  Earth, 
which  is  declared  not  to  revolve  on  its  own  axis, 
and  to  be  the  realm  of  finite  Motion  in  contrast 
with  the  infinite  cyclical  Motion  above.  This 
fanciful  scheme,  though  supplanted  by  the  Co- 
pernican  theory,  we  still  have  to  study  when  we 
read  Dante,  especially  his  Paradiso. 

(3)  The  cosmical  Process  has  an  End  (feJos) 
or  goal  toward  which  it  is  moving  and  which  is 
the  inner  cause  of  Motion,  or  the  Final    Cause* 


ARISTOTLE' S  niYSICS.  415 

so-called.  Though  Aristotle  combats  Plato's 
conception  of  a  World-Soul,  he  puts  into  the 
World  something  very  similar.  All  Nature  is 
regulated  by  an  order,  which  has  a  purpose. 
Aristotle  refuses  to  call  the  Cosmos  an  animal 
(with  Plato),  still  it  is  animated  by  a  design 
which  it  strives  to  realize,  namely  perfection.  In 
a  famous  saying  he  declares  that  God  and  Nature 
do  nothing  in  vain;  the  study  of  Natural 
Science  is  to  penetrate  this  universal  end.  So 
Aristotle  also  has  the  conception  of  a  World- 
Soul,  which  is  a  truly  Greek  conception,  going 
back  apparently  to  the  Milesians  with  their 
hylozoism,  but  is  quite  fully  elaborated  by  Plato 
(see  preceding  p.  320)  who  makes  the  Demiurge 
create  it,  and  assigns  to  it  a  mathematical 
character.  In  these  respects  Aristotle  is  differ- 
ent; still,  he  too,  has  a  living  soul  in  the  World 
with  an  End  which  is  the  source  of  all  activit}'. 
So  it  comes  that  the  chief  function  of  Natural 
Science  is  to  discover  the  laws  of  the  movement 
toward  the  End  or  the  Final  Cause.  We  must 
indeed  carefully  investigate  the  individual  ob- 
ject, but  such  investigation  is  not  science  till  it 
be  correlated  with  the  universal  End  of  total 
Nature. 

All  this  may  sound  as  if  Nature  proceeds  with 
conscious  deliberation  in  formino;  the  world  after 
her  design,  like  the  artist  who  makes  a  statue. 
But    Aristotle    declares    that  even    thouoh    the 


4 1 G         A  NCIENT  E  UR  OPE  A  N  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

artist  should  proceed  unconsciously,  he  still  has 
the  End  outside  of  himself,  in  his  work,  while 
Nature  has  her  End  inside  herself.  She  is  the 
maker  and  the  made,  she  has  the  End  but  it  is 
immanent  in  her  own  form  or  forms.  Still, 
owing  to  the  resistance  of  the  material  in  which 
she  works,  she  may  produce  a  monstrosity  —  she 
fails  to  realize  her  End.  Nay,  she  produces  a 
line  of  imperfect  shapes  in  her  ascent  toward  per- 
fection. Here  enters  the  conception  of  arise  of 
Nature  unfolding  herself  through  a  series  of 
forms  more  and  more  perfect  towards  the 
supreme  End,  which  can  only  be  God.  This  rise 
seems  to  begin  with  the  inora^anic,  ascending 
through  the  organic  up  to  the  conception  of 
Nature  with  her  End. 

Reviewing  the  Cosmical  Process  as  a  whole, 
we  find  in  it  primarily  the  Cosmical  Elements 
(Space,  Time,  the  Cycle)  ;  then  comes  the  Cos- 
mical Body  (the  First  Heaven,  the  Intermediate 
or  Planetary  World,  and  the  Earth)  ;  third  is  the 
Cosmical  End  which  is  manifested  in  the  Cos- 
mical Body  showing  the  ascent  of  Nature  (the 
Inorganic,  then  the  Organic,  which  reaches  up  to 
man  with  his  Soul). 

Aristotle  has  a  descent  in  the  Cosmos  whose 
lowest  stage  is  Matter,  which  resists  the  End 
with  its  moving  and  shaping  power.  But  at  the 
extreme  point  begins  the  ascent  which  is  the 
movement  of  Nature  through  and  toward  its  End. 


ABISTOTLE'S  PHYSICS.  417 

Plato  owing  to  his  repugnance  to  the  phj'sical 
world  as  a  whole,  seems  to  make  the  descent 
deeper,  and  so  places  the  rise  and  return  at  a 
different  point. 

3.  Man  —  The  Human  Process.  This  is  essen- 
tially psychical ;  Nature  produces  a  body  having 
a  soul,  which  soul  is,  in  Aristotelian  phrase, 
"  the  body's  first  Entelechy,"  is  the  living  body 
as  potential  made  actual  in  the  soul's  Process. 
(De  Anima  II.  1).  Or  the  essence  of  the  body 
(the  ousia  of  the  on')  is  the  soul.  Or  in  stiU 
different  categories,  the  body  is  Matter  of  which 
the  soul  is  Form. 

To  Aristotle  belongs  the  credit  of  having  first 
grasped  Psychology  as  a  distinct  science  (the 
treatise  De  Anima).  To  be  sure,  psychical 
phases  had  been  noticed  by  previous  philosophers 
and  partially  ordered,  especially  by  Plato.  But 
to  separate  the  science  of  the  soul  from  its 
immediate  adjuncts,  and  to  look  at  it  as  it  is  in 
itself,  begins  with  Aristotle.  On  the  one  hand 
he  connects  it  with  the  body  and  so  gives  to  it  a 
physical  side  ;  on  the  other  he  defines  it  w^ith  his 
metaphnsical  categories  (Entelechy,  etc.).  That 
it  is  ultimately  the  soul  which  makes  these  cate- 
gories does  not  enter  his  head.  The  supreme 
creativity  of  the  soul,  the  Creative  or  Formative 
Reason  (N^ous  poietikos)  comes  to  man  from  the 
outside,  and  departs  from  him  with  his  decease, 
apparently  lent  to  him  for  a  lifetime. 

27 


418         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PniLOSOPHT. 

A  fully  ordered  and  connected  sj^steni  of 
Psychology  is  not  to  be  found  in  Aristotle.  His 
book  is  composed  of  shreds  of  organization,  but 
it  is  not  organized  as  whole.  Still  he  emphat- 
ically suggests  that  there  is  such  an  organic 
Whole,  but  it  is  to  be  developed  by  time.  The 
most  that  can  be  done  b}'^  us  is  to  present  some 
of  these  fragments  as  ordered  by  him  here  and 
there. 

1.  First  is  the  division  of  the  soul  into  three 
fundamental  forms  or  stages  in  ascendino;  order  ."^ 
the  vegetative  or  nutrient,  the  animal,  and  the 
rational.  The  vegetative  function  belongs  pri- 
marily to  the  plants,  but  is"  taken  up  also  into 
animal  life,  which  has  feeling,  sense-perception, 
and  locomotion.  Those  again  are  all  found  in 
man,  who  has  in  addition  Reason  (JSTous). 

2.  In  the  lower  stages  of  intellection  Aristotle 
has  made  some  important  distinctions.  What  he 
calls  Phantasy  is  the  soul's  power  of  retaining 
the  image  after  the  perception  of  the  object. 
This  image  may  rise  involuntarily  in  memory 
mneme),  or  voluntarily  in  Recollection  {anam- 
nesis). All  these  furnish  materials  for  the  still 
higher  activity  of  JSFous. 

3.  In  general  Aristotle  sees  and  affirms  not 
only  in  his  book  on  the  soul  but  also  in  his  Meta- 
physics, the  supremacy  of  J^ous,  Reason,  Intel- 
ligence, Thought.  The  dominating  purport  of 
his  Philosophy    is  that    Thought   is    essentially 


AUTSTOTLE'S  PHYSICS.  419 

creative  of  the  object,  which  conception  we 
found  already  in  Socrates.  It  indeed  underlies 
the  whole  Athenian  movement.  "We  saw  the 
Metaphysics  of  Aristotle  culminating  in  Thouo-ht 
thmking  Thought;  the  Phvsics  we  now  behold 
ascending  to  man  whose  distinctive  trait  is  de- 
clared to  be  this  Eeason  or  Thought  (N^ons). 

But    here  arises  a  great  difficulty.     Aristotle 
makes    a   distinction   in    this  Eeason  which  h:is 
probably    given  more  trouble  to  his  readers  and 
commentators  than  any  other  passage  in  his  works, 
being   aggravated  by  the  fact  that  it  involves  a 
religious  question,  the  belief  in  the  immortality 
of  the    soul.     There    are   two    kinds    of   N'ous. 
First  is  the  Passive   B-eason  (jVous  pathetil^os), 
the  receptive  element  of  the  soul,  under  which 
term  Aristotle  would  include  sensation,  memory, 
and  imagination,  and  even  reflection.     Still  the 
Passive   Eeason  has    to  respond  to  the  external 
object,  in    so  far  as  to  take  its  impression,  and 
thereby  to  reproduce  it  as  copy.     In  this  con- 
nection our  philosopher  uses  the   famous  com- 
parison of  the  mind  to  a  tabula  rasa,  or  to  the 
white  sheet  of  paper  upon  which  the  outer  world 
inscribes   itself.     Here    also  can  be  applied  an- 
other well-known  philosophic  expression :   Xihil 
in  intellectu,  quod  nonfueritinsensu.     The  Pas- 
sive   Eeason   thus  represents  the  mind  as  deter- 
mined   by  the  outside  sensuous    world,    and  is 
declared  by  Aristotle  to  be  perishable. 


420         ANCIENT  EUBOTEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Then  comes  the  second  kind  of  JSfous,  called 
the  Active  or  Formative  Reason  (N'ous  poietikos) . 
To  it  Aristotle  applies  a  distinctive  set  of  predi- 
cates. First,  it  is  separate  (choriston)  from  the 
soul;  vrhile  other  activities  are  not  separable. 
It  comes  from  without  [fhurathen) ,  and  "  it  is 
divine  alone."  This  seems  to  mean  that  it  comes 
from  God  or  the  Absolute  Being.  Moreover  it 
is  impassive,  immaterial,  immortal.  How  it 
individualizes  itself  and  co-operates  with,  the  Pas- 
sive Reason,  from  which  it  always  remains 
separate,  and  what  becomes  of  it  after  the  disso- 
lution of  the  mortal  Passive  Reason,  is  not  told 
by  the  philosopher.  Yet  the  mind  "  can  think 
nothing^ "  without  this  Formative  or  Creative 
Reason. 

We  can  well  understand  why  many  commenta- 
tors have  interpreted  this  view  of  the  soul  pan- 
theistically,  that  is,  as  inconsistent  with  individ- 
ual immortality.  So  in  ancient  times  the  Stoics, 
and  the  later  exegete  Alexander  of  Aphrodisias ; 
so  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  Arabian  Peripatetics, 
followed  by  many  expositors  of  the  modern 
period  down  to  the  present  day.  And  yet  there 
are  strong  grounds  for  thinking  that  Aristotle 
could  not  have  regarded  his  supreme  God,  the 
immovable  and  indivisible,  in  this  way.  How 
could  a  divinity,  whose  character  is  to  be  eter- 
nally by  himself  alone,  impart  himself  to  many 
individuals?     From  the  outside  (  whence  Aristo- 


ARISTOTLE'S  PHYSICS.  421 

« 
tic  does  not  say)    the  Creative  Soul  enters    the 
body  or  rather  the  individual,  being  pre-existent; 
then  it  departs  unsullied  after  the  death  of   the 
body,  being    post- existent,  very    much  like  the 
Platonic  Idea.     And  here    again    we    note  that 
Aristotle,  with    certain    changes,  chiefly  in    his 
nomenclature,  falls  back  upon  his  master  Plato. 
In  regard  to   the  Passive  Eeason,  it  can  take 
and  preserve  impressions  of  the  external  object ; 
whence  does  it  get   this  power?     On  the  other 
hand,  the  external  object  has  the  power  of  stim- 
ulatinof    the    iniaoje    in    the   Passive  Reason  — 
whence  does  the  object  get  such  a  power?     Thus 
both  sides,  the  mind  and  the  object,  or  the  im- 
pressed and  the  impressing,  call  for  a  common 
creative  principle  which  is  over  both  and  unites 
both.     Also  the  two  kinds  of  JVotis  have  a  com- 
mon principle  indicated  in  the  name.     Repeat- 
edly  Aristotle    declares    that  the    thinking    act 
and    the    object    thought     are    one,     or     that 
the    mind    thinking    the    object,     thinks    itself 
in    the    object.       Now    this    is     the     essential 
function  of  the  Creative  or  Formative  Reason: 
it  sees  itself  as  the  generative  principle  of  the 
world,  which  world  is  what  images  itself  in  the 
Passive   Reason,  while   this    in   turn    stimulates 
the  Creative  Reason  to  think,  that  is,  to  repro- 
duce the  stimulating  world.     We  can  only  say 
that  such  seems  to  be  the  process  whereby  Aris- 
totle  connects  together  his  two  kinds  of   JVouf} 


422         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

with  the  Noximenon.  Furthermore  the  state- 
ment may  be  allowed  that  the  Passive  Reason 
can  attain  to  knowledge  or  the  cognition  of  the 
object  (^ejnsteme) ,  but  that  Creative  Reason  at- 
tains to  the  recognition  of  the  object  (fheoria) 
as  itself,  as  its  own  self -reproduction.  In  other 
words,  all  coo;nition  becomes  recoo-nition  throuo;h 
the  Creative  (or  Speculative)  Reason. 

We  find  a  third  kind  of  JSTous  mentioned  in 
Aristotle,  the  Practical  Reason,  which  considers 
thought  as  antecedent  to  action.  This  kind  of 
N^ous  also  has  a  creative  power,  being  able  to 
transform  and  regenerate  the  entire  nature  of 
man.  At  this  point,  however,  we  begin  to  enter 
the  sphere  of  Ethics.  Accordingly  we  ma}' 
consider  the  Psychology  of  Aristotle  as  round- 
ing itself  out  with  three  kinds  of  Nous  or 
Reason:  (1)  The  Passive  Reason  which  repro- 
duces the  impress  of  the  object,  from  image 
to  cognition;  (2)  The  Creative  or  Formative 
Reason,  which  reproduces  the  object  making  such 
impress;  (3)  The  Practical  Reason  which  repro- 
duces and  makes  over  the  entire  soul  of  man, 
bringing  him  to  lead  a  life  in  accord  with  the 
supreme  End,  or  with  true  Being. 

The  JSTous  Poietikos  which  we  translate  Forma- 
tive or  Creative  Reason  has  a  decided  resem- 
blance to  the  Domiurge  of  Plato  both  by  its 
name  and  character.  Its  name  is  applied  by 
Aristotle  to  artistic  production  [poiesis)  in  which 


ABISTOTLE' 8  PHYSICS.  423 

the  arti.st  tran.sforms  the  given  material  into  his 
work.  So  the  Demiurge  uses  Matter  as  his  given 
material  for  world-forming.  The  Formative 
Eeason  of  Aristotle  enters  the  soul  from  without 
and  enables  it  to  think,  that  is,  to  re-create  the, 
world  as  Thought .  But  the  Formative  Reason 
is  as  distinct  from  the  soul  as  such,  as  is  the 
Demiurge  from  the  Cosmos.  Aristotle,  however, 
seeks  to  get  rid  of  the  Platonic  Demiurge  by  his 
doctrine  of  Motion,  which  is  the  potentiality  of 
Matter  becoming  actual.  Having  thus  banned 
the  demiurgic  soul  out  of  the  Cosmos  apparently 
forever,  Aristotle  nevertheless  lets  him  in  at 
the  last  corner  of  it  w  hen  the  human  soul  has  to 
be  endowed  with  an  original  world-forming 
power.  Thus  our  philosopher,  after  getting  out 
of  Plato,  docs  not  get  rid  of  him  really,  but  has 
to  drop  back  (or  perchance  forward)  into  him  in 
the  final  outcome.  So  Aristotle  shows  himself 
again  unable  to  transcend  the  Platonic  dualism, 
which,  if  he  fully  succeeded  in  doing,  would  be 
to  transcend  Philosophy  itself.  But  he  remains 
the  philosopher  still. 

At  this  point,  then,  the  Physics  of  Aristotle 
concludes  with  its  three  Processes — Formative, 
Cosmical,  and  Human.  In  the  latter  the  soul 
rises  out  of  nature  and  becomes  ethical,  where- 
with the  transition  to  the  third  stage  of  the 
philosophical  Norm  has  taken  place.  The  fore- 
going  Philosophy  of  Nature    has    shown  God's 


424         ANCIENT  EUEOPE^AN  PHILOSOPHY. 

part,  the  World's  part,  and  Man's  part  in  the 
total  process  of  the  Cosmos,  which  process 
involves  the  separation  from  God  and  the  over- 
coming of  this  separation  in  the  soul's  return 
to  God.  Through  this  return  man  and  vrith 
him  the  Universe  become  ethical,  and  the  phi 
losophic  Norm  rounds  itself  out  with  being 
ethical  also  by  means  of  its  third  stage,  which 
is  now  to  be  set  forth. 

C.  Ethics. 

Under  this  title  are  included  several  different 
treatises  by  Aristotle  —  three  works  on  Ethics, 
the  Politics,  the  Rhetoric,  and  the  Poetics. 
These  various  productions  are  loosely  joined  to- 
gether, and  it  is  not  easy  to  find  their  connecting 
links.  The  three  ethical  treatises  taken  by 
themselves,  will  not  cohere;  nay,  the  main  one, 
the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  does  not  form  a  self- 
consistent  whole.  Aristotle  sometimes  seems 
to  regard  Ethics  as  an  adjunct  or  branch  of 
Politics;  then  again  the  two  are  treated  as  co- 
ordinate divisions  of  a  higher  science,  which 
has  to  do  with  the  entire  sphere  of  human 
action,  namely  Practical  Science.  It  should  be 
tiddcd  that  two  of  the  treatises  on  Ethics  —  the 
Eudcmian  and  the  Great  Ethics  —  have  been 
suspected  to  be  not  genuine  works  of  Aristotle. 

Still  there  is   in  Aristotle  the  outhne,   even  if 


ARISTOTLE'S  ETHICS.  425 

vjigue  in  places,  of  a  sphere  which  nmy  be  called 
ethical  in  the  wider  sense,  embracing  Morals  and 
Politics,  and  possibly  Poetics.  Thus  there  ap- 
pears an  order  in  this  sphere,  not  fully  explicit 
in  the  philoso})her,  but  which  an  expositor,  look- 
ing back  at  it  in  the  ]io;ht  of  its  succeedins^  evo- 
lution,  can  see  and  unfold  in  a  more  definite 
shape. 

The  ethical  sweep  of  Aristotle  shows  in  a  gen- 
eral way  the  return  of  man  to  True  Being  which 
is  Thouo;ht  thinking  Thcnioht,  or  God.  The 
same  return  essentially  we  find  in  Plato's  Ethics, 
though  the  outcome  is  different,  since  True 
Beinij  in  Plato  is  the  Idea,  or  the  abstract  Good. 
The  supreme  ethical  attainment  in  Aristotle  is 
the  vision  of  the  Divine  (^theoria).  Says  he: 
"  Such  an  activity  is  the  best  though  it  is  ours 
but  for  a  short  time."  (See  the  well-known 
passage  in  Met.  XL  7,  1072  h.).  Man  cannot 
continuously  have  this  theoria,  as  God  has,  but 
he  can  rise  to  it  through  an  ethical  discipline. 
Thus  he  shares  temporarily  in  the  eternal  nature 
of  God,  attaining  therein  blessedness  throuo;h 
the  vision  of  perfection.  "  Theoria  is  the  most 
delightful  and  the  most  excellent"  of  all  things, 
the  supreme  attainment. 

Here  again  we  have  to  see  that  Aristotle  moves 
on  the  great  general  lines  which  Plato  laid  down, 
though  with  significant  differences.  Even  Aris- 
totle cannot  help  having  a  return  and  restoration 


426         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  luaa,  after  some  kind  of  desccut,  for  the 
ground-work  of  his  Ethics.  He  may  avoid  the 
couception  of  a  lapse  through  Nature,  or  a  pri- 
mordial fall;  still  there  is  a  descent  from  the 
First  Mover  down  through  the  First  Heaven  and 
the  Second  Heaven  to  the  Earth  and  Matter. 
When  he  comes  to  man,  he  puts  both  tendencies 
into  the  human  soul,  the  lower  and  the  higher, 
the  irrational  and  the  rational.  At  this  point 
begins  or  may  begin  the  ethical  rise,  for  the 
soul  has  also  Will,  which  is  the  power  of 
subordinating  its  lower  elements  to  its  higher, 
or  to  Reason,  who  is  finally  to  be  enthroned  in 
man  somewhat  like  the  First  Mover,  toward 
whom  all  the  imperfect  and  finite  elements  of  the 
soul  move  as  toward  the  perfect  and  the  infinite. 
In  fact,  this  movement  of  the  separated,  imper- 
fect soul  unto  the  perf  ect  Reason  is  the  Will  of 
Aristotle,  corresponding  to  that  Desire  in  the 
Cosmos  for  the  First  Mover,  whereby  resulted 
all  Motion  in  the  physical  world. 

Ari  stotle  denies  the  pre-existent  soul  of  Plato. 
Yet  we  have  seen  on  a  previous  page  how  closely 
he  brushes  to  it  in  his  conception  of  the  Forma- 
tive or  Creative  Reason  {^N^ous j^oietlkos) ,  which 
enters  the  human  soul  from  without  sonie- 
whence  and  survives  the  death  of  the  body  and 
the  evanishment  of  the  Passive  Soul.  Thus  it 
is  something  separate  (chorision),  existent  in 
and    throui>;h     itself.     Now    this    Formative    or 


ABISTOTLE'S  ETHICS.  427 

Creative  Eeason  i,<  the  essential  ethical  prin- 
ciple in  man,  which  is  to  unite  him  with  the 
Divine,  '  even  for  a  httle  Avhile  "  in  this  life. 
Plere  there  seems  to  be  a  pre-existent  element 
in  Aristotle's  conception  of  the  soul,  and  it  is 
this  element  which  makes  it  ethical. 

From  these  statements  we  can  see  that  Ethics 
in  Aristotle  also  constitutes  the  third  stase  of 
the  philosophical  Norm  whose  two  previous 
stages  were  Metaphysics  and  Physics.  The  cul- 
mination of  Metaphysics  was  the  theological  Pro- 
cess, to  whose  highest  principle  Ethicsis  the  return 
of  the  soul  from  its  extreme  alienation  in  the  irra- 
tional Body,  through  its  rise  to  the  Divine,  whose 
Process  is  given  in  Metaphysics.  Herein  we  find 
that  san)e  ultimate  underlying  psj^chical  move- 
ment which  we  found  in  Plato,  and  which  we 
shall  find  in  all  Philosophy.  At  the  same  time 
Ethics  will  have  its  own  Process,  showing  a 
comj^lete  psychical  movement  within  itself, 
whose  stages  are  the  following :  — 

First  is  Avhat  we  may  call  Personal  Ethics, 
which  shows  the  Good  inmiediately  real- 
ized in  the  conduct  and  life  of  the  individual 
through  the  Will.  Second  is  the  Good  in  con- 
duct (or  possibly  its  opposite)  represented  in  a 
work  of  art,  particularly  in  the  drama,  whereby 
the  good  character  is  separated  from  its  imme- 
diate doing  (praxis)  and  is  made  to  manifest 
itself  through  a  new  form  of  production  (j^oiesis). 


428         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  is  the  fickl  of  Poelics.  Third  is  Institu- 
tional EtJiics,  showing  the  Good  realized  iu  In- 
stitutions, especiallj  the  State,  whose  object  is  to 
reinforce  the  Will  of  the  Individual  in  realizing 
the  Good  in  his  conduct  and  life,  wherein  we  see 
the  return  to  Personal  Ethics.  Such  is  the  pro- 
cess within  the  ethical  sphere  which  is  itself  a 
return  of  man  to  the  metaphysical  sphere,  partic- 
ularly to  the  Divine  part  thereof,  whose  essence 
he  is  to  make  his  own. 

Such  is  Aristotle's  ethical  scheme  as  a  whole, 
though  some  portions  of  it  are  by  no  means  so 
adequately  wrought  out  as  others. 

1.  Personal  EtJiics.  Aristotle  seeks  not  so 
much  the  G(jod  in  itself  as  the  Good  in  man  and 
what  is  good  for  him.  The  Idea  (here  of  the 
Good)  must  bo  realized  in  the  individual.  In  this 
respect  he  contrasts  with  Plato,  w^ho  begins  with 
the  Good  as  Idea,  while  Aristotle  must  have  from 
the  start  the  Good  individualized  in  man.  Still  he 
keeps  the  Good  as  the  ultimate  end  in  which  all 
other  and  lower  ends  culminate  and  which  is, 
therefore,  the  means  for  ethicizing  human  con- 
duct. Now  what  is  the  Good,  or  the  end  wdiich 
all  individuals  strive  for?  Aristotle's  answer  to 
this  question  is  Happiness  (eudmmonia). 

But  such  a  term  is  still  indefinite  and  the  phi- 
losopher proceeds  to  limit  it  and  to  explain  it.  It 
is  not  pleasure,  for  he  declares  that  pleasure 
cannot  be  the  motive  of  right  conduct,  though  it 


AniSTOTLE*S  ETHICS.  429 

be  the  result.  To  complete  Happiness  belong 
external  goods,  wealth,  health,  even  good-luck  ; 
still  these  are  not  the  essence  of  it.  True  Hap- 
piness lies  in  man's  noblest  activity,  that  of 
Reason;  self-realization  of  his  highest  manhood 
is  the  happy  state.  The  man  doing  his  best  in 
the  best  thing  that  he  can  do  best,  may  be 
deemed  the  happy  man.  The  work  must  be 
done  for  its  own  sake  on  the  one  hand,  yet  also 
for  the  sake  of  the  doing,  which  is  the  highest 
activity  and  which  is  Happiness.  This  highest 
activity  producing  Happiness  is  the  activity  which 
is  distinctively  man's:  namely.  Reason.  Such 
rational  activity  must  have  its  own  name  and  is 
called  Virtue.  But  there  are  mimerous  forms 
and  stages  of  rational  activity,  hence  at  this  point 
comes  the  division  of  Virtue  into  the  Virtues. 
At  the  start  this  division  is  twofold  in  Aristotle  — 
the  diauoetic  and  the  moral  (Eth.  JSfic.  I.  13, 
15. )  The  first  is  the  development  of  the  rational 
element  in  itself,  the  second  is  the  proper  sub- 
ordination of  feeling  and  appetite  to  this  rational 
element.  A  double  moral  discipline  is  here  sug- 
gested: that  of  the  higher  (Reason)  within  itself, 
and  that  of  the  lower  which  is  to  obey  the 
higher. 

Besides  these  two  kinds  of  Virtue,  Aristotle 
suggests  the  third  kind,  natural  or  physical  Vir- 
tue. For  Nature  of  herself  longs  for  the  Good, 
though  obstructed    by    IMatter,  and  the  lower  or 


430         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

appetitive  soul  tends  of  itself  to  Reason  and  so 
possesses  its  own  peculiar  Virtue,  which  is  thus 
the  normal  or  natural  product  of  human  instinct 
and  desire.  So  when  we  put  his  divisions  to- 
gether, he  seems  to  have  three  kinds  of  Virtues  — 
the  immediate  or  physical,  the  subordinated 
or  ethical,  the  self-determined  or  theoretic 
(dianoctic). 

After  these  three  general  divisions  Aristotle 
proceeds  to  consider  the  single  Virtues.  Each  is 
a  mean  between  two  vices  which  are  its  extremes; 
thus  true  courage  lies  between  cowardice  and 
rashness.  Virtue  is  a  process  of  the  soul  which 
unites  and  reconciles  its  own  opposites,  being 
really  a  continual  return  out  of  its  own  separa- 
tion. As  this  continual  activity  or  process,  it  is 
emphasized  by  Aristotle  as  a  habit  (hexis). 

To  regard  Virtue  as  a  mean  between  two 
extremes  is  open  to  objection,  since  it  is  likely  to 
be  misconceived.  It  suggests  as  man's  supreme 
action  the  conduct  of  the  trimmer  and  the  tem- 
porizer. Still  the  deed  of  Virtue  is  not  to  strike 
the  balance  between  two  opposing  principles,  but 
to  realize  the  best  self,  the  highest  conviction  of 
what  is  the  Good.  Aristotle's  mean  must  finally 
be  regarded  not  as  an  end  in  itself,  but  as  a 
means  for  attaining  this  supreme  ethical  end. 
In  the  ultimate  Virtue  (fheoria)  we  cannot  seek 
the  mean,  there  is  no  too-much,  even  if  there  be 
a  too-little.     Virtue  as  mean  is    determined  by 


ARISTOTLE'S  ETHICS.  431 

reason  as  arbiter,  and  thus  presupposes  knowl- 
edge. We  have  to  know  the  two  extremes  as 
vices  in  order  to  establish  the  mean  as  Virtue. 

The  supreme  ethical  attainment  in  Aristotle  is 
the  theoria  (vision,  contemplation  of  the  Divine 
as  habit).     This  brings  with  it  the  highest  hap- 
piness, or  blessedness.     It  is  a  participation  in  the 
perfection  of  the  Absolute  Being,  in  the  pure  self- 
conscious  One  of  the  Universe.     It  is  the  highest 
dianoetic  Virtue,  sometimes  called  theoretic  Virtue 
in  the  rather    unstable    nomenclature    of   Aris- 
totle.    The    ultimate    end  (felos)  of  man    is  to 
make  himself  Thought  thinking  Thought  {noesis 
noeseos).     Such  a  man  is  verily  the  philosopher, 
is  just  this  Aristotle,  to  produce  whom  his  ethi- 
cal   and  metaphysical  doctrines   unite.     This  is 
the  sweep  of  his  whole  philosophy,  its  innermost 
method,  which  is  not   found  in   his  logical  Or- 
ganon.     The  supreme    principle    of    Aristotle's 
Philosophy  is  thus  the  intellectual  vision  of  the 
process  of  the  All,  and  is  grounded  in  his   per- 
sonal charater,  in  his  very  selfhood,  whose  hio-h- 
est  delight  or  blessedness  is  to  see  in  everything 
this  Thought  thinking  Thought.     Hence  comes 
all  true  knowledge,  or  science  itself.     The  scien- 
tific man  is  thus  the  moral  man  in  the  supreme 
sense.     This  does  not  mean  (with  Socrates)  that 
knowledge  is  virtue,  but   rather   that   virtue    is 
knowledge ;  man  is  not  good  in  proportion  as  he 
knows,  but  rather  he  knows  in  proportion  as  he 


432        ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PIIILOSOPIIY. 

is  good.  Nature,  Aristotle  often  asserts,  has  as 
its  end  the  good;  so  man  is  naturally  good, 
though  by  his  own  will  he  can  become  bad. 

A  certain  order  we  may,  therefore,  find  in 
Aristotle's  ethical  writings,  though  not  without 
uncertainties.  (1)  He  has  the  natural  or  instinc- 
tive Virtue  in  which  Nature  is  considered  good. 
(2)  But  he  has  also  the  subordination  of  this 
instinctive  natural  element,  in  which  Nature  is 
not  considered  good.  Here  is  the  realm  of  the 
rational  versus  the  irrational,  with  Reason  deter- 
mining Virtues  by  the  mean  between  two  ex- 
tremes or  vices,  which  are  natural.  (3)  But  the 
highest  Reason  and  the  highest  Virtue  come  to- 
gether in  the  tJieoria  already  defined,  for  now 
Reason  is  what  Virtue  is  and  Virtue  is  what  Rea- 
son is.  Thus  the  cycle  is  complete  :  Aristo'Je's 
Philosophy  has  unfolded  the  Ethics  out  of  the 
Metaphysics,  and  then  the  former  back  into  the 
latter. 

2.  Artistic  E tides — The  Poetics.  Aristotle 
elaborated  a  doctrine  of  the  Fine  Arts,  but  to 
find  its  place  in  tlie  system  is  not  easy.  Only  a 
single  fragment  (the  Poetics)  belonging  here, 
has  come  down  to  us,  and  this  leaves  in  doubt 
many  important  matters.  It  would  seem  that 
Aristotle  conceived  of  a  sphere  embracing  all  the 
artistic  products  of  man's  intelligence,  including 
the  useful  as  well  as  the  fine  Arts,  which  were 
the  result  of  construction  (jwiesis),  in  contrast 


ARISTOTLE'S  ETHICS.  433 

with  action  (praxis).  The  science  of  the  latter 
would  be  Ethics,  of  the  former  Poetics  in  a  wide 
sense. 

From  the  existing  treatise  called  the  Poetics 
(in  a  narrow  sense),  we  see  that  Aristotle  (like 
Plato)  regards  the  essence  of  Art  to  be  imita- 
tion. Still  the  object  imitated  is  not  merely  this 
particular  thing,  but  is  the  universal,  the  genus. 
Herein  is  that  characteristic  which  we  observed 
at  the  start  in  Aristotle  :  the  essence  or  idea  is  not 
to  be  separated  from  the  manifestation  (which 
is  particular)  but  is  one  with  it,  constituting  the 
reality  (see  preceding,  p.  378-9).  Thus  Art  is 
to  manifest  the  universal  as  immanent  in  the  in- 
dividual object,  and  this  is  the  artistic  imitation 
of  it  mentioned  by  Aristotle.  But  Plato  would 
cast  away  all  Art  as  the  imitation  of  the  Appear- 
ance, or  the  Appearance  of  Appearance.  This 
is  his  general  trend,  though  he  is  not  always 
consistent.  But  in  this  sphere  Aristotle's  most 
famous  dictum  is  that  poetry  is  truer  (more  phi- 
losophical) than  history,  since  the  particulars  of 
the  former  are  so  chosen  and  set  forth  as  to 
reflect  the  universal  more  adequately  than  do  the 
events  of  the  latter.  Still  Aristotle  does  not 
deny  that  there  is  a  philosoph}^  of  history,  and 
he  specially  indicates  that  there  is  a  history  of 
philosophy. 

We  have  a  right  to  say  that  Aristotle's  concep- 
tion of  Art  is  ethical,  since  the  artistic  individual 

28 


434         ANCIENT  E  UB  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

is  to  represent  what  is  rational  and  universal. 
The  tragic  catharsis  or  purification  is  certainly 
ethical  in  some  form  or  degree.  There  has  been 
much  discussion  about  the  exact  meaning  of  this 
catharsis.  Tragedy  must  show  in  the  death  of 
its  hero  the  law  of  his  deed,  or  the  universal 
consequence  of  his  act ;  he  does  not  perish  merely 
through  an  accident.  The  catharsis  comes  to  the 
spectator  by  beholding  the  universal  law  in  the 
particular  career  of  the  tragic  character.  Art 
and  specially  tragedy,  according  to  Aristotle, 
ethicizes  the  individual  through  its  catharsis. 

For  this  reason  we  would  place  the  Poetics  and 
Art  generally,  according  to  its  Aristotelian  con- 
ception, as  an  element  or  stage  in  the  total  ethi- 
cal Process,  which  shows  man's  discipline  unto 
the  Good.  Already  our  philosopher  sees  that 
Art  is  fundamentally  ethical,  though  it  may  turn 
to  the  opposite  of  its  true  purpose.  The  expos- 
itors of  Aristotle  have  had  great  difficulty  in 
finding  the  right  position  of  the  Poetics  in  his 
total  system.  Usually  it  is  put  last,  which 
means  that  it  is  thrown  outside  and  cannot  be 
co-ordinated  with  the  whole.  Such  an  act  of  de- 
spair is  not  to  be_  thought  of.  We  cannot 
doubt  that  Aristotle  held  that  Art,  by  its  repre- 
sentation both  of  Gods  and  Men  in  their  action 
and  character,  was  a  great  ethical  trainer  of  the 
race . 

Moreover,  in  ordering   it,  we  can  well  place  it 


ARISTOTLE'S  ETHICS.  435 

in  the  second  stage  of  the  entire  ethical  Process, 
since  the  artist  separates  the  individual  from  his 
immediate  world  of  action  and  projects  him  into 
a  new  world  of  art  in  which  his  action  and  char- 
acter are  represented.     The  spectator    thus    be- 
holds an  ideal  ethical  discipline,  even  the  Divine 
itself  manifested  in  visible  shape,  whereby  he  re- 
ceives or  may  receive  for  his  own  life  and  con- 
duct purification.     While    the  Art- World    thus 
works    upon  the  Eeal  World,  and  helps  to  make 
it  ethical,  there  is  a  third  World,  that  of  Institu- 
tions, which  according  to  Aristotle  has  the  same 
purpose  of   rendering  man  ethical,  of   bringino- 
about  his  return  to  a  participation  in  tlie  Divine. 
3.  Insfitutional Ethics.    Aristotle,  in  harmony 
Avith  Plato,  is  convinced  that  the  individual  alone 
cannot  become  truly  virtuous ;   he  must  have  in- 
stitutions to  assist  him.     All  virtue  is,  therefore, 
primarily  political,  is  determined    by  the  State 
which   for   the  Greek  is   the    chief   institution. 
The   Family   is    considered    at   some  length  by 
Aristotle  in  his  Politics,  also  the  Social  or  Eco- 
nomic Order;  but  the  all-comprehending  institu- 
tion for  him  is  the   State,  which  is  an  ethical 
entity   likewise,  higher  and  more   perfect  than 
the  individual,  who  is  not  ethically  self-sufficient 
without  the  State.     It  is  true  that  Aristotle  has 
treated  of  Personal  Ethics  as  a  sphere  quite  by 
itself,  in  which  the  individual  is  shown  rising  to 
virtue  through  his   own  inner  development  and 


436         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

effort.  This,  however,  is  but  one  side  or  stage 
of  the  total  process ;  an  outer  institutional 
counterpart  must  co-operate  for  his  training, 
practice,  and  persistence  in  virtuous  conduct. 

Thus  we  see  a  sphere  of  Institutional  Ethics 
turning  back  to  the  sphere  of  Personal  Ethics, 
confirming  it  and  even  reproducing  it  in  the  in- 
dividual by  education.  Also  right  conduct  is 
enforced  in  the  State  by  law.  The  object  of  the 
State  according  to  Aristotle  is  not  simply  the 
protection  of  person  and  property,  not  simply  to 
secure  internal  welfare  and  to  ward  off  external 
foes,  but  is  likewise  to  produce  the  highest  virtue 
in  the  citizens,  who  are  to  obtain  happiness 
through  the  State.  As  already  set  forth,  their 
happiness  can  only  be  produced  by  rational  ac- 
tivity of  the  individual,  who  is,  therefore,  by 
reason  of  the  State  to  attain  his  supreme  self- 
realization,  which  is  Virtue. 

But  this  Virtue  we  have  seen  differentiating 
itself  into  three  main  Virtues  —  phj^sical,  moral, 
and  dianoetic.  But  how  do  these  arise  in  the 
individual  citizen?  Only  through  the  State 
which  thereby  gets  the  benefit  of  them  in  turn. 
Already  we  have  seen  the  individual  in  possession 
of  these  three  kiuds  of  Virtues  (under  the  head 
of  Personal  EtJilcs)  ;  we  have  also  heard  that 
the  individual  obtains  them  through  the  co- 
operation of  the  State.  Next  is  the  question: 
Whence  comes  this  State? 


ABISTOTLE'S  ETHICS.  437 

Man  is  a  State-making  animal  (poUtikon  zoon) 
says  Aristotle.     The    State    evolves    bv  nature, 
man  builds  it  instinctively,  as  the  bird  builds  its 
nest.     Aristotle  regards  the  State  as  before  the 
individual,  it  is  the  total  organism  of  which  the 
individuals  are  parts  or  members ;  it  is  the  ethical 
Whole  from  which  these  parts  or  members  derive 
then-    ethical    character.        Aristotle    shows    his 
State  as  a  growth,  which  unfolds  through  the 
Family  and  the  Village  Community ;  it  is  a  natural 
product.     Plato's  State  is,   on   the  contrarv,  an 
ideal  projection,  and  yet  manifests   a   relapse   to 
the    past,  to    something    like    the  Village  Com- 
munity, in  a  number  of  its  features. 

Aristotle's  State  unfolds  into  many  forms, 
such  as  Aristocracy,  Democracy,  Monarchy,  each 
with  a  good  and  a  bad  representative.  These 
forms  he  discusses  in  some  detail.  On  the  whole 
Aristotle  manifests  aristocratic  and  autocratic 
leanings.  Barbarians  are  to  be  enslaved,  the 
rulers  are  the  citizens  with  equal  rights  and  with 
nothing  to  do  except  to  govern,  unless  a  super- 
eminent  man  ni^pears,  who  is  to  be  the  absolute 
monarch. 

Education  is  to  be  deemed  the  chief  duty  of  the 
State  in  Aristotle.  If  the  end  of  existence  is 
to  unfold  the  supreme  rational  activity  of  man, 
and  if  this  end  can  only  be  attained  through  the' 
State,  then  the  Litter's  main  function  is  "educa- 
tion of   the  citizen  who  is  so  to   administer   the 


438         ANCIENT  EUBOFEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

State  that  it  may  perform  its  work,  namely, 
reproduce  himself.  The  highest  product  of  the 
State  must  be  the  philosopher,  the  man  who 
is  capable  of  Theoria,  or  Thought  thinking 
Thought. 

It  ma}^  therefore,  be  said  that  in  Aristotle 
the  State  exists  for  the  philosopher,  while  in 
Plato  the  philosopher  exists  for  the  State.  It  is 
true  that  Plato  also  holds  that  the  State  is 
necessary  to  make  men  virtuous,'  to  train  them 
into  the  idea  of  the  Good.  But  when  indi- 
viduals are  so  trained,  the}'  are  rulers,  guardians 
(in  the  Republic) ,  the  highest  class  in  the  State. 
The  philosopher,  by  virtue  of  his  training,  has 
to  be  a  ruler  in  Plato's  State,  but  no  such  ne- 
cessity hangs  over  him  in  Aristotle's  State. 
Even  the  philosophic  individual  Plato  would  not 
permit  to  run  free,  but  remands  him  to  his 
institutional  place.  But  with  Aristotle  he  may 
be  a  ruler  or  not.  Plato's  School  has  its  end 
in  the  State,  or  indeed  is  the  State;  per  contra, 
the  State  has  its  end  in  Aristotle's  School,  and 
exists  supremely  to  make  Aristotelian  philos- 
ophers. 

Aristotle's  State  interferes  with  the  individual 
from  the  beginning ;  it  tries  to  say  whether  he 
shall  be  born,  and  if  born,  whether  he  shall  live. 
The  supply  of  individuals  is  to  be  regulated 
by  the  State.  The  child,  once  granted  the  right 
to   exist,    is   to    bo   educated   according  to   the 


ARISTOTLE'S  ETHICS.  439 

scheme  of  the  State,  which  seeks  to  cull  forth 
in  it  the  three  great  divisions  of  virtues,  phj^s- 
ical,  moral,  and  dianoetic.  Gymnastic  training 
is  the  chief  means  for  the  first,  upon  which 
Aristotle  in  his  Politics  gives  us  a  number  of 
observations.  Music  in  the  narrower  sense 
(not  including  poetry)  is  the  chief  ethical  dis- 
cipline for  the  youth  —  an  unusually  high  place 
for  it  according  to  modern  notions.  At  this 
point  Aristotle's  scheme  of  education,  as  set 
forth  in  his  Politics,  is  brought  to  a  sudden 
close,  possibly  owing  to  the  fragmentary  char- 
acter of  the  work. 

What  we  most  miss  is  Aristotle's  views  on 
education  is  the  dianoetic  virtue,  or  the  supreme 
training  to  rational  activity.  To  make  his 
scheme  complete,  he  should  have  shown  how 
the  individual  is  to  be  educated  into  participa- 
tion in  the  highest  philosophic  principle,  which 
is  Thought  thinking  Thought  [iioesis  iioeseos). 
Thus  the  State  through  education  would  have 
mediated  the  return  of  every  born  (or  rather 
saved)  individual  to  the  Tlieoria,  to  that  exalted 
virtue  of  Contemplation  through  which  man 
shares  in  the  Divine. 

But  when  we  look  into  the  matter  more  closely, 
we  begin  to  spy  certain  reasons  which  may  have 
stopped  the  philosopher  from  carrying  out  his 
scheme  to  its  last  conclusion.  If  the  State  edu- 
cated the   man   upwards  into  the  pure  realm  of 


440        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHIL080PBY. 

theoretic  (dianoetic)  Virtue,  he  Avas  beyond  all 
practical  activity,  beyond  the  State  itself.  The 
great  end  of  education  is  the  contemplative  life, 
in  which  the  Will  is  quiescent.  The  State  is  to 
produce  the  philosopher  at  its  best,  but  the 
philosopher  at  his  best  is  not  to  produce  or  to 
administer  the  State.  That  would  be  a  descent 
from  the  lofty  pinnacle  of  the  Theoria.  Aris- 
totle's State  has  as  its  supreme  end  to  bring 
forth  an  Aristotle,  but  such  an  Aristotle  cannot 
bring  forth  his  own  State,  which,  however,  he 
has  brought  forth  seemingly  in  spite  of  his 
doctrine.  He  is  the  lofty  movens  non  motum ; 
the  State  is  to  move  toward  him,  but  he  cannot 
move  toward  the  State,  at  least  not  without 
degradino;  himself. 

Such  is  the  deep  separation  between  the  in- 
dividual and  the  State  in  the  last  outcome  of 
Aristotle's  political  Philosophy.  Really  it  is  a 
phase  of  that  dualism  inherent  not  only  in  Aris- 
totle's  but  in  all  Philosophy.  It  is  the  First 
Principle  controlling  not  controlled,  moving  not 
moved,  the  autocrat  of  the  Universe  who  is  desired 
but  desires  not,  who  is  loved  but  loves  not. 
The  State  must  long  for  Aristotle,  the  philoso- 
pher, and  seek  to  reproduce  him  as  the  quin- 
tessence of  its  activity  ;  but  Aristotle,  the  philoso- 
pher, is  not  to  long  for  the  State,  as  it  is  some- 
thing finite  and  lower  than  himself.  And  yet  he 
is  just  the  man  who    has  constructed  this  State, 


ABISTOTLE'S  ETHICS.  441 

and  so  must  have  longed  for  it  with  the  serious- 
ness of  a  man  seeking  to  help  his  country,  since 
it  is  no  mere  bubble  blown  for  the  pleasure  or 
the  dexterity  of  the  thing. 

Still  it  is  a  great  and  fruitful  thought  of  Aris- 
totle that  the  chief  function  of  education  is  to 
reproduce  in  every  soul  the  institutional  W'Orld. 
For  this  reason  the  State  must  support  education, 
which  supports  the  State  far  more  than  armies. 
It  would  be  well  for  modern  thinkers  on  educa- 
tion who  are  apt  to  dwell  so  exclusively  upon  the 
individual  element  of  it,  to  go  back  to  Aristotle 
and  learn  the  institutional  element  which  is  its 
deepest  ground  of  existence. 

Looking  at  Aristotle's  conception  of  the  State 
we  find  in  it  a  movement  embracing  the  follow- 
ing stages:  (1)  The  State  grows  by  nature, 
evolves  immediately  out  of  the  natural  man, 
through  various  grades  of  institutional  life.  (2) 
Its  end  is  to  produce  the  highest  virtue  in  its 
citizens.  (3)  This  end  is  to  be  attained  by  edu- 
cation, which  is  to  reproduce  in  the  individual 
the  entire  realm  of  institutions. 

Thus  the  ethical  process  as  conceived  by  Aris- 
totle has  completed  itself.  What  we  call  Insti- 
tutional Ethics  has  returned  to  and  reproduced 
Personal  Ethics,  making  the  individual  ethical. 
Still  further,  this  whole  sphere  of  Ethics  we 
liave  seen  going  l)ack  to  Metaphysics,  especially 
to  its  highest  activity,  which  is  Thought  thinking 


442         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PIIILOSOFIIY. 

Thought,  aud  making  the  same  live  in  the  con- 
duct of  the  individual.  The  philosophic  Norm  — 
Metaphysics,  Physics  and  Ethics  —  has  rounded 
itself  out  to  that  form  and  degree  of  complete- 
ness which  we  find  in  Aristotle,  and  which 
constitutes  the  distinctive  character  of  his  Phi- 
losoplw.  Already  we  have  seen  this  same  Norm 
in  Plato,  but  realized  so  differently  as  to  consti- 
tute the  Platonic  Philosophy  with  its  distinctive 
character.  And  with  many  diversities  this  same 
Norm  will  run  through  all  Philosophy,  and  will 
everywhere  show  the  like  excellence  and  the  like 
limitation.  The  philosopher  enounces  the  prin- 
ciple, the  law,  the  universal  freed  from  all 
caprice  and  change ;  but  he  leaves  himself  out 
as  the  determiner  of  this  law  or  principle  which 
determines  everything.  The  autocracy  of  Phi- 
loso})hy  is  sublimated  in  Aristotle's  God  who  is 
himself  motionless  and  emotionless,  though  the 
cause  of  all  motion  in  nature,  and  of  the  highest 
emotion  in  man,  namel}^  blessedness. 

Still  we  are  to  see  how  A^ast  a  step  Aristotle 
has  taken  in  this  formulation  of  the  one  supreme 
Deity,  which  is  verily  the  capstone  of  the  Hel- 
lenic Period  of  Greek  Philosophy.  He  has  seen 
and  asserted  the  essence  of  the  Universe  to  be 
self-conscious  Being,  which  signiifies  at  least  that 
the  basic  principle  of  all  things  or  of  the  All  is 
self-consciousness.  This  hardly  means  a  Person 
in  our  sense,  as  it  is  without  Will  and  Feeling. 


PLATO  AND  ARISTOTLE.  443 

But  this  very  abstraction  and  deification  of  the 
Intellect  as  the  central  principle  of  the  Universe 
makes  it  more  simple  and  impressive.  God  is 
henceforth  never  to  lose  the  self-conscious  In- 
tellect which  Aristotle  vindicated  for  Him, 
thouo-h  He  is  a^ain  to  be  endowed  with  Will  and 
Feeling  (or  Power  and  Love)  which  the  early 
Greek  thinker  took  from  Him,  when  He  mani- 
fested them  in  the  form  of  Oriental  caprice  and  ar- 
bitrariness. But  it  is  strange !  Hellenic  thought 
seeking  the  law  of  Being  and  looking  for  it 
away  from  the  Divine  has  come  back  to  the  God- 
consciousness  through  Aristotle.  In  fact  he 
has  affirmed  that  this  return  of  the  man  to  God 
is  the  innermost  movement  of  the  ethical  process, 
as  we  have  noted  in  studying  his  Ethics.  From 
this  point  of  view  Hellenic  Philosophy,  starting 
in  the  separation  observed  in  the  Milesian  Move- 
ment may  be  considered  an  unfolding  of  human 
Thought  into  Divine  Thought  as  the  principle  of 
all  things.  With  man  thinking  the  Thought  of 
God,  the  Science  of  God  (Theology)  becomes 
possible. 

Plato  and  Aristotle.  These  men  are  connected 
together  by  an  indissoluble  tie,  and  have  been 
for  twenty-three  centuries,  and  probably  will  be 
as  long  as  civilization  lasts.  They  present  many 
points  in  common  and  many  strong  contrasts. 
It  may  be  said  that  one  cannot  be  ade(|uately 
understood  without  the  other.     Their  lives  have 


444         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

fundamentally  the  same  general  outline  or  norm, 
though  there  is  much  diversity  in  incident  and 
content.  Paralellisms  might  be  drawn  indefi- 
nitely in  reference  to  their  careers,  their  writ- 
ings and  their  doctrines. 

The  basic  fact  in  all  these  likenesses  and  dif- 
ferences is  found  in  the  statement  already  often 
made :  they  belong  to  the  same  great  movement 
of  Athenian  Universalism,  and  therein  show 
sameness;  but  they  also  belong  to  different 
stages  of  that  movement,  and  therein  show  di- 
versity. Nothing  is  i)lainer  than  that  the  special 
effort  of  Aristotle  is  to  unify  the  separation  or 
dualism  which  is  in  Plato.  Equally  certain  is  it 
that  Aristotle  is  bound  up  with  Plato  in  the  one 
great  thought  which  finds  its  most  general  ex- 
pression in  the  proposition  that  the  essence  of 
Beinsr  is  the  Universal. 

But  now  we  have  reached  the  significant  and 
surprising  outcome  of  Aristotle's  philosophizing, 
which  is,  that  at  last  he  too  drops  backward  or 
rather  downward  into  dualism.  After  all  his 
polemics  against  Plato,  after  all  his  struggles  to 
unite  the  separation  of  the  Universal  and  the 
Individual,  of  the  Idea  and  the  Phenomenon, 
he  finally  divides  them,  and  leaves  his  Philoso- 
phy still  wrestling  with  or  rather  writhing  in 
their  contradiction.  This  point  we  shall  trace 
out  more  fully. 

1.  The  most  decisive  note  in  Aristotle  s  Meta- 


PLATO  AND  ABI8T0TLE.  445 

phi/sics  is  his  opposition  to  Plato's  separation  of 
the  Idea  from  the  Phenomenon,  of  the  Universal 
from  the  Particnlar.  He  affirms  the  immanence 
of  the  Universal  in  the  Particular  and  their  union 
in  the  Real  Thino;  ao-ain  and  as-aiu.  From  this 
we  might  infer  that  his  doctrine  is  that  the 
essence  of  Being;  is  the  Particular  or  the  Individ- 
ual.  But  he  with  equal  emphasis  affirms  that 
knowledge  is  of  the  Universal  and  not  of  the 
Particular,  that  science  has  to  do  with  general 
concepts,  not  with  individual  things.  So  after 
he  has  put  Plato's  Idea  back  into  the  Appear- 
ance, and  made  it  the  Eeality,  this  Reality  cannot 
be  known  as  such  but  only  the  Idea  of  it,  the 
Genus,  the  Universal.  Thus  he  returns  in  this 
first  point  of  his  Philosophy  to  dualism  (not 
Plato's  exactly),  after  having  united  its  two  sides. 
2.  When  we  come  to  Aristotle's  supreme  con- 
ception, that  of  God,  a  like  difficulty  presents 
itself.  Deity  with  him  is  self-conscious  Being, 
transcendent,  outside  the  world  and  its  process, 
essentially  uncreative  and  staying  with  Himself 
alone.  Such  separation  of  the  Divine  from  all 
manifestation  is  even  deeper  than  Plato's  supreme 
Idea,  for  this  is  not  self-conscious.  Nothing  can 
be  more  isolated  than  Aristotle's  God,  eternally 
contemplating  Himself  and  doing  nothing  else, 
whom  the  world  desires,  though  He  does  not 
desire  the  world.  Could  there  be  a  more  com- 
plete   expression    of     autocratic     haughtiness? 


446         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PniLOSOPHY. 

Yet  this  is  what  the  philosopher  is  to  appropriate 
in  order  to  become  ethical  in  the  highest  sense, 
in  order  to  attain  to  the  supreme  theoretic  virtue, 
that  is,  in  order  to  be  truly  the  philosopher,  who 
is  to  make  himself  a  hermit,  after  having  made 
God  a  hermit  and  put  him  on  top  of  the 
Universe. 

3.  The  Aristotelian  conception  of  Nature 
which  is  developed  in  his  Physics  shows  a  similar 
contradiction.  Aristotle  says  that  the  material 
world  has  a  desire  for  God,  which  can  only  cause 
it  to  move  toward  Him,  yet  it  is  certain  that  it 
also  moves  from  Him.  This  latter  power  Aris- 
totle seems  to  place  in  Matter,  which  is  an  energy 
also,  and  draws  the  world.  Thus  there  are 
two  antagonistic  powers  exerted  over  Nature 
from  opposite  directions.  It  would  not  be  far 
out  of  the  way  to  consider  him  as  imaging  two 
Gods  contending  for  the  mastery  of  Nature,  first 
the  one  prevailing  and  then  the  other.  So  there 
seem  to  be  in  Aristotle's  Physics  two  Motions 
coming  from  two  opposite  sources  and  wrestling 
in  a  kind  of  conflict  over  the  total  Cosmos  as 
their  arena. 

4.  Already  we  have  considered  the  dualism  in 
Aristotle's  conception  of  the  soul,  whose  immor- 
tal principle —  the  Creative  Reason  —  he  repre- 
sents as  coming  from  the  outside  and  co-operat- 
ing with  the  soul  during  life,  and  then  at  the 
death    of   the  individual  departing  unsullied  and 


PLATO  AND  ABISTOTLE.  447 

apparently  unchanged  liy  its  mortal  companion- 
ship. Thus  he  brings  together  two  souls,  or,  to 
use  his  own  expression,  two  kinds  of  ISfous  and 
harnesses  them  as  yoke-fellows,  till  one  of  them 
dies,  when  the  other  goes  his  way,  no  one  knows 
exactly  whither.  For  like  the  fabled  Dioscuri, 
one  of  them  is  mortal  and  the  other  immortal, 
the  latter  somehow  preferring  to  spend  a  part  of 
his  time  with  his  mortal  brother  on  earth,  out 
of  some  unknown  pre-existeut  affection  or  af- 
finity, which  our  philosopher  does  not  explain. 

5.  In  the  final  movement  of  Aristotle's  philos- 
ophy, the  ethical,  we  have  found  a  deep  separa- 
tion of  the  individual,  when  he  has  attained  the 
supreme  Virtue  (theoretic),  from  the  reality  b}' 
w^hich  he  has  attained  such  highest  end.  This 
reality  is  the  State,  which  he  is  to  make  (he 
being  defined  a  State-making  animal)  in  order  to 
become  virtuous.  Still  when  he  has  become 
virtuous  supremel}",  he  can  no  longer  have  any- 
thing to  do  with  State,  but  is 'to  occupy  himself 
with  TJieoria,  to  participate  in  divine  self-contem- 
plation. Thus  the  individual  as  virtuous  or  as 
philosopher  (for  both  are  the  same  in  this 
highest  sphere)  is  isolated  from  the  world  which 
produced  him,  and  is  as  transcendent  as  the 
Aristotelian  God. 

These  points  are  sufficient  to  show  the  funda- 
mentally dual  and  contradictory  character  of 
Aristotle's  philosophizing.       Primarily  his  move- 


448         ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPH Y. 

ment  is  toward  unifying  the  Platonic  dualism 
into  a  new  reality,  but  secondarily  this  reality 
develops  in  his  hands  into  a  fresh  dualism  and  a 
deeper  one  than  Plato's. 

Inevitably  the  question  forces  itself  to  the 
front,  What  is  the  signiticance  of  this  peculiar 
philosophic  evolution?  Sharp  critics  have  not 
failed  to  jDoint  out  the  above  difficulties,  often 
with  all  due  appreciation  of  the  greatness  of  the 
man  whom  they  criticise.  Usually,  however, 
they  regard  this  relapse  to  Platonism  (so  they 
mostly  deem  it)  as  the  grand  weakness,  if  not 
failure  of  the  Aristotelian  system. 

We  have  already  intimated  that  our  solution 
of  the  present  problem  is  altogether  different. 
Aristotle  in  his  completeness  has  to  be  conceived 
iu  this  double  and  contradictory  relation:  on  the 
one  side  he  is  unitary,  on  the  other  dualistic. 
As  the  third  stage  of  the  movement  of  Univers- 
alism  he  unifies  the  twofoldness  of  Plato,  who 
is  the  second  stas^e  of  the  same  movement  which 
finds  its  highest  expression  iu  Aristotle's  doc- 
trine that  the  essence  of  all  Being  is  self-conscious 
Being  or  Thought  thinking  Thought.  But,  as 
we  have  seen,  this  self-conscious  Being  at  once 
separates  itself  from  the  Whole,  from  the  Uni- 
verse as  it  were,  and  the  dualism  again  appears, 
another  dualism  after  Plato's  and  more  profound. 
It  is  at  this  point  that  Aristotle    winds    up  the 


PLATO  AND  ARISTOTLE.  449 

Hellenic  Period  aud  gives  a  glimpse  of  the  com- 
ing Hellenistic  Period. 

We  hold,  therefore,  that  Aristotle  even  in  his 
contradiction  is  deeper  than  Plato,   and  hence 
more  difficult  to  reach,  with  meaning  darker  and 
more   veiled.     Plato's    dualism   is   open,   frank, 
confessed  with  a  sort  of  defiance ;   he  scorns  the 
Particular,  and  despises  it  as  a  mere  appearance, 
a  vain  show,  a  lie,  which  is  to  be  throttled  at  the 
start   by  the  Idea.     For  this  reason  he  is  the 
philosopher  of  Europe,   not  so   hard  to  under- 
stand, at  least  in  his  general  trend,  though  some 
of  his  lateral  excursions  are  mysterious  enough . 
His  aristocracy  of  the  Idea  is  so  pronounced  as 
to    be   ready  to   wipe   out  the  Demos  called  the 
Phenomenon    or    the    Particular.      Aristocracy 
with  Plato  is  a  world-principle,  and  not  simply  a 
political  creed ;  the  Universe  is  aristocratic,  and 
is  to  be  exploited  by  and  for  a  select  set  of  the 
best.     Such  is  Plato's  message  whose  good  side  is 
not  to  be  forgotten :   he  puts  supreme  stress  upon 
the  excellent,  and  gives  himself  great  trouble  to 
find  it,  to  utter  it,  and  even  to  produce  it  in  man. 
But,  O  Plato,  be  not  so  exclusive  in  thy  pursuit 
and    recognition    of  the  excellent,   and  then  we 
shall  take  quite   a  slice  of  thy  aristocracy  and 
incorporate  it  in  our  democracy,  which  is  really 
the  whole  thing,  and  through  which  we   all  can 
participate  in  the  excellent,  all  mankind  becoming 
one  great  school  of  Platonic  philosophers.     But, 

29 


450        ANCIENT  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  such  an  event,  what  becomes  of  our  aristocratic 
Plato,  when  everybody  is  an  aristocrat? 

Aristotle  felt  the  inadequacy  of  the  Platonic 
view  and  sought  at  first  to  resist  it,  putting  the 
Idea  into  the  Phenomenon,  and  the  Universal 
into  the  Particular.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  this 
unity  he  at  last  dualizes,  and  he  cannot  help 
himself.  He  has  to  remain  a  philosopher,  though 
he  probes  to  the  very  heart  the  philosophic 
dualism,  reaching  it,  but  not  transcending  it. 
In  order  to  transcend  it  he  would  have  to  get  out 
of  Europe  which  had  in  his  age  barely  begun  its 
historic  career,  he  would  have  to  sliip  more  than 
twenty  centuries  of  time,  he  would  have  to  rise 
above  Philosophy  itself  and  ascend  into  an  entirely 
new  Discipline  of  the  World's  Spirit. 

It  is,  therefore,  the  supreme  greatness  of 
Aristotle  that  he  feels  and  unconsciously  struggles 
against  the  dualism  inherent  in  all  Philosophy, 
nay  in  the  European  consciousness  itself,  which 
had  been  so  powerfully  and  so  fascinatingly 
championed  by  Plato  with  his  unsurpassed  literary 
power.  When  we  see  Aristotle's  effort  to  put 
that  lofty,  all-dominating,  transcendent  Idea  into 
every  common  thing,  into  every  little  "nasty" 
particular  of  the  sensuous  world,  we  have  to  call 
him  prophetic  of  the  far-off  coming  time,  yea 
of  another  continent  with  its  new  institutional 
order,  which  not  only  exists  in  every  individual 
but   of   which    every   individual  has  to  be  con- 


PLATO  AND  ABISTOTLE.  451 

sciously  creative.     These  thoughts  of  his  stir  us 
as  does  the  thought  of  that  ancient  statesman  of 
Miletus  who  sought  to  introduce  a  Federal  Union 
among  the  Ionic  cities  of  Asia  Minor  more  than 
twenty-five  centuries  before  it  could  be  realized, 
which  realization  could  only  take  place  bej'ond 
the  limits  of  the  European  territory  and  bej^ond 
the  limits  of  the  European  consciousness.     Plato 
on    the   whole    (though    not  always   consistent 
herein)  disdains  to  make  his  Idea  creative  of  the 
Individual ;  Aristotle  seeks  to  do  just  this  on  one 
side  of  him  and  yet  on  another  side  does  quite  the 
opposite.     But  the  final  outcome  of  both  philoso- 
phers and  of  all  philosophy  is  the  new  and  com- 
plete thought  in  which  not  only  the  Idea  or  the 
Universal  determines  and  creates  the  Individual, 
but  also  the  Individual  wheeling  about,  in  his  turn 
determines   and  creates  the  Universal.     Man  is 
not  simply  to  be  controlled  by  Law  and  Institu- 
tion, but  is    to  make  the  Law  and  Institution 
which  control  him. 

Very  suggestive,  therefore,  is  Aristotle's 
attempt  to  solve  the  philosophic  dualism  so  im- 
pressively set  forth  by  Plato,  even  more  sug- 
gestive is  the  failure  of  this  attempt,  whereby 
the  Stagirite  is  landed  in  a  still  deeper  abyss  of 
the  Spirit,  which  the  coming  time  will  endeavor 
to  close  or  at  least  to  overarch. 

Such  limitations  we  may  see  in  these  great 
Athenian  philosophers,  looking  back  at  them  and 


452        ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL OSOPHT. 

judging  them  from  the  standpoint  of  a  new  order 
in  whose  evolution  they  themselves  are  among 
the  mightiest  factors. 

Heti'ospeci.  We  have  now  concluded  the 
originating  epoch  of  all  Philosophy.  The  pre- 
ceding Hellenic  Period  has  its  chief  significance 
in  being  the  genesis  of  Philosophy  itself,  which 
has  expressly  unfolded  into  its  Norm.  Primarily 
there  is  the  line  of  individual  philosophers,  each 
with  his  doctrine.  Then  comes  the  tendency  of 
these  philosophers  to  group  themselves  into 
schools,  which  further  arrange  themselves  into 
still  higher  groups,  and  these  ultimately  form  a 
Period.  But  this  is  not  the  end;  for  we  find 
that  the  Period  also  is  only  a  member  of  a  group 
of  Periods,  which  constitute  the  total  sweep  of 
Greek  Philosophy,  which  last  again  shows  itself 
to  be  a  member  in  still  larger  totality.  Thus 
the  Hellenic  period  is  composed  of  Elementalism, 
Atomism,  and  Universalism,  which  together  re- 
veal the  process  of  Hellenism  as  such  (as  dis- 
tinct from  the  following  Hellenisticism).  Yet 
each  of  these  members  of  the  Hellenic  process 
is  in  itself  a  process  similar,  though  not  the 
same,  having  its  own  members  or  stages,  which 
finally  reach  back  to  the  individual  philosopher 
whose  Ego  is  a  process  grasping  and  formulating 
in  its  own  way  the  process  of  the  All. 

On  the  one  hand  a  power  seemingly  external 
is   directing  and  arranging   the    single    philoso- 


PLATO  AND  ABISTOTLE.  453 

phers  into  groups,  and  then  forming  these 
groups  into  larger  wholes  in  some  mighty 
struggle  to  express  or  manifest  itself  as  the 
supreme  Whole,  the  Universe.  Yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  all  these  subordinate  groups,  smaller 
and  greater,  show  fundamentally  one  and  the 
same  process  or  method ;  they  have  a  common 
impress  by  which  we  see  them  to  be  members  of 
the  Universe  through  a  process  which  is  their 
own  as  well  as  that  of  the  All. 

Now  the  philosopher  is  a  philosopher  because 
his  entire  effort  is  to  seize  and  to  formulate  in 
abstract  terms  just  this  process  of  the  All  or  of 
the  Universe,  which,  when  he  has  abstracted, 
he  calls  the  Universal.  Hence  the  first  philo- 
sophic Period,  the  Hellenic,  has  to  grasp  this 
abstraction,  to  make  it  conscious,  and  to  state  it 
for  all  time.  Such  we  have  seen  to  be  the  per- 
sistent struggle  of  Hellenism  in  the  preceding 
exposition. 

The  power  which  apparently  determines  man's 
philosophic  Thinking  and  drives  it  forward  to  an 
ever-continued  repetition  of  itself  in  successive 
cycles,  little  and  large,  we  have  called  the  Pam- 
psychosis.  Yet,  if  it  determines  him  on  the  one 
hand,  on  the  other  he  determines  it,  putting  it 
into  his  thought,  into  his  own  inner  process. 
He  has  to  order  it  in  his  philosophizing,  for  just 
that  is  his  philosophy ;  still  it  orders  him  in  its 
development,   putting    him    into    his    place  in  a 


454         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

group,  a  movement,  a  period,  and  finally  in  the 
total  philosophical  Discipline  of  all  ages.  The 
philosopher,  in  seeking  to  utter  the  law  of  the 
Universe,  utters  the  law  of  himself,  indeed,  of 
the  Self  as  universal,  which  is  the  Pampsychosis. 
Such  utterance  is  the  spontaneous  expression  of 
his  own  deepest  nature,  of  his  spirit's  freedom; 
yet  the  process  of  his  spirit's  freedom  is  deter- 
mined by  the  process  of  the  Universe,  which  is 
the  Pampsychosis.  The  philosopher  is  a  kind 
of  legislator,  making  a  code  of  the  All ;  yet  this 
code  is  just  what  he  is  obeying  in  his  legislation. 
Thus  in  every  particular  Philosophy  are  united 
the  two  extremes :  the  Ego  of  the  philosopher 
and  the  movement  of  the  Universe.  Each  is  a 
process,  yes,  a  psychical  process;  hence  we  may 
say  in  technical  terms  that  the  Psychosis  of  the 
philosopher  determines  in  its  formula  the  Pam- 
psychosis which  in  turn  determines  the  Psychosis 
in  its  content,  and  also  determines  its  particular 
place  in  the  order  of  philosophic  evolution.  In 
Philosophy  as  such  the  Universe  is  seeking  to 
think  itself,  to  become  conscious  of  its  own 
process,  and  to  express  the  same;  but  it  can  do 
this  only  through  the  individual  philosopher  who 
belongs  to  a  certain  time,  city,  nation,  and  who, 
therefore,  stamps  ui)on  Philosophy  his  own  indi- 
vidual limits  and  those  of  his  period  and  race. 
So  it  comes  that  Philosoi)hy  the  one  divides  into 
Philosophies  the  many,  whose  varied  forms  nev- 


PLATO  AND  ARISTOTLE.  455 

ertheless  reveal  singly  and  iu  groups  the  one 
process  of  the  All,  seeking  but  not  attaining  its 
adequate  self-expression  in  an  historic  line  of 
systems  down  the  ages. 

It  has  been  already  stated  (see  pp.  74,  75) 
that  in  the  Hellenic  Period  the  total  soul  of  Hellas 
was  philosophizing,  breaking  forth  into  single 
Philosophies  and  then  into  cycles  of  these  single 
Philosophies,  which  must  have  been  determined 
by  some  Power,  Energy,  or  Spirit  beyond  the 
individual  philosopher.  His  thought  or  system 
was  taken  up  into  a  larger  process  of  which  he 
could  not  have  been  conscious ;  Xenophanes  the 
Eleatic,  could  hardly  have  been  aware  of  the 
place  of  his  principle  in  the  total  movement  of 
Eleaticism,  still  less  of  its  place  in  the  much 
wider  and  longer  sweep  of  Elementalism.  And 
yet  it  has  its  place  not  only  in  these  two  move- 
ments, but  also  in  the  yet  vaster  movements  of 
Hellenism  and  of  all  Greek  Philosophy.  What 
is  the  ordering  principle  of  these  ever-widening 
cycles  of  philosophic  processes,  extending  farther 
and  farther  beyond  the  consciousness  of  the  in- 
dividual philosopher,  yet  making  him  always  a 
stage  of  the  movement  somewhere,  and  even  giv- 
ing to  him  the  ultimate  purpose  and  content  of 
his  thinking?  It  can  only  be  the  psychical  pro- 
cess of  the  Universe  itself  which  we  have  so  often 
pointed  out  and  named  the  Pampsychosis,  inti- 
mating thereby  that  it  must  be  grasped  as  the 


456         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

process  of  the  Absolute  Self,  triune,  self-con- 
scious, creative  of  all  selfhood,  and  hence  the 
process  of  Processes,  or  the  Psychosis  of  all 
Psychoses,  just  the  Pampsychosis. 

But  not  alone  the  Hellenic  soul  was  at  work 
during  the  present  Period,  for  this  too  was  a 
stage  in  the  greater  totality  of  Greek  Philosophy, 
whose  process  again  is  a  stage  of  the  entire  move- 
ment of  European  Philosophy.  So  there  is  a 
power  above  all  these  philosophical  stages,  indeed 
above  the  philosophical  Norm  itself  after  whose 
pattern  Philosophy  fashions  itself,  or  is  fash- 
ioned spontaneously  by  the  thinking  mind  of  the 
philosopher.  For  that  man  is  the  philosopher 
who  has  spiritual  possession  of  this  philosophic 
Norm,  and  employs  it,  not  as  an  external  instru- 
ment whose  use  he  has  learned,  but  through  the 
native  bent  of  his  genius  as  the  most  direct  and 
natural  expression  of  his  very  selfhood.  Such  a 
man  cannot  help  himself :  he  has  to  follow  the 
philosophic  Norm,  both  in  its  grandeur  and  in 
its  limitation,  whenever  he  utters  what  is  deepest 
within  him. 

Still  the  Pampsychosis  as  the  process  of  the 
Universe  is  not  confined  to  the  philosophical 
Norm,  but  is  evolving  it  into  another  and  higher 
Norm,  which  Ave  have  called  the  psychological 
(see  Introduction,  pp.  24,  29,  31,  etc.).  Lying 
underneath  all  Philosophies,  and  lurking  quite 
unconsciously  in  the  thought  of  all  philosophers 


PLATO  AND  ABISTOTLE.  457 

is  this  unborn  Norm,  yet  struggling  to  be  born 
whenever  the  time  is  ripe  and  the  environment  is 
calling  for  its  achievement.  Already  we  have 
noticed  that  Aristotle  sending  down  the  plummet 
to  the  deepest  depth  of  his  thought,  came  upon 
the  limit  of  the  philosophical  Norm  with  its 
dualism,  and  lay  there  helplessly  stranded, 
though  his  keen  eye  had  seen  and  had  sought  to 
remedy  the  same  difficulty  in  Plato.  But  such 
is  the  struggle  of  all  Philosophy,  whose  whole 
historic  movement  shows  the  effort  to  evolve 
itself  out  of  its  own  Norm  continually  becoming 
inadequate  and  demanding  a  new  and  more  com- 
plete formuhition,  which,  however,  will  at  last 
develop  the  same  old  trouble. 

The  Pampsychosis,  emplo3^ing  the  philosophic 
Norm,  has  now  unfolded  through  the  Hellenic 
Period  to  the  point  of  formulating  the  essence  of 
Being  as  Thought  thinking  Thought,  of  declar- 
ing the  Universe  to  be  self-thinking  or  self-con- 
scious.  Such  is  the  lofty  attainment  of  Hellenic 
Intellect  in  Aristotle.  But  the  Will  is  left  out 
of  this  supreme  principle  called  God  by  the  phi- 
losopher, who,  however,  vindicates  for  man  the 
Will  to  attain  such  a  height  and  to  participate  in 
the  Divine.  Aristotle,  therefore,  rises  to 
Thought  thinking  Thought,  but  does  not  reach 
Will  willing  Will;  he  has  a  world  of  Free 
Thought  as  absolute  and  autocratic,  but  not  a 
world  of  Frce-Will  asserting   freedom    for   the 


458         ANCIENT  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

individual.  Aristotle's  God  does  not  and  can- 
not love  man,  so  occupied  is  He  vrith  the  con- 
templation of  His  own  perfection ;  the  Universal 
as  divine  cannot  humanize  itself  or  really  indi- 
vidualize itself.  But  just  this  is  what  must  next 
take  place,  is  the  coming  chief  philosophical 
labor. 

It  is  true  that  Aristotle  begins  with  putting  the 
Universal  into  the  Particular,  bringing  Plato's 
Idea  down  into  reality,  and  making  it  the  Real 
Thing.  And  this  strand  will  run  through  his 
whole  philosophic  career.  But  then  there  is 
the  other  and  deeper  strand  above  mentioned, 
quite  the  opposite,  in  which  he  is  seen  separat- 
ing his  first  principle  and  holding  it  aloof  from 
all  reality,  whereby  he  passes  into  a  dualism 
bej^ond  Plato's.  We  have,  therefore,  to  say 
that  the  process  of  the  Universal  as  Will  enter- 
ing into,  transforming  and  even  becoming  the 
individual,  belongs  not  to  Aristotle,  not  to  the 
Hellenic  Period,  but  is  the  supreme  philosophic 
task  of  the  Hellenistic  Period,  which  is  to  take 
up  the  Universal  inherited  from  Plelleuism,  and 
to  make  it  individual  in  the  World,  in  Man,  and 
in  God.  This  is  the  task  to  which  we  have  now 
to  address  ourselves. 


CHAPTER  SECOJVD.—  THE  HELLEN- 
ISTIC PERIOD. 

From  a  mighty  movement  of  concentration  we 
pass  to  a  movement  of  expansion  still  mightier, 
longer,  more  extended.  From  one  city  there  is 
a  going  forth  of  its  great  spiritual  acquisitions 
to  many  cities ;  from  one  people  and  race  to 
many  peoples  and  races ;  from  essentially  one 
Philosophy  to  many  Philosophies  with  their 
Schools  ;  from  one  individual  to  many  individuals 
if  not  to  all;  from  the  one  supreme  activity  of 
the  man  through  the  Intellect  to  the  total  man  in 
all  his  activities  through  the  Will  also.  Such  is 
the  marvelous  overflow  of  Philosophy  from  its 
one  center,  and  its  fertilization  of  the  whole  civ- 

(459) 


4G0         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PIIILOSOrHY. 

ilized  world  as  well  as  of  the  whole  individual 
within.  From  these  facts  we  may  catch  the  gen- 
eral thought  of  the  transition  from  Hellenism  to 
Hellenisticism. 

Still  we  shall  find  not  a  few  indications  of  the 
counter  movement,  which  seeks  to  bring  together 
this  expanding  multiplicity  into  unity.  The  in- 
dividual unfolds  and  exploits  himself  with  vast 
diversity,  still  this  diversity  we  shall  see  encom- 
passed and  subordinated  to  law  —  to  the  outer  law 
in  the  Roman  Empire,  and  to  the  moral  law 
which  is  at  first  subjective  in  Ethics  but  which 
becomes  realized  in  the  Christian  Eeligion. 

I.  In  Hellenisticism  we  behold  the  Universal 
which  has  been  attained  in  the  Hellenic  Period 
passing  into  the  Individual,  parting  itself  from 
the  one  and  imparting  itself  to  many  ones,  thus 
individualizing  itself.  So  we  shall  employ  a  brief 
formula  for  the  Hellenistic  Period :  the  Univer- 
sal individualized,  specially  in  man,  since  the 
Universal  is  to  enter  into,  transform,  and  so 
ethicize  his  very  Self.  Accordingly  we  may  fol- 
low the  line  of  previous  formulations  with  the 
statement:  the  essence  of  Being  (the  oiisia  of 
the  071^  is  now  the  Universal  individualized,  or 
if  we  put  the  stress  upon  the  process,  the  Univer- 
sal individualizing  itself.  This  thought,  quite 
abstract  and  possibly  not  very  intelligible  at  the 
start,  will  run  through  and  counect  together  all 
Hellenisticism,  as  well  as  suggest  its  relation  to 


TEE  EELLENISTIC  PERIOD.  461 

the  previous  Hellenism.  It  may  be  added  (as 
will  be  later  unfolded  more  fully)  that  if  the  Uni- 
versal makes  itself  individual,  it  follows  that  this 
individual  in  turn  must  make  itself  Universal.  If 
the  Whole  divides  psychically,  each  division  must 
have  the  process  of  the  Whole.  Such  is  the  in- 
ner germ  of  the  entire  Period,  which,  however,  it 
is  well  to  look  at  discursively  from  several  points 
of  view  before  entering  upon  the  detailed  organic 
movement. 

II.  This  second  Period  in  the  total  sweep  of 
Greek  Philosophy  is  called  the  Hellenistic,  its 
thought  is  no  longer  purely  national  and  Hellenic, 
but  the  world  outside  of  Greece  is  Hellenizing 
{hellenizein,  from  which  verb  the  above  term  is 
derived).  The  conquests  of  Alexander  who  was 
a  pupil  of  Aristotle,  broke  through  the  purely 
Hellenic  boundary  and  brought  not  only  Greek 
armies  but  the  Greek  spirit  into  the  Orient, 
which  soon  began  to  show  its  influence  in  various 
ways,  especially  in  the  cultivation  of  Philoso- 
phy. Afterwards  world-conquering  Rome  stud- 
ied and  appropriated  certain  phases  of  Greek 
Philosophy,  which  thereby  passed  from  its 
national  to  its  universal  supremacy,  being  the 
universal  discipline  of  the  civilized  world  both 
in  the  East  and  in  the  West. 

The  nations  and  the  tribes  which  the  Greeks 
deemed  barbarous,  being  non-Greek,  have  neces- 
sarily  changed    this    pure    Hellenic    culture   in 


462         ANCIENT  E  UR GPEAN  PHIL  OSOPH  Y. 

adopting  it  and  in  passing  it  through  their  own 
mental  alembic;  they  have  made  it  their  oivn, 
have  barbarized  it  by  the  very  act  of  assimila- 
tion; thus  they  have  to  a  degree  transformed 
their  spiritual  conqueror  while  accepting  his 
sway.  So  Hellenic  spirit  in  all  its  forms,  push- 
ing beyond  its  original  bounds,  becomes  Hellen- 
istic ;  separating  from  its  primal  creative  sources 
it  coalesces  with  foreign  elements,  which  in  time 
return  and  transform  it  in  its  native  seats.  A  re- 
ciprocal influence  between  the  two  sides  can  be 
traced  throughout  the  present  Period,  so  that  if 
Hellas  hellenizes  Barbary,  similarly  though  by 
no  means  so  profoundly  Barbary  barbarizes  Hel- 
las. Or,  we  may  say,  Hellenism  is  now  to  vanish 
into  Hellenisticism,  with  which  are  connected 
many  changes. 

In  the  first  place,  what  we  designated  as  the 
topographical  movement  of  Greek  Philosophy, 
its  outermost  spatial  presentation,  whirls  about  as 
it  were  on  its  Athenian  center,  and  sweeps  from 
within  outwards  in  all  directions.  This  is  in  the 
sharpest  contrast  with  the  topographical  move- 
ment of  the  previous  Hellenic  Period,  in  which 
we  saw  Philosophy  bursting  forth  on  the  peri- 
phery of  the  Greek  world  at  divers  places,  and 
thence  gathering  itself  into  the  central  city  of 
that  world,  where  it  had  its  grand  culmination  in 
its  three  greatest  individuals,  Socrates,  Plato,  and 
Aristotle.     But  now  this  centripetal  tendency  is 


THE  HELLENISTIC  PERIOD.  463 

changed  into  a  centrifugal,  which  will  radiate 
Philosophy  from  its  central  Sun  not  simply  back 
again  to  its  Hellenic  borders,  whence  it  started,  but 
far  beyond  them,  to  the  very  rim  of  civilization 
in  Orient  and  Occident.  So,  after  concentrating 
at  Athens,  it  must  separate  from  it,  becoming 
emanative  through  Space  and  down  Time. 

Athens  will,  however,  continue  to  be  for  along 
period  the  center  of  philosophic  culture,  though 
it  will  have  to  share  its  honors  with  other  rising 
centers,  inEhodes,  in  Pergamus,  in  Tarsus,  inAn- 
tioch,  in  Rome.  Finally  the  supremacy  will  dis- 
tinctly pass  to  Alexandria,  with  its  unparalleled 
library  said  to  have  contained  700,000  volumes 
in  the  first  centuries  of  the  Christian  era ;  it  also 
had  a  zoological  collection,  and  a  botanical  gar- 
den, both  of  vast  proportions,  for  the  study  of 
biological  science;  mathematicians,  astronomers, 
geographers  were  gathered  there  through  the 
unrivaled  facilities  afforded  by  the  Ptolemies ; 
we  even  hear  that  scholars  were  entertained  at 
public  expense  without  regard  to  nationality. 
Nothinof  like  that  in  the  modern  world ;  no 
University  of  to-day  would  think  of  such  a 
programme.  But  the  chief  significance  of  Alex- 
andria lies  in  the  fact  that  it  was  the  point  in 
which  Oriental  Religion  and  Greek  Philosophy 
met,  clashed,  and  then  coalesced,  laying  the 
foundations  for  a  new  European  Religion,  and 
with  it  a  new  European  "World. 


464        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOiSOPHY. 

III.  Thus  we  observe  the  second  Period  of 
Greek  Philosophy  as  a  whole  to  be  separative, 
emanative,  decentralizing  both  in  locality  and  in 
thought.  The  same  fact  may  be  noted  in  the 
political  sphere.  Athens,  the  imperial  City- 
State  of  Greece  after  the  Persian  War,  had  not 
only  lost  its  supremacy,  but  also  its  freedom ; 
this  was  likewise  true  of  every  other  Greek  City- 
State.  Hellas  was  no  longer  ruled  from  within 
but  from  without ;  each  community  had  to  give 
up  its  Greek  civic  virtue  of  being  self-centered 
and  to  acknowledge  a  master.  The  individual 
citizen  was  thereby  thrown  back  upon  himself, 
and  all  Hellas  was  dissolved  into  its  atoms,  since 
the  political  bond  which  held  them  together  was 
broken.  The  Greek,  living  hitherto  an  institu- 
tional life  prescribed  by  the  laws  and  customs  of 
his  country,  is  now  to  pass  to  his  moral  epoch 
in  which  he  becomes  self -legislative;  he  is  to 
find  the  law  within,  and  to  establish  that  in  the 
coming  centuries.  The  Athenian,  though  dwell- 
ing at  Athens  and  callino;  himself  a  citizen,  was 
in  reality  a  subject  of  Alexander's  empire  and 
then  of  Rome;  he  could  live  an  autonomous 
life  in  his  community  no  more,  he  must  become 
autonomous  in  himself  if  he  wishes  to  be  free 
henceforth ;  he  has  to  pass  from  his  un- 
consciously institutional  freedom  into  a  moral 
and  subjective  freedom.  Hence  the  Hellenistic 
Period    will    develop    and    practice  the  science 


TBE  IIELLEXISTIC  PERIOD.  465 

of    Ethics    with    an    empliasis    previously    un- 
known. 

In  this  stage  we  again  come  upon  the  atomic 
Ego  wliich  we  found  first  appearing  in  the  time 
and  work  of  the  Sophists,  and  wliich  Socrates 
specially  grappled  v.'ith  and  subjected  to  an 
ethical  discipline,  whereby  it  lost  its  distinctively 
atomic  character.  As  already  set  forth,  the 
great  Athenian  movement  of  Philosophy  rose  to 
the  point  of  declaring  through  Aristotle  that  the 
self-conscious  act  was  the  essence  of  all  things, 
was  the  first  principle  of  the  Universe  (or,  to 
use  the  Greek  terms  again,  the  ousia  of  the 
on,  was  the  noesis  noeseos).  But  this  one  ol)ject- 
ive  self-consciousness,  perched  on  the  height  of 
Hellenic  speculation,  has  to  descend  into  ever}' 
Greek  Ego  and  even  into  the  non-Greek,  and 
thus  become  Hellenistic.  In  such  a  transition  it 
will  lose  its  originality,  its  sublimity,  and  no 
small  ptirt  of  its  interest ;  but  it  will  become 
human,  universal,  for  all  mankind. 

Here  the  pedagogic  element  in  the  Greek  peo- 
ple comes  prominently  to  the  surface.  What 
the  few  have  won  in  the  supreme  discipline  of 
Philosophy,  must  now  be  imparted  to  the  world. 
The  mighty  inner  concentration  of  the  act  of 
production  is  henceforth  to  be  turned  outward 
and  scattered  among  the  nations  by  a  kind  of 
philosophical  apostolate.  Paul  had  his  Greek 
prototypes  for  being  an  apostle  to  the  Gentiles. 

30 


466        ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  fact  the  Greeks  are  supremely  the  educational 
nation  of  the  human  race.  Their  deepest  in- 
stinct is  to  impart  what  they  have  spiritually 
won,  be  it  science,  art,  poetry,  or  philosophy. 
Very  different  seem  the  Orientals  in  this  regard ; 
the  Egyptians  sought  to  conceal  their  science, 
while  the  Greeks  had  to  reveal  theirs  by  an 
inner  need  of  utterance.  The  Greeks  have  been 
the  educators  of  the  educators  of  the  world's 
peoples,  and  are  largely  so  still,  at  least  in  the 
European  sphere.  Their  work  as  universal 
educators  begins  decisively  in  the  Hellenistic 
Period  before  us,  which  will  have  many  schools, 
and  scholars,  and  scholarchs,  radiating  from 
the  Athenian  center  to  other  Greek  cities,  then 
over  the  border  to  the  East  and  to  the  West. 

It  will  not  be  a  great  creative  epoch,  like 
the  one  just  preceding;  that  epoch  is  past 
and  must  now  be  understood,  and  appropriated. 
It  will  be  a  time  of  vast  erudition,  and  special 
investigation  into  different  fields  —  literary,  his- 
torical, scientific,  philosophical;  a  time  of 
commentators  and  learned  interpreters  of  all 
sorts  of  ancient  books  ;  translators  and  expositors 
of  Oriental  lore  will  appear  particularly  at 
Alexandria  —  Egyptian,  Jewish,  Persian,  Baby- 
lonian, and  even  Hindoo.  The  main  lines  of  the 
schools  will  be  laid  down  and  followed  with 
a  certain  fixity  and  obedience  to  transmitted 
authority;   but  within  these  lines  a  vast  speciali- 


THE  HELLENISTIC  PERIOD.  467 

zation  will  take  place,  as  well  as  instruction. 
The  Hellenistic  Period  with  its  schools  has  a 
certain  resemblance  to  the  German  University 
of  to-day.  Indeed  this  term  (University)  is 
often  applied  by  writers  of  the  present  time 
to  those  ancient  centers  of  learning,  especially 
to  Athens  and  Alexandria. 

IV.  The   Hellenistic    Period  lasted   fully   550 
years,  if  we  reckon  it  from  the  death  of  Aristo- 
tle to  the  development  of    Neo-Platonism  in  the 
school  of  Ammonius  Saccas.     To  be  sure,  it  was 
already  putting  forth  its  early  germs  in  the   So- 
cratic  schools,  before  the  birth  of  Aristotle;  the 
great     Athenian    movement     was    continuously 
throwing    off    lateral    branches,     which     fore- 
shadowed the  breaking-up  of  that  mighty  con- 
centrated activity  into  many  channels  which  were 
to  become  independent  Philosophies.     And  those 
colossal  thinkers  in  whom  the  Universal  had,  as 
it   were,   individualized    itself,    will   send   forth 
many  streams  of  influence  in  accord  with  their 
character  and   principle;  the}',  too,  as   universal 
individualize  themselves  in  a  multiplicity  of  phi- 
losophers, who  as  teachers  will  still  further  prop- 
agate that  Athenian  thought-world  till  it  becomes 
the  possession  of  all  civilization  in  the  East  and 
West,  the  possession  of  all  individuals  of  culture. 
For  the  philosophic  formula  of   Hellenisticism, 
as  already  stated,  is  the  Universal  individualized, 
made   the    spiritual    property    of    the  individual 


468        ANCIENT  E UEOPEAN  PHIL OSOPH  T. 

universally.  Man  is  to  be  made  over,  trans- 
formed out  of  his  narrow,  selfish  particularity 
into  the  universal  man,  and  this  can  only  be  done 
by  the  Universal  itself,  as  manifested  in  Attic 
Philosophy,  entering  into  him  and  there  per- 
formins:  its  work  of  palinseuesis.  The  outcome 
of  the  previous  Hellenic  Period  we  have  called 
Universalism  or  the  getting  of  the  Universal  in 
Thought.  But  the  Hellenistic  Period  is  to  put 
this  into  man's  Will  also,  into  human  conduct, 
whereby  the  world  becomes  ethical ;  nay,  is  to 
put  this  into  God,  whereby  the  world  can  again 
become  religious.  So  w^e  see  that  Hellenism  in 
Philosophy  is  a  vast  preparation  for  Hellenisti- 
cisni,  whose  outcome  is  the  Univorsal  individual- 
ized, not  only  in  man  but  also  in  God,  in  the 
Christ. 

Far  slower  is  this  second  process  than  the 
first;  the  Hellenistic  movement  is  at  least  twice 
as  long  as  the  Hellenic,  which  we  have  followed 
as  it  concentrated  itself  from  the  rim  of  Hellas 
inward  with  steady  yet  rapid  progress.  That 
whirl  of  systems,  of  ten  suggested  in  Greek  Phi- 
losophy under  the  image  of  a  cosmical  vortex, 
gathers  itself  up  and  rises  mightily  at  the  center 
into  the  supreme  philosophic  movement  of  all 
ages  and  lands,  and  thence  breaks  forth  into 
many  streams  and  streamlets  which  subdivide 
and  ramify  themselves  far  beyond  the  Greek 
borderland  where  Philosophy  starts  into  the  non- 


THE  HELLENISTIC  PERIOD.  469 

Greek  world,  spreading  among  all  civilized  Aryan 
peoples  from  Bactria  and  India  in  the  Orient  to 
Gaul  and  Spain  in  the  Occident,  penetrating  into 
the  spiritual  recesses  of  even  non- Aryan  peoples, 
particularly  of  the  Semites  and  Egyptians.  Nat- 
urally such  a  process  had  to  be  slower,  overcom- 
ing, as  it  must,  the  deepest  racial  and  religious 
prejudices  of  the  human  soul,  than  the  original 
Hellenic  Movement,  confined  as  it  was  to  the 
relatively  small  and  homogeneous  Greek  world. 

V.  If  we  glance  at  the  historic  events  of  this 
Hellenistic  Period,  we  find  that  institutions 
political  and  social  are  passing  through  essen- 
tially the  same  process  which  is  uttered  in  thought 
by  Philosophy.  Alexander  the  Great,  the  politi- 
cal incarnation  of  the  Spirit  of  the  Age,  the 
pupil  of  Aristotle,  who  may  be  deemed  his 
philosophic  counterpart,  is  supremely  the  Univer- 
sal individualized,  and  actively  showing  himself 
just  such  an  individual  by  subordinating  and  then 
as  it  were  absorbing  into  his  all-comprehending 
universal  selfhood  the  whole  of  Hellas  and  of 
Western  Asia.  After  his  death  his  one  central 
authority  breaks  up  into  many  authorities  or 
individual  Greek  rulers  with  their  empires, 
between  whom  rises  incessant  struggle  of  the 
individual  for  universal  sway.  In  like  manner 
after  the  death  of  Aristotle,  the  central  Athenian 
Movement,  whoso  principle  is  the  Universal, 
splits   into    many   schools   with  their  individual 


470        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

leaders  and  followers,  among  whom  rises  an 
incessant  warfare  of  words  and  arguments,  cor- 
responding to  the  political  wars  among  the  suc- 
cessors of  Alexander.  But  in  the  West  a  new 
power  has  appeared  above  the  political  horizon, 
with  its  sword  in  one  hand  and  its  law  in  the 
other,  first  subjecting  to  its  sway  Occidental 
Hellas  in  Italy  and  Sicily,  then  passing  over  to 
the  mainland  of  Greece  and  reducing  it  to  obedi- 
ence, then  finally  conquering  the  Orient  and 
thereby  putting  the  whole  Hellenistic  world  under 
its  Universal  which  is  the  Roman  State  with  its 
Law.  But  even  here  in  Eome  the  Universal 
again  individualizes  itself  in  the  one  man,  the 
emperor,  and  the  old  separative  conflict  among 
individuals,  now  emperors  of  Rome,  breaks  out 
afresh.  In  the  meantime,  however,  Hollenisti- 
cism  has  found  out  that  no  Philosophy  within  and 
no  State  without  can  solve  its  problem  or  heal 
the  deep  inner  scission  of  its  soul.  Accordingly 
it  has  brought  forth  a  new  Religion  whose  great 
consolatory  promise  is  individual  salvation  both 
here  and  hereafter.  Man  cannot  rest  satisfied 
with  himself  deified  within,  or  with  an  emperor 
deified  without;  the  Universal  must  be  individu- 
alized in  God  Hiuiself ,  but  it  will  be  God  in  a 
wholly  new  part:  He  makes  Himself  individual 
in  an  onlv-bcgotten  Sou,  whereby  is  revealed  in 
a  religious  form  the  absolute  Process  of  the 
Universe. 


THE  HELLENISTIC  PERIOD.  471 

VI.  Hellenic  Philosophy  (by  which  we  mean 
the  preceding  First  Period)  is  the  child  of 
Greek  communal  freedom,  of  the  autonomy  of 
the  Greek  City-State,  with  its  independent  life. 
We  have  seen  all  the  early  Hellenic  Philosophies 
springing  up  in  separate  communities  along  with 
and  out  of  the  civic  spirit  of  the  time.  Each  of 
these  Philosophies  has  an  air  of  independence 
and  originality  peculiarly  its  own,  though  united 
unconsciously  in  the  total  philosophic  movement 
of  the  Period.  And  each  of  these  philosophers 
has  a  unique  and  original  character  in  himself 
and  in  his  thinking,  he  is  a  product  of  the  soil 
directly,  or  rather  a  product  of  the  soul  of  his 
community.  But  when  the  autonomy  of  these 
communities  is  gone,  their  independent  philoso- 
phizing ceases.  Subjected  first  to  Macedon  and 
then  to  Rome  in  the  Hellenistic  Period,  they 
lose  their  inborn  creative  power  and  sink  back 
exhausted  into  both  political  and  intellectual 
submission  to  external  authority.  Not  only 
Greek  Philosophy  loses  its  generative  energy, 
but  also  Greek  Art  and  Poetry.  It  is  most  sur- 
prising, and  even  painful,  to  witness  this  sudden 
and  universal  eclipse  of  Greek  originality;  the 
great  Sculptors,  Poets,  Historians,  as  well  as 
Philosophers,  belong  without  exception  to  the 
Hellenic  Period. 

One  cannot  help  delving  with  sympathetic 
interest   into   the  sources  of  such  a   rapid   and 


472         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PIIIL OSOPIl Y. 

complete  decay  of  the  njitioiial  spirit.  The 
Greek  at  first  took  for  granted  the  oneness  of 
Thought  and  Being;  his  life  was  a  unity,  quite 
unconscious  of  the  inner  and  outer  worlds,  and 
his  work  manifested  that  unity.  His  song  re- 
vealed Nature,  but  for  him  her  forms  had  alwajs 
a  spontaneous  soul ;  his  Art  expressed  naively 
the  harmony  of  the  Cosmos  with  the  Si)irit ;  his 
early  Philosophy  showed  the  same  character. 
What  he  thinks,  is,  and  the  essence  of  being  is 
his  thought.  Whatever  he  shapes  has  life  and 
speaks,  telling  outward  Avhat  is  inward.  He 
cannot  help  being  the  artist.  An  artless  objec- 
tivity is  his  art,  yea  his  very  existence;  if  he 
does  anything,  he  has  to  create  the  Beautiful. 

But  the  time  comes,  and  has  to  come  in  the 
natural  order  of  evolution,  when  this  instinctive 
unquestioning  unity  of  the  inner  and  the  outer, 
of  Thought  and  Being,  is  broken  in  twain,  and 
that  artistic  creative  Greek  world  vanishes  as  a 
fair  dream,  becoming  only  a  reminiscence  and  an 
imitation.  Plato  began  this  separation  by  his 
breach  between  the  Idea  and  Reality.  Aristotle, 
well  knowing  the  fatal  result  of  such  a  breach 
for  Greek  s})iiit,  souglit  to  heal  it,  but  only 
deepened  the  Platonic  dualism  to  the  very  bot- 
tom. Then  comes  Hellenisticism  in  which  the 
abysmal  separation  in  life,  the  divorce  of  the 
Idea  from  the  AVorld,  is  the  ever-present  actual 
fact;   behold  this  corrupt,  tyrannical,  alien  State 


THE  HELLENISTIC  PERIOD.  473 

over  us  which  dominates  everywhere  from  the 
outside  without  any  relief.  The  individual 
Greek  now  sees  and  feels  with  all  the  intensity 
of  his  nature  the  utter  worthlessness  of  the  Re- 
ality, and  this  is  what  hamstrings  his  original 
artistic  productivity.  For  the  artist  must  seize 
the  Reality  in  its  first  immediate  bloom,  but 
what  if  this  Reality,  in  his  conviction  and  also  in 
fact,  has  become  utterly  damnable  and  infernal? 
He  has  no  longer  an  harmonious  beautiful  exist- 
ence before  him  as  the  model  for  his  work;  if 
he  pours  out  his  artistic  soul  at  all,  or  if  he  has 
any  to  pour  out,  it  will  show  its  writhing  agony 
in  the  same  consuming  fire  which  is  destroying 
his  world.  Hence  it  comes  that  the  greatest 
artistic  product  of  all  Hellenisticism,  in  that  art 
which  is  peculiarly  Greek,  namely  sculpture,  is 
the  Laocoon,  representing  by  its  tortures  the 
dying  struggles  of  the  universal  Greek  soul  in 
the  coils  of  the  Destroyer. 

The  consequence  is  that  the  Greek  turns  to 
the  Idea  within,  uncontaminated  by  the  Reality, 
and  makes  it  his  own,  so  that  he  becomes  the 
Platonic  dualism  incorporate.  Thus  that  naive 
unity  of  Hellenism  between  Thought  and  Being 
is  torn  asunder,  that  spontaneous  fountain  of 
his  creative  power  no  longer  wells  up  to  sunlight 
in  Art,  Poetry,  and  Philosophy;  the  original 
charm  of  the  Greek  world  has  departed,  though 
its  echoes  may  still  be  heard   repeating   them- 


474         ANCIENT  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

selves  with  numerous  variations  down  through 
the  long  journey  of  the  Hellenistic  centuries. 

Accordingly,  for  the  origination  of  Hellenic 
Philosophy,  communal  freedom  is  seen  to  be 
necessary.  When  that  freedom  perishes,  there 
perishes  with  it  the  creative  po^r  of  Philos- 
ophy. Long  before  the  Hellenistic  Period  this 
fact  was  foreshadowed  in  the  history  of  Miletus, 
which  began  Greek  Thinking.  It  philosophized 
while  free,  but  after  its  conquest  by  the  Per- 
sians, it  was  struck  philosophically  dumb  forever, 
thouo-h  inhabited  at  a  later  time.  The  Democ- 
racy  of  Athens  developed  its  undemocratic  Phi- 
losophy, which  became  almost  as  centralized  and 
autocratic  as  the  Macedonian  State.  The  author- 
ity of  the  Schools  may  have  helped  to  quench 
Greek  Intellect,  but  it  had  really  spent  itself, 
and  Greece  had  passed  into  another  stage  in 
which  the  individual  must  through  Will  realize 
in  life  and  conduct  the  thought  which  his  Intel- 
lect has  formulated. 

VII.  In  the  Athenian  movement,  so  prolific  of 
greatness,  the  individual  as  philosopher  could 
and  did  say  that  the  essence  of  Being  is  the 
Universal,  and  he  realized  the  same  in  his  thought. 
Thus  he,  the  individual,  made  himself  the  image 
and  the  voice  of  the  Universal  in  his  thinking. 
This  Universal  ultimately  can  only  be  derived 
from  the  Universe  with  its  threefold  process, 
>yhich   becomes   the   innermost   process   of  the 


THE  HELLENISTIC  PERIOD.  475 

Intellect.  The  Hellenic  Period  evolved  the 
Athenian  philosopher,  who  is  the  individual  with 
the  Universal  or  the  process  of  the  All  in  his 
thouo-ht.  Thus  Athens  produced  the  individual 
universalized  in  Intellect  —  doubtless  the  highest 
form  which  the  mind  of  man  had  yet  taken. 
For  he  had  reached  universality,  which  signifies 
that  the  process  of  his  thinking  was  one  with  the 
process  of  the  Universe. 

In  the  Hellenistic  Period,  a  further  step  must 
be,taken.  The  individual  as  philosopher  now  says 
that  the  essence  of  Being  is  not  simply  the  Uni- 
versal, but  the  Universal  individualized^  not 
simply  the  Universal  in  Intellect  or  theoretical, 
but  the  Universal  in  Will  or  practical.  It  must 
enter  into  and  determine  the  actions  of  the  indi- 
vidual, it  must  ray  itself  out  into  all  the  par- 
ticulars of  life  and  conduct ;  thus  it  is  to  be 
individualized,  made  the  inner  possession  of  every 
individual  in  all  his  activities.  We  have  noticed 
the  centrifugal  movement  of  Philosophy  from 
Athens  during  the  Hellenistic  Period,  over  the 
whole  civilized  world ;  in  like  manner  this  central 
thought  of  the  Universal  is  to  specialize  itself 
into  all  the  details  of  human  conduct.  In  the 
Athenian  Epoch  man  thinks  universally ;  in  the 
Hellenistic  he  must  both  think  and  act  univer- 
sally in  his  own  person ;  then  he  must  reach  up 
to  the  conception  of  a  Divine  Person  who  thinks 
and  acts   universally,    not   capriciously.      Thus 


476         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Hellenisticism  comes  to  Keligion  as  its  final  goal, 
passing  through  Philosophy  proper  or  Meta- 
physics, and  also  Ethics. 

From  the  preceding  general  statements  it  is 
evident  that  the  Hellenistic  Period  will  show  three 
stages  which  constitute  its  fundamental  process. 
The  first  we  name  the  Theoretic  Movement;  the 
preceding  philosophical  Schools  determine  di- 
rectly this  movement,  in  which  we  shall  find  an 
acceptance  (Dogmatism),  denial  (Skepticism) 
and  selection  (Syncretism)  of  transmitted  doc- 
trines. The  philosophic  Norm  is  repeated,  but 
usually  with  more  stress  upon  one  part  than  upon 
the  rest,  according  to  the  bent  of  the  philosopher. 
The  second  will  be  called  the  Practical  Move- 
ment;  the  thinking  man  (theoretic)  is  to  turn  to 
action  in  the  sense  of  realizing  the  Universal  of 
Thought  in  conduct  and  in  law,  thereby  becom- 
ing ethical  in  the  wide  meaning  of  the  term 
( including  both  moral  and  institutional) .  Under 
this  general  head  we  shall  place  Stoicism,  Epi- 
cureanism, and  Legalism,  each  of  which  will  be 
discussed  later  on.  The  third  is  the  Iteligious 
Movement;  this  shows  that  neither  Metaphysics 
nor  Ethics  can  fully  realize  the  Hellenistic  man, 
who  turns  to  seek  the  Divine  in  Person.  But 
this  search  will  also  have  its  process,  in  which 
Philosophy  and  Religion  will  struggle  together 
till  they  unite  in  a  new  Faith. 

The  Hellenistic  Period  leads  out  of  the  philo- 


THE  THEOBETIC  MOVEMENT.  477 

sophical  Norm  into  the  religious  Norm  through 
Ethics.  Thus  we  seem  to  return  to  the  first  Dis- 
cipline, Religion,  from  which  Philosophy  origi- 
nally separated,  through  which  separation  some- 
thing is  lost  which  the  human  spirit  has  to 
recover.  The  struggles  for  this  recovery,  which 
is  also  to  be  a  regeneration,  are  manifested  in  the 
present  Period.  These  struggles  are  very  multi- 
farious, and  produce  a  vast  mass  of  material 
which  it  is  not  easy  to  organize.  Usually  the 
Hellenistic  Period  is  deemed  purely  ethical,  but 
it  is  also  metaphysical  and  religious.  In  it  the 
Universal  individuahzes  itself  in  the  world  and  its 
objects,  in  man  and  his  deeds,  finally  in  God  who 
becomes  man  in  his  Son  Christ.  It  philosophizes, 
ethicizes,  and  theologizes,  in  distinct  movements, 
which,  however,  form  one  characteristic  epoch. 
All  these  movements  must  be  set  forth  not  merely 
in  their  isolated  doctrines  but  in  their  mutual  rela- 
tions and  processes. 

I.  The  Theoretic  Movement. 

The  final  attainment  of  man  in  the  preceding 
Hellenic  Period  was  Aristotle's  TAeorm,  whereby 
the  individual  participates  in  the  vision  of  God 
or  the  Absolute  Truth,  even  if  briefly  and  par- 
tially. Thus  the  Universal  has  individualized 
itself  theoretically,  has  entered  into  man's  intel- 
lect and  made  its  human  home  there.     The  indi- 


478         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PmLOSOPlIY. 

vidua!  has  now  primarily  the  conviction  that  he 
can  know  the  essence  of  Being  through  his 
thought,  that  he  can  grasp  Truth  through  his 
intelligence.  With  such  a  conviction  he  goes 
forth  into  the  world  and  starts  to  using  and 
appljnng  his  principle,  wherewith  a  new  epoch 
begins.  This  principle  is  already  won  and  pre- 
pared for  employment,  being  formulated  and,  as 
it  were,  learned  by  heart. 

It  is  evident  that  the  present  Movement  has  a 
distinct  connection  with  the  preceding  third  stage 
of  the  Hellenic  Period,  which  has  been  designated 
as  Athenian  Universal  ism.  In  it  the  essence  of 
all  things  has  been  found  to  be  the  Universal  as 
Thought;  but  nowthis  first  principle  or  Thought 
is  to  be  applied  primarily  to  the  various  fields  of 
knowledge.  Such  a  procedure  orders  them  ac- 
cording to  Thought,  which  thus  gives  the  special 
sciences,  and  brings  to  light  the  scientific  strand 
in  this  Movement. 

It  is  first  to  be  observed  that  such  a  Movement 
is  no  longer  in  the  Hellenic  Period,  but  belongs 
to  the  Hellenistic  Period,  of  which  the  gen- 
eral purport  is  the  Universal  individualized, 
separated  within  itself,  whose  first  phase 
appears  in  the  present  theoretic  activit}'. 
Here  we  have  not  the  work  or  the  process  of 
unfolding  and  creating  the  fundamental  principle 
of  Philosophy,  but  of  specializing   and  applying 


THE  TEEOBETIC  MOVEMENT.  479 

the  principle  already  found.  It  is  a  time  of 
systematizing  and  classifying,  even  if  largely  in 
an  external  way.  The  labor  is  to  make  the 
universal  principle  valid  in  all  particulars,  to  have 
philosophy,  hitherto  limited  to  one  spot  and 
posscHsed  by  a  few,  branch  out  into  every  im- 
portant line  of  knowledge  and  enter  into  the 
soul  of  every  person  capable  of  approf)riating  it. 

Amid  all  these  developments  and  specializa- 
tions there  will  be  found  the  one  essential  Norm, 
to  which  allusion  has  already  been  often  made. 
This  philosophical  Norm  will  now  become  more 
explicit  than  ever,  indeed  it  will  be  directly 
formulated,  and  thus  become  a  conscious  prod- 
uct of  the  time.  To  be  sure,  this  Norm  will 
manifest  a  good  deal  of  variability  according  to 
the  philosopher  who  is  emploj^ing  it  and  through 
it  making  his  system.  Each  philosopher  will 
put  a  special  stress  upon  some  phase  of  the 
total  Norm,  following  his  bent,  his  ability,  and  his 
attainments.  One  prefers  the  ethical,  another 
the  physical,  still  another  the  metaphysical 
province  of  the  Norm.  And  the  three  provinces 
will  be  still  further  divided  and  specialized.  But 
in  these  particular  manifestations  we  are  to  see 
the  philosophic  Norm  working  itself  out  toward 
completeness,  even  to  the  point  of  transcending 
itself  and  reaching  forth  to  the  rehgious  Norm 
from  which  it  once  re-acted. 

Thus  the  individual  of  the  Hellenistic  Period, 


480        ANCIEN T  E  UBOPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

being  in  his  very  essence  the  Universal  individual- 
ized, will  carry  out  his  own  innermost  principle, 
which  is  also  that  of  his  age,  putting  it  into  all 
the  details  of  his  investigation  and  thought ;  he 
will  seek  to  make  the  Universal  individual  every- 
where theoretically,  through  the  Intellect.  But 
this  Intellect  has  the  power  of  denying  as  well  as 
affirming,  hence  the  theoretic  movement  will  have 
its  negative  as  well  as  its  positive  stage,  and 
even  a  mingling  of  the  two .  So  it  comes  that  a 
process  shows  itself,  in  which  we  note  the  follow- 
ing stages :  ( 1 )  there  is  the  dogmatic  acceptance 
and  assertion  of  the  doctrines  of  the  preceding 
Schools,  connected  with  the  further  unfolding 
and  application  of  these  transmitted  doctrines; 
(2)  there  is  a  denial  of  the  fundamental  princi- 
ple underlying  these  and  all  philosophic  doc- 
trines, namely,  tiiat  man  can  know  Truth  or  the 
essence  of  Being,  which  denial,  however,  im- 
plies the  theoretic  knowledge  of  the  Truth;  (3) 
the  individual,  seeing  that  he  is  both  what  affirms 
and  what  denies,  selects  from  each  side,  attempt- 
ing to  compromise  or  to  harmonize  extreme 
views.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  all  these  stages  are 
theoretic  and  pertain  to  intellectual  knowing ;  the 
individual  knows  that  his  thought  is  one  with  the 
object,  or  he  knows  that  he  does  not  know  any 
such  thing,  or  finally  he  knows  both  that  he 
does  know  in  part,  and  does  not  know  in  part, 
what  is  true. 


THE  THEORETIC  MOVEMENT.  481 

Of  the  Theoretic  Movement  we  may  name  the 
stages  as  follows :  First  is  the  Dogmatism  of  the 
Schools — scholastic  Dogmatism ;  second  is  Skep- 
ticism, which  is  negative  to  the  dogmatic  posi- 
tion; third  is  Syncretism,  which  is  eclectic,  a 
a  selecting  and  putting  together  of  doctrines 
from  dogmatic  and  skeptical  sources.  Three 
streams  we  may  deem  them,  arising  aud  develop- 
ing in  succession,  yet  running  parallel  and 
interacting  quite  through  the  whole  Period  of 
Hellenisticism. 

I.  Dogmatism  (scholastic).  —  A  time  of 
authority  in  philosophy  begins,  the  doctrines 
of  the  great  masters  are  transmitted  to  Schools 
which  continue  to  exist  in  one  form  or  other 
for  nearly  a  thousand  years.  The  Thought  is 
given  in  its  essential  formulation  which  remains 
pretty  much  the  same.  Philosophy  is  a  thing 
settled,  established,  and  handed  down  to  the 
future  in  the  shape  of  a  fixed  dogma;  it  is  no 
longer  to  be  determined  by  thinking  but  rather 
determines  thinking.  Such  is  the  sudden 
prodigious  change  after  Aristotle,  the  change 
from  a  bold  originality  to  an  almost  servile 
acceptance  and  imitation,  the  change  from 
Hellenism  to  Hellenisticism.  Erudition,  particu- 
larization,  analysis  thrives ;  the  Thought  is  taken 
for  granted  from  the  founders  and  is  applied 
in  a  more  or  less  external  way  to  many  new 
details  and  departments  of  information.     We  see 

31 


482         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Universal  individualized  immediately,  sepa- 
rated and  broken  up  into  a  thousand  particulars, 
which  are  nevertheless  controlled  from  the 
outside  by  a  transmitted  doctrine  or  principle. 

This  corresponds  to  the  political  condition 
of  the  Hellenistic  Period.  Free  Greece  was 
at  an  end,  subjected  first  hy  the  outside  power  of 
Macedon  and  then  of  Rome.  An  external 
absolutism  arose  both  in  Thought  and  in  the 
State;  the  inner  creative  self-activity  of  Hellas, 
which  kept  rising  higher  and  higher  in  the 
Hellenic  Period  till  it  culminated  at  Athens  in 
Aristotle,  now  sinks  far  more  suddenly  than 
it  rose.  Activity  by  no  means  ceased,  still 
the  Greek  mind  cut  no  new  grooves,  but  ran 
in  the  old. 

This  philosophical  Scholasticism  or  doctrine 
of  the  Schools  transmitted  from  generation  to 
generation  —  we  ask  its  source?  It  springs  from 
the  three  great  Athenian  philosophers  directly  — 
Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle  —  sending  forth 
three  streams  of  influence,  which  is  marked  by  a 
line  of  Schools.  Yet  we  must  not  underrate  the 
work  of  these  Schools.  They  transcended  the 
narrow  Hellenic  or  Athenian  limit  and  made 
Philosophy  the  property  of  every  individual, 
Greek  or  non-Greek,  who  would  choose  it. 
From  this  point  of  view  Hellenisticism  is  a 
humanizing  process,  and  breaks  through  the  old 
exclusive  Greek  world,  moving  from  the  center 


TBE  TBEORETIC  MOVEMENT.  483 

to  the    periphery   and    over    it  into  Orient  and 
Occident. 

Only  a  brief  survey  can  be  given  of  its  three 
lines  of  Schools  —  Socratic,  Platonic  and  Aris- 
totelian—  all  starting  from  the  Athenian  foun- 
tain-head, which  is  the  Universal  as  Thouo-ht. 

1.  Socraiic  Schools.  The  great  stream  of  phi- 
losophic evolution  passes  from  Socrates  through 
Plato  to  Aristotle,  as  has  been  already  unfolded. 
Still  Socrates  sends  off  several  lateral  branches, 
as  it  were,  partial  developments  of  certain  phases 
of  the  total  man  whose  marvelous  manj^-sided 
personality  would  throw  out  a  shoot  anywhere. 
Three  of  these  Schools  may  be  mentioned,  each 
representing  a  part  of  the  total  Socrates  or 
of  the  Socratic  process — the  Megaric  School 
founded  by  Euclid,  the  Cynic  School  founded  by 
Antisthenes,  and  the  Cyrenaic  School  founded 
by  Aristippus.  These  three  are  the  main  ones, 
though  there  were  others  arising  and  departing 
for  many  years  after  the  death  of  Socrates. 

The  Megaric  School  must  have  existed  already 
during  the  life-time  of  Socrates  with  some 
degree  of  eminence,  since  Plato  is  reported  to 
have  fled  thither  after  the  death  of  the  master, 
and  there  first  to  have  studied  the  Eleatic 
doctrine  of  Being  which  Euclid  combined 
with  the  Socratic  Concept  of  the  Good. 
The  Megaric  School,  however,  put  its  main 
stress  upon  the  dialectical  side  of  Socrates  which 


484        AN CIEN T  E  UBO PEA N  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

is  the  movement  toward  the  Concept  through 
question  and  answer,  rather  than  the  Concept 
itself.  Hence  this  School  has  the  name  of  being 
disputatious  and  fault-finding,  and  even  quarrel- 
some. Its  chief  fame  to-day  comes  from  the 
influence  of  it  seen  in  a  group  of  Plato's  Dia- 
logues—  often  called  the  Megaric  or  Dialectical 
group,  of  which  the  Parmenides  with  its  discus- 
sion of  Beino;  and  Non-Beino:  showino;  their  dia- 
lectical  interplay,  may  be  taken  as  an  example. 

The  Cynic  School  seems  to  have  sprung  up  at 
Athens  in  direct  contact  with  Socrates  and  to 
have  imitated  his  personal  peculiarities,  some- 
times even  to  the  verge  of  caricature,  as  in  the 
case  of  Diogenes.  The  endurance,  the  indiffer- 
ence to  the  luxuries  or  even  the  necessaries  of 
life,  the  personal  independence  of  the  master 
they  appropriated  in  conduct;  unlike  hira,  how- 
ever, they  cut  themselves  off  from  all  institutional 
and  social  relations,  yet  lived  as  beggars  and 
parasites  upon  society  in  their  pursuit  of  wisdom 
and  virtue. 

In  doctrine  Antisthenes,  the  founder  of  the 
Cynic  School,  concentrated  himself  upon  the 
attainment  of  virtue,  which  was  with  him  hardly 
a  positive  but  a  negative  activity,  an  abstraction 
from  all  public  interests,  from  all  needs,  from 
riches,  honor,  pleasure.  Moreover  he  dispensed 
with  the  dialectical  process  for  reaching  the  con- 
cept of  virtue,  which  is  such   an  important  part 


THE  THEOBETIG  MOVEMENT.  485 

of  Socrates'  training.  Antisthenes  deemed  that 
he  could  lay  hold  of  virtue  immediately,  or  at 
least  by  simply  leaving  out  all  the  relations  of 
life,  or  reducing  them  to  the  lowest  possible 
terms.  Thus  he  asserts  the  individual  against 
all  the  world  Avhich  seeks  to  determine  him. 
This  ultimate  affirmation  of  the  Self,  though 
wholly  abstract  and  empty,  has  its  place  in  the 
history  of  the  time,  since  even  the  tyrannical 
State  with  its  absolute  rulers  could  not  crush  it. 

Such  a  personal  defiance  of  all  externality 
seems  to  have  reached  its  culmination  in  a  disci- 
ple of  Antisthenes,  the  Cynic  Diogenes  of  Sinope. 
His  direct  individual  challenge  of  the  w^orld  and 
all  its  cohorts  to  determine  his  Ego  made  a 
mighty  impression  upon  all  succeeding  antiquity, 
if  we  may  judge  by  the  many  allusions  to  him  in 
the  writings  of  those  who  came  after  him.  Still 
to-day  we  know  well  his  name  and  catch  some- 
thing of  his  character  in  the  word  Cynicism. 
Such  a  man  could  only  arise  and  become  a  typi- 
cal character  when  the  age  was  what  he  was, 
when  the  World-Spirit  itself  had  become  cynical. 

Tlie  Cyrenaic  School  develops  a  third  phase 
of  the  Socratic  doctrine  or  perchance  of  the  So- 
cratic  personality.  For  Socrates  was  not  an  ascetic 
and  never  renounced  pleasure  if  kept  in  due  sub- 
ordination. A  most  remarkable  capacity  for 
wine  he  must  have  had,  being  judged  by  Plato's 
Symposium.     Aristippus  of  Cyrene,the  founder 


486         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  rHILOSOrHY. 

of  this  School,  develops  the  idea,  which  is  also 
Socratic,  that  virtue  is  a  means  of  happiness, 
producing  great  benefits  to  the  individual  who 
practices  it.  From  this  point  of  view  it  is  but  a 
step  to  affirm  with  Aristippus  that  pleasure  is  the 
end  of  life,  virtue  itself  being  chiefly  useful  for 
that  end.  Hedonism,  with  all  its  various  forms, 
Utilitarianisn,  Eudemonism,  etc.,  finds  here  its 
germinal  doctrine,  which  will  be  still  further 
developed  in  the  later  School  of  Epicurus.  Aris- 
tippus dees  not  eschew  knowledge,  temperance, 
culture,  but  he  considers  them  not  as  ends  but 
as  means  for  heightening  the  sensation  of  pleas- 
ure. The  fact  may  also  be  noted  that  a  Greek 
colony  of  the  South,  African  Cyrene,  now  enters 
the  philosophic  periphery  of  Hellas  with  its 
small  derived  light,  not  to  be  compared  with  the 
original  Philosophies  which  we  have  seen  shoot- 
ing up  on  the  border  at  other  points  of  the  com- 
pass—  East,  West  and  North. 

Thus  each  of  these  three  Schools  takes  a  part 
or  phase  of  the  total  Socratic  process  and  holds 
fast  to  it  alone  —  the  Dialectic,  the  pure  Concept, 
and  the  application  of  the  Concept  as  universal 
to  the  individual  case,  this  being  the  final  end  of 
the  process.  In  such  fashion  is  Socrates,  doubt- 
less during  his  life,  divided,  anatomized,  dis- 
membered; already  in  these  pupils  of  his  the 
Hellenistic  movement  has  begun,  or  the  universal 
Socrates  with  his  Universal  is  specialized,  being 


TEE  THEORETIC  MOVEMENT.  487 

reduced  to  particulars.  The  stress  of  this  mighty 
unification  is  too  great  for  Greek  Spirit,  which, 
when  the  all-compelling  man  is  removed  flies  into 
a  thousand  pieces,  and  each  piece  now  becomes 
the  object  of  consideration.  Thus  we  observe 
that  the  Hellenistic  Period  overlaps  backward 
the  Athenian  movement,  each  of  whose  philoso- 
phers sends  forth  successive  streams  of  influence 
thitherward. 

2.  The  Platonic  School — The  Academy. 
Plato  gathered  his  pupils  into  one  spot,  held 
them  together  to  one  fundamental  doctrine, 
which  was  still  further  fixed  in  books,  and  he 
transmitted  the  headship  of  his  School  to  one 
person,  his  nephew  Speusippus,  making  of  his 
scholarchy  a  kind  of  monarchy  to  be  kept  in  the 
family,  though  such  a  plan  after  his  death  did 
not  hold  out  very  long.  This  unity  of  the 
School  shows  itself  in  a  long  line  of  Scholarchs, 
who,  amid  many  variations,  cling  to  the  general 
Platonic  traditions. 

Here  we  see  the  difference  in  development 
between  the  Platonic  and  the  Socratic  Schools. 
The  latter  sprang  up  contemporaneously  and 
became  many  at  once,  while  the  former  remained 
one,  though  passing  in  time  through  many 
chanses.  The  orio-inal  School  of  Socrates  had 
no  fixed  locality  in  Athens ;  it  was  opened  any- 
where at  any  time,  and  anybody  could  be  a 
pupil.     The  exclusive,  aristocratic  Plato  changed 


488         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

this,  and  sought  to  establish  an  aristocracy  of 
philosophers  with  a  ruler  at  their  head,  some- 
what as  we  see  in  his  RepuhJic.  But  Socrates 
founded  no  distinctive  School  of  his  own;  he 
let  his  followers  do  that,  of  whom  the  chief  one 
was  Plato.  The  latter,  however,  developed  his 
own  philosophical  principle  as  the  basis  of  his 
School,  which  was,  therefore,  Platonic  and  not 
Socratic. 

The  divisions  of  the  Platonic  School  are,  ac- 
cordingly, successive  and  not  contemporaneous ; 
the  whole  does  not  split  up  into  parts,  but  un- 
folds into  differences.  The  history  of  the 
Academy  is  usually  divided  into  three  periods, 
and  sometimes  into  five,  extending  down  to 
the  Christian  Era  and  beyond.  The  three  divi- 
sions bear  the  names  of  Old,  Middle  and  New 
Academies,  each  of  which  will  be  briefly 
designated. 

The  Old  Academy  lasted  about  one  hundred 
years  after  the  death  of  Plato,  and  continued  to 
propagate  his  Philosophy  though  in  its  later  and 
less  pure  form.  It  began  to  revert  to  the  doc- 
trine of  Pythagoras,  and  to  pass  from  the  Idea 
to  Numbers  as  the  essence  of  things  —  a  distinct 
relapse,  whose  source  we  may  observe  in  the  last 
works  of  Plato  —  the  Laws  2i\\d  the  £Jpinomis. 
The  grand  Platonic  chasm  these  later  Platonists 
soutjht  to  bridije  over  —  the  chasm  between  the 
sensible     and    supersensible    realms ;     so    they 


THE  THEORETIC  MOVEMENT.  489 

turned  back  to  the  Numbers  of  Pytliagoras  as 
the  intermediate  entity  between  Idea  and  Matter. 
Xenocrates  succeeded  Speusippus;  he  divided 
philosophy  into  Dialectics,  Physics  and  Ethics, 
which,  though  not  explicitly  stated  by  Plato 
or  even  by  Aristotle,  is  present  in  their 
writings  taken  as  a  whole,  The  philosophic 
Norm  is  now  formulated,  though  not  completely 
formulated,  and  will  remain  as  a  kind  of  center 
for  all  systems.  A  popular  moralizing  is  found 
in  the  Old  Academy  rather  than  a  scientific 
development  of  Ethics ;  also  there  is  a  tendency 
to  religion  or  religionizing ;  both  are  significant 
signs  of  the  coming  time. 

The  Old  Academy  transmitted  the  doctrines 
of  the  master  in  a  somewhat  formal  academic 
manner  (whence  conies  the  secondary  mean- 
ing of  this  term).  But  outside  of  the  Acad- 
emy new  forces  are  at  work  which  it  cannot 
ignore,  its  assumptions  are  assailed  by  a  keen 
foe,  and  its  dogmatic  certainty  is  undermined. 
Skepticism  enters  it,  and  questions  the  validity 
of  the  principle  upon  which  Plato  had  founded 
his  Philosophy.  Herewith  begins  a  decided 
change,  introducing  a  new  period  of  the  Acad- 
emy. 

The  Middle  Academy  begins  with  Arcesilaus 
of  Pitane  as  scholarch.  He  makes  the  transition 
out  of  the  Old  Academy  into  the  Middle  Acad- 
emy, which  is  the  transition  from  prescription  to 


490         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

doiil^t,  from  dogniatism  to  skepticism.  He 
taught  his  people  to  think  for  themselves,  to  test 
the  transmitted  doctrine.  One  main  dogma  he 
had :  take  nothing  for  granted.  Thus  he  too 
could  not  help  being  dogmatic  in  his  hostility  to 
dogmatism;  his  one  assumption  is:  have  no  as- 
sumption. He  affirmed  the  skeptical  suspension 
of  judgment  (epoche),  because  of  the  contradic- 
tions of  reason.  Hence,  if  he  spoke,  he  must 
speak  on  both  sides ;  Diogenes  Laertius  says  of 
him  '*  he  was  the  first  to  argue  on  both  sides  of 
a  question;"  such  was  his  principle  as  both  were 
for  him  equally  valid.  Thus  he  shows  strikingly 
the  dualism  which  has  come  into  the  Platonic 
School.  The  same  Diogenes  reports  further  of 
him  that  some  say  he  never  wrote  a  book,  be- 
cause of  his  suspension  of  judgment  on  every 
point,  while  others  say  that  he  wrote  a  book 
*'but  threw  it  into  the  tire."  He  must  have 
discovered  that  it  contradicted  his  principle  of 
suspension  of  judgment  even  to  write  a  book, 
and  so  he  concluded  to  suspend  judgment  on  his 
doctrine  of  suspension  of  judgment  by  burning 
his  production.  Arcesilaus  (born  about  315  B. 
C,  died  about  241 )  was  succeeded  by  a  number 
of  unimportant  Scholarchs,  till  a  greater  than  he 
appeared. 

This  was  Carneades  (215-130  B.  C.)  who 
wrought  out  the  system  of  Academic  skepticism 
to  completion.     First  of  all  he  assailed  the   cri- 


THE  THEOBETIG  MOVEMENT.  491 

terion  of  Truth,  as  maintained  by  the  Stoics,  who 
claimed  an  immediate  intuition  of  it  by  the  Ego. 
But  Carneades  shows  how  this  Ego  varies,  and 
thus  he  returns  to  the  standpoint  of  Protagoras 
and  Sophisticism.  He  denies  the  validity  of 
logic  by  pointing  out  that  the  major  premise  is 
itself  an  assumption  requiring  proof.  He  argues 
that  the  idea  of  God  is  a  contradiction,  and  so 
are  right,  duty,  responsibilit}' ;  in  general,  all  re- 
ligious and  ethical  concepts  are  really  inconceiv- 
able. The  fact  is,  all  thought  is  a  denial  of 
thought;  still  man  thinks  and  acts  from  thought. 
Hence,  as  a  kind  of  compromise  between  Intel- 
lect and  Will,  Carneades  developed  the  doctrine 
of  Probabilism.  Though  there  is  no  certainty, 
no  objective  Truth  for  us,  we  still  can  judge  of 
probabilities  which  have  their  degrees  of  Truth. 
This  thought,  after  all,  may  probably  be  true. 
Thus  skepticism  acknowledges  a  criterion  of 
Truth  (even  if  this  be  merely  probable  Truth), 
and  gives  up  its  fundamental  principle.  It  has 
come  to  an  end,  has  really  ended  itself  as  it  ulti- 
mately must.  Carneades,  in  fighting  the  dogma- 
tism of  the  Stoics,  brought  into  clear  light  his 
own  dogmatism ;  he  even  makes  a  system  with  a 
principle  which  denies  the  possibility  of  any  such 
principle.  In  his  case,  too,  the  negation  has 
negated  itself. 

The  Middle  Academy  lasted  about  one  hundred 
and  fifty  years.     A  significant  picture  is  that  of 


492         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Carneades  at  Rome  (155  B.  C),  as  an  embas- 
sador from  conquered  Greece  to  her  conqueror. 
The  philosopher  is  reported  to  have  given  two 
discourses  on  two  successive  days,  the  first  for 
and  the  second  against  justice.  This  philosophy 
Roman  Cato  did  not  think  a  good  thing  for 
Rome,  v^hose  destiny  was  to  be  the  great  or- 
ganizer of  justice  for  all  the  world.  So  we 
behold  in  this  act  Carneades  the  philosopher 
undoing  Carneades  the  embassador,  who  must 
have  been  sent  to  get  justice  for  his  countrymen. 
Having  given  this  display  of  itself  in  its  greatest 
representative,  the  Middle  Academy  can  now  be 
allowed  to  retire. 

Tlie  N'eiu  Academy  shows  the  Platonic  School 
gradually  developing  out  of  Skepticism  into 
Eclecticism,  that  principle  which  became  the 
characteristic  of  the  Roman  world  in  the  second 
century  B.  C,  when  it  had  conquered  many 
nations  and  had  to  govern  them  from  some  gen- 
eral policy.  An  adoption  and  amalgamation  of 
the  best  ideas  of  all  for  all  became  the  ruling 
spirit  of  the  age.  Each  people  of  importance 
was  found  to  have  something  important  to  give 
and  also  to  receive.  A  universal  liberalism  of 
mind  and  mutual  appreciation  began  to  weaken 
all  limits,  and  particularly  the  limits  of  the  phi- 
losophical Schools  against  one  another. 

The  pupils  of  Carneades  began  to  show  this 
relaxation  of  doctrine,  and  when  Philo  of  Larissa 


THE  THEORETIC  MOVEMENT.  493 

(in  the  early  part  of  the  first  century  B.  C.) 
was  Schohirch,  the  renunciation  of  Skepticism 
was  openly  avowed.  The  same  attitude  was 
taken  by  his  successor  Antiochus  of  Ascalon, 
whom  Cicero  heard  at  Athens  in  79-78  B.  C, 
and  who  supported  the  view  that  Plato,  Aristotle, 
and  the  Stoics  gave  the  same  thing  from  differ- 
ent standpoints.  This  eclectic  attitude  main- 
tained itself  with  some  variations  in  the  School 
till  the  rise  of  Neo-Platonism.  With  this  return 
to  the  great  founders  of  the  Schools  was  con- 
nected a  renewed  study  of  their  works,  with  a 
preference  for  Ethics. 

Looking  back  at  the  three  Academies,  Old, 
Middle,  and  New,  we  observe  that  they  form  a 
process  together,  which  rounds  them  out  with 
a  certain  degree  of  completeness.  The  Old 
Academy,  most  of  whose  Scholarchs  lived  amid 
the  memories  of  the  personal  Plato,  was  dom- 
inated prescriptively  by  his  doctrine.  But  the 
Middle  Academy  shows  the  separation  from 
Plato  and  also  within  itself,  while  the  New 
Academy  indicates  a  return  to  the  first  stage. 
All  three  likewise  reflect  the  historical  character 
of  their  respective  periods,  from  the  absolute 
personal  authority  of  the  great  conqueror  like 
Alexander,  through  a  time  of  reaction  and  revolt 
under  his  successors,  to  the  universal  Roman 
domination  which  has  in  its  character  a  kind  of 
Electicism. 


494        ANCIENT  EUROPE  An  PHILOSOPSY. 

3 .  The  Aristotelian  Schools  —  The  Peripatetics. 
The  philosophic  movement  springing  from  Aris- 
totle has  a  continuous  development  at  Athens, 
like  the  Platonic  Academy,  whose  counterpart  is 
there  the  Aristotelian  Lyceum.  But  Aristo- 
telianism  sends  forth  many  branches  elsewhere ; 
it  scatters  itself  over  the  Greek  world  and  forms 
not  a  few  Schools  outside  of  Athens.  Thus  it 
works  like  Socraticism  also,  dividing  up  into 
special  tendencies,  and  throwing  itself  out 
spatially;  but  it,  like  Phitonism,  keeps  its 
central  locality  too,  and  unfokis  in  time  through 
a  long  list  of  Scholarchs.  Hence  it  shows  itself 
more  universal,  capable  of  assimilating  a  greater 
diversity  of  minds  and  of  peoples.  Plato  is 
still  an  Athenian  and  his  School  remains  essen- 
tially Athenian;  Aristotle  is  a  Greek  as  well 
as  an  Athenian,  and  is  spiritually  a  world-con- 
queror, such  as  Alexander  is  politically. 

The  creative  spirit  of  Aristotle  manifested  it 
self  more  powerfully  at  Alexandria  than  it  did 
amono"  his  successors  at  Athens,  where  the 
Platonic  School  seems  on  the  whole  to  have 
drawn  the  abler  men.  Specially  the  departments 
of  Natural  Science,  Literature,  and  History  were 
cultivated  at  Alexandria,  and  later  it  became  the 
center  of  the  great  religious  movement  which 
agitated  both  Orient  and  Occident.  Still  the 
pure  philosophy  of  Aristotle  as  well  as  its 
physical  and  humanistic  departments,  was   kept 


THE  THEOBETIC  MOVEMENT.  495 

alive  by  the  School  of  Athens  with  great  zeal 
and  persistency  for  more  than  five  hundred 
years,  till  the  time  of  Neo-Platouism.  That  is, 
the  entire  Aristotelian  Norm  —  Metaphysics  with 
Logic,  Physics,  and  Ethics  —  was  preserved  in 
the  teaching  of  the  Lyceum  as  a  whole,  though 
each  Scholarch  may  have  had  his  individual 
preference  for  certain  branches  or  portions  of 
the  Norm. 

Another  point  may  be  here  noted  in  advance: 
the  movement  of  the  Peripatetic  School  in  time 
shows  the  same  general  stages  as  the  Academy, 
indicating  the  similar  response  of  each  to  the 
spirit  of  the  age.  These  stages,  which  are 
three,  we  shall  briefly  designate.  The  first  or 
prescriptive  stage  was  represented  by  the  first 
Scholarch  after  Aristotle,  Theophrastus,  who 
assisted  the  master  in  founding  the  Lyceum 
(335  B.  C),  and  after  the  flight  and  death  of 
Aristotle  (323-2  B.  C.)  took  charge  of  the 
School.  His  bent  was  toward  Natural  Science, 
in  which  two  of  his  botanical  works  have  been 
preserved  as  well  some  fragments  pertaining 
to  the  History  of  Physics.  But  he  did  not 
neglect  Metaphysics  or  Ethics,  to  the  latter  of 
which  belongs  his  well-known  book  on  Ethical 
Characters.  Others  are  named  (Eudemus  of 
Rhodes,  Aristoxenus  of  Tarentum,  Dicsearchus 
of  Messene)  who  may  be  said  to  represent  this 
first    or    prescriptive    stage    along    with    Theo- 


4y6        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

phrastus,  each  one,  however,  having  his  own 
special  tendency.  All  of  these  maintain  in 
o-eneral  the  Aristotelian  tradition  in  its  more 
immediate  ^form.  But  necessarily  the  breach 
with  external  authority  will  set  in,  especially 
when  such  a  spirit  belongs  to  the  time. 

The  second  or  separative  stage  begins  with 
decided  emphasis  in  Strato,  who  was  head  of 
the  Peripatetic  School  for  eighteen  years  (287- 
269  B.  C),  and  so  was  an  early  contemporary 
of  the  Middle  Academy,  which  reacted  from 
Plato  to  Skepticism.  The  dualism  of  Aristotle 
has  been  already  noticed :  the  transcendence  of 
the  Supreme  Being,  Thought  of  Thought,  God 
on  the  one  hand,  yet  the  immanence  of  this  high- 
est principle  in  the  world  and  man  on  the  other. 
Strato  working  at  this  dualism  of  the  master, 
rejected  the  transcendent  part  both  in  Man  and 
God.  The  human  JSToiis  or  Thought  is  one  with 
perception;  the  divine  N'oiis  is  one  with  the 
world.  Thus  he  reacts  from  the  supreme  prin- 
ciple of  his  master  to  pantheism  or  immanence. 
His  attack  is  against  an  external  absolute  power 
or  authority,  hence  it  would  turn  against  an 
absolute  political  ruler  like  Alexander,  and  also 
asainst  an  absolute  intellectual  ruler  like  Aris- 
to  tie.  This,  at  bottom,  shows  the  same  spiritual 
tendency  as  the  reaction  of  Arcesilaus  of  the  Mid- 
dle Academy  against  the  Platonic  doctrine.  Both 
are  moving  in  opposition  to  a  prescribed  authority 


TEE  TnEORETIC  MOVEMENT.  497 

in  philosophy,  which  ought  to  develop  the  free 
activity  of  the  spirit.  Both  are  revolts  against 
the  domination  of  an  external  autocratic  prin- 
ciple of  mind,  and  correspond  to  the  contem- 
porary political  revolts  against  the  autocratic 
authority  capriciousl}^  exercised  by  the  successors 
of  Alexander. 

But  again  the  mighty  genius  of  the  master 
after  a  period  of  protest  and  partial  obscuration 
makes  itself  valid  in  his  School,  and  the  result 
is  a  new  period  in  its  history. 

The  third  stage  of  the  Peripateticism  is  a 
period  of  commentators,  zealous  expositors, 
who  have  returned  to  the  fountain  head  and 
occupy  themselves  with  an  erudite  and  detailed 
study  of  the  Aristotelian  writings.  The  first 
important  Scholarch  to  be  mentioned  in  this 
connection  is  Andronicus  of  Rhodes,  belono-inff 
to  the  first  half  of  the  last  century  B.  C,  and 
hence  quite  cotemporaneous  with  the  beginning 
of  the  New  Academy,  which  likewise  sought  to 
get  back  to  Plato  oat  of  skepticism.  Androni- 
cus edited  and  interpreted  the  works  of  Aristotle 
afresh,  and  his  pupil  Boethus  continued  the  task. 
At  the  same  time  the  spirit  of  the  Roman  age  in 
the  form  of  eclecticism  made  itself  felt  in  the 
Peripatetic  School  as  well  as  in  the  Platonic,  as 
is  seen  in  the  pseudo-Aristotelian  treatise  De 
Mundo  written  in  the  first  century  B.  C. 

The  line  of  commentators  continues  in  the 
32 


498         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

school  at  Athens  for  quite  300  years,  teaching, 
interpreting,  and  writing  without  much  origi- 
nality, maintaining  themselves  on  pretty  much 
the  same  dead  level  of  mediocrity.  Finally  the 
line  concludes  in  the  greatest  of  them  all,  Alex- 
ander of  Aphodisias,  called  the  exegete  par 
excellence^  even  proclaimed  a  second  Aristotle 
by  some  extravagant  admirers.  His  time  in  the 
School  was  from  the  year  198  A.  D.  to  211 
A.  D.,  the  Roman  Emperor  during  this  period 
being  Septimus  Severus.  He  may  have  had 
some  successors  in  the  School,  but  they  are  not 
known  with  any  definiteness,  and  certainly  were 
of  small  importance. 

The  Neo-Hellenic  movement  was  already  set- 
ting in,  which  was  a  far  deeper  and  grander 
return  to  Hellenism  than  that  of  either  the 
Platonic  or  Aristotelian  Schools,  which  had 
chiefly  gone  back  to  the  dogmas  of  the  two 
masters.  It  is  no  wonder  then  that  both  Schools 
were  gradually  absorbed  into  this  new  philo- 
sophical movement,  which  sought  not  merely  to 
restore  formal  Aristotelianism  and  Platonism 
(hence  the  term  Neo-Platonism  is  not  a  good 
one)  but  the  entire  Hellenic  Philosophy,  and  to 
make  it  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  great 
religious  regeneration  which  was  expressing 
itself  in  Christianity. 

This,  however,  brings  us  to  the  end  of  the 
distinctively  scholastic  (or  dogmatic)  Movement 


THE  THEOBETIC  MOVEMENT.  499 

of  Greek  Philosophy  in  the  Hellenistic  Period. 
The  Athenian  Schools  have  run  their  course, 
which  we  have  seen  to  correspond  in  a  general 
way  to  the  social  and  institutional  changes  of 
the  ancient  world  to  which  they  belonged.  Still 
amid  all  their  ups  and  downs  these  Schools 
clung  to  the  doctrines  of  their  respective  founders, 
even  if  they  had  at  times  to  contradict  them- 
selves in  doing  so.  The  Middle  Academy  still 
called  itself  Platonic  and  apparently  taught  Plato's 
principles  in  conjunction  with  its  skepticism, 
Strato  still  considered  himself  an  Aristotelian 
though  he  renounced  Aristotle's  transcendent 
Thought  of  Thought.  Thus  the  philosophical 
Schools  remained  essentially  prescriptive,  holding 
fast  to  the  transmitted  doctrine,  even  when 
in  partial  reaction  from  it;  in  other  words 
they  never  fully  renounced  their  dogmatic 
attitude. 

Hence  they  naturally  beget  a  deeper  opposition 
than  any  that  lies  inside  their  Schools,  an  oppo- 
sition which  denies  wholly  their  prescriptive 
basis  as  well  as  their  inherited  doctrines.  This 
is  then  an  assault  upon  the  very  principle  of  the 
School  as  the  preserver  and  propagator  of  philo- 
sophic dogmas,  which  in  one  way  or  other,  affirm 
the  validity  of  oar  knowledge  of  the  object. 
Skepticism  breaks  the  unity  of  Thought  and 
Being  which  underlies  the  whole  Hellenic  Period. 
It  denies  that  what  we  think    necessarily  is ;  the 


500         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHT. 

truth  of  the  thing  known  we  cannot  know,  it  is  a 
mere  appearance.  Yet  somehow  we  do  know 
that  it  is  an  appearance,  and  so  the  skeptical  atti- 
tude has  its  Dogmatism  also,  and  asserts  it 
against  all  Dogmatism,  which  thus  divides  within 
itself  into  two  opposite  forms,  positive  and  nega- 
tive. Hence  the  following  is  the  second  or  sep- 
arative stage  in  the  total  sweep  of  the  present 
(Theoretic)  Movement. 

II.  Skepticism  (^negative).  This  is  the  nega- 
tive counterpart  and  indeed  product  of  philoso- 
phical Dogmatism,  which  we  have  just  considered. 
Skepticism  is  primarily  a  reaction  against  the  im- 
perialistic tendency  of  Philosophy.  Especially 
the  system  dominated  externally  by  a  first  princi- 
ple and  ordering  everything  according  to  its 
behest  begins  to  be  questioned  by  Skepticism  in 
the  interest  of  freedom.  The  inherent  Dogma- 
tism of  European  spirit  as  expressed  in  its  supreme 
Discipline  is  now  brought  to  light  by  itself  in  one 
of  its  manifestations,  the  skeptical.  Philosophy, 
being  imperial  in  its  law  or  principle  commands 
the  individual,  who  has  nothing  to  do  but  obey  or 
revolt.  In  Dogmatism  he  obeys,  in  Skepticism 
he  revolts.  But  that  the  individual  is  to  make 
the  law  which  commands  him,  is  a  height  to  which 
Skepticism  with  its  negative  never  reaches  in  spite 
of  its  protest  against  external  authority.  Nor 
has  European  philosophy  reached  it  consciousl}' 
to  this  day.  Only  the  Occidental  Discipline  as  the 


THE  THEOBETIC  MOVEMENT.  501 

expression  of  ii  free  institutional  world  can  bring 
to  light  completely  and  positively  that  thought 
which  shows  its  first  blind  and  helpless  struggle 
in  Greek  Skepticism.  Thus  we  may  catch  here 
an  early  premonition  of  the  coming  science  of 
Psychology,  as  the  successor  of  Philosophy. 

The  skeptical  affirmation  is  that  the  essence  of 
Being  is  Appearance.  Things  have  no  essence, 
no  truth  in  themselves ;  they  are  simply  what 
they  seem  to  us.  We  cannot,  therefore,  know 
them  as  they  are,  but  as  they  affect  us. 
There  is  no  thought  in  this  thing  as  far  as  we 
can  tell,  no  genus,  no  universal.  Thus  Skepti- 
cism is  a  philosophy  which  negatives  philosophy 
declaring  that  the  essence  of  Being  is  no  essenc® 
at  all,  but  its  opposite,  an  appearance,  a  lie. 

The  general  formula  of  Helleuisticism  is  that 
the  essence  of  Being  is  the  Universal  individual- 
ized, that  is,  divided,  made  particular.  Dog- 
matism affirms  this  Universal  individualized  to  be 
reality,  truth;  Skepticism  affirms  this  Universal 
individualized  to  be  unreality,  appearance,  a 
contradiction  in  terms.  For  the  individual  is 
just  the  opposite  of  the  Universal,  which  vanishes 
into  the  individual  when  held  off  against  it.  So 
the  Universal  individualized  is  the  complete 
evanishment  of  the  Universal;  that  is,  the  skep- 
tical Ego  posits  the  Universal  individualized  to 
be  merely  individual  (or  wliat  appears  to  me), 
while  tho  dogmatic  or  scholastic  Ego  posits  the 


502         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Universal  individualized  to  be  still  universal. 
Such  is  the  inner  dialectical  movement  of  these 
two  spheres  of  Hellenisticism,  in  which  the  Uni- 
versal is  seeking  to  be  the  complete  psychical 
process  of  itself,  Avhich  process  is  to  separate  itself 
into  individuals  and  then  to  return  to  itself  out 
of  this  self-separation.  The  inadequacy  of  Dog- 
matism is  that  the  Universal  is  not  made  to 
evolve  internally  its  own  difference  (or  its  indi- 
viduals), but  is  clapped  upon  the  same  from  the 
outside  by  the  dogmatic  Ego.  The  inadequacy 
of  Skepticism  is  that  the  difference  (or  the  indi- 
vidual) is  not  made  to  evolve  out  of  itself  and 
return  to  the  Universal,  in  other  words,  that  the 
Negative  is  not  made  to  overcome  itself  and  so 
become  positive,  but  remains  fixed  in  its  own 
self-assertion.  Thus  Skepticism  may  and  does 
usually  become  as  dogmatic  as  Dogmatism 
itself.  The  contradiction  which  it  points  out  in 
the  dogmatic  schools  becomes  its  own,  particularly 
when  it  too  makes  itself  a  dogmatic  school, 
which  it  will  not  fail  to  do. 

The  germ  of  Skepticism  may  be  traced  in  the 
very  birth  of  Philosophy,  which  sprang  from  a 
reaction  against  the  absolutism  of  an  Oriental 
Will  divine  and  huuian.  Zeno,  the  Eleatic, 
showed  it  in  his  negative  Dialectic,  and  particu- 
larly the  Sophists  in  their  maxim  that  man  is 
the  measure  of  all  things.  Socrates  cannot  be 
left  out  with  his  "  I  know  that  I  do  not  know." 


THE  THEORETIC  MOVEMENT.  503 

But  as  already  said,  iDhilosophical  Skepticism 
cannot  arise  till  there  is  a  Philosophy  with  a 
system.  For  Skepticism  must  have  some  kind 
of  system  in  refuting  system,  some  kind  of 
knowledge  in  denying  knowledge. 

Thus  Philosophy  as  affirmative  casts  this  pe- 
culiar negative  image  of  itself  as  a  kind  of  Me- 
phistophelean companion  to  itself,  which  never 
fails  to  appear  with  it  through  all  ages.  The 
most  important  of  these  Hellenistic  skeptics  and 
their  work  we  may  briefly  glance  at. 

1.  Pyrrho.  Distinctly  the  first  philosophical 
skeptic,  since  philosophy  had  to  develop  to  the 
point  of  affirming  truth  to  be  objective  and  uni- 
versal, before  such  a  proposition  could  be  denied. 
The  Athenian  Movement  (Socrates,  Plato  and 
Aristotle)  had  declared,  in  general,  the  universal 
validity  of  Thought;  this  is  what  Pyrrho  assails, 
he  is  the  primal  antagonist  of  Athenian  Univer- 
salism.  He  is  not  of  Athens,  but  an  Elean,  and 
may  have  felt  that  Olympia,  seat  of  Zeus,  de- 
served pre-eminence  instead  of  the  city  of  Pallas 
Athena.  He  also  went  with  Alexander's  army 
as  far  as  India  in  the  company  of  Anaxarchus,  a 
follower  of  Democritus ;  both  of  which  facts  may 
have  had  an  influence  upon  his  negative  attitude 
toward  Athenian  domination  in  philosophy.  He 
is  supposed  to  have  had  some  connection  with  two 
Socratic  offshoots,  that  of  Megara  and  that  of 
Elis,  in  which  latter   province  he  lived;  both  of 


504         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

these  offshoots  were  dialectical  and  critical  rather 
than  creative.  His  life  hcs  between  365  B.  C. 
and  275  B.  C,  so  that  he  was  a  j^ounger  contem- 
porary of  Aristotle,  43  years  old  when  the  latter 
died,  and  also  was  a  witness  of  the  rise  of  the  Stoic 
and  Epicurean  Schools  in  addition  to  the  Academy 
and  Lyceum.  Thus  the  Athenian  empire  was 
transferred  from  the  political  to  the  intellectual 
world ,  and  another  Peloponnesian  War  broke  out, 
the  two  chief  hostile  protagonists  against  Athens 
being  Pyrrho  and  Timon  (of  Phlius),  both 
Peloponnesians,  but  not  Spartans,  since  the  latter 
did  not  philosophize,  and  were  averse  even  to 
talking.  We  shall  see  that  a  doctrinal  point  of 
Timon  was  aphasia,  talklessness,  and  also  of 
Pyrrho  (though  Timon  seems  to  have  first  used 
the  word)  b}^  which  they  proposed  to  put  down 
or  refute  Attic  volubility. 

It  was  consistent  in  Pyrrho  not  to  leave  any 
writinos,  and  indeed  not  to  converse  at  all;  still 
he  had  to  talk  a  little  just  for  the  purpose  of 
fightino-  the  Athenian  devil  with  his  own  fire. 
The  starting-point  of  Pyrrho  was,  Man  cannot 
know  the  essence  of  things,  or  the  essence  of 
Beino"  is  to  have  no  essence,  at  least  for  us. 
AYliat  then  are  we  to  do?  As  we  cannot  know 
the  object,  the  best  is  to  withhold  judgment 
(epoche)  ;  surely  from  this  follows  also  that  we 
should  hold  our  tongue  {apliasia).  Nothing 
ought  to  paralyze  the  talking  member  more  com- 


THE  THEOBETIG  MOVEMENT.  605 

pletely  than  the  knowledge  that  we  can  know 
nothing.  Here  we  observe  the  contradiction  in- 
herent  in  all  Skepticism,  it  is  dogmatic  in  deny- 
ing Dogmatism,  it  knows  all  about  the  unknowa- 
ble, it  covertly  reaffirms  what  it  is  refuting. 

Though  this  difficulty  lies  in  Pyrrho's  general 
principle,  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  did  good 
work  in  pointing  out  and  criticising  the  formal 
and  inadequate  views  of  the  Schools.  Already 
philosophy  had  begun  to  transmit  categories  and 
maxims  externally,  its  divisions  were  accepted 
as  final,  authority  began  to  rule  in  the  very  cita- 
del of  freedom,  in  the  self-active  mind.  After 
a  great  original  movement  like  the  Athenian, 
formalism  sets  in  and  really  destroys  the  very 
purpose  of  philosophizing.  Now  Pyrrho  wins 
his  eternal  fame  because  he  was  the  first  philos- 
opher who  made  philosophy  itself  assail  its  own 
formalism,  made  it  batter  down  its  own  external 
autocratic  authority  and  assert  freedom,  though 
this  was  as  yet  only  a  negative  freedom.  When 
the  soul  has  gone  out  of  the  philosophic  body 
Skepticism  first  proclaims  the  fact  of  death, 
though  it  has  no  power  in  itself  of  bringing  back 
life.  Pyrrho,  therefore,  belongs  to  all  times, 
and  represents  a  typical  fact  not  only  in  Phi- 
losophy, but  also  in  Religion,  in  Literature,  in 
Art,  and  in  Institutions.  His  part  is  a  negative 
part,  as  far  as  he  is  concerned,  but  in  the  total 
process  of  \h.Q  All  (the  Pampsychosis)  he  is  ne- 


506        ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

gating  a  negative,  he  is  destroying  what  has 
ah'eady  become  destructive,  and  must  be  burnt 
up  to  prepare  for  the  new  positive  era. 

Pyrrho,  as  a  result  of  his  philosophical  Skep- 
ticism, enforced  the  mental  attitude  which  he 
called  ataraxia,  impassiveness,  which  has  its 
ethical  side  and  connects  him  with  the  Stoics  and 
Epicureans.  But  his  ataraxia  springs  from 
his  skeptical  philosophy  and  is  not  primarily 
ethical. 

Already  we  have  mentioned  Timon,  the  friend 
and  follower  of  Pyrrho,  who,  in  spite  of  the 
doctrine  of  suspension  of  judgment  and  of 
aphasia,  wrote  books  which  very  decisively  pro- 
nounced judgment  upon  the  philosophers.  In 
those  biting  epigrams  of  his  (called  silloi)  some 
of  which  have  come  down  to  us,  he  shows  an 
unbridled  touojue  and  damns  Doo^matism  in  a 
most  doo-matic  and  discourteous  manner. 

Strictly  speaking  there  could  be  no  system  of 
Skepticism,  since  that  would  imply  a  funda- 
mental principle,  which  the  skeptics  denied. 
Nor  could  there  well  be  a  School  holdino^  the 
followers  together  by  a  common  thought,  for  it 
was  just  that  common  thought  of  which  they 
were  skeptical.  Hence  we  need  not  be  sur- 
prised to  find  that  this  early  Skepticism  was  taken 
up  by  the  Middle  Academy  which  united  it  with  a 
dogmatic  principle,  and  maintained  both  in  spite 
f)f   the  contradiction.     Herewith  Skepticism  as 


THE  TIIEOBETIC  MOVEMENT.  507 

an  active  original  force  quite  vanishes  for  more 
than  two  centuries. 

But  when  tlie  Middle  Academy  abandoned 
Skepticism,  and,  adopting  Eclecticism,  became 
the  New  Academy,  the  skeptical  consciousness 
began  to  awaken  and  after  a  time  started  a  fresh 
movement  in  its  own  right  and  under  its  own 
name. 

2.  Aenesidemus.  This  is  the  name  of  the 
chief  reviver  of  the  Pyrrhonian  Skepticism.  He 
is  supposed  to  have  lived  a  little  before  the  Chris- 
tian Era,  though  his  exact  period  is  uncertain. 
He  came  from  Gnossus  in  Crete,  taught  in  Alex- 
andria, and  wrote  a  book  in  which  are  given  the 
so-called  ten  tropes  of  Skepticism,  or  reasons  for 
discreditino;  all  our  knowledge  of  things.  These 
reasons  are  founded  upon  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
ject perceiving,  the  object  perceived,  and  the 
relation  between  the  two.  Aenesidemus  herein 
goes  back  to  the  general  standpoint  of  Sophisti- 
cism.  Yet  we  see  that  he  has  started  to  system- 
atize Skepticism,  which  we  may  suppose  is  his 
chief  advance  upon  Pyrrho.  Thus  his  dogmatic 
procedure  becomes  pronounced,  and  his  tropes 
are  means  of  knowing  that  things  cannot 
be  known,  and  therefore  of  imparting  quite  a 
little  bit  of  knowledge  about  those  unknowable 
things. 

Another  skeptic,  Agrippa,  added  five  tropes, 
which  are  more  profound  as  well  as  more  general. 


608         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

than  those  of  Aenesidemus.  Finally  these  tropes 
are  reduced  to  two.  In  such  changes  we  see  an 
attempt  to  order  Skepticism  into  a  system,  but 
this  Skepticism  seems  to  be  somewhat  skeptical 
of  its  own  system.  Still  the  old  contradiction 
grows  more  explicit:  in  denying  that  he  can 
know  truth,  the  skeptic  implies  the  truth  of  his 
denial.  He  was  aware  of  this  dogmatic  implica- 
tion in  his  Skepticism,  and  sought  to  get  rid  of  it 
by  a  new  denial,  which  could  only  mean  the  de- 
nial of  his  denial.  Where  then  was  his  Skep- 
ticism? 

3.  SextusEmpiricus.  This  is  the  only  ancient 
skeptic  whose  writings  have  been  preserved  with 
any  degree  of  completeness.  He  lived  about 
200  A.  D.,  and  is  supposed  to  have  resided  at 
Alexandria  and  also  at  Athens.  Very  distinctly 
does  the  fact  come  out  in  Sextus  that  the  skeptics 
form  a  school  with  its  history,  its  body  of  doc- 
trines, also  with  its  great  names,  and  its  inher- 
ited enemies.  It  is  a  system  similar  to  the  other 
dogmatic  systems  which  it  is  assailing  for  their 
Dogmatism.  It  has  its  regular  tenets,  its  pre- 
scribed lines  of  procedure,  its  assumptions  which 
require  proof.  In  Sextus  Skepticism  has  become 
quite  as  scholastic  as  the  Schools  which  it  com- 
bats for  this  very  reason.  He  brings  his  skep- 
tical principle  against  the  truth  of  all  the  sciences, 
metaphysical,  physical  and  ethical.  Thus  Skep- 
ticism which  is  to  permit  no  self-assertion,  asserts 


THE  TIIEOitETIC  MOVEMENT.  509 

itself  very  emphaticallv  and  profuseh"  iu  these 
writings  of  Scxtus. 

Of  this  inner  contradiction  in  himself  and  in 
his  books  Sextus  is  aware ;  keen  antagonists  had 
made  it  only  too  evident.  So  he  declares  him- 
self opposed  to  both  sorts  of  Dogmatism,  to  that 
of  the  Peripatetics  and  Stoics,  who  affirm  the 
knowability  of  things,  and  to  that  of  the  Aca- 
demics who  affirm  the  unknowability  of  things. 
The  skeptical  objection  is  to  the  positive  affirma- 
tion in  each  case.  Sextus  the  skeptic  affirms 
very  positively  that  one  is  not  to  affirm  positively. 
It  must  be  confessed  that  he  shows  little  suspen- 
sion of  judgment  in  his  argument  for  suspension 
of  judgment,  and  his  aphasia  has  talked  itself 
out  in  two  (some  say  three)  considerable  books, 
in  which  his  imperturbability  (^ataraxia^  often 
shows  a  state  of  perturbation  at  the  dogged 
dogmatists. 

It  is  manifest  that  the  inherent  negative 
nature  of  Skepticism  has  negated  itself  and  has 
shown  the  underlying  affirmation  in  its  denial. 
There  are  many  details  in  Sextus  which  we  here 
pass  over.  His  general  place  in  the  sweep  of 
philosophical  Skepticism  is  to  have  made  its 
inner  contradiction  evident  to  his  age,  which, 
restless  as  it  was  spiritually,  cannot  find  peace  in 
such  a  doctrine.  Still  Skepticism  performed  a 
great  function  in  the  movement  of  ancient 
Philosophy,    by    exposing    its    assumption,    its 


510         ANCIENT  EUBOPE AN  PHILOSOPHY. 

authoritative  and  dogmatic  character,  which,  in 
form  at  least,  sought  to  dominate  the  free  spirit 
from  the  outside.  The  philosopliic  system 
posits  tlie  essence  of  being  as  this  all-ruling 
principle;  the  Skeptic  demands,  why  should  it 
rule  me,  and  proceeds  to  deny  its  supremacy. 
Thus  Skepticism  is  always  a  step  in  spiritual 
freedom,  though  its  freedom  be  but  negative. 
Moreover  it  winds  up  in  a  system  also,  with  a 
dogmatic  principle  denying  all  dogmas.  Thus  it 
anciently  rounded  itself  out  to  a  kind  of  negative 
completeness. 

Still  Skepticism  is  not  going  to  die ;  it  has  an 
abiding  principle  as  the  critique  of  all  philo- 
sophic systematizing,  which  never  fails  to  have 
the  same  old  dang-er  of  becoming;  an  external 
dogmatic  authority  over  the  free  self.  In  fact, 
Skepticism  lays  bare,  though  it  cannot  remedy, 
the  inherent  defect  in  all  Philosophy  as  the 
European  world-discipline.  Philosophy  becomes 
imperial,  absolute,  autocratic,  laying  down  its 
principle  as  the  final  law  governing  spirit,  which 
is  expected  to  acquiesce.  Still  in  Siiepticism 
spirit  revolts,  and  may  overturn  the  prevailing 
philosophy  by  a  revolution,  which  revolution, 
however,  is  likely  to  end  in  a  new  dogmatism  or 
a  new  despotism.  Sextus  Empiricus  belonged  to 
the  age  of  Roman  imperialism,  which  the  world 
could  not  yet  shake  off;  though  it  protested  and 
revolted  and  fought,  it  always  fell  back  into  the 


TEE  TEE  OBE  TIC  MO  VEMENT.  5 1 1 

arms  of  a  new  imperial  tyrant.  The  Skepticism 
of  Sextus  voices  in  its  way  the  time's  protest, 
and  also  shows  the  time's  impotence. 

The  reader  will  observe  that  Skepticism  has 
a  humorous  if  not  comic  strain  in  its  very 
character  which  comes  to  the  surface  in  any 
complete  statement  of  it.  Seen  in  its  depths 
it  is  always  affirming  what  it  denies,  being 
through  its  negative  nature  self -annulling,  nuga- 
tory, absurd,  comic  in  itself.  It  is  a  fire  which 
burns  itself  up  while  burning  up  something 
else  which  is  combustible.  Hence  it  often  takes 
a  bitter  satirical  form,  which,  however,  is  always 
a  boomerang.  The  damnation  which  it  hurls 
against  Dogmatism  (often  very  effectively)  is 
equally  or  even  more  deeply  true  of  itself, 
so  that  the  charitable  reader  is  frequently  com- 
pelled to  cry  out:  O,  my  brother,  you  are 
another.  But  let  such  an  undignified  comedy  be 
at  once  banished  from  the  presence  of  divine 
Philosophy. 

Thus  we  have  traced  down  through  the 
Hellenistic  Period  two  philosophical  threads,  the 
dogmatic  and  the  skeptical,  or  the  positive  and 
the  negative.  Both  arose  in  Greece  and  were 
born  of  Greek  conditions  belonging  to  the  age 
of  Alexander.  Then  a  new  world-conqueror 
appears,  not  a  Greek,  but  one  coming  out  of  the 
West!  What  will  he  do  with  Greek  thought? 
He    will   take    possession    of    it,    but    far    more 


512         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

deeply  it  will  take  possession  of  him,  and 
overlay  his  native  bent  with  a  philosophical 
training.  The  Roman  is  developing  his  imperial- 
istic character  and  moving  toward  universal 
domination,  when  Greek  philosophy  meets  him 
in  its  two  leading  forms  —  Dogmatism  and  Skep- 
ticism. He  will  not  become  a  partisan  of  either, 
but  will  assume  the  attitude  of  a  judge  over 
both,  and  even  in  Philosophy  enact  the  dispenser 
of  justice.  He  will  choose  some  doctrines  from 
each  side,  making  his  Ego  the  lord  over  all  these 
Greek  Schools  of  Philosophy,  as  becomes  the 
ruler  of  the  Avorld.  For  he,  the  monarch  over 
the  monarchs  of  all  nations,  must  assert  himself 
as  autocrat  over  autocratic  Philosophy,  which 
is  nationally  a  Greek.  The  path  for  choosing 
has  been  already  made  by  Skepticism,  which  has 
assailed  the  authority  of  the  dogmatic  Philoso- 
phies, asserting  the  right  of  the  individual 
to  reject  and  consequently  to  select,  according 
to  insight  and  needs.  The  chooser  must,  there- 
fore, know  what  is  true,  in  order  to  make 
his  selection  out  of  the  materials  which  lie 
before  him.  Thus  we  reach  the  third  stage 
of  the  present  Theoretic  Movement. 

HI.  Syncretism  or  Eclecticism.  —  After  a 
great  struggle  of  parties,  political  or  philosoph- 
ical, there  rises  in  many  minds  a  tendency  to 
compromise,  to  select  the  good  in  each  and  make 
a  new  party.     Such  a  bent  is  always    present  in 


THE  TREOBETIC  MOVEMENT.  513 

some  individuals,  but  at  given  periods  it  becomes 
national,  or  indeed  universal.  In  the  matter  of 
Philosophy,  a  period  of  this  sort  began  to  appear 
in  the  second  century  B.  C,  and  its  germs  can 
be  found  sprouting  in  the  third  century  B.  C. 
In  fact  some  such  Syncretism,  by  which  name 
Eclecticism  is  also  called,  we  may  trace  already 
in  the  early  Hellenic  Period  during  which  many 
Philosophies  rose  to  the  surface  almost  simul- 
taneously. Even  Plato,  at  one  time  of  his  life, 
might  be  termed  an  eclectic.  But,  on  the  whole, 
the  great  Athenian  thinkers  assimulated  the  pre- 
ceding Philosophies  into  their  own,  making  the 
same  an  organic  part  of  a  greater  philosophic 
totality. 

Such  a  power  of  assimilation  is,  however, 
largely  wanting  in  the  Hellenistic  Period,  for  no 
great  original  thinker  arises  with  a  thought  capa- 
ble of  taking  up  and  organizing  into  a  new  sys- 
tem the  previous  Philosophies  in  which  antiquity 
had  expressed  itself.  Plato  and  Aristotle  remain 
the  two  canonical  books  of  the  philosophical 
Bible,  with  exeo;esis  piled  mountain  high  down 
the  ages,  and  with  many  small  single  rivulets 
running  in  various  directions  out  of  the  great 
fountain-head .  Four  leadinsf  Schools  at  Athens, 
with  many  lesser  Schools  at  different  places  de- 
velop various  sides  of  the  one  great  Thought 
which  underlies  Athenian  Universalism  as  ex- 
pressed by  its  three  supreme  philosophies.    Each 

33 


514         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY*. 

of  these  Schools  antagonized  the  rest  and  they 
filled  all  Greece  with  disputes,  subtleties,  and 
negations,  which  in  the  course  of  time  made  even 
the  disputants  long  for  a  truce.  Eclecticism  was 
the  result  which  we  can  hardly  consider  a  definite 
school,  but  rather  a  tendency  or  even  a  fashion 
of  time,  in  which  everybody  may  indulge  accord- 
ing to  insight,  taste,  fanc}^  or  associations. 

It  is  impossible  to  regard  Eclecticism  as  a  very 
profound  thing,  or  its  followers  as  very  profound 
men.  It  had  its  chief  harvest  in  the  Roman 
mind  and  in  the  Roman  world  during  the  century 
before  and  after  the  Christian  Era.  Eclecticism 
was  old  Rome's  first  attempt  to  think  and  just 
about  its  last.  The  Roman  had  an  enor- 
mous will-power,  but  small  thought-power;  left 
to  his  native  bent  he  expressed  his  thinking 
by  doing.  Really  Thought  had  no  meaning 
for  him  except  as  directly  leading  to  action. 
Science  he  might  condescendingly  call  useful 
if  he  could  put  it  into  practice  without  too  much 
delay.  Herein  he  was  quite  the  opposite  of  the 
intellectual  Greek  who  possessed  the  faculty  of 
pursuing  science  for  its  own  sake.  Especially 
did  he  delight  in  thinking  Thought,  which  act 
Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle  enthrone  at  the 
summit  of  human  attainment.  Not  so  the 
Roman,  who  would  say :  My  Intellect  must  be 
useful  to  my  Will ;  but  the  Greek  would  say : 
My  Will  must  be  useful  to  my  Intellect.     So  the 


THE  THEORETIC  MOVEMENT.  515 

one  put  all  of  his  thinking  into  action  and  the 
other  all  of  his  action  into  thinking.  "  Will 
3^our  philosophy  help  conquer  this  world  before 
me  and  rule  the  nations?  "  asked  the  Roman  of 
the  Greek,  who  replied:  "It  will  help  you  to 
conquer  the  world  within  you  and  to  rule  your 
self."  "I'll  take  some  of  it,"  replied  the 
Roman  after  a  while,  for  he  was  in  no  hurry 
to  begin  thinking ;  but  finally  he  started  to  select 
this  and  that  doctrine  from  the  various  Greek 
Schools,  whatever  he  might  find  useful  for  his 
Roman  ends.  Quite  like  the  Anglo-Saxon  of 
to-day,  English  or  American,  adoring  his  God 
Utility,  mighty  in  doing,  weak  in  thinking.  To 
Cicero,  the  silver-tongued  Roman  spokesman  of 
Eclecticism,  even  God  is  useful,  otherwise  not 
much,  if  He  exists  at  all.  Thus  the  one  divine 
attribute  is  utility,  which  however  undoes  all 
true  divinity. 

Still  Eclecticism  arose  in  Greece  before  it 
reached  Rome.  It  is  a  part  of  a  process  which 
presupposes  both  Dogmatism  and  Skepticism. 
First  is  the  separation  and  strife  of  the  dogmas 
of  the  Schools ;  second  is  the  dogma  denying 
the  validity  of  all  dogmas — a  new  separation 
and  strife ;  then  comes  peace  and  also  partnership 
among  the  dogmas,  since  that  negative  dogma 
of  Skepticism  has  negated  all  dogmas,  itself 
included,    as  isolated  dogmas.     So    they  are  no 


516        ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPSY. 

longer  hostile  to  one  another  but  come  together 
and  fraternize  under  a  new  power. 

Eclecticism  takes  for  granted  a  multiplicity  of 
doctrines,  from  which  the  choice  is  to  be  made; 
the  Ego  is  the  chooser,  independent,  possibly 
capricious,  who  is  to  take  what  pleases  him  or  is 
useful  for  his  ends.  Here  again  we  may  note 
the  Roman  conqueror  with  the  world  at  his  feet ; 
in  the  present  case  Greek  Philosophy  is  spread 
out  before  him  for  his  choice.  Knowing  his 
wants,  he  selects  what  is  useful  for  meeting 
them,  and  lets  the  rest  go.  Every  individual  is 
thus  a  kind  of  master  over  Philosophy,  which  is 
likely  in  turn  to  become  master  over  him  and 
lead  him  to  self-mastery,  or  make  him  ethical, 
to  which  end  all  later  Greek  Philosophy  chiefly 
directed  itself. 

Moreover,  we  see  in  Eclecticism  a  return  to 
the  positive  or  dogmatic  princij)le  (first  stage) 
through  the  negative  or  skeptical  (second  stage), 
which  fact  shows  it  to  be  the  third  stao^e  of  a 
psychical  movement,  here  named  the  Theoretic 
Movement  of  the  Hellenistic  Period.  In  other 
words.  Eclecticism  is  a  return  to  Dogmatism 
through  Skepticism,  and  shows  a  commingling 
of  its  two  antecedents  in  the  doctrine  of  Prob- 
abilism,  which  is  not  altogether  skeptical  nor 
altogether  certain  or  dos^matic,  but  both  of  them 
in  one. 

Looking  back  at  the  general  formula  of  the 


THE  THEOBETIC  MOVEMENT.  517 

Hellenistic  Period  we  find  now  that  the  Universal 
individualizes  itself  in  a  new  way,  namely  in  the 
individual  who  selects  and  adopts  certain  doc- 
trines which  he  has  taken  from  the  various 
Schools  of  Philosophy.  Over  the  multiplicity  of 
dogmas  stands  the  individual  who  has  appro- 
priated them  all  and  judges  them  bj'his  criterion 
of  value.  This  tendency  doubtless  shows  itself 
in  the  time  of  the  earh^  Greek  Schools,  but  its 
culmination  belongs  emphatically  to  the  Roman 
epoch  of  universal  conquest  and  rule,  of  which 
it  is  more  nearly  the  theoretic  side  than  any 
other  kind  of  Philosophy. 

1.  Greek  Eclecticism.  The  first  Eclecticism 
properly  belongs  to  Greece  and  the  Middle 
Academy.  Thus  its  origin  is  philosophical. 
When  Arcesilaus  could  unite  the  Platonic  dogma 
with  the  Pyrrhonic  denial  of  dogma,  he  had 
started  Eclecticism  (or  Syncretism,  which 
term  emphasises  the  combining  rather  than  the 
choosing).-  Still  further,  when  Carneades  had 
elaborated  his  doctrine  of  Probabilism,  he  made 
a  new  synthesis  of  the  positive  and  the  negative 
in  Thought,  a  union  of  the  is  and  of  the  is- not 
in  the  may-be,  in  which  secretly  lurks  the  may- 
noi-be. 

Probabilism  is  a  thinking  which  is  simply  a 
preparation  for  action.  It  puts  together  certain 
facts  and  from  these  casts  up  the  probability  of 
a  future   event  which    calls  for  the    deed.     To 


518         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

speculate  upon  past  probabilities  is  au  idle  busi- 
ness. It  once  seemed  probable  that  Hannibal 
would  take  Eome,  but  he  did  not,  and  that  is  the 
end  of  the  probability.  What  might  have  hap- 
pened if  Hannibal  had  taken  Rome,  the  Roman 
did  not  trouble  himself  about,  but  he  did  con- 
sider the  probabilities  of  victory  in  an  impend- 
ing battle  by  taking  every  means  to  secure  it. 
A  purely  speculative  probabihty,  that  of  thought, 
is  not  worth  the  thought.  But  a  reckoning  of 
probability  as  a  preparation  for  the  deed  is  what 
the  practical  man  must  perform,  or  act  blindly. 
The  doctrine  of  Probabilism  is  thus  a  philos- 
ophy of  action,  and  appealed  strongly  to  the 
Roman,  and  doubtless  gave  him  much  real  help. 
Here,  then,  Greek  thinking  and  Roman  doing 
begin  to  join  hands  and  co-operate. 

Still  this  first  Eclecticism  of  the  Middle  Acad- 
emy, culminating  in  the  Probabilism  of  Car- 
neades,  was  a  direct  outgrowth  of  Greek  philos- 
ophy and  not  at  all  an  intentional  acfJlptation  to 
Roman  ends.  It  suited  the  time,  however,  and 
the  intellectual  need  of  the  new  world-people. 
For  the  Greeks,  who  were  once  the  world-people, 
were  so  no  longer,  their  place  had  been  taken  by 
the  Romans,  who  were  at  this  time  (second  and 
first  century  B.  C.)  toiling  at  their  mighty  his- 
torical task.  Of  course  when  we  speak  of  the 
Greeks  in  the  present  connection,  we  mean  the 
contemporaries  of  the  Romans,  not   the   Mara- 


THE  THEOBETIC  MOVEMENT.  519 

thonian  Greeks,  who  also  had  shown  colossal 
will-power,  which,  however,  seems  to  have  ex- 
hausted itself  in  the  desperate  struggles,  outer 
and  inner,  of  the  fifth  century  B.C.  Then  that 
and  the  next  century  brought  forth  the  great 
Athenian  philosophers,  the  most  gigantic  and 
deepest-reaching  minds  that  Greece  ever  pro- 
duced (with  the  single  exception  of  Homer), 
who  had  the  power  of  turning  the  whole  Greek 
national  character  from  Will  to  Intellect,  and 
of  making  themselves  the  thinkers  of  their  race. 

Still  there  w^ere  Greek  philosophers  who  more 
or  less  consciously  adapted  their  doctrine  to  the 
Eonian  character.  These  we  may  briefly  desig- 
nate. 

2.  Romanizi7ig  Greek  Eclecticism.  We  have 
already  noted  that  the  Middle  Academy  after 
Carneades  substantially  threw  its  Skepticism  aside 
and  became  eclectic  in  a  postitive  fashion  (under 
Philo  of  Larissa  and  Antiochus  of  Ascalon), 
And  something  of  the  same  sort  occurred  at 
about  the  same  time  in  the  Peripatetic  School. 
It  may  be  said  that  these  Greek  Schools  were 
Eomanizino;  on  the  one  hand  and  on  the  other 
were  being  Romanized.  Hardly  different  could 
be  the  situation  in  the  first  century  B.  C. 
During  this  period  the  two  other  Athenian 
Schools,  Stoic  and  Epicurean  (^hereafter  to  be  con- 
sidered in  the  Ethical  Movement  of  Hellenisti- 
cism),  Romanized  with  great  success,  especially 


520         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHT. 

the  Stoic  School.  Pansvtius  of  Bhodes  (180-112 
B.  C.)  was  the  first  important  man  to  introduce 
Stoicism  into  Rome,  winning  the  friendship  of 
Scipio  and  L»lius.  More  popuhir  and  influen- 
tial his  pupil,  Posidonius,  seems  to  have  been  in 
the  matter  of  instruction,  whoso  activity  belongs 
to  the  first  half  of  the  first  century  B.  C,  and 
extends  over  the  whole  Roman  Empire  from 
Cadiz  in  Spain  to  Rhodes  and  Athens  in  the  East. 
The  missionary  and  popular  writer  (a  journalist 
he  would  have  been  to-day)  of  his  cause  he  may 
be  regarded,  though  less  original  than  his  master, 
PanjBtius.  Thus  Eclectic  Stoicism  becomes  uni- 
versally known  to  the  Roman  educated  world, 
whose  members  begin  to  choose  for  themseves 
from  the  various  branches  of  the  Greek  uni- 
versity. 

3.  Roman  Hellenizing  Eclecticism.  Very  nat- 
urally this  Roman  Eclecticism  begins  to  express 
itself  in  the  native  tongue  of  Rome,  which  could 
find  a  grammatical  pattern  for  itself  in  the  fully 
developed  Greek  language.  The  retro-active  in- 
fluence must  have  shown  itself  from  the  start :  as 
the  Hellenes  Romanized,  so  the  Romans  Hellen- 
ized.  The  appropriation  of  Greek  art,  literature 
and  philosophy  had  to  become  finally  the  work  of 
the  Romans  themselves.  The  empire  of  Rome 
must  be  intellectual  as  well  as  political;  she  must 
seek  to  rule  the  philosophies  as  well  as  the  na- 
tions, the  word  as  well  as  the  deed. 


THE  THEORETIC  MOVEMENT.  521 

Here  we  can  place  the  aspiratiou  and  to  a  cer- 
tain degree  the  achievement  of  Cicero.     Greek 
oratory,  reborn  in   him,  speaks  at  Rome  upon 
Roman  affairs ;   but  he  makes  Greek  philosophy 
talk  Latin  to  all  future  ages  with  such   elegance 
and  charm  of    style  that  its  propagation  and  its 
perpetuity  are  in  no    small    degree  due  to   him. 
Even  at  the  present  time  the  number  is  not  small 
who  derive  their  sole  idea  of    philosophy  from 
reading  Cicero  at    College  or    the    High  School. 
In  fact  the  general   popular   conception  of  the 
philosophic   discipline  is    largely  Ciceronian  to- 
day.    The  deeper-digging   specialists  in  philos- 
ophy are  apt  to  despise  Cicero  because  he  is  not 
what  they  are,  but  they  will  hardly  do  as  much, 
all  of  them  put  together,  for  the  sacred  cause  as  he 
did.    It  is  not  hard  now  to  point  out  his  mistakes, 
his  superficial  views,  his  lack  of  originality  and 
.  all  the  other  defects ;  in  spite  of  our  regard  for  the 
man,  we  cannot  help  taking  a  little  furtive  laugh 
at  him,  when  he  starts   on  one  of  his  grandiose 
rhetorical  flights,  which  of  themselves  constitute 
a  unique  species  of  philosophical  spread-eagleism, 
always  dear  to  the  popular  heart.     Cicero  is  the 
-  greatest  of  all  phil-Hellenes ;  not  only  Rome  but 
all  civilization  he  has  helped  to  Hellenize,  having 
in  this  line  done  more  than  any  other  mention- 
able  person.     During  the  Middle  Ages  his  light 
did  not  go  out,  and  in  the  Renascence  he  was  the 


522         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

central  literary  luminary  and  chief  trainer  of  the 
new-born  spirit. 

Cicero  proclaims  himself  an  Eclectic  with  Stoic 
preferences;  he  selects,  arranges  and  utters  his 
favorite  doctrines  of  the  Greek  Schools,  which 
have  to  pass  through  him  on  their  way  down 
time.  Cicero's  Eclecticism  is  still  a  working 
power.  Other  Romans  such  as  Varro  and  the 
Sextii,  famous  in  their  day,  belonged  to  the  same 
general  tendency,  but  their  works  are  lost,  and 
probably  would  not  add  much  to  those  of  Cicero. 

The  spirit  of  the  time  showed  itself  in  rehgion, 
as  the  Roman  practiced  his  Eclecticism  upon  the 
Gods  of  the  nations,  making  himself  in  his  choice 
a  kind  of  God  over  them  all.  In  politics  the 
eclectic  tendency  manifested  itself  in  the  Roman 
State  of  this  period,  with  its  peculiar  comming- 
ling of  Aristocracy,  Democracy,  and  Monarchy. 
But  the  philosopher  of  Eclecticism  took  the  en- 
tire philosophic  Norm  —  Metaphysics,  Physics, 
and  Ethics — which  he  subjected  to  his  selection, 
taking  what  parts  he  wanted  and  putting  them 
together  without  regard  to  their  inner  principle 
of  order.  In  this  way  his  individual  Ego  as  think- 
ing asserts  itself  over  the  Norm,  determining  it 
from  the  outside. 

Thus  the  Theoretic  Movement  of  Hellenisticism 
completes  itself  by  the  Universal  individualizing 
itself  in  the  thinking  individual  who  determines 
his  own  philosophic  Norm,  and  is  not  determined 


THE  PBACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  523 

by  it,  as  was  the  case  in  Dogmatism.  He 
has  passed  through  three  stages  as  this  thinking 
Self — that  of  accepting,  denying,  and  finally 
determining  the  philosophic  Norm  for  himself. 
We  have  now  shown  the  individual  as  tliiiiking ; 
next  this  thinking  individual  is  to  be  seen  acting^ 
or  realizinaj  himself  in  deed  and  conduct.  From 
Intellect  we  go  to  Will,  which  makes  outside 
what  is  inside,  passing  from  Thought  to  Action, 
from  the  Theoretical  to  the  Practical  Movement 
of  the  Hellenistic  Period.  This  Movement  like- 
wise we  shall  find  beginning  far  back  in  the 
Hellenic  Period,  and  is  notably  prominent  in 
Plato  and  Aristotle;  still  it  does  not  separate 
itself  from  the  total  Norm  and  start  out  for 
itself  till  the  epoch  of  Hellenisticism,  in  which 
it  is  the  central  and  most  voluminous  stream. 

II.  TiiE  Practical  Movement. 

We  place  the  present  Movement  as  second  in 
the  Hellenistic  Period,  since  its  general  character 
is  that  the  individual  now  makes  external  in  act 
what  he  had  theoretically  taken  up  in  thought. 
Thus  the  Movement  is  psychically  separative,  as 
is  the  Will  generally;  what  the  Ego  has  in- 
ternalized through  Intellect,  it  separates  from 
itself  and  realizes  in  conduct. 

From  this  psychical  point  of  view  we  have  to 
order  the  present  and  the  preceding  movements. 


524         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  the  meanwhile  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
their  evolution  is  not  simply  successive,  but  also 
synchronous;  the  main  streams  run  parallel, 
and  to  a  certain  extent  also  their  subdivisions, 
the  streamlets.  For  instance,  the  Theoretical 
and  the  Practical  Movements  start  quite  abreast 
in  the  same  place  (Athens),  and  at  about  the 
same  time  (a  little  before  300  B.  C).  The 
first  successors  in  the  Schools  of  [^lato  and 
Aristotle,  and  the  founders  of  Stoicism  and 
Epicureanism,  belong  essentially  to  the  same 
o-eneration  and  are  the  product  of  the  epoch  of 
transition  from  the  Hellenic  to  the  Hellenistic 
Period.  And  these  two  primary  divisions 
(Theoretic  and  Practical)  as  well  as  their  leading 
subdivisions  maintain  their  separation  and  their 
individuality  while  Hellenisticism  lasts. 

The  Practical  Movement  involves  a  change  in 
the  sweep  of  the  philosophic  Norm,  which  now 
becomes  dominantly  ethical.  Metaphysics  and 
Physics  are  still  studied,  but  their  purpose  is 
Ethics.  The  Good  in  Plato  and  Aristotle  is  the 
intellectual  Good,  whose  object  is  to  produce  the 
Philosopher  in  thought.  But  the  Good  in  Hel- 
lenisticism is  the  practical  Good  whose  object  is  to 
produce  the  Wise  Man  in  conduct.  Ethics  in  the 
first  case  is  the  means,  in  the  second  ease  it  is 
the  end.  The  total  philosophical  Norm  is  pres- 
ent in  both  cases,  but  we  see  how  different  is  the 
stress  or  the  ideal  point  of  striving.     The  scien- 


TEE  PHACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  525 

tific  interest  is  subordinated  to  the  ethical.  This 
corresponds  deeply  to  a  need  of  the  age,  which 
had  to  be  made  moral,  internally  self-deter- 
mined through  the  moral  law.  The  institutional 
law  of  the  Greek  City-State  was  lost  forever, 
and  the  institutional  law  of  the  Eoman  World- 
State  had  not  yet  arisen.  Society  would  have 
gone  to  pieces  in  sheer  lawlessness,  but  for 
this  cultivation  of  the  inner  moral  spirit  of  its 
best  men.  Hence  the  stress  of  the  Age  falls 
upon  Ethics  for  salvation. 

Moreover,  not  only  man  in  general  but  all 
knowledge  is  to  be  moralized.  It  has  been  made 
only  too  clear  that  science  itself  can  become  ut- 
terly depraved,  diabolic,  destructive  of  the  so- 
cial order  and  of  and  hence  of  man,  unless  it 
undergo  a  transformation  in  the  individual  and 
be  subjected  to  an  ethical  end.  The  moraliza- 
tion  of  knowledo;e  is  one  of  the  chief  functions 
of  Hellenisticism,  wherein  the  Stoics  play  a  very 
important  part.  Whatever  we  learn  is  in  itself 
of  small  worth  till  it  be  turned  to  account  in 
making  us  virtuous.  The  philosophical  Norm 
thus  becomes  ethical. 

It  may  well  be  repeated  that  the  Greek  City- 
State,  subjected  first  to  Macedon  and  then  to 
Eome,  has  lost  its  autonomous  character,  through 
which  both  Plato  and  Aristotle  made  the  individ- 
ual ethical.  Autonomy  must,  accordingly,  go 
inside  the  man,  and  be  cultivated  there,  while  the 


526        ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

civil  authority,  having  become  alien  and  external, 
can  only  be  regarded  with  indifference.     Hence 
the  rise  of  incivism  in  this  epoch  of  pure  Ethics, 
or,  more    exactly    stated,  the  moral  has  become 
indifferent,  if  not  hostile,    to  the  institutional. 
Moreover,  the  doctrine  of  apathy  or   impassive- 
ness,  which  has  such  an  important  place  in  all 
the  systems  of  Hellenisticism,  Stoic,  Epicurean, 
Skeptic,  andevenDogmatic,  is  at  bottom  the  Greek 
steeling  himself  to  the  separation  from  his  com- 
munal life,  weaning  himself  from  the  breast  of 
his   institutional  mother.     Only   with    difficulty 
can  we  moderns  think  ourselves  back  into  such  a 
situation,  to  which  the  Greek  was  peculiarly  sen- 
sitive.    Endure,  endure,  is  the    painful    cry   of 
Hellenistic  Ethics,  painful  from  its  very  suppres- 
sion of  pain.     We  can  hear  or  even  see  that  cry 
in  the  fragments  of  Greek  art,  especially  in  the 
sculpture  of  this  period.     An  external  power  like 
Fate  has  swooped  down  upon  our  beautiful  Hel- 
lenic world  and  wiped  out  its  free  public    life ; 
but  this  inner  world  of  ours,  the  moral  life.  Fate 
cannot  reach,  at  least  not  without  our  consent. 
Let  us  cultivate  it,  and  suppress  our  sorrows  — 
and   so  the  Greek  with  an  agonizing  world-pain 
slowly  moved  from  Civics  to  Ethics,  from  a  com- 
munal to  a  moral  manhood,  and  with  that  Greek 
tongue  of  his  expressed  the  same  for  all  coming 
ages. 

In  each  individual,  therefore,  the  Universal  in 


THE  PRACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  527 

the  form  of  the  inner  or  moral  hiw  is  realized. 
This,  however,  can  only  lead  to  a  struggle  of  in- 
dividuals, to  meet  which  a  new  outer  law  grad- 
ually appears,  for  all  and  over  all.  The  phe- 
nomenon of  Roman  Law  is  intimately  connected 
with  the  movement  of  Hellenistic  Ethics, 
especially  with  Stoicism,  whose  moral  cosmo- 
politanism is  made  legal  and  authoritative  by  the 
jurisprudence  of  Rome.  Thus  the  moral  spirit 
has  not  only  put  down  nature  in  the  form  of 
physical  appetite  and  passion  (Naturism),  but 
has  also  gone  far  toward  doing  away  with  the  in- 
equalities of  birth  and  race  (Nativism). 

In  general,  we  see  the  following  process  in  this 
Practical  Movement :  The  moral  element  (sub- 
jective) in  the  individual  separates  itself  from 
the  institutional  element  (objective)  in  the 
Greek  City-State,  first  asserting  (Stoic)  and 
then  denying  (Epicurean)  its  own  universality, 
which  is  then  reaffirmed  by  the  Roman  World- 
State  with  its  law.  Thus  the  moral  principle 
after  being  estranged  from  the  institutional,  and 
even  from  itself,  returns  to  the  same  and  shapes 
the  external  law  governinof  the  world. 

Accordingly  this  second  or  Practical  Move- 
ment of  the  Hellenistic  Period  will  show  three 
stages :  First  is  Stoicism  in  which  the  Univer- 
sal as  the  Good  is  affirmed,  and  is  taken  as  the 
immediate  end  of  the  individual  by  himself, 
commanding  him  to  obey  its  behests.     Second  is 


528        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Epicure a7iism,  in  which  the  Universal  as  the 
Good  is  denied  to  be  the  end,  but  is  reduced  to 
a  means  for  the  individual  and  his  gratification. 
Third  is  Legalism  in  which  the  Universal  as  the 
Good  is  again  affirmed,  not  merely  as  a  subjec- 
tive behest,  but  as  an  objective  Law,  whose 
command  is  over  all. 

Such  are  the  three  stages  of  the  present 
sphere,  of  which  the  last  is,  in  certain  respects, 
an  outgrowth  of  the  two  former.  But,  when 
once  started,  it  runs  parallel  with  them  for  sev- 
eral hundred  years,  down  through  the  Hellenistic 
Period. 

I.  Stoicism  — The  Moral  Law.  —  One  of  the 
chief  acquisitions  given  by  the  Hellenistic  Period 
to  the  race  was  the  distinct  affirmation  and  prac  • 
tical  realization  in  conduct  of  the  Moral  Law. 
This  was  particularly  the  great  contribution  of 
the  Stoics.  Undoubtedly  the  Athenian  philoso- 
phers (Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle)  had  devel- 
oped the  moral  element  of  man,  but  this  was 
never  completely  separated  from  the  communal 
life  of  the  City-State  with  its  laws  and  customs. 
Hence  there  always  remained  a  tie  or  thread 
which  bound  up  the  individual  immediately  with 
his  native  Athenian  institutions.  Thus  he  was 
not  fully  freed  of  the  prescribed,  the  estab- 
lished ;  he  was  not  altogether  thrown  back  upon 
himself  and  made  a  law  unto  himself.  The 
umbilical  cord  of  nativism  was  not  completely 


THE  TBACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  529 

severed  even  in  thought  by  the  greatest  Greek 
thinkers.  But  the  time  has  come  when  the 
separation  must  take  phice,  and  the  man  has 
appeared  who  is  to  perform  the  operation. 

This  was  Zeno  of  Citium  in  Cyprus,  on  the 
borderland  between  the  Greelc  and  Semitic  peo- 
ples, both  of  which  commingled  in  many  Cyprian 
towns.  Citium  is  said  by  Diogenes  Laertius  to 
have  had  Phoenician  immigrants,  and  Zeno  is 
called  a  Phoenician.  He  is  supposed  to  have 
reached  Athens  about  320  B.  C,  having  come 
thither  for  trade.  But  he  found  the  philosophers 
and  studied  in  several  Schools.  Finally  about 
300  B.  C.  he  began  teaching  in  the  Stoa  Poekile, 
from  which  fact  his  followers  were  called  Stoics, 
though  at  first  they  took  the  name  of  Zenonians. 
But  this  School  did  not  continue  to  bear  the  in- 
dividual name  of  its  founder,  which  was  in  con- 
trast to  most  of  the  other  great  Schools. 

Thus  a  man  of  a  different  race,  a  non-Aryan 
seemingly,  has  the  power  to  interweave  himself 
and  his  doctrine  into  the  spiritual  development  of 
Athens,  of  Greece,  and  finally  of  the  whole  civi- 
lized world.  The  Semitic  type  of  mind  is  best 
revealed  in  the  Hebrew  Scripture,  and  Stoicism 
has  a  Jewish  cast,  as  has  often  been  observed. 
Zeno  himself  may  have  been  of  Jewish  blood,  for 
by  the  Greeks  of  this  age,  all  who  came  from  the 
Syrian  coast  were  called  Phoenicians. 

Moreover  this  same  character  is  preserved  in 


630        ANCIENT  E  UB  OPE  AN  PHIL  O  SOPHY. 

the  School  after  the  time  of  Zeuo.  Some  of  his 
most  famous  pupils  came  from  the  Greco-Semitic 
borderland  in  Asia  Minor,  Syria  and  the  eastern 
islands  of  the  Mediterranean.  Cleanthes,  the 
successor  of  Zeno  as  Scholarch,  was  a  native  of 
Assus;  Chrysippus,  the  main  writer  andthought- 
oro-anizer  of  the  school  and  third  Scholarch,  was 
from  Soli  in  Cilicia  (others  say  Tarsus,  which 
city  furnished  several  distinguished  Stoics). 
The  other  Schools  of  Athens  had  at  first  the 
tendency  to  be  manned  by  Greelvs,  if  not  by 
Athenians.  But  here  is  distinctly  a  disregarding 
and  a  transcending  of  Hellenic  nativism;  Bar- 
barians have  actually  intruded  themselves  into 
Athens,  have  taken  possession  of  its  beautiful 
Pictured  Porch,  and  are  philosophizing  with 
great  success.  Shocking  it  must  have  appeared 
to  the  hide-bound  autochthonous  Athenian,  but 
his  time  is  past,  even  in  his  own  city. 

We  may  therefore  consider  Stoicism  the  first 
important  philosophical  meeting  of  Greek  and 
Oriental.  They  had  indeed  met  before  in  re- 
ligion, in  mythology,  in  literature  and  art;  but 
above  all  they  had  met  in  battle.  The  Oriental, 
conquered  by  arms,  had  become  a  part  of  the 
greater  Greek  political  empire.  But  now  he  has 
reached  out  to  the  center  of  Hellenic  culture, 
and  is  to  become  a  part  of  the  greater  Greek 
intellectual  empire.  Not  Hellenic  but  Hellenistic 
Stoicism  is,  and  so  is  mediatorial  in  its  character, 


THE  riiACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  531 

reconciling  the  Greek  and  the  non-Greek  spirit. 
In  this  function  it  will  travel  westward  to  Koms, 
and  there  show  itself  as  one  of  the  chief  mediat- 
ing influences  between  the  new  world-conqueror 
and  conquered  Hellas.  Many  of  the  great 
Romans  will  embrace  Stoicism,  which  will  in  and 
through  them  bring  forth  new  fruit,  which  is 
hereafter  to  be  considered. 

The  Eoman,  it  may  here  be  said,  cannot  be- 
come Hellenic,  but  he  can  Hellcnize,  if  taught 
arisht,  and  his  chief  teacher  was  the  Stoa.  The 
philosophy  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  with  its  pure 
Hellenism,  and  especially  with  its  small  exclusive 
City-State  of  a  few  thousand  citizens,  must  be 
transformed  in  order  to  meet  the  needs  of  Kome, 
the  World-City,  all-mclusive.  We  have  already 
noted  that  it  was  the  Greek  philosopher  Panaetius 
who  first  introduced  Stoicism  into  Rome,  about 
150  B.  C.  He  was  followed  by  Posidonius,  who 
made  himself  a  kind  of  missionary  to  the  whole 
Roman  Empire.  After  the  Christian  Era  Stoi- 
cism produced  the  writers  who  have  made  it  best 
known  to  future  ages —  Seneca,  Epictetus, 
Marcus  Aurelius.  The  eclectic  Cicero  leaned 
mainly  to  Stoicism  in  the  matter  of  Ethics. 

The  Stoics  expressed  the  triple  philosophical 
Norm  as  Logic,  Physics  and  Ethics.  Their  Logic 
sought  specially  for  the  criterion  of  knowledge. 
All  knowing  of  the  thing  was  an  impression  from 
within,  like   that  of   a  seal  upon  wax:    so  said 


532        ANCIENT  EUBOPE AN  PHILOSOPHTt. 

Cleanthes,  though  hiter  Stoics  modified  this 
statement.  Sensation  is  the  source  of  ideas,  the 
outside  world  is  the  determinant  of  the  Ego's 
knowing.  Thus  in  their  pure  Philosophy  they 
were  materialistic.  In  their  Physics  they  re- 
garded the  cosmos  as  an  animal  or  living  being 
of  which  God  is  the  soul.  Yet  there  is  a  Reason 
or  Intelligence  governing  the  Avorld,  which  is  the 
law,  and  is  also  called  the  spirit  or  breath 
(pneuma).  The  Stoics  ascribe  to  God  provi- 
dence, love  of  mankind,  as  well  as  unitary  su- 
premacy; herein  they  are  very  different  from 
Epicureans,  and  even  from  Aristotle,  whose  deity 
was  "moving  not  moved."  The  Stoical  con- 
ception of  God  is  on  one  side  pantheistic,  on  the 
other  theistic ;  it  did  not  distinguish  between 
immanence  and  transcendence,  but  employed 
somewhat  of  both.  In  these  religious  views  we 
see  that  Zeno  was  a  Semite  who  was  Hellenizing ; 
he  was  a  monotheist,  yet  compromised  with 
polytheism  by  allowing  lesser  Gods  who  were 
mortal,  the  one  only  God  being  immortal.  Man 
is  a  little  copy  of  the  great  world-animal,  the 
Cosmos,  with  a  spark  of  the  divine  Spirit  or  fire 
in  him,  which  is  finally  to  be  united  with  its 
source  in  the  great  conflagration  at  the  last  day. 
Many  of  these  Stoical  doctrines  sound  like  stray 
thoughts  coming  from  afar  without  much  inner 
connection.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that 
the  Stoics  clung  to  the   conception  of  a  Divine 


TEE  TEA  OTIC AL  MOVEMENT.  533 

Reason  {Nous,  Logos)  which  permeates  every 
thing  and  especially  man,  who  was  to  live 
according  to  its  behest,  or  according  to  Nature, 
as  they  stated  it  generally . 

This  brings  us  to  the  Ethics  of  the  Stoics, 
their  great  field.  They  cared  little  about 
knowledge  for  its  own  sake;  logic,  the  sciences, 
philosophy  itself  are  only  a  means  for  Virtue, 
for  the  Good.  Whatever  does  not  make  man 
better  is  indifferent  or  bad ;  moral  conduct  is 
the  sole  end,  and  in  proportion  as  they  conduce 
to  that  end,  do  things  have  true  value.  Hence 
the  Stoics  moralized  all  knowledge  and  indeed 
everything  else;  the  function  of  man  was  to 
moralize  himself  and  the  world. 

What  was  their  method  of  bringino;  about 
such  a  result?  The  Person  or  Self  was  the 
center — the  ideal  Wise  Man  whose  supreme 
wisdom  consisted  in  the  pursuit  of  virtue  for  its 
own  sake.  Such  was  the  command,  not  an 
external  one  but  his  own;  really  it  was  the 
command  of  his  higher  Self  to  his  lower,  to  his 
appetites,  desires,  temptations,  in  fine  to  every 
sort  of  external  determination,  which  flowed  in 
upon  him  from  the  world.  Thus  the  Stoic  as- 
serted the  colossal  power  of  Selfhood;  it  could 
cut  loose  from  and  throw  away  the  entire  outer 
world  of  splendor,  wealth,  ambition,  as  well  as 
of  gratification.  The  Stoic  proclaimed  the 
freedom  of  the  Ego,  as  such;   his  was  a  dcclara- 


534         ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  FllIL  OSOPH  1\ 

tion  of  independence  of  the  Self.  To  be  sure, 
this  was  the  inner,  subjective  moral  independence. 
Macedon  and  Rome  might  establish  an  external 
empire  over  and  around  him,  he  had  an  un- 
conquered  and  unconquerable  empire  within,  of 
which  he  was  the  sole  emperor.  Moreover  while 
he  can  command,  he  knows  at  the  same  time 
how  to  obey ;  in  fact  his  is  the  only  true 
obedience — the  obedience  to  Duty,  which 
includes  all  other  kinds. 

It  is  throuo;h  the  Stoics  that  the  three  central 
categories  of  morality,  Duty,  Conscience  and 
Responsibility,  were  exemplified  in  life  as  well  as 
taught  to  the  world.  The  whole  is  indeed  an 
inner  process :  Duty  is  the  voice  of  the  Impera- 
tive commanding  that  the  Good  be  done,  which  is 
to  subject  all  passion,  desire,  in  fine  all  ex- 
ternality; Conscience  is  the  Self  knowing  such 
command  to  come  from  within,  from  the  Self  as 
inspired  with  the  divine  spirit  {^pneuma)  whereby 
Conscience  becomes  the  supreme  judge  sitting 
within  and  demanding  rigid  Responsibility.  Such 
is  the  inner  judicial  process  practiced  and  taught 
by  the  Stoics,  which  process,  we  may  here 
remark,  has  to  be  within  before  it  can  be  ex- 
ternalized in  Roman  Law. 

But  now  it  is  the  Moral  Law  which  has  risen 
in  the  souls  of  men  and  is  uttering  itself  through 
the  Stoics.  Limitations  they  showed,  which 
however   were    profoundly    inwoven   with   their 


THE  FliACTICAL  MOVEMENT,  535 

excellences.  Only  one  virtue  and  only  one  vice 
at  first  existed  for  them,  but  from  this  narrow- 
ness they  afterwards  relaxed  somewhat.  Their 
virtue  of  impassiveness  (apa(heia)  was  an  ex- 
treme, so  was  their  withdrawal  from  the  world 
as  well  as  their  exclusive  occupation  with  the 
Self.  Still  it  may  be  affirmed  that  without  just 
such  intense  and  pointed  concentration,  the 
worth  of  the  Self  with  its  inner  freedom  could 
never  have  been  established  as  a  spiritual  pos- 
session of  the  race.  Morality,  theoretical  and 
practical,  certainly  existed  before  the  Stoics,  but 
they  by  example  and  precept  confined  themselves 
to  the  one  great  object  of  moralizing  the  Self 
through  rousing  the  sense  of  Duty  and  Kespon- 
sibility,  as  well  as  the  negative  counterpart  there- 
of, the  sense  of  Sin. 

The  Stoic  in  his  one-sided  moralism  was  indif- 
ferent or  hostile  to  institutions.  This  was  his 
greatest  defect ;  though  he  realized  the  supreme 
universal  law  in  himself,  he  could  not  actualize 
it  in  the  world.  He  proclaimed  the  equality 
of  men  before  the  inner  tribunal;  he  asserted 
a  common  humanity,  he  maintained  the  wrong- 
fulness of  slavery,  he  broke  down  tribal 
and  national  limits  in  determining  human  rights. 
It  may  be  justly  said  of  the  Stoic  that  he 
was  the  first  to  declare :  All  men  are  created 
free  and  equal.  Moreover  we  are  to  live  accord- 
ing to  Nature,  which  is  what  determines  the  con- 


536         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tent  of  Virtue,  and  hence  is  the  Universal  Law, 
the  World-Law,  which  the  wise  man  grasps  and 
realizes  in  his  individual  life,  and  which  Rome 
will  raise  to  a  positive  universality  in  her  Juris- 
prudence. Furthermore  the  Stoic  renouncing  all 
ties  of  city  and  nation  and  race,  declared  him- 
self to  be  cosmopolitan,  whereby  a  vague  ideal 
of  a  World-State  of  which  he  was  a  citizen 
floated  before  his  imagination.  This  ideal  will 
bear  fruit  iu  the  Roman  future,  indeed  it  has 
evidently  yet  to  bear  fruit  iu  the  future  of  our 
modern  age. 

With  many  modifications  we  find  the  philoso- 
phic Norm —  Metaphysics,  Phj^sics,  and  Ethics — 
runninof  through  the  whole  course  of  Stoic 
philosophizing.  This  had  little  theoretic  interest, 
and  showed  small  philosophic  originality.  Its 
meaning  is  practical,  ethical;  its  intensity  lies  in 
putting  the  Universal  into  the  individual  acting 
rather  than  thinlving.  In  Stoicism  Athenian 
Thought  showed  signs  of  satiety,  of  intellectual 
disgust  and  exhaustion.  To  the  metaphysical  and 
physical  spheres  of  the  Norm,  Stoicism  con- 
tributed almost  nothing  in  their  scientific  aspect, 
but  treated  them  perfunctorily  as  a  means  for 
Ethics.  Thus  it  reverses  quite  the  movement 
of  the  Norm  as  indicated  in  the  works  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle.  Still  we  must  not  fail  to  notice 
that  the  Stoics  are  in  conscious  possession  of  this 


THE  PRACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  537 

Norm  and  are  moving  on  its  lines  after  their  own 
fashion. 

II.  Epicureanism  ( Hedonism ) .  —  That  which 
the  Stoic  regarded  as  the  universal  End  (the 
Good,  Virtue)  is  by  the  Epicureans  reduced  to 
a  means  for  a  particular  End.  I  am  indeed  to 
cultivate  Virtue,  yet  not  for  its  own  sake  but  for 
my  pleasure.  And  if  it  does  not  conduce  to  my 
pleasure  it  has  no  right  to  be.  The  Stoic  af- 
firmed the  inner  Law  as  the  determinant  of  the 
individual  in  all  his  particularity  ;  the  Epicurean 
affirms  the  inner  Law  to  be  determined  by  the 
individual  in  all  his  particularity;  that  is,  what- 
ever will  make  him  happy  is  his  inner  Law, 
which  is  indeed  to  have  no  law  at  all  but  Caprice. 
The  doctrine  of  Epicurus,  therefore,  declares 
the  negation  of  the  Moral  Law  to  be  moral.  It 
proclaims  an  universal  End,  which,  however,  is 
some  particular  end,  whatever  pleases  me. 

Epicureanism  is,  accordingly,  from  this  point 
of  view,  a  separation  from  and  opposition  to 
Stoicism.  Pleasure  and  Virtue  were  completely 
one  for  the  Stoic,  but  they  are  emphatically 
two  for  the  follower  of  Epicurus,  who  separates 
Pleasure  from  Virtue  and  makes  it  the  goal  even 
for  Virtue.  As  Skepticism  is  a  dogmatic  denial 
of  dogmatism,  so  Epicureanism  is  a  moral  denial 
of  morality;  that  is,  the  universal  end  is  to  have 
no  universal  end,  but  your  particular  pleasure. 
Both  sides,   however,    assert   the   right    of   the 


538         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Ego  —  the  one  to  set  up  the  Moral  Law  and  the 
other  to  knock  it  down.  Herein  both  are 
equally  subjective,  capricious,  insufficient;  each 
is  equally  impotent  against  the  other,  each 
assertins  the  absolute  risiht  of  asserting  itself 
absolutely.  The  Epicurean  Ego  shows  to  the 
Stoic  Ego  its  weakness,  which  is,  in  general,  the 
weakness  of  the  purely  subjective,  moral  stand- 
point. The  Epicurean  claims  the  moral  right  to 
destroy  morality,  and  the  Stoic  cannot  deny  such 
a  right  without  denying  his  own  right  to  establish 
morality.  Something  must  be  appealed  to 
above  both,  some  Law  ruling  both  their  laws. 
Moralism  and  Hedonism  by  themselves  will  keep 
the  universe  in  an  eternal  see-saw  between  two 
equally  one-sided  and  contradictory  principles. 
Without  doubt  Stoicism  has  the  advantage  of 
baing  a  positive  moral  doctrine,  though  dog- 
matically and  arbitrarily  such.  On  the  other 
hand.  Epicureanism  has  the  advantage  of  the 
negative  side  in  the  argument,  and  so  can  easily 
call  in  question,  deny  and  even  burn  up  in  its 
dialectic  the  dogmatism  of  the  Stoic. 

Epicureanism  is  named  after  its  founder,  Epi- 
curus, who  w^as  probably  born  at  Samos,  of 
Athenian  parents,  who  had  gone  out  to  that 
island  as  settlers.  The  date  of  his  birth  is  341 
B.  C,  and  of  his  death  270  B.  C.  His  father 
was  a  schoolmaster,  and  he  seems  to  have  taken 
lessons  (doubtless  very  elementary)  from  some 


THE  rRACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  539 

philosophers  at  Samos ;  then,  in  his  eighteenth 
year,  he  came  to  Athens,  and  probably  heard  the 
Aristotelian  Xenocrates.  But  the  philosopher 
who  gave  him  his  bent  was  undoubtedly  the  At- 
omist,  Democritus,  one  of  whose  disciples  is  re- 
ported to  have  instructed  him  in  early  youth. 
After  trying  at  Mitylene  and  Lampsacus,  he  re- 
turned to  Athens  and  founded  his  School,  Avhich 
was  located  in  a  garden,  where  he  philosophized 
on  his  own  private  ground  and  not  in  public 
places,  as  did  most  of  the  philosophers.  This 
is  in  accord  with  the  doctrine  of  Hedonism, 
which  cannot  well  be  a  missionary  Philosophy. 
If  a  man's  pleasure  is  in  being  a  Stoic  or  a  Pla- 
tonist,  Epicurus  cannot  properly  have  anything 
to  say  to  him.  A  garden  is  a  quiet,  retired  spot 
to  which  friends  can  withdraw  and  have  a  good 
time.  At  most  the  Hedonist  can  laugh  at  the 
folly  of  the  Stoic  for  taking  such  a  rough  road 
to  pleasure,  the  road  of  Duty  for  its  own  sake. 
Ensconced  in  his  beautiful  garden,  why  should 
he  care  for  the  outside  world?  The  great  object 
is  to  get  rid  of  care  and  fear  and  even  responsi- 
bility, so  that  you  can  really  enjoy  yourself.  If 
you  seek  to  convert  others,  you  give  yourself 
care  instead  of  ridding  yourself  of  it ;  hence  any 
propagandism  of  Epicurus  was  a  contradiction 
of  his  doctrine.  Still  Epicurus  was  an  industri- 
ous propagator  of  his  Philosoph}' ,  writing  more 
than  three  hundred  volumes  according  to  Diog- 


540         ANCIENT  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  0  SOPHY. 

enes  Laertius,  who  adds  that  there  is  not  one 
citation  in  them  from  another  author.  We  have 
to  infer  that  the  great  end  of  Epicurus  was  the 
pleasure,  not  of  eating  and  drinking,  but  of 
writing  books. 

Epicurus  has  the  philosophical  Norm  which  he 
calls  Canonic  (Logic),  Physics,  and  Ethics. 
The  first  was  hardly  more  than  a  superficial  ap- 
plication of  the  Sophistic  formula  that  Man  is 
the  measure  of  all  things — that  is,  Man  as  this 
sensuous  individual.  The  Physics  of  Epicurus 
are  almost  wholly  based  upon  the  atomistic 
theory  of  Democritus.  But  science,  physical  or 
philosophical,  is  to  be  studied  not  for  its  own 
sake,  but  for  relieving  man  of  fear,  specially  the 
fear  of  Gods,  the  fear  of  future  punishment  in 
Tartarus,  the  fear  of  any  kind  of  responsibility. 
In  general  Epicurus  never  stops  raising  his 
bulwarks  against  fear,  which  seems  to  have  been 
his  devil.  From  that  life  of  his,  written  by  the 
friendly  hand  of  Diogenes  Laertius,  we  cannot 
help  taking  away  the  impression  that  of  all 
mortals  Epicurus  was  the  one  most  afraid  of 
fear,  the  one  most  anxious  about  not  being 
anxious.  The  state  of  the  political  world, 
especially  the  political  outlook  of  Athens  and 
Hellas,  was  indeed  dark  under  the  successors  of 
Alexander.  Sensitive  Ei)icurus  and  many  others 
doubtless  were  afflicted  with  the  world-pain 
(Weltschmerz)  of  the  time,    and    their    leading 


THE  PRACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  541 

question  was,  How  can  I  deaden  this  consuming 
intolerable  anxiety  which  creeps  in  upon  me 
from  the  whole  external  universe?  The  Epi- 
curean answer  is,  ataraxy,  imperturbility ;  the 
Wise  Man  is  not  to  be  moved  by  any  care  or 
fear  or  hope ;  the  whole  universe  has  indeed 
turned  into  one  colossal  threatening  demon,  but 
we  shall  flee  from  him  into  our  little  garden  of 
pleasure  and  there  cultivate  ataraxy.  The 
thought  will,  however,  come  up  that  the  fiend 
still  pursues  Epicurus  and  gets  into  his  garden, 
creeping  in  unawares  perchance,  as  that  other 
fiend  crept  once  into  that  other  garden  of  much 
greater  fame.  Else  why  this  prodigious  effort, 
lasting  a  whole  life-time  and  piling  up  "  more 
than  three  hundred  volumes,  all  his  own"  in 
order  to  live  without  anxiety? 

Though  Epicurus  connects  with  the  Cyrenaic 
School  of  Aristippus,  he  modified  the  grossness 
of  the  latter,  and  inculcated  Virtue  as  the  best 
means  for  happiness.  We  may  well  believe  his 
biographer  Diogenes  Laertius,  who  defends  him 
against  the  charges  of  debauchery  and  licentious- 
ness with  which  his  name  has  been  generallv 
associated.  Epicureanism  still  to-day  popu- 
larly means  unrestrained  sensual  indulgence,  and 
not  an  ethical  doctrine.  Such  a  reproach  we 
may  not  cast  upon  Epicurus  personally,  but  time 
has  doubtless  drawn  the  right  inference  from  his 
teachings.     He   does   not  deny  the  existence  of 


542         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Gods,  but  he  makes  them  Epicureans,  wholly 
without  any  care  or  love  for  mortals,  existing 
apart  by  themselves,  happy  Homeric  deities  in 
an  eternal  round  of  enjoyment.  The  God  of 
Epicurus  is  selfishness  immortalized,  gratification 
deified,  the  very  apotheosis  of  the  sensuous  nature 
of  man.  Thus  in  the  present  sphere  is  the  Uni- 
versal made  individual  in  an  Ego  which  denies  it 
(the  Universal),  affirming  it  to  be  only  an  indi- 
vidual affair  and  to  exist  perchance  (as  Virtue) 
for  the  gratification  of  the  individual. 

So  Epicureanism  hands  man  over  to  his  own 
Pleasure,  to  be  followed  or  restrained  according 
to  his  Pleasure.  Epicurus  acknowledges  that 
Pleasure  pursued  to  excess  may  turn  to  its  oppo- 
site, to  Pain ;  hence  there  is  to  be  em})loyed  in 
its  pursuit  some  judgment  or  calculation,  and 
this  is  the  only  use  of  Philosophy  or  Logic 
(Canonic).  It  is  evident  that  the  individual, 
having  reached  the  utter  denial  of  any  law  except 
his  own  pleasure,  must  have  the  law  placed  over 
him  externally.  Such  is  what  next  appears. 
Epicureanism  is  not  only  destructive,  but  through 
it  man  has  become  self -destructive.  Hence  if  he 
continues  to  exist,  his  own  principle  must  be  put 
down  from  the  outside. 

Again  the  Eoman  appears,  and  asserts  himself 
practically  as  the  arbiter  over  both  doctrines. 
He  will  not  be  satisfied  with  the  principle  of  the 
Stoic's  virtue  as  the  merely  subjective  end  —  on 


TEE  PRACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  543 

this  side  he  denies  it  Avith  the  Epicureans ;  still 
he  agrees  with  the  Stoics  in  having  a  controlling 
law,  but  it  must  be  objective  and  institutional^ 
the  authority  over  all.  Thus  Greek  Stoicism 
finds  its  external  counterpart  in  Roman  Law,  and, 
externally  at  least,  puts  a  limit  upon  its  antag- 
onist, Greek  Epicureanism. 

III.  Legalism  — The  Institutional  Law\ — 
The  third  stage  of  the  Practical  or  Ethical  Move- 
ment of  the  Hellenistic  Period  is  that  the  Moral 
Law,  hitherto   internal    and  subjective,  becomes 
external  and  actual,    the  positive   Law   of    the 
World,    specially    of    the    Eoman    World.     In 
Stoicism  the  Universal  in  the  form  of  the  Good, 
determines      the     individual    through    himself,' 
through  his  own  particular  Will    in  ""consequence 
of  his  own  particular  insight.     But  in   Legalism 
the  Universal  in   the   form    of  the  enacted  Law 
determines    the  individual   not  particularly   but 
universally,    being   placed    over   all   individuals 
alike    and    recognizing   their  equality  as  well  as 
their  right.     Thus  the  inner  Moral  Law  of  the 
Stoics  is  now   made  actual  and  objective,  being 
enthroned   the   true  ruler  of  men,  whose  end  is 
to  secure  to  them  equal  and  impartial    justice. 
So  we   pass    from  Moralism  to  Institutionalism, 
being   forced   thereto    by   the    caprices    of    the 
Moral  Ego    which    has   manifested  its  own  self- 
negation,  particularly  in  Hedonism. 

Though  the  Stoics,  by  their   withdrawal  from 


544         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

all  externality  into  themselves,  were  in  the  main 
indifferent  to  Institutions  (Family,  Society, 
State),  still  they  conceived  of  man  as  a 
member  of  the  great  cosmic  Whole  imbreathed 
with  the  spirit  of  the  one  God.  It  was  but  a 
step  from  such  a  conception  to  that  of  a  World- 
State  of  which  every  human  being  was  or  could 
be  a  citizen  (cosmopolite).  So  it  comes  that  we 
hear  of  a  Polity  or  ideal  State  written  by  Zeno, 
in  evident  contrast  to  the  Polities  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  which  were  narrowly  Greek  and  which 
limited  themselves  to  the  transmitted  City-State 
of  Greece.  In  Zeno's  State  there  were  "no 
divisions  into  cities  and  peoples ;  ' '  every 
political  limit  which  separated  man  from  man 
on  account  of  city,  tribe,  nation,  race,  was 
broken  down,  so  that  "  we  may  consider  all 
men  our  countrymen  and  our  fellow-citizens  " 
who  are  to  be  provided  with  Law  and  Justice, 
not  local  but  universal.  Another  Stoic,  Mu- 
sonius,is  reported  by  Stobaeus  as  saying:  the 
good  man  is  a  citizen  of  the  city  of  Zeus  (Aug- 
ustine's Civitas  Dei),  which  city  is  composed 
of  ' '  Men  and  Gods . ' '  And  Stoic  Epictetus  could 
go  yet  further  and  say  that  all  men  are  brothers 
as  havino;  God  for  their  father.  Such  were  the 
far-reaching  flights  of  Stoic  idealism,  fore- 
shadowing not  only  the  coming  secular  World- 
State  of  Rome,  but  also  the  coming  religious 
"  City  of  God,"  the  Church. 


2HE  PRACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  545 

The  Stoic  nioralitj,  as  we  have  seen,  very 
strongly  insisted  upon  Law  as  controlling  the 
individual,  though  the  Law  was  internal.  Still 
it  was  that  which  all  men  had  in  common,  and 
by  which  they  lived  or  might  live.  Such  a  life 
the  Stoics  called  a  life  according  to  Nature,  and 
its  Law  could  only  be  the  Law  of  Nature.  That 
inner  judicial  act  wherein  the  Self  judges  the 
Self,  absolvinof  or  condemninoj  the  same  accord- 
ing  to  this  Law  of  Nature,  was  the  great  prepara- 
tion for  an  external  jurisprudence  corresponding 
to  it  and  actualizing  it  through  the  universal 
Institution,  the  Roman  World-State. 

To  this  development  there  was  an  historical 
side.  Each  nation  or  tribe  had  its  own  customs 
and  laws ;  the  Roman  City-State  had  its  special 
body  of  Laws  (^thejus  civile).  But  now  arose 
over  the  whole  the  conception  of  the  one  Law 
of  Nations  (jus  gentium)  which  the  necessities 
of  the  Roman  Empire  elaborated  for  securing 
justice  to  all  its  diverse  peoples  along  with  its 
own  authority.  The  Roman  lawyers  who  were 
deeply  imbued  with  the  principles  of  Stoicism 
found  it  their  chief  practical  vocation  to  trans- 
form the  Stoic  ideal  AVorld-State  into  the  Roman 
actual  World-State.  Rome  could  not  adopt  pure 
Hellenism  with  its  narrowness  and  nativism;  it 
must  also  lay  aside  pure  Romism,  which  was 
also  nativistic.  It  is  the  merit  of  Stoicism  that 
it   trained  the  Roman  to  universality  and    con- 


546         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

stituted  him  the  workl's  perpetual  hiwgiver, 
who  makes  actual  the  supreme  ethical  transition 
from  Moralism  to  Institutionalism. 

Legalism  restores  a  missing  element  in  the 
ethics  of  both  the  Stoics  and  the  Epicureans  — 
the  institutional  element,  which  we  have  already 
found  to  be  an  integral  part  in  the  total  ethical 
movement  of  Plato  (p.  339)  and  of  Aristotle 
(p.  435).  Both  Stoics  and  Epicureans  were  so 
narrowly  moralistic  that  they  can  justly  be 
charged  with  incivism.  What  may  be  called 
institutional  Virtue,  they  had  not,  in  spite  of 
Zeno's  cosmopolitanism.  So  the  Sti?te  with  its 
Law,  which  was  an  inner  evolution  in  the  ethical 
systems  of  both  Plato  and  Aristotle,  has  to  be 
clapped  on  externally  to  these  ethical  systems  of 
Hellenisticism,  in  order  to  complete  the  Practical 
Movement  of  which  they  are  stages. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  these  three  stao;es 
of  the  Practical  Movement  have  a  decided 
correspondence  to  the  three  stages  of  the 
preceding  Theoretic  Movement,  Stoicism  is 
dogmatic,  affirming  the  Universal  immedi- 
ately, or  that  Virtue  is  the  end  for  the  individual ; 
Epicureanism  is  skeptical,  denying  the  Universal, 
declaring  that  Virtue  is  not  the  end  but  the 
means  for  the  individual.  Legalism  is  a  kind  of 
Roman  Eclecticism  which  places  itself  above  both 
sides  and  chooses,  making  its  choice  the  law. 
Thus  the  Universal    has    individualized  itself  in 


4 


THE  PRACTICAL  MOVEMENT.  547 

the  law-giver,  who,  however,  is  not  merely  the- 
oretic, but  also  practical,  making  rather  his 
Intellect  subserve  his  Will,  than  his  Will  sub- 
serve his  Intellect,  producing  a  legal  rather  than 
a  philosophical  world. 

In  this  way  the  Practical  Movement  of  Hellen- 
istic Ethics  completes  itself.  But  now  a  new 
fact  appears :  Hellenistic  Ethics  though  appar- 
ently completed  in  separate  systems,  begins  to 
show  itself  again  as  a  means  for  bringing  back 
man  to  participation  in  the  Divine,  such  as  we 
saw  the  Ethical  process  to  be  in  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle. Once  more  the  philosophic  Norm  asserts 
itself,  and  Ethics  is  seen  to  be  at  bottom  the 
third  stage  of  its  movement,  which  is  the  return 
to  Absolute  Being  in  some  form.  Particularly 
Aristotle's  ethical  end  as  the  vision  of  God  be- 
gins to  realize  itself  in  every  thinking  individual. 
Indeed,  Roman  Law,  with  its  universal  authority, 
as  a  phase  of  institutional  Ethics,  led  in  the  same 
direction,  moving  back  to  the  one  supreme  Au- 
thority of  the  Universe.  Greek  Philosophy, 
though  born  of  a  reaction  against  Religion,  is  in 
a  process  of  returning  to  Religion,  to  an  abso- 
lute Will  with  its  moral  Law  willing  man's  moral 
Law.  Necessarily  the  Universal  has  to  be  indi- 
vidualized in  the  universal  individual  as  its  ulti- 
mate ground.  We  have  now  reached  that 
movement,  long  and  fluctuating,  in  which  divinity 
is  to  be  humanized  and  man  is  to  be  divinized  — 


548         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  son  of  God    is    to    become  a  man  and  man 
is  to  become  the  son  of  God. 

Thus  we  attain  to  the  Religious  Movement, 
which  is  the  outcome  and  inner  significance  of 
the  Hellenistic  Period  from  the  start.  It  is  not 
simply  an  ethical  return  to  the  Good  (Plato)  or 
even  to  the  vision  of  God  (Aristotle),  both  of 
which  are  essentially  philosophical.  But  now 
Philosophy  itself  is  to  move  back  (or  rather  for- 
ward) to  Religion  from  which  it  was  once  es- 
tranged ;  the  philosophical  Norm  as  a  whole  is 
in  some  way  to  become  reconciled  with  the  re- 
lio;ious  Norm,  which  has  risen  to  be  the  most 
urgent  need  of  the  civilized  world. 

III.  The  Religious  Movement. 

In  the  sweep  of  the  practical  movement  just 
given,  we  passed  from  Moralism,  which  de- 
veloped in  Man  the  inner  Moral  Law,  to  Legal- 
ism, which  developed  the  outer  Positive  Law  in 
the  political  Institution,  the  Roman  World- 
State.  It  was  found  that  Moralism  terminates 
in  Individualism,  though  this  be  moral  —  each 
man  is  a  law  unto  himself.  Thus  we  have  my- 
riads of  law-makers,  each  with  his  own  code; 
the  result  could  only  be  an  incessant  conflict  of 
laws.  This  conflict  the  Roman  State  solved  ex- 
ttrnoXlij  with  its  positive  jurisprudence,  which 
affects  chiefly  the  outer  relations  of  life  (in  the 


THE  RELIGIOUS  310  VE. ME  NT.  549 

matter  of  property,  contract,  business,  personal 
rights,  etc.).  But  there  must  be  an  infernal 
solution  of  the  great  conflict  called  up  by  Moral- 
ism ;  there  must  be  a  universal  inner  law  and 
law-giver  corresponding  to  the  individual  inner 
law  and  law-Sfiver.  In  other  words,  there  must 
be  an  Absolute  Being,  who  is  himself  a  Moral 
Ego,  governed  by  his  own  inner  Moral  Law, 
which  thus  becomes  also  objective  and  universal. 
Throush  the  Ethical  Movement  God  is  born  or 
rather  re-born  in  the  soul  of  the  Greco-Roman 
world.  Those  profound  ethical  categories,  Duty, 
Conscience,  Responsibilty,  must  be  actually 
deified,  made  divine,  elevated  into  the  univer- 
sality of  God's  Self,  whereby  they  are  no  longer 
individual  and  subjected  to  each  man's  insight 
or  caprice.  Thus  the  inner  Law  has  its  corre- 
s})ondence  and  confirmation  only  in  God  Himself, 
who  also  has  the  Ethical  Process  in  His  spirit  as 
the  ruler  of  the  Universe. 

The  Roman  Law  could,  then,  construct  simply 
an  outer  order,  very  important  for  that  time  and 
for  all  time.  But,  on  the  whole,  Legalism  pre- 
supposes wrong,  violation,  negation  on  part  of 
the  individual,  who  thus  has  the  initiative;  the 
Law  is  in  some  way  to  meet  his  wrong  and  undo 
it  as  far  as  possible;  in  other  words,  positive 
Law  is  chiefly  a  negation  of  a  negative,  actual  or 
possible.  Hence,  the  question  arises.  Cannot 
this  neij;ation  which  lies  in  the  will  of    the  indi- 


550         ANCIENT  E  UU  OPE  AN  PHIL  O  SOPH  Y. 

vidual  be  reiiched  and  internally  transformed  be- 
fore it  becomes  negative?  The  universal  outer 
Latv  can  only  seize  hold  of  the  deed  already  done  ; 
it  must  be  supplemented  by  an  universal  inner 
Law  which  on  the  one  hand  rules  the  human  soul 
by  authority,  which  authority  is,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  soul's  own,  its  own  command  to  itself. 
So  Religion  becomes  the  true  realization  of 
Ethics,  making  the  inner  Moral  Law  as  well  as 
the  outer  Positive  L:iw  over  into  a  single  supreme 
authoritative  Person  who  is  both  the  moral  and 
legal  legislator  in  one,  is  God  moralized  and  in- 
stitutionalized. The  Wise  Man  of  Moralism 
with  his  inner  Law  and  Order  ascends  into  Divin- 
ity; the  Roman  formulator  of  Legalism  with  his 
outer  Law  and  Order  also  ascends  into  Divinity; 
there  is  now  a  wise  and  moral  God  "with  his  Law 
and  Order  which  are  both  inner  and  outer. 

But  here  we  must  interweave  an  historical  and 
evolutionary  element,  since  it  interweaves  itself 
into  the  age  we  are  considering.  Religion  is  not 
made  now  for  the  first  time,  but  is  something 
given  by  the  past,  transmitted  from  antecedent 
peoples.  The  Orient  is  the  creative  home  of 
Religions,  which  just  in  the  present  conjuncture 
come  streaming  into  the  Hellenic  world,  as  it 
were  in  response  to  the  fervent  call  of  the  spirit. 
As  already  observed,  all  Greek  Philosophy  is  a 
reaction  against  Religion  in  its  immediate  phase  ; 
but  that  very  Greek  Philosophy  has  brought  men 


THE  HELIGIOUH  MOVEMENT.  551 

l);ick  to  the  need  of  Relioioii.  The  result  is  a 
grand  gathering  of  Religions  into  one  center, 
where  they  are  to  be  wrought  over  by  Greek 
spirit  which  they  in  turn  are  to  work  over  for 
themselves. 

This  geographical  center  is  Alexandria  in  Egypt, 
founded  by  Alexander  the  Great  and  nurtured  for 
business  and  science  by  the  Ptolomies.  Hellas 
comes  to  the  Orient,  and  this  is  a  sign  of  her 
present  Orientalizing  spirit.  The  Greek  has 
conquered  and  unified  the  Oriental  nations  polit- 
ically, at  least  he  did  so  for  a  short  time ;  but 
his  chief  feat  is  that  he  brings  the  many  sepa- 
rate and  recalcitrant  Oriental  Religions  mto  one 
spot  under  the  inspection  of  Greek  Philosophy. 
In  Alexandria,  then,  a  religious  process  begins 
to  manifest  itself  which  in  its  total  sweep  consti- 
tutes the  greatest  epoch  in  the  history  of  Relig- 
ion, at  least  as  far  as  the  Occident  is  concerned. 
The  Orientals  flock  to  the  Greek  City  with  their 
Gods,  all  of  them  tribal  or  national,  none  of 
them  universal  or  as  yet  having  the  principle  of 
universality,  whereat  through  mutual  friction  the 
general  swirl  commences. 

Thus  tlie  spiritual  center  of  the  age  begins  to 
pass  from  Athens  to  Alexandria  somewhere  in 
the  third  century  B.  C.  Zeno,  an  Oriental  of 
Semitic  birth  and  cast  of  mind,  had  already  pen- 
etrated Athens  and  had  assailed  and  in  part 
broken  through  Greek  civic  nativism,  proclaini- 


552         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ing  in  substance  that  all  men  are  free  and  equal. 
But  in  Alexandria  a  deeper  and  more  desperate 
conflict  was  taking  place :  the  mutual  interaction 
and  gradual  transformation  or  abolition  of  nativ- 
istic  Religions.  The  tribal  and  national  Gods 
of  Hellas  and  the  Orient  were  whirled  into  that 
seething  cauldron  of  peoples  in  order  to  free 
them  of  religious  nativism  (something  far  more 
profound  and  stubborn  than  even  political  nativ- 
ism), wherefrom  the  coming  world-religion  was 
to  spring  forth,  which  was  just  now  in  the  pro- 
cess of  evolution.  The  present  Religious  Move- 
ment-is, therefore,  to  bring  to  light  Christianity ; 
in  fact  it  may  be  said  that  this  whole  Hellenistic 
Period  has  as  its  outcome  the  one  underlying 
thought  and  purpose :  to  bring  forth,  to  propa- 
gate and  to  formulate  the  Christian  Religion. 

The  Hellenistic  Period  is  characterized  by  an 
original  and  widespread  development  of  Ethics. 
But  it  is  more  deeply  characterized  by  its  longing 
for  a  Personal  God.  Ethical  culture  did  not  and 
could  not  satisfy  it;  man  will  not  rest  content 
with  making  himself  a  subjective  deity  governed 
internally  by  his  own  moral  Law.  Deity  and 
Law  must  be  made  objective,  world-ruling  through 
a  personal  Will.  We  have  seen  Greek  Philoso- 
phy going  East  already  during  the  ethical  period 
for  its  teachers,  especially  in  case  of  the  Stoics. 
But  with  far  prof ounder  aspiration  it  turns  to  the 
Orient  to  still  its  religious  yearnings.     At  the 


THE  EELIQIOUS  MOVEMENT.  553 

yame  time  the  Orient  comes  to  it,  having  on  its 
side  a  philosophical  need.  Philosophy  has  etlii- 
cized  man  ;  can  it  ethicize  God,  freeing  Him  from 
His  Oriental  caprice  (against  which  Philosophy  was 
originall}^  a  protest),  and  putting  Him  too  under 
the  Moral  Law?  So  Philosophy  will  religionize 
and  Eeligion  will  philosophize.  In  the  one 
we  see  man  making  God,  in  the  other  God  mak- 
ing man,  in  both  cases  after  some  philosophic 
pattern.  Each  of  these  efforts  show  the  all- 
dominatino;  religious  struggle  of  the  age  in  seek- 
ing  God  who  will  at  last  be  found  in  a  revealed 
Religion. 

Meanwhile  Rome  is  ethicized  by  Greek  Thought, 
which  her  practical  sjiirit  makes  the  Law  of  the 
State  for  governing  the  world.  Thus  she  pre- 
pares civilization  by  an  obedience  to  universal 
external  Law  for  an  obedience  to  the  Divine 
Person,  who  has  the  universal  Moral  Law  within. 
Rome  herself  with  her  secular  emperor  will  sub- 
mit to  this  imperial  Divine  Person  and  become 
Christian.  Moreover  the  Church  will  arise  to 
make  objective  and  institutional  the  Moral  Law 
of  God  and  to  enforce  the  same  in  its  own  name 
and  right. 

So  Greek  Philosophy  and  Oriental  Religion  are 
now  to  pass  before  us  in  their  mutual  inter- 
action, opposition  and  final  union.  The  one  pri- 
marily seeks  to  get  God  through  Thought,  the 
other  seeeks  to  get  Thought  through  God.     Both 


554         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  FIIILOSOFIIY. 

ways  will  show  themselves  inadequate  and  one- 
sided; each,  however,  is  a  contribution,  in  fact, 
a  necessary  stage  to  the  revelation  of  the  Abso- 
lute Self  as  the  Divine  Process  of  the  Universe, 
or  the  Pampsychosis  in  religious  form.  Hence 
we  classify  the  stages  of  the  Religious  Movement 
of  the  Hellenistic  Period  as  follows  :  ( 1 )  Philos- 
ophy religionzes;  (2)  Religion  philosophizes; 
(3)  Religion  reveals. 

Castino;  a  glance  back  at  our  Hellenistic  for- 
inula  (the  Universal  individualized),  we  observe 
that  its  outcome  has  been  reached.  That  is,  the 
Universal  individualizes  itself  in  the  Individual 
who  is  universal,  having  in  Himself  the  process 
of  the  Universe  as  his  own  individual  or  personal 
process  in  triune  form.  And  the  inner  Moral 
Law  has  become  truly  universal  in  the  universal 
Person  (objective)  ;  not  alone  in  the  individual 
Person  (subjective)  can  it  be  such.  Thus  Ethics 
has  become  religious  and  Religion  has  become 
ethical.  And  God  both  moves  and  is  moved, 
both  is  loved  and  loves  in  return,  wherein  we  see 
the  great  change  from  Aristotle  and  Hellenism. 
Of  this  important  Movement  we  shall  note  some 
of  the  details. 

I.  Philosophy  Religionizes.  —  The  great 
effort  now  is  to  evolve  Religion  out  of  Philos- 
ophy ;  the  philosopher  is  somehow  to  make 
God  and  reveal  Him  with  His  worship.  Such 
is  the  time  ;  Ethics  can  no  longer  satisfy  the  total 


THE  RELIGIOUS  MOVEMENT.  555 

mail,  and  Philosophy,  the  great  creative  discipline 
of  the  Greco-Eoman  world,  is  invoked  to  create 
a  Eeligion  suited  to  the  needs  and  responsive  to 
the  ]onoino;s  of  the  age.  The  result  is  an  untold 
variety  of  attempts  to  formulate  the  coming  Ee- 
ligion. The  most  prolific  period  of  God-making 
in  the  history  of  the  world  starts  with  Alex- 
andria, as  center.  Every  philosopher  begins  to 
call  his  first  i)rinciple  a  God  or  divine,  and  every 
Philosophy  is  going  to  establish  its  Eeligion. 

To  be  sure,  Aristotle  had  already,  in  a  very 
circumspect  way,  defined  a  philosophic  God. 
Plato  often  mythologizes,  introducing  deit}^  and 
deities.  The  Stoics  conceived  their  God  as  the 
soul  or  breath  (jmei'.ma)  immanent  in  the 
cosmos.  Nor  must  we  forget  that  the  Epicurean 
also  had  his  Gods  dwelling  "  in  the  intermundane 
spaces,"  free  of  all  care,  regardless  of  mortals, 
and  devoted  to  the  pursuit  of  their  owm  happiness. 
Thus  every  system  made  its  own  God,  who  was 
certainly  not  the  most  important  part  of  it,  being 
rather  a  supernumerary  or  a  double  of  the 
abstract  First  Principle.  And  Ave  must  remem- 
ber that  Hellenic  Philosophy  set  out  as  a  reaction 
against  Eeligion. 

But  Hellenistic  Philosophy  has  ver}^  decidedly 
moved  forward  to  a  return  and  recovery  of  Ee- 
ligion, and  the  first  stage  of  such  a  tendency  is 
to  make  Eeligion  after  a  ]:)hil<)sophic  formula. 
At   least   Philosophy    can   select   what    it  needs 


556         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

from  the  vast  repertory  of  Eeligions  which 
poured  into  Alexandria,  and  later  into  Eome; 
thus  people  can  have  an  eclectic  Eeligion  as  well 
as  eclectic  Philosophy.  The  man-made  God  is  a 
characteristic  of  the  age.  Even  Skepticism  has 
its  deities;  Cicero  who  hardly  believes  in  the 
Gods,  believes  them  to  be  useful  to  the  State 
and  so  philosophizes  them  into  a  system.  But 
of  course  this  does  not  represent  the  deep  and 
earnest  long-ino;  of  the  time  for  God  and  for  a 
revelation  of  Him. 

Of  all  these  God-creating  Philosophies  which 
were  called  into  activity  at  the  present  period, 
that  of  Plato  comes  first.  And  the  sect  or  school 
which  used  Plato's  thought  most  successfully  in 
this  movement  were  named  Neo-Pythagoreans, 
though  they  were  more  properly  Neo-Platonists. 
The  Platonic  Ideas  are,  however,  no  longer  inde- 
pendent entities,  as  they  appear  in  Plato,  but 
are  thoughts  of  the  Divine  Ego.  Thus  God  is 
posited  as  transcendent,  being  the  Absolute  Self 
over  Hellenic  Philosophy  and  thinking  ail  its 
thoughts.  This  conception  will  remain  and  be- 
come a  leading  principle  of  the  Neo-Hellenic 
Period,  to  be  treated  of  later.  Moreover,  as  the 
Absolute  Self  is  the  Supreme  Thinker,  it  must 
speak  and  be  able  to  utter  itself.  Thus  with  the 
thinking  God,  whose  essential  content  is  the 
thought  of  Greek  Philosophy,  comes  the  belief 
that  he  must  give  a  Revelation  of  Himself.     The 


THE  RELIGIOUS  MOVEMENT.  557 

Neo-Pythagoreans  claimed  for  themselves  a  Di- 
vine Revelation,  wliich,  however,  was  voiced  by 
their  teachers,  heroes,  God-favored  disciples,  to 
whom  the  pure  doctrine  was  imparted  imme- 
diately from  its  primal  source.  One  of  these 
disciples,  Apollonius  of  Tyana,  became  cele- 
brated in  the  iirst  century  A.  D.  as  a  worker  of 
miracles  and  the  founder  of  a  new  religion  —  a 
kind  of  Neo-Pythagorean  Christ. 

The  Neo-Pythagoreans  had  also  their  world- 
forming  Demiurge  (as  in  Plato's  Timceits),  for 
God  is  not  to  touch  matter,  otherwise  he  would 
be  polluted  by  it.  This  Demiurge  plays  a  some- 
what uncertain  and  variable  part,  being  regarded 
as  a  sort  of  mediator  or  at  least  intermediary  be- 
tween God  and  the  World,  to  the  latter  of  which 
man  belono;s.  But  this  sect  seems  never  to  have 
coupled  the  idea  of  divine  sonship  with  the 
Demiurge,  at  least  in  its  pre-Christian  phases. 

Man,  sunk  in  the  flesh,  is  to  be  restored  to 
communion  with  God  through  the  complete  sub- 
ordination of  passion  and  ajopetite  by  means  of 
prayer,  rites,  and  purification.  The  moral  prob- 
lem of  subjecting  the  senses  to  the  reason  is  ele- 
vated into  a  religious  duty  with  elaborate  forms 
of  expiation  which  introduces  demons  and  lesser 
deities  with  supernatural  agencies  of  many  kinds. 
Here  lay  the  weakest  side  of  this  sect;  along 
with  its  Greek  philosophical  training  it  let  in  all 
the  superstitions  of  Hellas  and  the  Orient.     All 


558         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  crudities  of  popular  religion  it  coupled  with 
the  ideal  thinking  of  Plato.  It  did  not  employ 
the  Philosophy  of  Pythagoras  to  any  great  ex- 
tent, though  it  played  with  his  sacred  numbers 
as  archetypal  forms,  as  Plato  himself  had  done 
in  the  last  period  of  his  philosophizing.  The 
sect  seems  to  have  taken  the  name  of  Pythagoras 
since  he  was  the  founder  of  a  school  of  ascetic 
practice  and  religious  mysticism. 

Thus  the  time  religionizes,  seeking  through 
Philosophy  to  make  or  at  least  formulate  God. 
This  is  religionism  rather  than  relio-ion.  Still 
this  Neo-Platonism  puts  a  God  back  of  Plato, 
and  wants  a  revelation  from  Him  directly  as 
authority.  In  Ethics  every  man  makes  his  own 
law,  makes,  so  to  speak,  his  own  God.  But  the 
reflection  will  come :  man  cannot  make  God 
unless  God  has  already  made  man,  yea  made 
man  the  God-maker.  Hence  He  is  really  the 
authority  of  all  authority.  Thus  the  subjective 
ethical  Ego  comes  to  demand  an  objective  ethical 
Ego  as  the  one  law-giver,  who  is  to  reveal  his 
law  as  authoritative  and  universal.  Very  dis- 
tinctly does  the  ethical,  through  its  inner  process, 
call  forth  the  religious.  But  Greek  Ethics  is  the 
product  of  the  great  creative  discipline  of  the 
Greeks,  Philosophy,  which  must  now  be  invoked 
to  create  this  supreme  authority.  The  call  is 
answered  in  many  ways,  but  Neo-Pythagoreanism, 


THE  RELIGIOUS  3I0VEMENT.  559 

founded    mainly    u]wn    Plato's    thought,   is    the 
most  characteristic. 

So    Philosophy  religionizes,  seeking    to   utter 
after  its  formula  the  process  of  the  absolute  Self 
unto  man.     But  man,  making  his  God,  will  come 
at  last  to  ask  :     Who  then  made  me?     Which  is 
first,  the  maker  or  the  made?     Herein  we  beo-in 
to    see  the  transition  to  an  entirely  new  move- 
ment :  from  the  ready-made  Philosophy  religion- 
izing to  the  ready-made  Religion  philosophizino-. 
II.  Eeligion  Philosophizes. — It  is  evident 
that   Religion  is  now  the   given  thing    and  the 
determinant,    such  as   Philosophy    was    in    the 
foregoing  movement.     Religion,  though  the  au- 
thoritative   and    the    transmitted,    is     neverthe- 
less   called    upon,    in    this    philosophical    world 
of    Helleuisticism,    to    justify  itself    by  Philos- 
ophy.    So    Ave  are  to  see  for  the  first   time    a 
Philosophy    of    Religion,    of   course   from    the 
standpoint   of    Religion,    while   just   before    we 
have  had  more  a  Religion  of  Philosophy. 

Again,  the  center  of  such  a  movement  can  only 
be  Alexandria,  the  grand  arena  of  Oriental  Re- 
ligions, which  are  battling  with  one  another, 
seeking  to  justify  themselves  externally  as  well  as 
internally  before  Greek  Philosophy,  which  is  in- 
voked, not  only  as  judge,  but  as  defender  of  the 
Religions  of  the  East.  The  Egj^ptians,  the  Par- 
sees,  the  far-off  Brahmins  and  Buddhists  are 
there  with  the  extraordinary  claim  that  more  or 


560         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

less  directly  the  Greek  thinkers  drew  their  doc- 
trines from  these  Oriental  Religions.  The  Ori- 
entals still  to-day  declare  that  the  West  has 
derived  its  chief  wisdom  from  their  ancestors. 
Indeed  some  modern  German  philosophers  have 
written  learned  books  in  support  of  the  same 
declaration. 

Religion  is  now  not  the  man-made,  but  the 
God-made,  and  is  divinely  transmitted  to  man. 
Still  at  Alexandria  even  the  ardent  devotees  feel 
that  it  must  be  philosophized,  Hellenized,  cate- 
gorized into  the  concepts  made  universally  cur- 
rent by  Greek  Thinking.  This  undoubtedly  pro- 
duces a  change  in  the  Religion,  it  is  made 
rational  through  interpretation,  it  is  no  longer 
the  work  of  Divine  Caprice,  but  of  Divine 
Reason.  Greek  Philosophy,  we'may  repeat,  was 
born  of  a  reaction  against  Greek  and  Oriental 
Religions,  chiefly  because  of  their  capricious 
deities,  who  seemed  to  have  no  law,  moral  or 
otherwise. 

Religion  is  philosophizing  —  what?  The 
process  of  the  Absolute  Self,  which  now  lurks 
in  all  human  thinking.  The  Universe  is  in- 
dividualized in  the  universal  Ego  or  Person  who 
is  to  be  vindicated  bv  thouo:ht.  Relisjion 
determines  Philosophy,  not  Philosophy  Religion. 
Indeed  it  is  said  that  Relio;ion  determined  the 
philosopher  originally,  for  instance,  Plato,  who 


THE  liELIGIOUS  MOVEMENT.  561 

could  only  have  obtained  such  wisdom  as  his 
from  Moses. 

Doubtless  many  Oriental  Religions  were  thus 
philosophizing  at  Alexandria  and  elsewhere  in  the 
p]ast,  but  the  one  that  outstripped  all  the  rest  in 
this  movement  w^as  the  Jewish,  with  its  all-sur- 
passing Holy  Books,  which  now  become  the  spir- 
itual treasure  of  the  race.  The  Hel)rew  Bible 
was  translated  into  Greek  (Septuagint)  at  Alex- 
andria, and  thereby  passed  from  being  a  national 
or  tribal  possession  into  its  marvelous  career  as 
a  chief  world-book  of  Western  civilization.  Now 
this  world-book  opens  wnth  God  who  is  creating 
man  and  the  cosmos,  and  then  delivering  the 
law  to  his  people.  Very  impressive  is  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  man-creating  God  of  the  Hebrews 
in  contrast  to  the  man-created  God  of  the  Neo- 
Pythagoreans  Avith  their  theurgic  rites  and  invo- 
cations. It  is  no  wonder  that  man  creatingf  his 
God  becomes  dissatisfied  and  seeks  after  a  God 
who  creates  man.  Ethically  man  has  subjected 
himself  to  his  higher  Self  within,  but  religiously 
he  is  next  to  subject  himself  to  the  supreme  cre- 
ative Self  of  the  Universe,  who  is  the  true  reali- 
zation of  the  Moral  Law. 

So  the  Jews  have  returned  to  Egypt  in  great 
numbers  and  live  under  the  Ptolomies,  as  they 
once  before  went  to  Egypt  and  lived  under  the 
Pharaohs.  According  to  Philo  there  were  a  mil- 
lion Jews   in  Egypt  during  his  time  (about  the 

3(J 


562         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

beginning  of  the  Christian  Era),  and  it  would 
seem  from  his  account  tliat  quite  one-third  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Alexandria  were  Jews.  But  ag-ain 
persecution  followed  them  as  of  old,  and  as  of 
to-day;  under  the  Romans,  especially  in  the  time 
of  Caligula,  they  seem  to  have  been  substantially 
extirpated  from  Egypt. 

Judaism,  then,  philosophizes  in  Alexandria 
and  interprets  its  Holy  Books  through  Greek 
Philosophy.  The  outer  events  of  scriptural 
history  were  supposed  to  have  an  inner  philo- 
sophical meaning;  thus  the  interpretation  be- 
came a  system  of  allegorizing.  The  Jewish 
claim  was  that  Greek  wisdom  was  derived  from 
the  Hebrew  Bible  primarilj^  so  that  the  ex- 
positors were  simply  bringing  the  Philosophy  of 
Greece  to  its  fountain-head.  Of  course  the 
Bible  was  first,  the  authority,  the  divine  revela- 
tion and  perfect;  then  came  Philosophy,  the 
handmaid,  the  servant.  This  was  a  situation 
afterwards  repeated  in  the  Middle  Ages. 

The  most  famous  name  in  the  history  of  phil- 
osophizing Judaism  is  that  of  Philo  (born  about 
25  B.  C,  died  about  50  A.  D.),  whose  life 
spanned  the  Christian  Era.  His  philosophy  is 
primarily  religious,  seeking  to  conceive  the 
nature  of  God,  and  determining  Him  to  be 
essentially  indeterminate.  The  Absolute  Being 
is  affirmed  with  negative  predicates  only ;  He  is 
beyond    any    idea  of  human  perfection,  beyond 


THE  ItELIGlOUS  MOVEMENT.  5G3 

our  conception  of  goodness  and  wisdom.  This 
l)egins  to  resemble  Plotinus,  though  for  Philo 
God  is  already  given,  is  the  Hebrew  Jehovah, 
and  is  not  merely  a  philosophic  projection  beyond 
Plato's  Ideas.  But  since  God  cannot  be  con- 
nected with  impure  matter.  He  sends  forth  the 
Potencies  which  culminate  in  the  Loijos. 

Here  we  come  to  the  most  interestino;  doctrine 
in  Philo.  The  Logos  is  the  grand  mediator  be- 
tween God  and  the  world.  Here  the  original, 
immediately  creative  act  of  the  Hebrew  God  is 
changed,  or  is  at  least  explained,  in  accord  with 
Platonism.  The  Logos  is  the  Idea  (or  Power) 
which  emln-aces  all  other  Ideas,  and,  while  being 
a  property  of  God,  seems  at  the  same  time  to  be 
an  individual  entity  alongside  God.  Does  Philo 
conceive  the  Logos  to  be  a  person?  Sometimes 
and  sometimes  not ;  he  uses  such  contradictory 
predicates  concerning  the  Logos  that  the  easiest 
way  out  is  to  consider  that  the  question  did  not 
present  itself  to  him  consciousl3^  To  us,  indeed, 
with  the  Gospel  of  John  in  mind  it  is  the  ques- 
tion of  questions.  Philo  can  call  the  Logos  an 
angel,  a  priest,  a  second  God,  yet  also  regard  the 
same  as  a  quality  or  power  of  the  one  God. 

Another  important  doctrine  of  Philo  is  that 
the  Highest  God  is  supra-rational,  bej^ond 
Thought  or  Reason.  This  doctrine  will  be  trans- 
mitted to  the  Neo-Platonists  and  furnish  them 
with    their   supreme  principle.        Philo   has  also 


564         ANCIENT  ETITtOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  conception  of  ecstas}^  or  the  immediate 
union  of  tlie  soul  with  God,  which  is  with  him 
the  prophetic  condition.  Plotinus  hereafter  will 
employ  this  Philonic  ecstasy  as  the  highest  ethi- 
cal act  of  the  soul  in  its  return  to  the  Supreme 
One. 

But  the  world  cannot  become  Jewish,  nor  can 
it  worship  the  Jewish  God,  who  is  after  all  a 
tribal  deity  and  not  universal,  in  spite  of  Philo's 
Philosophy.  In  fact  his  attempt  to  force  what 
is  universal  into  what  is  purely  national  and  par- 
ticular, has  driven  the  Jewish  Religion  into  a 
decided  contradiction  with  itself.  Pliilo,  the 
Jew,  has  unconsciously  though  very  decidedly, 
shown  the  insufBciency  of  the  old  Jewish  Revela- 
tion by  thrusting  into  it  with  a  kind  of  externa] 
violence  too  large  a  content  just  through  his  phi- 
losophical interpretation.  A  new  Revelation, 
which  will  again  be  of  Jewish  origin,  will  answer 
the  importunate  call  of  the  age. 

III.  Religion  Reveals. —  Naturally  one  asks : 
What  docs  religion  now  reveal?  In  general  terms 
the  answer  is  the  process  of  the  Absolute  Self. 
The  divinely  creative  Ego  is  explicitlj^  manifested 
in  the  individual,  proclaims  itself  to  the  world  in 
Christ  and  is  finally  categorized  in  the  Christian 
dogma.  What  Philosophy  religionized  in  Nco- 
Pythagorianism  and  in  kindred  movements,  what 
Religion  philosophized  in  Philo  and  others  of 
his  tendency,  is  revealed  in  the  Christian    Relig- 


THE  BELIGIO  US  MO  VEMENT.  5 65 

ion,  whose  birth  is  the  end  toward  which  all 
Ilcllenisticism  has  been  moving.  If  we  ghmcc 
back  at  the  Hellenistic  formula  as  the  Universal 
individualized,  we  find  that  this  resulting  individ- 
ual is  the  universal  Self  grasped  in  its  triune 
process.  Or,  the  Universal  as  Hellenic  Thought 
is  now  individualized  in  the  universal  individual 
as  the  Son  of  God,  who  thereby  has  revealed 
not  merely  the  implicit,  indeterminate  Oriental 
God,  but  the  total  divine  process  of  the  Universe, 
of  which  he  is  a  part  or  stage,  yet  which  is  in 
him  in  its  entirety.  He  is  a  member  of  the 
whole  and  just  for  this  reason  has  the  whole 
within  him. 

Thus  that  which  the  Hellenistic  world  has  been 
seeking  for  in  manifold  tortuous  ways  has  come 
to  light  —  a  Revelation  of  the  process  of  the 
Absolute  Self,  which  calls  for  and  calls  forth  a 
new  Holy  Book.  The  greatest  written  product 
of  Hellenisticism  is  the  New  Testament,  just  as 
the  greatest  written  product  of  Hellenism  is 
the  works  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Strong  indeed 
is  the  contrast.  Originally,  however,  the  chief 
contents  of  the  New  Testament  were  spoken  in 
Aramaic,  or  probal)ly  in  a  local  dialect  of  the 
Aramaic.  Then  they  were  written  down  in 
Hellenistic  Greek,  the  universal  tongue  of  the 
age,  whereby  they  became  the  property  of  all 
civilization.  So  we  may  see  that  even  in  the 
matter  of  language,  tlie  Universal  as  the  thouajht 


566         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  age,  iudividuulizes  itself  first  iu  a  petty 
rustic  patois,  from  which  it  elevates  itself  iuto 
the  dominating  speech  of  the  world  at  that  time. 

Thus  there  is  an  immediate  present  Revelation 
of  the  present,  as  well  as  the  Revelation  coming 
down  from  the  past  through  Moses  and  the 
Prophets,  which  is  being  bolstered  up  so  labor- 
iously through  Greek  philosophy  by  the  learned 
Jews  of  Alexandria.  Good  is  the  intention,  and 
by  no  means  is  such  work  thrown  away ;  but  can 
we  not  have  a  new  Revelation?  is  the  voice  of 
the  time  crying  out  of  the  depths  of  its  doubt 
and  despair.  Yes,  is  the  answer,  and  here  it  is 
just  now  being  uttered  in  the  rude  dialect  of  a 
rural  district  of  Judea  cotemperaneously  with  the 
erudite  philosophizing  Judaism  of  Philo  at  Alex- 
andria. 

If  we  look  into  the  doctrine  thus  announced 
and  trace  its  relation  to  what  has  gone  before, 
we  find  that  the  two  previous  stages  of  the  Hel- 
lenistic Religious  Movement  are  united  in  a  third, 
which  gives  the  new  Revelation.  The  man-cre- 
ating God  (Jewish)  begets  the  man  (Christ) 
who  re-creates  God  in  life  and  thought  (Greek)  ; 
that  is,  reveals  Him  creatively,  in  His  own  Divine 
Process.  Thus  Christ  is  here  the  mediator,  me- 
diating the  two  sides,  Greek  and  Hebrew,  both 
of  which  were  deeply  fermenting  in  the  spirit  of 
the  age.  Thereby  it  is  not  said  that  Christ  was 
conscious  of  any  such  purpose.     Probably  not. 


THE  llELIGIO  US  MO  VEMENT.  567 

But  that  spirit  of  the  age  was  working  within 
him  and  all  others;  he  possessed  the  power  (we 
may  call  it  genius)  to  give  it  adequate  utterance 
for  the  people,  he  being  of  the  people.  We  must 
recollect  that  for  more  than  three  centuries  be- 
fore Christ  the  Greeks  had  ruled  in  Palestine  and 
had  established  Greek  cities  there  which  had  their 
share  of  Greek  philosophic  schools.  Greek  civ- 
ilization had  entered  deeply  into  the  world-view 
of  the  Jews,  and  was  transforming  it,  in  a  part 
of  them  at  least.  Then  came  the  other  ciuestion, 
Can  the  Jewish  spirit  transform  the  Greek  spirit 
into  a  new  world-^iew,  or  indeed  into  a  new  re- 
ligion? Such  is  the  process  now  starting  from 
Galilee,  destined  to  embrace  all  Europe  and  to 
continue  more  than  five  hundred  years,  till  the 
final  close  of  the  Schools  of  Athens. 

Evidently  there  will  be  many  stages  of  this 
process  and  stages  of  those  stages.  Here,  how- 
ever, it  is  in  place  to  give  only  a  brief  outline  of 
the  main  sweep,  which  we  shall  characterize  by 
the  Greek  terms  generally  used  in  this  connec- 
tion —  Pistis,  Gnosis,  Dogma. 

1.  Pistis.  The  stage  of  Faith  is  first,  which 
comes  from  the  immediate  personal  appearance 
of  Christ  proclaiming  himself  to  be  the  Son  of 
God,  embodying  in  conduct  and  in  simple  speech 
the  supreme  INIoral  Law,  and  manifesting  the 
})roccss  of  man  in  his  life,  death  and  resurrec- 
tion.    The   Pistis  is  primarily  based  upon  the 


568         ANCIENT  E  UR  OPE  AN  PHIL  O  SOPHY. 

immediate,  visible,  we  may  say,  sensuous  mani- 
festation of  the  actual  Person,  who  thus  is  a 
direct  Revelation  from  God,  as  well  as  utters  a 
Revelation,  and  whose  human  career  is  a  Revela- 
tion. We  may  note  three  processes  here  inter- 
woven in  one  Personality:  the  Religious  (the 
Son  of  God),  the  ethical  (the  Moral  Self  with 
its  law),  and  the  human-divine  (the  Son  of  Man). 
Thus,  the  Religious  Movement  of  Hellenisticism 
has  revealed  not  merely  the  Absolute  Self  but 
especially  the  process  thereof  in  an  Ego  or  Per- 
son. 

This  doctrine  is  now  to  be  imparted  by  those 
who  have  it  in  the  form  of  Faith  (^Pisiis)  to  those 
who  have  it  not.  Hence  rises  the  Apostolate  of 
Christianity,  bringing  the  new  Evangel  to  the 
Jews  first  (through  the  twelve  Apostles)  and 
also  to  the  Gentiles  ( through  Paul ) .  But  another 
stream  sets  in,  an  age  of  cidture  and  philosophy 
demands  to  know.  To  believe  is  well,  yea  is 
fundamental ;  but  cannot  this  new  Faith  be 
explained,  interpreted,  categorized  for  the  under- 
standing? 

2.  Gnosis.  This  general  term  may  include 
several  important  movements,  heretical,  semi- 
heretical  and  orthodox,  which  sought  to  base 
upon  reason  and  philosophy  the  Christian  Re- 
ligion. The  original  stream  of  Faith  (Pistis) 
remains  and  develops,  at  first  inopj:)osition  to  the 
Gnosis  (Science),  and  then  in  harmony  with  it. 


THE  BELIQIOUS  MOVEMENT.  560 

lu  the  New  Testament  the  first  heresy  appears 
in  Simon  Magus.  But  the  Christian  communi- 
ties show  an  early  tendency  to  split  up  into  sects 
under  the  guidance  of  leaders  who  give  some 
new  turn  to  the  doctrine  of  Christians. 

Very  early  in  the  history  of  Christianity 
appeared  the  Gnostics  proper,  who  were  named 
from  the  Gnosis.  They  too  had  many  divisions 
among  themselves.  But  they  showed  a  common 
tendency  in  the  fact  that  they  regarded  Christi- 
anity as  evolved  out  of  antecedent  Religions, 
Jewish  and  Heathen,  whose  conflict  they  por- 
trayed as  the  battle  of  the  old  Gods.  These 
were  conquered  by  the  true  God  through  the 
Revelation  of  Jesus,  which  is  thus  the  final  pur- 
pose of  the  historic  movement  of  Religion.  This 
was  a  significant  thought  and  it  remained  a  valid 
contribution  for  the  future.  But  the  warlike 
form  of  the  Greek  Mythus  of  Homer,  in  which 
their  doctrine  clothed  itself,  was  not  consonant 
with  the  New  Testament,  which  was  thereby 
heathenized.  The  struffo-le  between  Gods  be- 
comes  the  conflict  between  good  and  evil  and 
begets  in  the  Orient  Manichaeism.  But  Christian- 
ity  could  not  well  take  the  Gnostic  attitude  to- 
ward the  Jewish  Jehovah  of  the  old  Testament. 
Nor  could  the  mythical  element  in  Gnosticism 
satisfy  the  philosophical  mind. 

Accordingly  the  Apologists  arise  who  seek  to 
make  Revelation  rational,  and   to  bring   it  into 


570         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHTLOSOPHY. 

harmonj  with  Greek  thought.  Thus  began  the 
tendency  to  philosophize  Christianity.  Socrates 
and  Plato  had  flashes  of  inspiration,  moreover 
they  were  supposed  to  have  received  somehow 
the  teachings  of  Moses  and  the  Prophets.  But 
the  perfect  Revelation  of  the  Divine  Logos  is  in 
Jesus  who  is  to  redeem  man  fallen  in  sin.  The 
chief  Apologists  are  Justin  Martyr  and  Athena- 
goras.  But  they  as  rationalists  found  opposition 
in  the  followers  of  the  pure  Faith  (Pistis)  who 
did  not  wish  for  any  philosophical  interpretation 
of  the  Christian  Religion  (Tatian  and  Tertul- 
lian ) . 

Still  the  Gnosis  is  indispensable,  and  begins 
to  take  a  new  shape  in  the  so-called  Catechists 
of  Alexandria,  among  whom  Clement  and 
Origen  stand  pre-eminent.  The  various  doc- 
trines are  now  brought  too-ether  and  ordered  into 
a  s}stcm  by  reason,  so  that  we  begin  to  see  the 
total  Christian  edifice,  constructed,  to  be  sure, 
by  Greek  thought.  Christianity  now  becomes  a 
science,  it  has  a  theology  which  is  chiefly  the 
work  of  Origen,  the  great  constructive  thinker 
of  early  Christendom.  He  starts  at  the  top  by 
conceiving  God  as  pure  creativity,  as  Supreme 
Will,  who  eternally  creates  the  Logos  as  Person  or 
second  God.  The  created  spirits  are  endowed 
with  Free  Will  and  have  fallen,  but  can  be  saved 
thiough  Failli  in  the  Mediator. 

The  "icat  strui>i>le  of  the  Gnosis  in  all  its  forms, 


THE  RELIGIOUS  MOVEMENT.  571 

heretical,  orthodox  and  semi-orthodox,  is  to  evolve 
the  conception  and  formulation  of  the  Trinity 
out  of  the  Pistis.  The  process  of  the  Absolute 
Self  has  now  to  be  known  and  categorized  as  the  act 
of  Will  which  creates  the  Universe.  This  is  ex- 
plicitly the  work  of  Origen,  who  declares  the  world 
to  be  the  product  of  God's  Will .  The  world  is  and 
is  what  it  is  because  God  has  willed  it  to  be  such. 
Tlius  Origen  is  the  most  direct  and  emphatic  de- 
nial of  the  whole  sweep  of  Greek  Philosophy  ;  he 
has  postulated  an  universal  arbitrary  Will  as  the 
source  of  all  things.  Now  Greek  Philosophy 
came  into  existence  by  way  of  protest  against  the 
divinely  creative  Will  of  the  Oriental  and  Greek 
Religion  as  arbitrary.  Is  this  view  of  Origen  a 
relapse  to  the  Orient?  Not  exactly,  for  he  seeks 
to  make  the  Divine  Will  permanent,  essential, 
eternal  as  Law  and  Cause.  But  this  element  is 
Greek  and  philosophical,  and  seems  to  determine 
the  Divine  Will.  Creation  is  not  a  single  act  m 
time,  but  is  the  very  essence  of  God  manifesting 
itself  from  eternity  to  eternity,  according  to 
Origen . 

lie,  therefore,  has  still  a  refractory  Greek  ele- 
ment in  him,  which  has  not  permitted  him  to 
overcome  wholly  the  dualism  between  Eeligiou 
and  Philosophy'.  Hence,  in  the  view  of  the 
Church,  he  is  still  tainted  with  heresy.  On  one 
side  he  is  still  aCinostic.  But  he  has  jiroclaimed 
the  Will  of  God  as  the  central  creative  principle 


572         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  universe,  which  doctrine  will  reniain  as 
Christian,  and  against  which  the  mighty  Greek 
protest,  Neo-Platonism,  will  rise  and  struggle 
with  a  new-born  energy  lasting  hundreds  of  years. 
Origen  was  a  contemporary  of  Plotinus,  and  both 
probably  attended  at  Alexandria  the  School  of 
Ammonius  Saccas,  from  which  the  two  chief  spir- 
itual tendencies  of  the  future  gush  forth,  as  two 
opposite  streams  from  a  single  fountain-head. 

But  the  separative,  unregulated  condition  of 
Religion,  which  is  the  character  of  the  Gnosis,  is 
now  to  be  united,  formulated  and  organized, 
whereby  a  universal  creed  is  established  and  a 
universal  church  becomes  possible. 

3.  Dogma.  The  general  principle  of  Dog- 
matism has  already  appeared  in  the  preceding 
Theoretic  Movement  of  Hellenisticism,  in 
which  the  doctrines  of  the  antecedent  philoso- 
phers (especially  Plato  and  Aristotle)  were  still 
further  unfolded,  applied,  and  formulated.  In 
the  present  epoch  the  Christain  doctrine  will  de- 
velop for  a  century  from  Origen  (185-254  A. 
D.)  in  whom  the  Dogma  becomes  explicit  and 
organic  till  Athanasius  (298-373)  through 
whom  chiefly  the  Dogma  becomes  authoritative, 
the  universal  creed  of  Christendom,  mainly  by 
means  of  the  Council  of  Nice  (325). 

It  was  this  Council  which  defined  the  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity  for  the  Christian  world,  which  doc- 
trine turned  chiefly  upon  the  nature  of  the  Son, 


THE  TiELIGIOUS  MOVEMENT.  573 

declaring  it  to  be  of  like  essence  {homoousios)  to 
that  of  the  Father.  The  Logos  (or  Son)  is  not 
the  Demiurge,  not  an  intermediate  being,  who  is 
inferior,  who  is  not  eternal,  not  able  to  com- 
municate an  adequate  knowledge  of  God :  so 
Athanasius  contended  against  Arius,  whose  tend- 
ency was  to  relapse  to  Platonic  Heathenism. 
On  the  other  hand,  Sabellius  had  the  tendency  to 
relapse  to  purely  monotheistic  Hebraism,  but  the 
creative  power  of  the  world  was  no  longer  to  be 
the  Father  immediately.  There  is  a  very  im- 
portant distinction  between  genesis  and  creation ; 
the  Father  generates  the  Son  of  like  essence,  but 
the  Son  creates  the  world  of  different  essence. 
Eeally  the  Son  is  both  created  and  creating, 
recreating  the  Father  who  would  not  be  Father 
without  the  Son ;  the  latter  is  thereby  the  total 
process  in  Himself.  This  process,  taken  by 
itself  and  formulated,  becomes  the  doctrine  of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  which  is  dogmatically  enounced, 
though  not  yet  fully  defined,  at  Nice. 

Herewith  the  Religious  Movement  of  Hellenis- 
ticisni  has  revealed  itself  as  the  process  of  the 
Absolute  Self,  which  has  finall}^  formulated  itself 
in  the  Christain  Dogma.  Thus  it  has  become 
the  Law  of  Faith,  enforced  by  authority,  first  of 
the  Religious  Institution  (Church),  and  then  of 
the  political  Institution  (State).  From  subjec- 
tive Faith  (Pistis)  it  has  unfolded  through  science 
(Gnosis)  till  it  has   become    objective  in  its  own 


574         ANCIENT  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

formulated  Law  and  Institution.  So  we  recollect 
that  subjective  Ethics  (in  the  preceding  Prac- 
tical Movement)  rose  to  objective  authority  in 
the  Roman  Law  and  State.  Both  the  latter  are 
novv  to  re-enforce  and  support  the  Religious 
Movement  as  established  by  the  Dogma.  At 
this  point,  then,  one  epoch  of  Religion  ends 
and  another  begins. 

Moreover,  looking  back  at  the  total  sweep  of 
the  Hellenistic  Period,  we  find  that  its  three 
Movements  (Theoretic,  Practical,  and  Religious) 
have  brought  forth  and  made  explicit  the  inner 
creative  movement  of  the  Universe  expressed  in  the 
form  of  the  Christian  Trinity.  Thus  the  triune 
process  manifests  itself  as  three  Divine  Persons, 
each  of  which  is  a  stage  of  the  total  process,  yet 
is  also  this  process  in  itself.  That  which  we 
have  called  the  Pampsychosis,  the  threefold 
psychical  movement  of  the  All,  has  assumed 
its  religious  form  and  has  become  an  object 
of    Faith,    the    basic   formula    of    Christendom. 

At  the  same  time  it  is  established  as  externally 
authoritative  in  Church  and  State,  dogmatic, 
autocratic,  hence  dominating  the  free  Ego  from 
the  outside.  That  is,  the  Pampsychosis  in  the 
shape  of  Dogma  determines  and  subjects  to  its 
outer  authority  the  Psychosis  as  individual, 
which  is  its  essence  and  which  must  also  deter- 
mine it,  as  well  as  be  determined  by  it.  Here- 
with  a    new  Religious    Movement  opens,  wdiich 


THE  liELIGIOUS  MOVEMENT.  575 

cannot  be  here  set  forth.  But  we  may  reraark 
that  this  imperial  Dogma  of  Trinity  is  destined  to 
be  the  great  educator  of  Europe  for  a  thousand 
years. 

The   progressive    movement   of  the    Hellenic 
Period  has  produced  the  Hellenistic  Period,  and 
the  latter  has  now  produced  the  Christian  Trinity 
as    a    formulated    doctrine.     This    Trinity    has 
shown   itself   as  three  Persons  and  one  Process, 
the    absolute    Process    of   the    Universe.     Not 
three  Persons  and  one  Substance  is  the  present 
formulation;   we  must   see  and  express  the  Pro- 
cess   of   the  All    as  personal.     Now  this  fact  is 
what   has  been   brought   into  the  foreground  of 
the   whole   preceding  exposition  of    Greek  Phi- 
losophy.    Every  stage  of  it  has  shown  a  process 
which   three  persons  constitute,    beginning   far 
back  in  old  Miletus,  and  culminating  in  the  three 
great  Attic  philosophers.     The  conclusion  is  that 
the   Trinity   is  the  true  outcome  of  the  progres- 
sive   movement  of  Greek  Philosophy,  and  must 
have  been   implicit   in  the  same  from  the  start. 
Hence    it  is  the  principle  by  which  this  Philoso- 
phy  is   to   be  interpreted  and  organized.     The 
Pampsychosis  is  now  conceived  as  personal,  and 
as  the  creative  ground  of  all  philosophic  Thought. 
But    next    comes    the    reaction    against   this 
expHcit   personal  principle  w'hich    is  indeed  the 
undoing    of  the  Greek  world-view  as  such.     A 
new  Period  begins,  which  shows  the  attcm})t  to 


576        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

return  to  the  first  Hellenic  Philosophy,  and  to 
restore  it  as  the  vital  power  of  a  new  era.  This 
is  our  next  task. 


CHAPTER    THIRD.  — THE    NEO-HEL- 
LENIG  PERIOD. 

Such  is  the  name  we  give  to  the  new  Period 
instead  of  calling  it  Neo-Platonism,  which  is  its 
ordinary  designation.  For  it  is  not  simply  an 
attempt  lo  rejuvenate  Plato,  or  to  go  back  to 
the  study  of  his  works,  but  it  is  a  return  to  the 
total  Hellenic  Period  from  beginning  to  end, 
and  includes  all  the  great  Greek  philosophers. 
Aristotle  has  quite  as  much  influence  as  Plato 
upon  Neo-Hellenism ;  Pythagoras  and  the  Stoics 
are  very  important  factors.  But  this  is  not  all : 
the  present  movement  reaches  back,  as  we  shall 
see,  to  the  very  starting-point  of  Greek  Think- 
ing, which  it  in  its  final  effort  tries  to  recover. 

37  (577) 


578         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPEY. 

It  will  seek  to  return  to  that  primal  unity  of 
Thought  and  Being,  of  the  individual  and  the 
universal,  from  v^hich  Hellenic  Philosophy  sets 
out.  Neo-Platonism  we  have  had  all  along, 
especially  at  Alexandria  during  the  Hellenistic 
Period.  The  early  Christian  Thinkers  were  Neo- 
Platonists ;  so  were  the  learned  Jews  of  Alex- 
andria, where  seemingly  all  Oriental  religions 
had  a  tendency  to  Plato nize. 

The  inadequacy  of   the  term    Neo-Platonism 
for  the  present   movement  has   been  very  gene- 
rally recognized  by  modern  Historians  of  Philos- 
ophy.    Even    ancient   Porphyry,    who   was   the 
friend  and  pupil  of  Plotinus,  and  who  edited  the 
latter's  writings,  acknowledged  in  them  Stoical 
elements,  and  particularly  emphasized  the  influ- 
ence of  Aristotle's  Metaphysics  (see  his  life  of 
Plotinus  c.  14).     It  is  true,   however,  that  Plo- 
tinus is  devoted  to  Plato,  and  evidently  regards 
him  as  master.     But  that  Plotinus  transcended 
the  Master,  and  in  the  deepest  matter  ran  coun- 
ter to  him,  becomes  evident  in  studying  the  Plo- 
tinian  Philosophy.     Neo-Hellenism  is  not   then 
an  imitation  or  reproduction  of   Plato;   if  such 
were  the  case,  it  would  not  be  an  original  system 
of  Thought.     Nor  is  it  an  imitation  or  reproduc- 
tion of  the  total  Hellenic  Period,  for  the  same 
reason.     It  is,  indeed,  a  return  to  Hellenism,  yet 
is  also  its  opposite.     In  general,  Hellenism  is  a 
forward  movement,   Neo-Hellenism  a   backward 


THE  NEO-RELLENIC  PERIOD.  579 

movement;  their  movements  are,  therefore,  con- 
tradictory at  bottom.  Hence  we  shall  see  that 
Neo-Hellenism  on  its  negative  side  counteracts 
and  neutralizes  in  principle  all  that  Hellenism 
has  done.  But  just  this  is  the  winding  up  and 
completion  of  Greek  Philosophy,  whereby  it  be- 
comes a  well-rounded,  finished  totality,  unique 
of  its  kind  in  the  spiritual  achievements  of  the 
race.  The  cycle  of  Greek  Philosophy  is  fulfilled 
by  Neo-Hellenism,  which  has,  therefore,  to  join 
together  the  last  and  the  first,  to  push  forward 
to  a  conclusion  which  goes  back  and  interlinks 
with  the  starting-point.  Thus  the  movement  of 
the  Thought  of  Hellas  with  its  three  Periods 
completes  itself. 

So   we  shall    here  persist  in  using   the   term 
Neo-Hellenic   for  the  present  Period  as  far  more 
definite  and   far  more  suggestive  of  its  true  pur- 
port.    To  be  sure  we    have    already  employed 
the  word   JS'eo-Platonic  in  a  general  way,  as   the 
one  in  common  use  and   therefore  more  intelli- 
gible on   the  spot.     But  now  we   must   employ 
more  accurate   terms  for   the  sake  of   the  more 
precise   thought   which  is  at  present  our  object. 
There  need  be  no  confusion  if  both  words  are 
used  in   the   right   place  and   in  the  right   way. 
1.  If   we  wish  to  grasp,  as  nearly  as  possible, 
the    definite    time    and    place    at   which    Neo- 
Hellenism  shows  itself  a  distinct   Movement   as 
against  Hellenisticism,  we  must  turn  to  Alexan- 


580         ANCIENT  ETJBOFE AN  PHILOSOPHY. 

dria  in  the  second  quarter  of  the  third  century 
A.  D.  In  fact  we  may  well  point  to  the  School 
of  Ammonius  Saccas  as  the  very  source  from 
which  proceeds  the  grand  bifurcation  of  the 
Hellenistic  Period  into  two  streams,  the  Chris- 
tian and  the  Neo-Hellenic,  each  of  them  being 
represented  by  a  great,  epoch-making  thinker  — 
Origen  the  Christian,  and  Plotinus  the  Neo- 
Hellenist.  Both  were  pupils  of  Ammonius,  not 
indeed  at  the  same  time,  for  Origen  quit  Alexan- 
dria in  232  A.  D.,  the  year  Plotinus  entered  the 
School  of  Ammonius. 

Of  this  Ammonius  very  little  is  known.  Por- 
phyry (in  his  Life  of  Plotinus)  gives  some  facts 
about  him  which  are  significant.  He  seems  not 
to  have  left  any  writings,  and  he  made  his  pupils 
promise  not  to  publish  his  opinions,  though  evi- 
dently they  had  the  right  of  teaching  these 
opinions  orally.  After  several  pupils  had  broken 
their  promise,  Plotinus  broke  his  too,  or  at  least 
broke  his  silence,  and  began  to  write,  but  not  until 
many  years  had  elapsed.  Then  he  started  to 
compose  his  Enneads,  for  which  act  Philosophy 
will  always  be  thankful.  It  is  strange  that 
Plotinus  seldom  if  ever  mentions  his  master  by 
name ;  very  different  is  Plato's  treatment  of 
Socrates.  Still  Ave  may  note  in  Plotinus  a  dis- 
inclination to  speak  of  persons,  even  when  he  is 
discussing  their  doctrines.  We  find  that  Plato, 
upon   whose    writings  he  so  often  falls  back,  is 


THE  NEO-  HELLENIC  PERIOD.  58 1 

not  always  cited  by  name.  The  individual  was 
worthless  in  the  eyes  of  Plotinus,  he  was  to  be 
re-absorbed,  was  to  get  rid  of  himself  by  return- 
ing to  the  One,  even  in  this  life.  So  Plotinus, 
in  accord  with  his  doctrine,  "  seemed  to  be 
ashamed  of  his  being  in  a  body,"  and  more 
deeply  still  contemned  his  own  Self.  Hence  he 
appears  to  shun  any  glorification  of  the  indi- 
vidual, of  his  individual  teacher  Ammonius,  and 
even  of  his  master,  the  divine  Plato.  Not  in- 
gratitude but  conviction  we  may  see  in  his  scant 
mention  of  his  great  predecessors  in  Philosophy. 
It  is  further  stated  of  Ammonius  that  he  was 
born  of  Christian  parents  in  humble  life,  but 
that  he,  studying  Greek  Philosophy,  renounced 
his  faith  and  returned  to  the  Hellenic  Gods. 
This  fact  is  characteristic,  as  is  the  further  state- 
ment that  in  his  teachins;  he  souo-ht  to  show  the 
fundamental  unity  of  doctrine  in  both  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  In  his  school  he  seems  to  have 
adopted  something  similar  to  the  Pythagorean 
Askesis.  From  these  hints  we  see  that  Ammo- 
nius sought  to  return  to  Hellenism,  especially 
to  Hellenic  Philosophy' .  But  long  before  him, 
the  same  movement  was  fermenting  in  the  spirit 
of  the  time.  We  catch  its  struggles  in  Philo, 
in  the  Gnostics,  especially  in  Numenius,  from 
whom  cavilers  said  that  Plotinus  had  plagiar- 
ized his  Philosophy.  This  is,  of  course,  false, 
since  Plotinus  is  as  original  as  any  philosopher 


582         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  ever  lived ;  still  the  charge  indicates  that  he 
came  forth  only  i  n  the  fullness  of  a  long  preced- 
ing evolution,  which  had  given  many  signs  of 
the  new  thought. 

So  we  may  conclude  that  in  the  little  school  of 
master  Ammonius  Saccas,  seemingly  insignifi- 
cant in  the  great  bustling  city  of  Alexandria, 
full  of  commercial  life,  and  particularly  full  of 
religious  and  philosophical  feuds,  began  distinct- 
ly that  prophetic  Parting  of  the  Ways,  the  one 
leading  forward  through  Christian  Origen  to  the 
future  of  Europe,  the  other  leading  backward 
through  heathen  Plotinus  to  the  past  of  Hellas, 
the  one  being  essentially  a  progressive  and  the 
other  a  regressive  movement. 

II.  In  this  manner  we  bring  before  ourselves 
the  bifurcation  of  Hellenisticism,  which  is  also 
its  conclusion.  Seeking  for  the  deeper  ground 
of  these  movements,  we  find  that  Origen  first 
decisively  formulates  the  Will,  the  divinely 
creative  Will,  as  the  source  of  the  world  and 
man,  though  this  creative  activity  he  posits  as 
eternal.  Secondly,  he  proclaims  Christ  as  the 
only  begotten  Son  of  God,  generated  not  pro- 
duced or  emanated.  Thus  the  Universal  individ- 
ualizes itself  in  a  Person  who  is  the  universal  indi- 
vidual. Thirdly,  Origen  proclaims  the  Trinity  as 
personal;  the  absolute  process  of  the  Universe  is 
triune  and  is  composed  of  three  Divine  Persons. 
Thus  Origen  organizes  Christianity,  and  lays  the 


TEE  NEO-HELLENIQ  PEBIOD.  583 

foundation  of  Christian  Theology,  and  with  it  of 
the  Church. 

Every  one  of  these  three  doctrines  Neo-Hellen- 
isiu  controverted,  reacting  against  them  prima- 
rily by  a  return  to  philosophic  Hellenism,  which, 
however,  it  transcended.  It  sought  to  conceive 
God  as  supra-personal,  as  the  pure  Universal  which 
swallows  up  the  individual.  It  w^ould  not  think 
of  God  begetting  a  Son  like  unto  Himself,  that 
were  the  deepest  divine  degradation  for  those 
who  were  ashamed  of  their  bodies  and  of  their 
selfhood.  The  great  ethical  function  of  the 
individual  in  Neo-Platonism  is  to  get  rid  of 
himself  by  becoming  one  with  the  One,  and  van- 
ishing as  a  self-conscious  individual  or  person. 
But  to  make  God  a  person,  whose  first  duty  is  to 
cancel  personality,  could  only  be  for  the  Neo- 
Hellenist  unphilosophical  or  even  blasphemous. 
On  the  contrary,  Christianity  is  fundamentally 
personal,  making  God  a  person  and  the  father 
of  a  person.  The  infinite  stress  is  upon  the 
salvation  of  the  individual  and  not  his  absorption. 

Plotinus  has  left  a  considerable  record  of  this 
early  separation  and  antagonism  between  the 
Christians  and  Neo-Platonists,  in  a  treatise 
(^Ennead  II.,  Book  9)  which  Porphyry  entities 
"Against  the  Gnostics,"  though  the  Gnostics 
are  not  mentioned  in  it,  nor  is  any  sect  named, 
as  is  the  custom  of  Plotinus.  But  a  careful 
reading    of   the  treatise  shows  clearly  that  it  is 


584         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

directed  ao-ainst  the  leadiuo;  doctrines  of  the 
Christians,  both  Gnostic  and  Catholic.  There 
is  a  decided  polemic  poured  forth  upon  the  idea 
of  the  Christ.  Pk)tinus  with  an  aristocratic 
disdain  reprobates  the  custom  of  saying  to  every 
common  man  "  Thou  art  the  son  of  God." 
Who  could  have  spoken  such  a  sentence,  but  a 
Christian?  And  "  thou  art  better  than  the  Heaven 
itself  "  with  its  sun  and  stars.  Plotinus  deems 
it  not  proper  to  say  that  the  soul  of  the  vilest 
man  is  immortal  and  divine.  Who  could  have 
asserted  that?  Many  other  passages  show  the 
philosopher's  protest  against  the  worth  of  the 
individual,  especially  if  he  be  of  the  common 
herd.  In  theae  statements,  some  of  which  still 
retain  the  heat  of  discussion,  Ave  can  doubtless 
hear  an  echo  of  the  controversies  in  the  Alexan- 
drian School  of  Ammonius. 

In  the  same  treatise  Plotinus  reveals  his  ten- 
dency to  go  back  to  "  the  doctrines  of  those 
ancient  and  divine  men,"  the  old  Hellenic  phi- 
losophers. Again  he  grows  warm  in  reproving 
the  arrogance  of  those  who  claim  to  have  a  new 
light  surpassing  that  of  the  Wise  Men  of  all 
heathendom,  and  "  who  defame  and  insolently 
assail  the  opinions  of  the  Greeks."  Great  is 
the  philosopher's  indignation,  though  he  men- 
tions no  names ;  over  and  over  again  his  aristo- 
cratic coiitein[)t  breaks  out  against  those  "  wiio 
are  willing   to   call  the  lowest  of  mankind  their 


THE  NEO-HELLENIC  PEEIOD.  685 

brethren."  Just  here  indeed  lies  the  great  dis- 
tinction which  causes  the  open  split  in  the  Hel- 
lenistic Period.  Shall  the  return  to  God  save  the 
individual  or  destroy  him?  Neo-Hellenisui  de- 
clares that  he  must  go  back  and  be  re-absorbed  in 
the  source  whence  he  came.  Hellenisticism, 
with  its  doctrine  of  individualizing  the  Universal, 
has  unfolded  to  the  point  of  individualizing,  that 
is,  humanizing  even  God,  having  made  Him  a 
man.  But  at  this  point  Neo-Hellenism  separates 
from  the  Hellenistic  stream,  rising  up  in  a  mighty 
swell  and  rolling  back  to  the  fountain-head  of 
Greek  Philosophy.  It  will  continue  this  return- 
ing current  with  a  surprising  vitality,  seeking  a 
restoration  of  Hellenic  Thought,  but  in  reality 
accomplishing  something  very  different. 

HI.  The  Neo-Hellenic  Period  lasted  about 
300  years,  if  we  reckon  from  its  beginning  in 
Alexandria  to  the  close  of  the  School  of  Athens 
(529  A.  D.).  This  is  nearly  the  same  in  length 
of  time  as  the  Hellenic  Period  to  which  it  is  a  re- 
turn. All  these  years  it  was  engaged  in  a  life- 
and-death  struggle  with  Christianity,  gradually 
losing  its  hold  upon  the  world  till  at  last  it  suc- 
-  cumbed,  or  rather  was  knocked  in  the  head  by 
the  emperor  Justinian. 

It  was  indeed  a  sad  time,  in  which  all  men, 
both  Christian  and  Heathen,  were  overwhelmed 
with  a  feeling  of  decadence,  which  sprang  from 
a  civilization  going  to  pieces.     In  this  decline  and 


586         ANCIENT  E  UEOPEAN  PHIL  O SOPHY. 

fall  of  a  world  man  felt  himself  utterly  helpless, 
and  in  a  kind  of  terror  turned  for  external  aid  to 
the  higher  powers,  being  ready  to  believe  almost 
anything,  if  it  promised  assistance.  Even  intel- 
ligence was  no  bulwark  against  the  superstitious 
dread  of  the  grand  collapse  which  everybody  felt 
to  be  coming.  The  philosopher,  who  ought  to  be 
the  last  person  to  be  terrorized,  though  caught 
in  thecatacly  ?m  of  the  Universe,  yielded  and  be- 
came panicky  along  with  the  common  mass.  For 
the  Neo-Hellenic  Period  was  one  long  panic  of 
the  whole  Greco-Eoman  wo  rid  fleeing  for  shelter 
with  prayers,  incantations,  ceremonies,  invoca- 
tions to  every  imaginable  sort  of  supernatural 
beings  against  the  impending  Crack  of  Doom.  In 
this  universal  scare  Christian  and  Heathen  equally 
participated,  being  equally  threatened  when  the 
whole  edifice  of  antiquity,  in  which  they  all  were 
still  living,  was  toppling  over  their  heads. 

In  this  way  we  account  for  a  peculiar  element 
in  Neo-Hellenism :  the  crass  superstition  which 
weaves  through  it  from  beginning  to  end,  in  the 
shape  of  demons  and  devils  and  spirits  and  spooks 
in  infinite  quantity  and  gradation  up  to  the  gods, 
who  are  likewise  of  all  conditions  and  tribes  and 
nations.  Now  such  a  tendency  is  directly  the 
opposite  of  the  Hellenic  Period,  which  starts  in 
the  clear  sunrise  of  Intelligence  and  grows  brighter 
and  brighter  till  the  noon  of  Athenian  Universal- 
ism.     But  the  Neo-Hellenic   Period   moves  the 


THE  NEO-HELLENIC  PEBIOD.  587 

other  way ;  tlie  night-side  of  human  spirit  grows 
darker  and  darker  from  Plotinus  to  Jamblichus 
and  Proclus,  till  at  last  the  philosophic  hght  of 
Hellas  sinks  down  forever.  Thus  the  return  to 
Hellenism  in  this  as  in  so  many  other  cases 
is  not  progressive,  but  regressive ;  the  day  of 
Greek  Philosophy  is  indeed  advancing,  yet  not 
from  dawn  to  noon,  but  from  afternoon  to 
darkness. 

Still  we  must  admire  the  desperate  valor  of 
those  thinkers  who  refused  to  give  up  their  old 
world,  but  sought  to  get  back  to  it  again  through 
a  rejuvenation  of  its  Philosophy.  They  were  the 
romanticists  of  their  age,  and  have  nourished  the 
romanticism  of  all  times,  which  generally  is  seek- 
ing to  restore  some  lost  ideal.  We  recollect  that 
Schelling,  the  philosopher  of  the  last  centurj^'s 
German  romanticism,  received  no  small  part  of 
his  intellectual  food  from  Neo-Hellenism. 
Though  the  old  heathen  life  of  Hellas  w^as  felt  to 
be  giving  away,  many  of  the  choicest  spirits  of 
this  period  made  a  strong,  fresh  endeavor  to  re- 
store that  antique  power,  originality  and  happi- 
ness which  still  irradiated  the  clouds  that  overcast 
their  heaven.  At  iirst,  indeed,  the  State  was  on 
their  side,  but  gradually  it  went  over  to  their 
enemies,  and  finally  gave  them  the  fatal  blow. 

IV.  The  outer  topographical  movement  of  Neo- 
Hellenism  is  seen  again  to  be  essentially  centri- 
petal,   as  was    the  first  Hellenic  Period,  whose 


588         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

sweep  we  have  already  noted,  starting  from  the 
Greek  borderhiud  and  concentrating  finally  at 
Athens.  In  a  similar  manner  the  Neo-Hellenic 
idea  begins  at  Alexandria  in  the  south,  then 
comes  to  Rome  in  the  west  in  the  person  of 
Plotinus,  then  leaps  to  Syria  in  the  east  to  the 
school  of  Jamblichus,  and  finally  reaches  the  cen- 
ter, Athens,  for  the  last  years  of  activity,  dying 
in  the  same  city  where  Philosophy  first  concen- 
trated itself  for  its  highest  effort  nearly  a  thou- 
sand years  before.  In  one  sense,  however,  Neo- 
Hellenism  did  not  die,  and  is  not  yet  dead,  for 
it  is  still  an  influence,  a  spirit  which  stirs  to-day 
kindred  souls  to  adopt  its  doctrines. 

On  the  contrary,  the  Hellenistic  movement 
was  centrifugal,  going  forth  from  Athens  to  the 
borders  of  the  civilized  world  east,  west,  north 
and  south.  Hellenisticism  had  a  missionary 
function,  it  carried  Greek  Philosophy  far  beyond 
the  periphery  of  Hellas  to  the  very  rim  of  the 
Roman  Empire  where  it  touched  outlying  bar- 
barism. In  this  work  it  had  spent  several  cen- 
turies, seeking  to  give  itself  to  all  men  of  all 
nations,  But  its  chief  product  was  the  new  uni- 
versal Religion,  Christianity, 

But  now  to  this  vast  outward  sweep  of  expan- 
sion succeeds  a  fresh  concentration,  in  which 
Greek  Philosophy  seeks  to  return  to  its  first  cen- 
tralizing, unifying  tendency,  and  to  save  itself 
from  its   own  child.     Indeed,  as  Hellenism  un- 


THE  NEO-IIELLEmC  PERIOD.  589 

folded  itself  into  this  expansion,  Neo-Hellenism 
must  get  back  of  it  and  negate  just  the  preceding 
evolution  which  has  been  revealed  as  its  very 
nature.  Such  a  principle  we  shall  find  in  the 
One  of  Plotinus,  which  is  beyond  Reason,  beyond 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  even  if  it  can  be  shown  to 
be  implicitly  in  them  at  times.  But  really  it  is 
an  Oriental  religious  inheritance,  which  Neo- 
Hellenism  probably  received  from  Philo  the  Jew. 
The  philosophic  Norm  has  gone  outside  of  itself 
for  its  highest  principle,  having  no  longer  the 
controlhng  power  over  itself  within  itself.  Phi- 
losophy is  not  autonomous,  not  truly  self-deter- 
mined in  Neo-Hellenism,  but  invokes  a  supra- 
rational,  indeed  supra-philosophical  energy  to 
come  down  and  rule  its  world.  In  other  words 
Neo-Hellenism  is  autocratic,  absolutistic,  im- 
perial like  its  age. 

The  fact  that  the  Neo-Hellenic  movement, 
even  in  its  outward  topographical  sweep,  is  cen- 
tripetal, can  now  be  seen  to  be  deeply  consonant 
with  the  social  and  institutional  character  of  the 
time.  The  Roman  Emperor  was  likewise  the 
absolute  One  in  whom  all  was  concentrated;  he 
was,  too,  a  God,  in  whom  all  lesser  deities  of 
tribe  and  nation  vanished,  before  whom  all  indi- 
viduals were  as  stubble  in  the  fire.  Verily  he 
was  the  Universal  individualized  in  a  being  whose 
universality  was  all-absorbing.  The  negative 
might  of  Neo-Hellenism  against   the    individual 


590        ANCIENT  E  UliOPEAN  PHIL OSOPHi*. 

received  its  living,  practical  illustration  in  such  a 
supreme  ruler.  Indeed  the  Roman  Emperor  as 
individual  was  liable  to  be  destroyed  by  another 
stronger  individual  during  the  whole  Neo-Hellenic 
Period.  Some  mio-htier  beins:  seemed  to  hover 
above  every  Emperor  as  person,  often  swooping 
down  and  devourins;  him  after  a  little  brief 
authority.  The  One  of  the  Neo-Hellenic  world 
would  appear  to  tolerate  no  individual,  not  even 
an  Emperor.  Thus  it  swallowed  its  own  personal 
representatives  one  after  another  with  great 
rapidity.  Think  of  what  passed  before  the  eyes 
of  Plotinus  at  Rome.  Gallienus  the  Roman 
Emperor  was  his  friend ;  he  saw  that  friend, 
after  having  reached  the  throne  by  destroying 
other  pretenders,  destroyed  in  turn  by  Claudius 
who  succeeded  him,  but  who  was  soon  followed 
by  Aurelian,  in  the  year  of  the  death  of  Plotinus. 
So  the  time  reveals  an  all-devouring  One  above 
the  individual,  even  the  highest,  above  Emperors, 
who  seem  to  be  its  choicest  food. 

Thus  Greek  Philosophy  returns  to  Athens  for 
its  last  years,  after  making  the  circuit  of  the 
Roman  Empire  lying  around  Hellas.  We  are 
again  reminded  of  the  vortex,  of  the  peripheral 
movement  of  the  First  Period  and  the  final 
flight  to  the  Athenian  center.  But  Athens  was 
in  a  very  different  condition  at  that  former 
time.  Then  it  was  independent,  autonomous, 
the  center  of  the  Will  and  also  of  the  Intellect 


THE  NE  0  -  HELLENIC  rERIOD.  5  9 1 

of  the  Hellenic  world.  But  now  its  power  and 
its  freedom  as  well  as  its  spirit  are  gone;  it 
receives  its  law  not  from  itself  but  from  an 
external  authority.  Thus  Neo-Hellenism  does 
not  return  to  Hellenic  Athens,  to  the  Athens  of 
Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle.  These  were  the 
marvelous  product  of  the  Athenian  City-State, 
the  children  of  its  free  comiiumal  life.  Athens 
then  could  give  birth  to  its  own  philosophers. 
But  the  Neo-Hellenists  come  to  it  from  the  out- 
side, they  are  not  its  mighty  progeny.  Athens 
is  now  but  a  tomb  out  of  which  they  seek  to  raise 
the  dead.  But  their  philosophic  fate  is  to  die  on 
that  tomb  themselves,  and  they  only  bring 
Philosophy  back  to  expire  in  its  own  birthplace. 
Thus  the  return  of  Neo-Hellenism  to  Athens  is 
just  the  opposite  of  the  first,  in  which  the  city 
was  determined  from  within,  while  in  this  it  is 
determined  from  without,  by  an  external  power. 
Neo-Hellenism  was  philosophically  the  bearer  of 
that  supernal  One,  which  was  already  over  it 
politically,  and  which  had  absorbed  its  essence, 
its  individuality.  Such  a  doctrine  do  these  late 
philosophers  bring  to  Athens  —  a  doctrine  which 
heralds  its  own  dissolution  as  well  as  that  of  its 
disciples. 

V.  But  who  were  these  ardent  disciples  seek- 
ing to  restore  that  primal  Hellenic  Philosophy, 
and  even  to  bring  it  back  to  its  first  home?  The 
curious  fact  comes  to  light  that  the  most  impor- 


592         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tantof  them  were  not  Athenians,  not  even  Greeks, 
jes,  not  even  Aryans  apparently.  Ammonius 
Saccas  the  founder  of  Neo-Phitonism  was  an 
Egyptian,  judging  by  his  name;  so  wasPlotinus. 
Jamblichus  and  Porphyry,  coming  next  in  time 
and  importance,  were  Syrians.  Proclus,  the  last 
great  light  of  Neo-Hellenism,  was  born  of  parents 
who  came  from  Lycian  Xanthus  in  Asia  Minor. 
These  are  the  greatest  names  —  all  of  them 
Orientals,  though  Hellenized.  As  Greek  culture 
once  went  to  the  Orient  with  Alexander  and 
deeply  transformed  it,  so  now  the  Orient  will 
return  to  the  Greco-Roman  world,  seeking  to 
restore  that  original  Hellenic  spirit  which  has 
given  so  freely  of  itself  to  the  East. 

Still  this  is  not  a  Greek  love  of  Greece,  but  an 
Oriental  love  of  Greece ;  it  is  not  an  Hellenic 
return  to  Hellas,  but  an  Oriental  return.  And 
just  in  this  last  fact  lies  the  originality  of  Neo- 
Hellenism,  which  will  have  in  it  a  new  strand 
coming  from  the  Orient,  and  so  will  not  be  and 
cannot  be  a  more  repetition  or  imitation  of  Hel- 
lenism. The  Supreme  One  above  Reason,  which 
is  the  highest  principle  of  Neo-Hellenism,  is 
distinctly  non-Hellenic,  we  may  say,  anti-Hel- 
lenic. Without  doubt  it  developed  in  the  Hel- 
lenistic Period,  but  from  Orientals.  For  instance, 
the  dj'uamic  pantheism  of  the  One  is  derived 
from  the  Stoics,  whose  founder  Zeuo  and  whose 
chief  Scholarchs  came  from  the  Orient.      On  the 


THE  NEO-HELLEmC  PERIOD.  593 

other  hand,  the  Oue  as  supra-rational  is  found  in 
the  Jew  Philo,  who  also  has  the  idea  of  ecstasy 
whereby  the  individual  returns  to  an  unconscious 
unity  with  the  One.  Neo-Hellenism  will  com- 
bine these  doctrines  with  Hellenic  Philosophy, 
making  a  new  and  distinct  Philosophy,  far  more 
original  than  that  of  the  purely  Platonic  or  Peri- 
patetic Schools,  more  original  than  any  system 
of  Thought  that  arose  durino;  the  Hellenistic 
Period.  Creative  Thinking  shows  itself  once 
more  and  celebrates  a  second  birth.  Plotinus  is 
properly  to  be  placed  with  Plato  and  Aristotle 
as  the  third  among  the  greatest  Greek  philoso- 
phers, who  have  organized  their  Thought  and 
set  it  down  in  writing. 

So  it  was  not  the  Greek  personally  who  was 
the  bearer  of  Greek  Philosophy  in  its  final  stage 
of  return  upon  itself,  but  the  Oriental.  The 
Greek  philosopher  proper  had  done  his  work  in 
the  Hellenic  Period,  which  through  him  had 
advanced  into  Hellenisticism.  He  seemingly 
could  not  reverse  himself ;  he  might  repeat  his 
progressive  movement  in  the  Schools,  but  he 
could  not  become  regressive  and  run  counter  to 
his  own  philosophic  evolution.  Yet  this  is  what 
a  return  meant,  what  it  had  to  do.  Greek 
thought  had,  therefore,  to  take  possession  of  an 
Oriental  mind  in  order  to  fulfill  itself,  and  com- 
plete   its    cycle.       Having    gone    forth    to    the 

38 


594        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Orient,    it   could  not  get   back  except  through 
Orient. 

VI.  There  is  a  strong  negative  element  in  Neo- 
Platonism,  which  places  the  One,  the  grand  ob- 
ject of  attainment,  above  all  reason,  all  know- 
ing, all  consciousness.  This,  of  course,  denies 
not  only  science,  but  even  the  possibility  of 
the  same ;  it  denies  the  scientific  results  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  while  going  back  to  them  and 
treating  them  as  a  kind  of  Bible.  Hellenistic 
skepticism  lurks  in  the  very  fiber  of  Neo-Hellen- 
ism ;  though  there  is  the  return  to  the  Hellenic 
Period,  Plotinus  and  his  followers  must  carry 
back  with  themselves  the  knowledge  of  its  de- 
cline. Plato  and  Aristotle  did  not  save  Greece, 
or  the  Greco-Roman  life ;  there  was  some  power 
over  them  which  made  them  instruments  in  the 
evanishment  of  their  own  world.  The  Neo- 
Hellenist,  therefore,  even  while  studying  his 
philosophical  Bible,  cannot  help  having  the  con- 
sciousness of  an  energy  mightier  than  the 
mightiest  philosoj)hers  —  an  energy  transcending 
their  science  and  all  science.  Yet  this  potency 
unknown  (for  it  is  above  knowledge),  indeter- 
minate, but  all-powerful,  he  must  somehow  reach 
and  participate  in,  otherwise  he  loses  the  whole 
purpose  of  his  return.  The  latter  must  lead  him 
to  what  lies  beyond  it  and  determines  it  —  to  the 
Supreme  One   beyond  Thought,  and  hence  be- 


THE  NEO-HELLENIC  PERIOD.  o9o 

yond  Hellenism,  yet  the  secret  power  producing 
the  same. 

Thus  the  skeptical  element  of  Hellenisticism 
will  not  be  wantini?  to  the  Neo-Hellenic  move- 
ment.  Still  this  is  not  the  bitter  Pyrrhonic 
skepticism  which  denies  all  authority  and  all 
truth.  Nco-IIelleni.sm  will  have  its  authoritative 
canonical  books,  its  Bible,  as  already  stated. 
Such  a  characteristic  it  could  also  have  derived 
from  religious  Hellenisticism,  especially  from 
Philo  who  took  the  Hebrew  Bible  as  supreme 
authority  even  for  Philosophy.  But  in  the  pres- 
ent case  Philosophy  furnishes  its  own  Bible,  the 
Hellenic  one,  made  up  of  the  writings  of  the  old 
Greek  philosophers,  especially  of  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle. 

From  these  statements  we  see  that  Neo-Hel- 
lenism  bears  in  it  both  a  positive,  preservative 
principle,  and  also  a  negative,  destructive  prin- 
ciple toward  the  world  to  which  it  returns.  In 
the  first  case  it  appropriates  and  affirms,  in  the 
second  case  it  transcends  and  so  denies  as  ulti- 
mate, the  Ideas  of  Plato  and  the  Thought-think- 
ing-Thought  of  Aristotle.  In  like  manner  it 
shows  both  a  positive  and  negative  attitude 
toward  the  world  from  which  it  departs,  the 
Hellenistic.  With  the  Christian  the  Neo-Hellen- 
ist  affirms  the  supra-rational  One,  and  accepts  a 
biblical  authority;  but  in  opposition  to  the 
Christian  he  denies  the  personality  of   the  One 


596         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  its  process,  and  scouts  the  biblical  authority 
of  the  New  Testament. 

VII.  The  absolute  autocracy  of  Neo-Platon- 
ism  has  been  already  touched  upon  and  c©nsti- 
tutes  one  of  its  most  striking  characteristics, 
and  one  which  is  decidedly  anti- Athenian,  in 
fact  anti-Greek.  In  this  respect,  too,  the  Neo- 
Hellenic  return  runs  counter  to  Hellenism.  Still 
the  autocratic  Philosophy  is  deeply  harmonious 
with  the  institutional  environment  of  the  whole 
Neo-Hellenic Period.  The  imperial,  irresponsible, 
supra-rational  One  has  its  unquestioned  represent- 
ative in  the  political  head  of  Rome,  in  whose 
presence  the  individual  can  have  no  substantial 
being. 

The  Roman  State  was  still  heathen  when  Neo- 
Hellenism  began  in  Alexandria,  and  it  became  a 
persecutor  of  Christianity ;  but  it  changed  com- 
pletely at  the  time  of  Constantine's  conversion 
(usually  dated  312  A.  D.)  Not  Plotinus  but 
Jamblichus  saw  the  civilized  world  becoming 
Christian  in  its  political  authority.  Finally,  in 
the  last  stage  of  Neo-Hellenism,  persecution 
had  faced  about,  and  the  philosophers  in  their 
turn  felt  its  blow  coming  from  the  Christian 
State.  The  fact  is,  then,  that  Christianity  with- 
stood persecution  and  even  thrived  on  it,  while 
it  destroyed  Neo-Hellenism  as  an  active  existing 
school,  though  the  hitter's  doctrines  were  still 
studied,    and    privately    taught   and     believed. 


THE  NEO-HELLENIG  PEBIOD.  597 

But  its  power  as  an  independent  movement  was 
broken  with  the  ckjsing  of  the  School  of  Athens 
by  Justinian.  Its  teachers  were  scattered, 
though  they  did  not  fail  to  produce  an  important 
influence  upon  the  dominant  Christianity,  con- 
tributing largely  to  its  element  of  mysticism. 

The  fact  is,  the  Neo-Hellenists  never  sought 
to  improve  the  condition  of  the  Eoman  State 
when  the  latter  was  at  its  worst.  They  held 
aloof  from  pohtical  affairs,  no  reform  for  the 
betterment  of  social  conditions  is  attributed  to 
them,  no  ideal  polity  like  that  of  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle did  they  try  to  construct.  It  is  true  that 
Plotinus  is  reported  by  Porphyry  to  have  con- 
ceived a  City  of  Philosophers,  a  Platouopolis ; 
this,  however,  could  not  have  been  a  State,  but  a 
School,  a  Monastery,  a  Mount  Athos  full  of  celi- 
bates, vegetarians  and  ecstatics.  Neo-Hellenism 
is  not  institutional,  has  no  institutional  Ethics, 
except  perchance  the  shadow  of  a  pohtical  virtue, 
the  very  lowest  virtue  in  its  opinion.  It  must 
shun  the  real  world  of  sense,  and  so  it  eschewed 
politics;  it  could  not  reach  the  people  with  its 
abstract,  impersonal  One  as  God. 

In  Neo-Hellenism,  accordingly,  we  cannot  help 
finding  the  belief  that  the  Roman  State  and  in- 
deed that  the  State  as  an  Institution  was  a  failure. 
The  time  gave  only  too  nnich  confirmation  to 
such  a  belief.  But  still  dce[)er  runs  the  Neo- 
Hellenic  criticism  of  the  age,  proclaiming  that 


508        ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPH  Y. 

Europe  has  failed.  What  has  the  Greco-Roman 
civilization  produced?  Look  around  everywhere 
and  behold  a  kind  of  Inferno.  How  shall  we 
get  out  of  it?  Back,  back  to  old  Hellas,  and 
then  beyond  it  to  the  Orient.  Such  is  their 
regressive  cry,  on  the  one  side  a  gospel  of  de- 
spair, on  the  other  the  deep  necessity  of  the 
time.  The  Neo-Hellenic  Orientals  have  come 
into  Europe,  acquired  its  language,  culture  and 
civilization,  and  are  now  subjecting  the  whole 
European  world  to  their  fierce  criticism,  indirect, 
to  be  sure,  but  very  real.  Their  work  reveals 
the  disease  and  must  be  regarded  as  a  condition 
of  future  health. 

From  this  point  of  view  Neo-Hellenism  has  a 
prominent  place  in  Thought.  It  will  become 
the  nourishment  of  ideal  spirits  who  are  in  a 
state  of  protest  against  their  age  and  its  civiliza- 
tion. Hence  it  exiots  to-day.  In  Neo-Hellenism 
European  Philosophy  is  made,  by  its  own  act,  to 
reach  entirely  through  itself  and  to  get  out  of 
itself.  The  Supreme  One  is  to  be  attained  by 
the  complete  cancell'ition  of  the  European  dual- 
ism, which  dualism  is  what  Philosophy  at  bottom 
expresses,  and  by  the  very  nature  of  its  Norm  it 
can  ultimately  express  nothing  else.  Hence  Neo- 
Hellenism  becomes  extremely  interesting  and 
valuable  as  a  judgment  of  Europe  seen  in  its 
very  essence. 

Still  this  judgment  is  fundamentally  negative. 


THE  NEO-HELLENIC  PEBIOD.  ^^^ 

and  that  is  its  weakness.  Spirit  must  go  for- 
ward for  its  highest  fruition,  not  backward  — 
forward  to  the  Occident,  not  backward  to  the 
Orient.  It  must  advance  to  a  new  Discipline, 
not  retreat  to  an  old  Discipline.  Hence  Neo- 
Platonism  will  remain  good  as  a  critique  of  the 
old,  but  not  as  a  construction  of  the  new. 

Moreover  it  is  a  Philosophy  which  retires  to 
the  shelter  of  Keligion  and  still  remains  philo- 
sophical. It  seeks  to  transcend  Philosophy,  and 
yet  it  remains  Philosophy  in  the  act  of  trans- 
cendence. Thus  it  will  show  the  very  malady 
which  it  points  out  and  strives  to  remedy.  It 
to©  labors  under  the  European  dualism  of  which 
it  seeks  to  get  rid.  It  will  run  into  the  same 
trouble  from  which  it  is  a  flight.  Some  writers 
call  it  a  religion,  but  it  remains  a  philosophy  in 
spite  of  its  strong  religious  element,  which, 
indeed,  varies  a.  good  deal  among  its  different 
philosophers. 

VIII.  The  Neo-Hellenists  will  preserve  the 
philosophic  Norm  in  their  Thinking,  and  hence 
must  be  called  philosophers  even  when  they  put 
the  greatest  stress  upon  religion,  as  does  Jam- 
blichus.  Still  further  the  Neo-Hellenists  will 
have  their  own  form  of  the  philosophic  Norm, 
wherein  lies  the  distinctive  characteristic  of  their 
School.  It  is  Plotinus  who  elaborates  the  Neo- 
Hellenic  edition  of   the  philosophic  Norm,  and 


600         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

therefore    he    is  the    great  original  thinker  and 
founder  of  Neo-Hellenism. 

Tlie  movement  of  this  Tliird  Period  of  Greek 
Philosophy  groups  itself  around  three  central 
personages,  quite  as  we  saw  in  the  Athenian 
movement  of  the  First  Period.  Moreover  these 
three  central  personages  form  together  a  psy- 
chical process  which  is  the  total  sweep  of  the 
Period.  Likewise  each  philosopher  has  his  own 
individual  process  which  is  revealed  in  his 
Philosophy.  To  be  sure  there  are  many  other 
Neo-Hellenists  of  distinction  besides  these  three, 
but  in  one  way  or  other  they  range  themselves 
with  or  between  these  loftiest  summits  of  specu- 
lation, which  alone  can  be  regarded  in  the 
present  exposition. 

( 1 )  Plotinus  seeks  primarily  to  restore  Hel- 
lenic Philosophy  as  such,  though  he  does  not 
leave  out  Religion.  He  is  therefore  the  pure 
Neo-Hellenist,  and  constructs  the  philosophical 
Norm  of  his  School.  In  Plotinus  man  is  to  re- 
turn to  the  supra-rational  One  essentially  through 
Philosophy.     The  Eoman  School. 

(2)  Jamblich us  seeks  really  to  restore  Poly- 
theism, but  formally  he  makes  this  a  means  for 
his  Philosophy.  Thus  he  is  twofold,  dualistic, 
hovering  between  the  abstract  (philosophical) 
and  concrete  (religious)  elements  of  his  system. 
The  Syrian  School. 

(3)  Proclus  goes  back  to  Plotinus  and  seeks 


THE  NEO-HELLENIC  FEUIOD.  601 

to  restore  Hellenic  Philosophy,  yet  unites  with  it 
the  religious  tendency  of  Jamblichiis.  The  for- 
mal element  dominates  him,  so  that  he  has  been 
called  the  scholastic  of  Neo-Hellenism.  The 
Athenian  School. 

All  three  formulate  the  descent  of  the  soul 
into  body,  and  then  its  ethical  rise  to  the  supra- 
rational  One  in  some  form.  Inside  of  this  gen- 
eral formula,  we  are  now  to  consider  their 
individual  diversities  —  Ploiinus  being  more  the 
complete  Neo-Hellenist,  lamblichus  more  the 
Neo-Pythogoreau,  Proclus  more  the  Neo-Aris- 
totelian. 


602         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


II.  JMotinus. 

The  greatest  name  in  Greek  Philosophy  after 
the  great  Athenians  —  Socrates,  Phito  and  Aris- 
totle —  is  Plotinus.  Neo-Hellenism  as  a  perma- 
nent system  of  Thought,  which  is  still  an 
intellectual  force,  having  its  followers  and 
propagators  even  to-day,  is  his  work.  Though 
not  a  Greek,  his  keynote  is  the  restoration  of 
the  Hellenic  world.  It  is  true  that  he  more  or 
less  unconsciously  reaches  back  of  Hellenism, 
and  employs  a  first  principle  quite  unknown  to  it 
and  inconsistent  with  it ;  still  his  avowed  object 
is  a  return  to  the  old  Philosophy  of  Hellas,  that 
of  her  First  Period. 

A  good  deal  has  been  handed  down  about 
Plotinus ;  we  are  able  to  gain  a  pretty  fair 
survey  of  the  man  and  his  doctrines,  putting  him 
in  line  with  Plato  and  Aristotle,  whom  he  sought 
to  re-establish  in  their  spiritual  supremacy  with 
so  much  devotion  and  genius.  Accordingly,  we 
shall  give  an  outline  of  him  in  three  fundamental 
aspects:  his  Life,  his  Writings,  and  his  Philos- 
ophy. 

I.  His  Life.  — We  are  fortunate  in  possessing 
a  considerable  biography  of  Plotinus  written  by 
his    friend  and    pupil    Porphyry,    who    narrates 


PLOTINUS.  G03 


that  his  master  would  not  speak  of  his  birth- 
place or  of  his  origin,  as  if  he  "  were  ashamed  of 
being  in  his  body."  But  a  later  writer,  Euna- 
pius,  has  told  us  that  Plotinus  was  born  at  Ly- 
copolis  in  Egypt,  whether  of  Greek,  Semitic  or 
Egyptian  parentage  is  not  said.  As  this  Ly- 
copolis  was  probably  a  city  of  the  upper  country 
in  the  Thebaid  according  to  Creuzer,  it  is  likely 
that  Plotinus  was  of  Egyptian  blood  and  lan- 
guage. According  to  what  Porphyry  says  of 
him,  he  never  fully  mastered  the  Greek  tongue  in 
speech  or  in  writing.  The  date  of  his  birth  is 
usually  assigned  to  204  A.  D.,  though  sometimes 
it  is  placed  a  year  later. 

( 1 )  Nothing  is  told  of  his  youth  in  the  matter  of 
education,  till  he  is  brought  before  us  wandering 
about  in  Alexandria  in  search  of  a  philosopher 
who  could  speak  to  him  the  satisfying  word. 
Evidently  he  has  come  to  that  great  center  of 
learning  and  of  disputation,  impelled  by  his 
spiritual  needs .  He  passes  from  one  school  to 
another  "full  of  sorrow,"  because  of  disap- 
pointment; finally  a  friend,  to  whom  he  has  im- 
parted his  unhappy  state  of  mind,  directs  him  to 
Ammonius  Saccas.  Entering  and  listening  he  says 
to  his  companion,  "this  is  the  man  I  have  been 
hunting  for."  Some  eleven  years  he  remained 
with  Ammonius,  beginning  when  he  was  28  years 
old  (in  232  A.  D.),   studying  philosophy,  and 


604         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

doubtless  discussing  the  Ijurning  questions  of  the 
time. 

What  was  going  on  at  Alexandria  during  this 
period?  It  was  the  time  of  Origcn  (185-254) 
who  was  the  founder  of  Christian  Theology,  who 
sought  to  unite  Christian  Faith  (Pis(is)  with 
Greek  Science  (Gnosis),  making  the  latter  the 
means  for  organizing  and  upbuilding  the  super- 
structure of  Christianity.  Origen  was  born  in 
Alexandria  and  remained  there  till  232,  when  he 
was  compelled  by  religious  strife  to  leave  the  city. 
But  he  had  already  (before  228)  written  his  great 
work  on  Fundamental  Principles  (peri  archon) 
in  which  Dogmatic  Theology  first  became  a  sys- 
tem. An  interesting  fact  is  that  Orio;en  attended 
the  school  of  Ammonius  Saccas,  though  there 
was  another  person  by  the  name  of  Origen  who 
belonged  to  the  same  school  and  continued  to  be 
a  heathen.  To  the  last  there  remained  in  the 
thought  of  Orio;en  the  Christian  a  Neo-Platonic 
strain,  especially  in  his  mystic  union  of  the  soul 
with  God  through  contemplation.  But  on  the 
other  hand  he  emphasized  the  personality  of  God, 
whose  Will  was  the  source  of  the  world,  even 
though  the  latter  be  eternal. 

Now  Plotinus,  thrown  into  this  seething  mass 
of  controversies,  religious  and  philosophical,  the 
very  year  in  which  Origen  quit  Alexandria,  was 
at  the  heart  of  the  epoch  about  to  be  born,  and 
felt  its  thfoesduringthe  whole  time  of  his  school- 


PLOTINUS  605 

training.  He  may  be  said  to  have  been  present 
at  the  birth  of  Christianity  as  the  European  Re- 
ligion, with  its  personal  Trinity  theologically  for- 
mulated. Just  this  constitutes  the  germinal 
starting-point  of  his  career  of  reaction  against 
the  new  order,  and  of  his  return  to  Hellenism. 
That  school  of  Ammonius  must  have  had  many 
memories  of  the  great  Origen,  wdiich  Plotinus, 
coming  after  him,  heard  and  appropriated  in  his 
own  fashion. 

In  some  such  way  we  may  conceive  the  years 
of  instruction  (Lehiy'ahre)  of  Plotinus.  But 
the  time  comes  when  he  must  quit  school,  and  go 
forth  into  the  wide  world.  It  is  probable,  as  in 
so  many  other  cases,  that  the  pupil  of  genius  had 
learned  all  that  the  master  had  to  give  him,  and 
had  begun  to  feel  the  limits  of  his  situation. 

(2)  Accordingly  he  breaks  loose  from  Alexan- 
dria and  starts  on  his  travels.  He  is  thirty-eight 
years  of  age,  a  year  older  than  Aristotle  when 
the  latter  quit  the  school  of  Plato,  having  out- 
grown the  master,  or  at  least  having  attained  his 
own  independent  standpoint.  But  whither  will 
Plotinus  bend  his  steps?  Toward  the  East 
whose  wisdom  he  lono;s  to  drink  from  its  native 
fountains.  This  fact  is  highly  characteristic  of 
the  man ;  he  turns  away  from  the  Occident, 
which  he  deems  corrupt  and  lost,  as  it  is  slowly 
becoming  Christian,  and  he  will  go  back  to  the  dis- 


606         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tant  Orient,  to  Persia  and  India,  beyond  the  in- 
fluence of  Christianity,  for  his  truth  undefiled. 

The  Emperor  Gordian  was  making  an  expedi- 
tion against  the  Persians;  to  this  our  philosopher 
attached  himself.  But  the  campaign  turned  out 
unfortunate  and  the  Emperor  perished.  Why 
Plotinus  did  not  endeavor  to  reach  the  peaceful 
wisdom  of  the  East  through  peaceful  channels, 
we  do  not  know.  At  last  he  had  to  flee  from  the 
Orient  for  life,  and  with  difiiculty  reached  Anti- 
och  in  safety.  He  continued  his  journey  back 
to  the  Occident  till  he  reached  Rome,  this  time 
not  staying  even  at  Alexandria.  Such  was  his 
violent  rebound,  externally  at  least,  from  his 
Oriental  search  for  wisdom.  Somewhat  simi- 
larly the  last  Neo-Hellenists,  nearly  300  years 
afterwards,  went  to  Persia  when  their  school  at 
Athens  had  been  closed  by  the  order  of  Justinian, 
and  there  sought  to  realize  their  ideal.  But  after 
a  brief  experience  they  were  glad  to  get  back  to 
the  Occident  and  live  again  in  the  Empire. 

This  episode,  though  not  lasting  two  full  years, 
must  have  made  quite  an  epoch  in  the  life  of 
Plotinus.  He,  a  born  Oriental,  and  evidently 
dissatisfied  with  the  Occident  and  its  tendencies, 
sought  to  Orientalize  himself  still  more  pro- 
foundly. Behold  the  result:  he  is  thrown  back 
upon  the  west,  and  never  stops  till  he  comes  to 
Pome,  its  central  seat  of  authority.  Without 
this  Oriental   experience  he  would  probably  have 


PLOTINVS.  607 

never  devoted  himself  to  the  restoration  and  fur- 
therance of  Greek  wisdom,  instead  of  that  of  the 
Orient.  Be  this  as  it  may,  he  returns  to  the 
Hellenic  lines  of  the  school  of  Ammenius,  and 
starts  out  for  himself  in  the  capital  of  the  world. 

(  3 )  Plotinus  at  Rome  gives  instruction  to  a  few 
private  listeners,  which  evidently  becomes  more 
and  more  public,  though  Ammonius,  in  Egyptian 
fashion,  had  forbidden  any  publication  of  his 
doctrines.  Plotinus,  however,  may  well  have 
thought  that  he  was  teaching  his  own  philosophy, 
and  not  that  of  another  man.  He  was  forty 
years  old  when  he  began  his  Eoman  career  (in 
244  A.  D.),  which  lasted  some  twenty-six  years, 
till  his  death. 

His  method  of  teaching,  as  indicated  by  Por- 
phyry, was  mainly  through  the  reading  of  the 
old  philosophers  and  their  commentators,  accom- 
panied by  interpretation  and  discussion.  In  this 
way  his  own  thoughts  unfolded  till  they  formed 
an  independent  j)hilosophy.  He  possessed  the 
power  of  inspiring  his  pupils  and  of  forming 
them  into  an  apostolate  for  perpetuating  and 
propagating  his  doctrines.  He  not  only  imparted 
knowledge,  but  the  askesis  or  the  philosophic 
life,  for  which  he  had  the  example  of  Pythagoras 
and  Plato.  He  abstained  from  animal  food,  and 
practiced  a  stern  purity  tinged  with  a  sort  of 
monasticism.  Still  he  had  women  as  hearers  and 
disciples,  among  them  the  empress  Salonina. 


608         ANCIENT  EUEOPEAN  PIIILOSOPnY. 

Plotiniis  kept  aloof  from  iiistitutious,  family, 
society,  state.  He  was  the  individual  Ego  that 
must  get  back  to  God  at  all  hazards,  and  do 
nothino;  else  in  this  terrestrial  existence.  His 
way  leads  not  through  the  institutional,  but 
through  the  ethico-philosophical  life ;  that  is, 
through  himself,  through  his  own  subjective  dis- 
cipline culminating  in  ecstasy.  Herein  he  is  dif- 
ferent from  both  Plato  and  Aristotle,  leaning: 
more  to  the  Stoics.  Still  the  influence  of  Plato 
led  him  to  the  idea  of  establishing  a  philosophic 
city  in  Campania,  to  be  called  Platonopolis,  and 
to  be  organized  and  governed  after  the  manner 
of  Plato's  Republic.  The  plan  was  favored  at 
first  by  the  emperor  and  empress,  but  came  to 
naught. 

It  must  have  given  a  great  shock  to  Plotinus 
when  his  patron  and  friend,  the  Emperor  Galli- 
enus  (260-8)  was  slain  by  Claudius  who  seized 
the  imperial  throne.  The  philosopher  might 
truly  think  in  such  an  age  that  the  world  below 
was  falling  to  pieces,  that  the  reality  was  a  show 
and  delusion,  from  which  the  wise  man  had  to 
flee  to  the  supra-mundane,  immutable  one  above 
all  consciousness.  The  absolutism  of  Plotinus 
rises  beyond  that  of  imperial  Rome  with  its  ever 
changing  rulers,  though  these  be  absolute  too. 
At  the  center  of  the  wor.ld's  unity,  he  felt  still 
all  its  uncertainty,  and  longed  for  the  unity 
above  this  conscious,  purposed  unity    of  man's 


.  PLOTINUS.  609 

intelligence.  His  doctrine  lay  in  his  time,  and 
his  environment  might  well  drive  him  into  a 
divine  nirvana  as  a  relief  from  his  world-pain. 

So  Plotiuus  continued  to  philosophize  at  Rome 
till  his  last  illness  came  on,  when  he  went  to  the 
country- seat  of  a  friend  where  he  died  in  270 
A.  D.  at  the  age  of  QQ. 

II.  His  Writings. — Not  till  he  was  about 
fifty  3^ears  old  did  Plotinus  begin  to  set  down  his 
doctrines  in  writing.  These  must  have  been 
pretty  thoroughly  thought  out  during  his  long 
period  of  instruction  at  Rome.  His  philosophy 
w^as,  therefore,  the  fruit  of  his  teaching,  as  it 
usually  is.  One  result  was  a  certain  uniformity 
of  thought  and  style,  as  we  found  to  be  the  case 
with  Aristotle.  Consequently  there  can  be  dis- 
covered no  inner  development  of  the  man  Plo- 
tinus in  his  works,  such  as  we  noted  in  Plato, 
whose  Writings  run  through  and  reflect  his  whole 
life.  But  the  Writings  of  Plotinus  are  essen- 
tially of  one  period,  though  some  critics  have 
endeavored  to  re-arrange  them  in  chronological 
order.  It  is  true  that  Porphyry  {Life  PI.  c.  4) 
throws  them  into  three  successive  groups,  and 
thinks  he  sees  a  rise,  culmination,  and  decline  of 
power  in  these  groups.^  Other  readers  have  not 
been  able  to  discern  any  such  distinctions. 

Porphyry  was  the  first  editor  of  Plotinus  and 
was  the  one  who  took  the  fifty-four  books  of  the 
author  and  divided  them  into  six  Enneads  of  nine 

39 


610         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

books  each,  under  which  name  the  work  is  still 
known.  An  ancient  authority  states  that  there 
was  another  edition  of  Plotmus  by  a  different 
editor,  Eustochius,  also  a  pupil  of  the  philos- 
opher. 

The  style  is  abstract,  with  little  ornament, 
often  oracular.  It  is  not  like  that  of  Plato,  it 
calls  to  mind  Aristotle.  There  is  no  Platonic 
dialogue,  but  a  series  of  dissertations,  not  always 
connected.  Plotinus  had  a  master,  Ammonius, 
who  must  have  possessed  considerable  philo- 
sophic originality ;  but  he  plays  no  personal  part 
in  the  JEnneads,  as  dees  Socrates  in  the  Platonic 
Writings.  Herein  again  Plotinus  is  like  Aristotle. 
Though  he  often  refers  to  Plato  as  his  teacher, 
the  thought  will  come  that  he  owes  more  to 
Aristotle  than  to  Plato.  The  total  mass  or  body 
of  his  Avork  resembles  Aristotle's  and  not  Plato's. 
Then  the  distinctive  Plotinian  doctrine,  that  of 
ecstasy,  is  more  Aristotelian  than  Platonic.  In 
style,  in  thought,  and  in  exposition,  Plotinus  is 
the  child  of  the  Stagirite,  though  with  many 
Platonic  connections.  Animonuis  Saccas,  his 
teacher,  declared  that  Plato  and  Aristotle  had 
the  same  fundamental  doctrine ;  but  the  pupil, 
Plotinus,  shows  the  desire  of  referring  his  thought 
wholly  to  Plato.  Why  is  this?  Plato  had  been 
almost  •  christianized  at  Alexandria ;  Plotinus 
would  wrench  him  from  the  Christian  Platonists, 


PLOTINUS.  Cll 

and  restore  him    to    Heathendom  in   this    Neo- 
Hellenic  renascence. 

It  seems  strange,  but  this  ardent  Hcllenizer 
did  not  speak  Greek  correctly,  often  transposing 
tlie  syallables  of  a  word,  of  which  Porphyry  gives 
an  instance.  The  same  editor  comphiins  of  his 
bad  spelhng,  and  of  his  faulty  composition.  He 
would  not  even  re-read  what  he  had  once  hastily 
written.  Such  trifles  as  style,  orthography, 
grammar,  belong  to  the  outer  appearance,  and 
evidently  seemed  despicable  to  Plotinus.  In  this 
again  he  was  not  like  Plato  the  stylist.  Still 
he  was  a  genius,  even  if  he  could  not  spell;  he 
was  a  great  philosopher  even  if  he  spluttered 
Attic  Greek  with  an  Egyptian  accent.  No 
native  Grecian  of  that  age  approached  him  in 
the  zeal  and  ability  with  which  he  sought  to 
restore  the  old  Hellenic  world,  at  least  in  its 
Philosophy. 

There  is  only  the  one  work  of  Plotinus,  the 
Enneads,  but  it  is  a  large  one,  and  requires 
effort  for  its  mastery.  One  of  the  greatest 
spiritual  treasures  of  antiquity  it  must  be  re- 
garded, and  has  a  very  important  place  in  the 
evolution  of  human  Thinking,  of  which  it  is  a 
unique  specimen. 

III.  His  Philosophy. — Out  of  the  Enneads 
the  Philosophy  of  Plotinus  is  to  be  extracted 
and  organized.  Its  diversity  is  considerable  and 
its  doctrines  are  manifold ;   still  we  see  the  great 


6 1 2         ANCIENT  E  UROPEAN  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

effort  to  be  one  iu  the  attainment  of  the  One. 
Plotinus,  iu  order  to  get  rid  of  the  vast  conflict- 
ing multiplicity  of  the  individual  self-conscious 
ones,  projected  the  Absolute  One  above  all  self- 
consciousness,  wherein  the  Greek  mind  vanished 
into  its  own  boundlessness.  Seeking  the  imper- 
sonal One,  it  undid  itself  as  person,  and  thus 
concluded  i^s  thinking  activity.  The  Self  pro- 
jects itself  through  its  own  inner  self -transcend- 
ence into  the  One  above  all  selfhood,  and  there- 
Avith  ends,  must  end.  But  this  requires  a  long 
process  of  thought,  indeed  an  extensive  scheme 
of  Philosophy,  which  is  what  we  are  now  to  con- 
sider. 

As  already  indicated,  the  work  of  Plotinus  is 
thrown  together  into  the  form  of  essays  or  disser- 
tations on  different  topics  without  any  direct 
systematic  connection.  Still  there  is  a  system 
underlying  all  these  different  expositions ;  there 
is  not  only  a  series  of  subjects,  but  an  order 
moves  in  them  and  controls  them,  though  such 
an  order  never  becomes  fully  explicit.  To  the 
mind  of  Plotinus,  his  manifold  discussions,  his 
explanations,  his  fantastic  flights  (for  he  has 
these  too)  hover  about  a  scheme  which  is  the 
ultimate  deposit  and  outc®me  of  his  philoso- 
phizing, and  which  is  the  overflowing  center 
whence    all    comes   and  whither  all  returns . 

It  is  not  long  before  the  reader  of  Plotinus 
begins  to  get  glimpses  of  this  pervasive  scheme, 


PLOTINUS.  G13 

and  finds  himself  continually  carried  buck  to  it 
as  to  the  source  of  liajlit.  Still  it  i.-5  never  eltib- 
orated  in  detail  as  the  total  plan  of  his  book. 
What,  then,  is  this  scheme,  ever  present  but 
never  fully  schematized?  The  answer  can  be 
given  directly :  it  is  that  philosophical  Norm 
which  we  have  seen  working  itself  out  and  ex- 
pressing itself  in  one  way  or  other  through  all 
Greek  Philosophy,  both  Hellenic  and  Hellenis- 
tic. Plotinus,  like  a  true  philosopher,  has  before 
him  the  Universe,  and  is  seeking  to  grasp  and  to 
express  its  fundamental  process  to  his  age ;  such 
is  the  depth  and  the  worth  of  the  man.  But 
this  philosophical  Norm  has  its  Greek  mould  and 
its  Greek  utterance,  given  to  it  already  by  the 
greatest  Greek  thinkers,  Plato  and  Aristotle,  in 
accord  with  the  inner  behest  of  the  universal 
Greek  spirit.  Plotinus  is  seeking  to  recover  and 
to  restore  this  philosophical  Norm  after  the 
pattern  of  it  in  its  great  creative  Hellenic  Period. 
Undoubtedly  he  changes  it,  has  to  change  it, 
though  partly  unconscious  of  the  act,  for  he  lives 
in  a  new  epoch,  in  a  new  order  of  the  world 
which  moulds  his  thinking  even  against  his  will. 
There  will  be,  accordingly,  the  Plotiuian  or 
Neo-Hellenic  formulation  of  this  philosophical 
Norm,  keeping  its  great  general  outline,  but 
marvelously  transforming  its  contents.  We  shall 
behold  in  the  scheme  of  Plotinus  the  three 
main    divisions    so  often    noted    already  —  God, 


614         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Nature,  and  Man,  the  three  grand  elements 
in  the  triune  process  of  the  All.  The  Greek 
philosophers  unfolded  these  into  science  and 
called  them  Metaphysics,  Physics  and  Ethics, 
which  division  is  explicit  but  not  yet  fully 
expressed  in  Aristotle.  Plotinus  subdivides  each 
of  these  divisions  in  his  own  way,  using,  old 
terms  in  new  relations  and  old  material  in  a 
new  fashion.  Our  eye  meets  the  categories  and 
the  language  of  the  ancient  Greek  world,  but 
they  are  not  the  same  in  meaning,  nor  are 
they  in  the  same  order  in  which  we  once  knew 
them,  but  strangely  translocated  and  transfigured. 
And,  as  above  stated,  the  same  general  Norm  is 
there,  but  the  whole  matter  has  to  be  re-thought, 
and  explained  anew. 

Here  we  shallj  set  down  in  advance  the  Ploti- 
nian  Norm  which  is  the  more  or  less  concealed 
framework  of  these  discursive  Enneads:  — 

I.  Metaphysics,  dealing  with  the  supra-sen- 
sible, invisible  world.     Three  stages. 

1.  Tlie  0?ie,  above  consciousness,  above  Per- 
son or  Self,  the  supra-rational  One,  often  called 
the  Good  by  Plotinus,  and  also  God,  whence  all 
overflows  or  emanates. 

2.  Nous  or  Reason,  Intelligence.  The  first 
emanation  from  the  supra-rational  One  into  the 
rational  world,  which  is  now  twofold  —  subject 
and  object  {Nous  and  noetos  kosmos).  Nous  is 
also  the  realm  of  Ideas  as  supra-sensible. 


PLOTINUS.  615 

3.  Psyche  —  the  Soul.  This  is  an  emanation 
from  the  Nous,  as  the  latter  is  from  the  first  (the 
One).  The  Soul  has  no  longer  pure  Ideas,  as 
the  Nous,  but  sees  them  by  reflection.  Not  the 
Idea  in  itself  (or  Thought)  but  the  image  of  the 
Idea  is  the  Soul's  content. 

11.  Physics,  which  in  Plotinus  does  not  mean 
the  Science  of  Nature  in  the  ordinary  sense,  but 
which  pertains  to  the  visible,  sensible,  phenome- 
nal world,  as  distinct  from  that  of  Ideas.  The 
Soul  is  the  bridge  between  these  two  worlds  supra- 
sensible  and  sensible,  partaking  of  both. 

1.  The  Body  or  Soul  embodied,  which  em- 
braces Nature  with  its  Soul.  The  Body  human, 
telluric,  or  cosmic,  is  the  manifestation  of  the 
indwelling  Soul  which  in  Plotinus  is  double, 
according  to  its  corporeal  or  incorporeal  relation. 

2.  Matter,  the  purely  formless,  hence  without 
Body  and  without  Soul.  It  is  the  negative  as 
such  or  non-Being  which  j^et  is,  the  self-opposed 
as  the  opposite  of  the  One.  Called  by  Plotinus 
the  Privation  (steresis). 

3.  Evil;  here  the  ethical  substrate  which  un- 
derlies the  Plotinian  Physics  begins  to  show 
itself.  Matter  is  the  original  evil  of  the  Uni- 
verse, being  the  opposite  pole  of  the  supra-rational 
One  or  of  the  Good  (or  God).  Yet  the  Body 
participates  in  this  Matter  or  Evil,  and  through 
the  Body  the  Soul  also.  Thus  we  htive  reached 
the  bottom  of  the  Plotinian  world :   the  Supreme 


Gl(3         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Good  has  overflowed  itself  into  Evil,  has  ema- 
nated the  bad  Soul,  with  the  accompaniment, 
however,  of  Free-Will,  or  the  power  of  self- 
overcoming.  At  this  point,  then,  the  rise  and 
return  of  the  Soul  is  possible  (or  the  negation 
shows  itself  to  be  self-negative). 

There  are  two  Souls  in  Plotinus  or  two  rela- 
tions of  the  Soul-prmciple :  supra-sensible,  the 
emanation  of  JSTous,  and  sensible,  the  embodi- 
ment in  Matter.  The  former  is  more  in  the 
descending  line,  the  latter  is  the  starting-point 
for  the  ethical  ascent. 

III.  Ethics;  this  is  the  third  stage  or  the 
restoration  of  the  estranged,  materialized  Soul  to 
its  primordial  source  in  the  Supreme  One  at  the 
summit  of  the  Universe.  Here  again  we  can  dis- 
tinguish three  stages,  or  perhaps  methods  of 
attainino;  the  highest. 

1.  Praxis,  or  the  virtues;  man  can  realize  the 
good  in  many  forms  through  his  personal  con- 
duct, and  thus  manifest  in  life  the  Virtues,  which 
were  specially  unfolded  by  the  old  philosophers. 

2.  Theoria.  Three  theoretic  ways  or  dis- 
ciplines—  Art,  Eeligion,  and  Philosophj^  —  were 
employed  by  Plotinus  for  the  ascent  of  the  Soul 
to  God.  , 

3.  Ecstasis.  The  entrance  of  the  Soul  into 
immediate  communion  with  the  supra-rational, 
supra-conscious,  and  also  supra-beautiful  One  • — 
the  Being  of  all  Being. 


PLOTINUS.  617 

Such  is  the  philosophical  Norm  of  Plotinus. 
While  the  outline  or  skeleton  remains  the  same 
as  before,  we  can  see  that  it  has  been  internally 
transformed  from  beginning  to  end.  That  supra- 
rational  One  lies  beyond  the  Ideas  of  Plato  and 
the.Thought-Chinking-Thought  of  Aristotle,  and 
really  determines  them  and  everything  else.  The 
Hellenistic  principle  is  thus  carried  back  to 
Hellenism  and  placed  over  it.  One  cannot  help 
thinking  of  the  Roman  Empire  of  the  time  of 
Plotinus,  which  had  made  the  individual  the 
universal  ruler,  establishing  him  over  Hellas  and 
the  whole  civilized  world  with  absolute  authority . 
Or,  to  put  it  abstractly,  Neo-Hellenism  affirms 
the  essence  of  being  to  be  the  universal  individ- 
ualized in  the  Universal  above  all  individuality. 

The  exposition  of  the  philosophy  of  Plotinus 
is  simply  the  development  of  the  precedmg  Norm 
into  completeness,  the  unfolding  of  the  bud  into 
the  perfect  flower.  Still  it  should  be  noted  that 
Plotinus  by  no  means  works  out  this  Norm  with 
the  same  degree  of  fullness  or  of  clearness  in  all 
of  its  parts.  His  book  is  not  a  systematically 
constructed  edifice  with  all  its  architecture  laid 
out  in  due  proportion  and  order.  There  are 
gaps,  some  portions  are  hastily  sketched,  while 
others  are  dwelt  upon  with  evident  delight  and 
often  repeated.  One  can  see  that  Plotinus  loved 
the  supra-sensible  world  far  better  than  the 
sensible,  the  latter  being  indeed  for  him  but  a 


6 1 8         ANCIENT  E  UB  OPE  AN  PHIL  OSOPHY. 

lapse  or  degradation  of  the  former.  Still  the 
exposition  of  his  system  must  proceed  on  the 
lines  above  given  and  unfold  the  Norm. 


I.  Metaphysics. 

This  embraces  what  may  be  called  the 
supra-sensible  world,  and  suggests  the  sepa- 
ration of  the  latter  from  the  sensible  world. 
Such  a  separation  goes  back  to  Plato  with 
whose  name  it  is  particularly  connected. 
Plotinus,  however,  bridges  the  chasm  between 
these  two  worlds  (which  Plato  does  not)  by  mak- 
ino"  the  one  arise  or  overflow  out  of  the  other. 
The  visible  realm  is  but  a  deeper  lapse  of  the 
soul  from  its  invisible  sphere. 

Very  distinctly,  however,  Plotinus  divides  his 
supra-sensible  world  into  three  stages  or  grades 
of  descent.  This  descending  stairway  from  the 
height  of  the  Supreme  One  to  the  lower  spheres 
is  often  referred  to  by  the  philosopher  and  may 
be  given  in  some  detail. 

T.  The  Supra-rational  One.  —  In  some  such 
way  it  is  necessary  to  designate  the  first  principle 
of  Plotinus,  though  it  does  not  permit  positive 
predicates.  A  main  fact  of  it  is  that  it  trans- 
cends Reason,  Thought,  the  Rational,  rising 
above  Aristotle's  Though  t-thinking-Thought, 
and  so  we  call  it  the  supra-rational.  Plotinus 
often  names  it  God,  as   the   supreme    source  of 


PLO  TINUS.  —  METAPHYSICS.  619 

all  things,  but  it  is  not  a  Person  or  a  Self,  as  it 
is  supra-personal  also,  above  self -consciousness. 
Hence  in  the  supra-sensible  world  it  is  that  stage 
which  is  supra-rational. 

Moreover,  Plotinus  has  emphasized  it  as  the 
One,  from  which  all  multiplicity  has  to  be  ex- 
cluded, since  it  is  the  One  above  many  ones,  3'et 
the  source  or  essence  of  them  all.  Hence  the 
One  is  not  merely  One  arithmetically,  but  the 
unifying  principle  which  keeps  the  universe  from 
flviug  to  pieces.  This  conception  of  the  Supreme 
One  took  the  deepest  hold  of  Plotinus,  without 
its  almighty  grip  he  deemed  that  the  All  Avould 
go  asunder  in  a  general  crash.  It  is,  therefore, 
the  Good,  or  rather  the  supernal  Good  to 
which  all  things  tend,  and  to  which  man  must 
assimilate  himself  in  his  ethical  ascent  and 
purification.  To  be  good,  man  must  get  rid 
of  all  division,  inner  and  outer,  even  of  the 
separation  of  the  Self  and  the  not-Self,  as 
well  as  of  the  internal  separation  of  the  Self 
into  subject  and  object. 

The  effort  of  the  philosopher  is  to  extirpate 
the  separative  stage  in  God  and  Man,  and  to  get 
back  to  that  of  immediate  unity.  God  is  not  self- 
conscious,  for  this  implies  the  Ego's  twofoldness. 
Nor  can  the  Supreme  One  be  Will  which  is  like- 
wise an  act  of  self-separation,  hence  it  is  not 
nuiker  or  creator.  Will  is  a  finitizing,  a  deter- 
mming  of  the  undetermined  Self,  while  the  One 


G20         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  the  Undetermined,  l)eing  the  negation  of  every 
determinate  predicate.  It  is,  accordingly,  the 
unthinkable,  for  Thought  would  determine  its 
content.  In  general,  the  distinction  between  the 
thinking  and  that  which  is  thought  must  be 
obliterated  in  the  One,  which,  therefore,  does  not 
think.  If  neither  wills  nor  thinks,  yet  it  is  the 
unity  of  willing  and  thinking,  over  both  and  the 
source  of  both.  Nevertheless  both  are  lapses, 
and  the  world,  having  deteriorated  into  Intellect 
(Greece)  and  Will  (Eome),  must  return  to  the 
One  in  which  such  a  differenced  world  overcomes 
all  its  septiration,  strife,  and  wrong  in  a  nirvana 
of  eternal  rest.  To  such  a  doctrine  had  the 
Greco-Roman  time  driven  the  last  great  philoso- 
pher ;  the  prodigious  outlay  of  its  Thought  and 
Action  is  to  end  in  the  negation  of  all  Thought 
and  Action, 

Here  is  without  question  an  Oriental  strain  in 
the  system  of  Plotinus,  who,  we  must  not  forget, 
was  an  Egyptian,  bora  not  in  the  Greek  city  of 
Alexandria,  but  at  Lycopolis.  At  any  rate  this 
doctrine  of  the  Supreme  One  recalls  the  unspeak- 
able, almighty,  absolute  Power,  personal  or 
impersonal,  whom  the  Orientals  name  God. 
Plotinus  has,  therefore,  in  him  not  merely  the 
return  to  old  Hellenic  philosophy,  but  to  the 
Oriental  conception  of  the  divine  order.  He 
thought  he  was  going  back  to  Plato,  but  uncon- 
sciously he  went  back  still  further,  out  of  Europe 


PLOTINUS  —METAPHYSICS.  621 

into  Asia.  For  in  the  time  and  in  his  own  nature 
lay  this  flight  to  an  antecedent  and  probably  an- 
cestral world,  in.  which  the  present  decadent  and 
utterly  corrupted  Greco-Roman  world  with 
its  Thought  and  Action  might  be  swallowed 
up  and  lost  in  unconsciousness.  Was  it 
not  evident  on  every  hand  that  Europe 
had  utterly  failed  in  civilization?  Externally  it 
could  no  longer  defend  itself;  behold  the  in- 
breaking  barbarians ;  internally  it  was  rotten 
at  the  heart,  a  condition  most  manifest  in  the 
line  of  emperors.  Their  conduct  and  fate  would 
seem  to  declare :  let  no  person  be  put  at  the 
head  of  the  Universe.  Such  was  a  voice  of  the 
age  which  our  philosopher  heard,  but  there  was 
another  voice  which  he  did  not  hear  or  to  which 
he  shut  his  ears.  Plainly  his  remedy  is  negative, 
really  destructive  as  the  barbarians  themselves ; 
but  the  positive  remedy  already  w^orkiug  with 
might,  the  Christian  remedy  for  this  world- 
malady  he  re-acted  against  with  intensity.  Still 
he  IS  supremely  interesting,  being  the  grand 
romanticist  of  these  ages,  in  certain  respects  the 
greatest  one  that  ever  lived. 

The  doctrine  of  Plotinus  is  therefore  a  form 
of  Pantheism,  in  which  the  one  is  not  simply 
immanent,  but  distinctly  transcendent.  Still 
the  Self  is  absorbed  into  this  one  only  One,  and 
loses  consciousness  of  selfhood,  and  that  in 
which   it   is  lost  is    the  supremely    unconscious 


622         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

One,  which  can  have  no  virtue,  being  above  it, 
can  have  no  wisdom,  being  above  it,  can  have  no 
beauty,  being  above  it.  Nor  can  it  be  categor- 
ized except  with  the  category  above  all  categoriz- 
ing. Hellenic  philosophy  affirms  the  essence  of 
Being  to  he,  Neo-Hellenic  philosophy  affirms  the 
essence  of  Being  to  be  above  Being.  And  still 
it  is:  wherein  lies  the  inherent,  necessary  con- 
tradiction of  the  Plotinian  doctrine. 

This  form  of  Pantheism  has  been  called 
dynamic  Pantheism,  since  it  overflows  from  its 
own  fullness  and  even  communicates  its  power. 
But  it  does  not  generate,  that  is,  it  does  not 
communicate  its  substance  or  itself.  Thus,  how- 
ever, very  manifestly  difference  has  entered, 
cover  it  up  as  we  may;  emanation  takes  place, 
which  cannot  be  conceived  without  some  sort  of 
separation. 

Somehow  thus  we  strive  to  comprehend  the 
supernal  One,  the  distinctive  tenet  of  Plotinus 
and  of  all  Neo-Platonism,  though  it  be  above 
comprehension.  Its  characteristic  is  supra  — 
supra-rational,  supra-personal,  supra-beautiful, 
in  fact,  supra-everything.  Plotinus  struggles  to 
name  it,  and  well  he  may,  for  it  is  the  un- 
nameable.  Still  he  will  use  certain  terms  for  it: 
the  metaphysical  (the  One),  the  ethical  (the 
Good)  and  also  the  religious  (God).  The  un- 
speakable One  which  still  must  be  spoken  — 
such  is   the  germinal    point  of  Medieval  Eoman- 


PLOriNUS.—METAniYSlOS.  623 

ticism  in  Art,  and  of  Medieval  Mysticism  in 
Religion.  Distinctly  can  these  be  traced  to  the 
present  doctrine  of  Plotinus,  the  creative  ro- 
manticist. 

But  the  One  overflows  through  its  own  power, 
dynamically ;  this  brings  us  to  the  second  stage 
of  the  supra-sensible  world. 

II.  Nous. — The  primal  fact  of  Nous  (Intel- 
lect) in  Plotinus  is  the  self-conscious  or  the  self- 
reflecting  act  of  mind:  the  seeing  and  the  seen, 
the  knowing  and  the  known,  the  thinking  and  the 
thought.  This  is  the  original  separative  stage 
of  the  Ego  or  Self,  wherein  it  is  divided  within 
itself  and  becomes  subject  and  object.  By 
Plotinus  this  was  regarded  as  a  descent  or  lapse 
from  the  Highest  One  which  has  no  such  div- 
sion  within  itself,  being  unconscious  or  properly 
supra-conscious.  But  in  its  first  overflow  or 
emanation  there  arises  the  second  One  which 
is,  however,  twofold  (dyas),  or  the  twain  which 
is  One,  this  second  One  being  not  the  original 
One  but  the  derived  One  w^hich  comes  from  the 
Two. 

Thus  Plotinus  in  a  kind  of  numerical  play, 
which  hints  the  Pythagorean  side  of  his  doctrine, 
seeks  to  adumbrate  the  primordial  act  of  self- 
consciousness  or  the  Self  knowing  itself.  He 
tells  in  some  detail  how  this  is  brought  about. 
The  second  or  the  separated  (the  overflow)  turns 
back  to  the  First  One  of  its  own  inherent  nature 


G24         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(this  is  the  epistrophei,  a  very  important  word 
inPlotinus),  and  images  the  same,  whereby  it 
gets  a  content,  and  thus  thinks.  Such  is  the 
simple  Nous  with  its  twofoldness,  thinking  on  the 
one  hand,  and  having  a  thought  on  the  other;  the 
latter  is  the  First  One,  as  yet  unthought,  till  it 
becomes  the  content  of  Nous. 

Manifestly  Plotinus  is  seeking  to  bring 
before  himself  the  origin  of  the  Ego  with 
its  self-separating  yet  self -returning  power. 
It  is  the  only  thing  in  all  the  universe 
which  has  any  such  power,  the  power  of  cutting 
itself  in  two  (becoming  the  clijas)  and  remaining 
itself  in  that  operation,  that  is,  remaining  in 
complete  unity  while  sundering  itself.  This  is 
the  real  mystery  which  Plotinus  has  before 
him  in  all  vividness,  the  mystery  of  the  self-con- 
scious Self  which,  however,  is  no  mystery  at  all, 
being  the  most  transparent  matter  in  the  world, 
since  it  is  just  the  self -manifested,  or  that  which 
is  perfectly  clear  to  itself.  Plotinus  endeavors 
to  account  for  this  fundamental  act  of  the  Ego 
and  of  the  Universe  too,  by  projecting  back  of  it 
the  primal  undivided  One,  from  which  somehow 
this  separation  was  to  be  derived,  yet  from  which 
it  was  also  to  be  kept  away  by  all  means.  Behind 
that  which  is  thought  must  be  the  unthought, 
whose  destiny  is,  however,  to  be  thought.  So  it 
overflows  by  its  own  inner  necessity  or  emanates, 
as  the  sun  overflows  with  light.     Really  it   sep- 


PL  0  TIN  VS.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  625 

anitcs  within  itself  and  becomes  JSFous  and  the 
JSFoumenon.  Plotiiius  knows  the  diffi<'iilty  of  this 
transition  from  the  First  One  to  the  Two  and 
the  Many  —  from  the  Infinite  to  the  Finite,  from 
the  Perfect  to  the  Imperfect.  Why  did  God 
create  the  world,  create  negation,  separation, 
sin?  Or,  as  Plotinus  puts  it,  "  AVhy  did  not  the 
One  stay  with  itself,"  and  not  overflow?  So 
impressed  is  he  that  he  would  have  us  open  the 
consideration  of  this  subject  with  prayer,  "  in- 
voking God  himself  not  with  words  but  with  the 
soul,  extending  ourselves  in  supplication  to  Him, 
the  alone  to  the  Alone.''  {Enn.  V.  1.  6.)  Thus 
we  may  behold  Nous  emanating  from  the  One, 
then  turning  back  to  it  and  reflecting  it,  whereby 
this  Nous  is  the  image  of  the  One,  yet  also  is 
that  which  images  it  as  content.  "  But  it  is  not 
the  One,"  as  Plotinus  is  careful  to  say,  this  does 
not  transfer  its  own  essence,  or  its  absolute 
Oneness  to  the  derived  Nous.  "  How  then 
does  it  produce  the  same?  Because  the  latter 
(Nous)  by  turning  around  to  it  (^epistrophe)  saw 
it  —  this  seeing  is  Nous."  (^Enn.Y.  1,  7.) 

But  also  the  Nous  in  beholdino;  the  One 
beholds  itself,  or  is  subject-object  in  grasping 
the  object.  Very  often  does  Plotinus  say  that 
this  descent  of  the  Nous  into  itself  is  the  means 
of  all  knowing,  which  is  at  bottom  self-knowing. 
He  is  himself  Nous  in  seeins^  and  settino;  forth 
all  these  characteristics  of  Nous.     It  is  Plotinus 

40 


626         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

himself  as  Nous,  who  turns  back  and  looks  at 
the  primal  undivided  One  which  he  projects 
back  of  his  looking.  It  is  only  the  conscious 
man  who  can  think  his  unconsciousness  and  talk 
about  it  and  describe  it,  sett i no;  aside  even  that 
separation  which  makes  him  conscious.  Thus 
Plotinus  as  philosopher  is  conscious  of  the 
unconscious,  which  is  just  the  trouble  that  he 
seeks  to  remove  by  Ecstasy. 

Such  is  the  essential  fact  of  the  Nous  of 
Plotinus,  who  next  seeks  to  put  into  it  things 
more  or  less  alien.  He  makes  it  the  realm  of 
Ideas  taken  from  Plato.  From  the  latter  also 
he  derives  the  notion  of  the  Good  (or  the  One) 
as  the  cause  of  knowing  and  being,  which  are 
essentially  the  twofoldness  of  Nous  already 
considered.  Then  too  Plotinus  has  his  doctrine 
of  the  categories,  which  he  reduces  to  five. 
Finnally  he  combines  all  these  forms,  ideas 
spirits,  intelligences  into  a  grand  totality  which 
he  names  the  world  of  Nous  (cosmos  noefos), 
which  has  an  extended  description  in  his  book. 
Plotinus  emploj^s  his  Nous  as  a  kind  of  receptacle 
for  the  many  Gods  —  a  phase  which  later  Neo- 
Hellenism  will  devlop  enormously. 

In  general  we  see  that  Plotinus  grasps  the 
realm  of  Nous  as  that  of  self-conscious  Being, 
substantially  that  of  Aristotle's  Thought- 
thinking-Thought,  which,  however,  has  over- 
flowed from  a  higher  principle  tlian  Aristoile's 


PL  0  TIN  US.  —  ME  TAPHYSW8.  627 

highest.  But  iu  this  realm  ulso  an  overflow 
takes  place,  which  brings  us  to  the  next. 

III.  Soul. — Of  the  supra-sensible  world  the 
Soul  is  distinctly  the  third  stage  in  the  process 
of  emanation,  as  set  forth  by  Plotinus.  As  the 
One  overflows  and  becomes  Nous  (self-conscious 
mind),  so  now  Nous  overflows  and  becomes  soul. 
As  Nous  had  essentially  the  first  great  separation 
into  Thinking  and  Thought,  or  subject  and 
o])ject,  so  Soul  has  the  second  great  Sisparation 
between  the  spiritual  and  material,  the  supra- 
sensible  and  sensible,  or  the  Self  and  the 
not-Self.  That  is,  the  Soul  is  the  bridge  from 
mind  to  matter,  partaking  of  both ;  it  is  the 
conclusion  of  the  supra-sensible  (or  noetic) 
movement,  as  well  as  the  transition  to  the  sensible 
world.  As  Nous  revealed  the  inner  dualism 
of  self -consciousness,  so  the  Soul  reveals  the 
outer  dualism  between  spirit  and  sense. 

Still  the  Soul  does  not  of  itself  belono;  to  the 
sensible  world,  though  overflowing  into  it  and 
causing  it.  The  Soul,  therefore,  is  double,  divid- 
ing primarily  into  two  parts  or  tendencies.  As 
intelligible  (or  noetic)  it  remains  in  its  own  supra- 
sensible  realm,  or  rather  it  turns  back  and  re- 
unites itself  with  the  same  (ejnsd^oj^he),  fleeing 
from  the  sensil^le.  Equally  certain  is  the  oppo- 
site tendency  of  the  soul ;  it  moves  forward  to 
the  sensible,  enters  it,  and  produces  bod}',  cor- 
poreality.    For  in  strict  speech,  there  can  be  no 


628         ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPH  V. 

Botly  without  its  Soul,  they  are  counterparts, 
two  yet  one.  Now  this  One  of  the  Body,  every- 
where in  it  yet  in  no  particular  part  or  member, 
indivisible  yet  in  the  divided,  is  the  Soul,  while 
the  divisible,  spatial,  extended,  is  Body,  which, 
however,  is  Body  through  the  presence  of  the 
One,  the  indivisible  Soul. 

The  primal  characteristic  of  the  Soul,  then,  as 
it  comes  down  out  of  Nous  is  this  bifurcation  of 
itself  into  two  tendencies,  the  one  rolling  back 
eternally  into  the  Nous  or  indeed  to  the  One, 
and  thereby  maintaining  the  unceasing  process 
of  the  supra-sensible  world,  the  other  tendency 
moving  forward  or  downward  (in  the  view  of 
Plotinus),  and  incorporating  itself  in  the  ex- 
tended and  divisible  world.  The  Soul  has,  there- 
fore, as  its  inheritance  from  Nous,  the  primal 
separation  or  bifurcation,  also  the  return  out  of 
separation  on  the  one  side,  yet  the  persistence  in 
the  separation  on  the  other  side,  whereby  it  be- 
comes corporeal,  and  sensible,  without,  however, 
losing  even  then  its  unity  as  Soul  in  Body.  But 
in  this  way  it  has  thrown  off  the  sensible  world 
which  now  appears. 

The  first  Soul  is  naturally  the  All-Soul,  or,  as 
it  is  often  called  by  Plotinus  and  Plato,  the 
cosmical  Soul,  the  World-Soul.  The  total 
Cosmos  has  its  own  Soul,  and  is  alive,  a  very 
animal  (^autozoon) .  It  seems  to  be  a  kind  of 
Person  too,  and  has  self -consciousness,  yet  with- 


PL  0  TIN  US.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  629 

out  memory,  since  it  has  never  had  any  relation 
to  the  sensible  world  ;  also  it  is  without  reason- 
ing power  {logizcsthai),t\i[s  being  something  un- 
necessary to  its  working.  Still  into  the  World- 
Soul  must  come  the  dualism  above  noted ;  it  has 
a  double  relation,  to  the  supra-sensible  and  to 
tiie  sensible,  which  bifurcates  it  into  two  op- 
posite tendencies,  both  of  which  become  in 
Plotinian  speech   two  World-Souls,  higher   and 

lower,  the    heavenly   and    the  earthly  Venus 

the  former  turning  back  to  the  Nous,  the  latter 
entering  the  visible  Cosmos  and  manifesting 
itself  in  the  same  as  Nature  (physis). 

This  World-Soul  as  universal  is  the  holder 
and  indeed  producer  of  all  individual  Souls. 
Here  again  we  have  the  One  overflowing  into  the 
Many— the  One  Soul  into  the  Many  Souls. 
Each  individual  Soul  has  in  it  the  same  duality 
which  we  have  observed  in  the  World-Soul, 
which,  however,  is  as  different  from  individual 
Souls  as  the  One  is  from  Nous.  It  is  the 
Soul,  as  't  were,  in  itself,  in  the  descent  from 
Nous,  without  choice,  acting  by  necessity  in  the 
line  of  the  lapse,  hence  it  has  no  ethical  char- 
acter. But  the  individual  soul,  man,  is  very 
different  in  this  regard,  as  we  shall  see,  having 
Will  and  hence  belonging  to  the  ethical  sphere 
also. 

k5uch  are  the  throe  distinctive  forms  or  phases 
of  the  supra-sensible  world  of  Plotinus.    They  are 


630         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ill  a  descending  order,  yet  they  are  not  wliolly 
without  a  psj^chical  process  among  themselves. 
Certainly  there  is  the  primal  unseparated  One, 
unconscious,  yes,  undeveloped,  unemanated. 
Then  there  a  separative  act  in  Nous,  that  of  self- 
consiousness ;  finally  in  the  lapse  of  the  Soul, 
there  is  the  conception  of  the  return,  however 
incomplete.  Still  the  general  SAveep  here  is  not 
the  evolution  to  the  Higher,  but  the  devolution 
to  the  Lower,  which  does  not  stop  with  the 
supra-sensible  Soul,  but  lapses  still  further  into 
Body  —  wherewith  we  have  entered  a  new  realm. 

II.  Physics. 

By  means  of  the  Soul  the  transition  is  made 
out  of  the  supra-sensible  (or  noetic)  world  to 
the  sensible,  which  distinction  is  decidedly  em- 
phasized in  Plotinus.  How  does  he  construct 
the  bridge?  In  general  by  means  of  the  various 
categories  of  Separation  and  its  opposite,  for 
just  here  (in  Mind  and  Matter)  the  Universe  is 
cleft  in  twain,  and  still  it  must  be  one. 

It  is  a  characteristic  of  sensible  magnitudes 
that  they  are  in  themselves  separable,  divisible, 
opposed  to  unity,  given  up  to  multiplicity. 
Such  is  the  fundamental  fact  of  the  sensible  or 
phenomenal  world :  it  is  the  INIany  versus  the 
One,  this  One  always  becoming  Many,  or  infin- 
itely  divisible;  it  is,   therefore,    the  realm    of 


PL  0  TINUS.  —  PHYSICS.  631 

change,  of  appearance,  of  Time  versus  Eternity; 
it  is  the  arising  and  the  departing,  the  flux  of 
Heraclitus,  the  fleeting  show  of  the  external 
world.  Still  further  it  is  the  false,  the  bad,  in  fine 
it  is  evil.  Such  does  the  Soul  produce,  or  rather 
become ;  the  divided  Soul  becomes  the  Soul  of 
all  division.  Dividing  itself  within  itself  (bifur- 
cating) and  not  recovering  itself  and  returning 
to  the  One,  it  drops  to  the  Many  in  all  its  separa- 
tion and  manifests  itself  as  the  outer  material 
phenomenon,  as  the  sensible  "World.  As  endless 
self-division  the  Soul  is  materialized,  which  is  its 
lapse  into  complete  self -externality. 

There  are,  however,  stages  in  this  physical 
realm,  not  so  distinctly  set  forth  as  in  the  pre- 
ceding supra-sensible  world,  nevertheless  obtain- 
able by  a  little  search. 

I.  Body. — This  is  primarily  the  embodied  Soul, 
the  immediate  unity  of  the  Soul  and  its  opposite, 
or  of  the  indivisible  and  the  divisible.  The  Soul, 
being  without  division,  gives  itself  to  Body  or 
makes  itself  Body  and  thus  becomes  divided, 
passing  into  all  parts  of  the  Body .  Still  in 
all  these  parts  of  the  body  it  shows  itself  to 
be  one,  for  instance,  through  sensation.  The 
Body,  taken  simply  by  itself,  has  continuity,  one 
part  or  particle  outside  of  the  other  and  in  a 
different  place.  But  the  Body  ensouled  has  a 
unity  in  all  its  multiplicity,  has  a  center  raying 
put  into  all  its  mcuibers,  which  are  the  periphery 


632         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  Soul's  corporeal  sphere.  So  Plotinus 
speaks  of  "that  Nature  both  divisible  and  indi- 
visible which  we  call  Soul;"  really  it  is  Soul 
embodied,  or  Body  ensouled;  "  it  is  divisible  be- 
cause it  is  in  all  the  parts  of  that  Body  in  which 
it  subsists;  it  is  indivisible,  because  it  is  the 
Whole  of  itself  in  all  the  parts,  and  in  each  part. ' ' 
{Enn.  IV,  2.  1.)  Still  further  in  the  same 
place :  "  Not  having  magnitude,  the  Soul  is  pres- 
ent in  all  magnitude  ;  just  here  it  is,  yet  not  here  ; 
it  is  determined  not  by  another  but  by  itself,  so 
as  not  to  be  divided  in  its  very  divisions."  With 
such  a  dialectical  play  of  contradictories  does 
Plotinus  seek  to  express  this  union  of  oppo- 
sites  —  Body  and  Soul,  the  non-extended  and  the 
extended,  the  undivided  which  divides  itself  and 
yet  is  one  in  all  its  divisions. 

The  entire  physical  universe  is  the  Body  into 
which  the  All-Soul  has  poured  itself,  or  over- 
flowed; it  manifests  itself  in  the  beauty  and 
order  of  the  Heavens  with  their  Bodies.  "  Soul 
has  made  the  Sun,  has  made  the  stars,  and  keeps 
them  in  order;  Soul  has  made  all  living  things, 
breathing  into  them  the  breath  of  life;  whatever 
the  land,  the  sea,  and  the  air  nourishes,  is  the 
product  of  Soul."  {Enn.  V.  1.  2.)  Plotinus 
tells  us  to  behold  the  cosmical  Soul  entering 
"  the  Body  of  Heaven  as  the  rays  of  the  Sun  dart 
into  a  black  cloud,  illuminating  it  and  making 
it    golden,"     Thus    the    Body    of    Heaven   is 


PL  0  TINUS.  —  PHYSICS.  633 

endowed  with  immortal  life,  and  "  becomes  a 
happy  animal."  It  has  many  different  parts  or 
members,  but  it  is  "  One  through  the  power  of 
Soul."  It  is  at  this  point  we  may  see  Plotinus 
adjusting  his  scheme  to  Greek  polytheism, 
though  there  be  for  him  "  the  one  only  One  " 
above  all  division  and  multiplicity.  *'  The  Sun 
is  a  God,  because  it  is  ensouled,  also  the  Stars 
are  Gods,  and  the  total  Cosmos  is  a  God." 
Here  is  an  element  which  later  Neo-Hellenism 
will  develop  with  a  luxuriant  imagination. 

In  the  same  chapter  is  the  following  thought: 
"The  Soul  does  not,  by  cutting  up  itself  into 
small  particles,  impart  life  to  individuals,  but  all 
these  it  vivifies  through  the  Whole  of  itself;  it 
is  present  everywhere  (i.e.  in  each  part  and  par- 
ticle) as  Whole,  assimilating  itself  therein  to  the 
creative  parent,  both  in  respect  to  its  unity  and 
multiplicity  (or  ubiquity)."  A  very  significant 
insight  is  this,  showing  that  Plotinus  had  glimpses 
of  the  fundamental  fact  of  the  Soul  as  Ego  or 
Self,  which  we  have  already  named  the  Psychosis. 
For  every  separate  act  of  the  Soul  is  to  be 
grasped  as  the  total  process  of  the  Soul ;  in 
every  division  or  stage  of  it  exists  the  whole 
Soul  in  threefold  movement.  Still  Plotinus 
does  not  distinctly  seize  and  formulate  the  Soul 
as  process,  though  there  arc  many  intimations 
and  adumbrations  thereof  in  these  J^iiiicnds. 
Nor  must  we  leave  out  the  further  hint  that  Soul 


634         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is,  in  the  above-mentioned  activity,  truly  creative, 
like  unto  "its  creative  parent,"  who  is  an  Ego 
or  Person.     So    our  philosopher  struggles  ^\i\\ 
his  conception  of  the  All-Soul,  seeking  to  explain 
its  embodiment  in  .the  Cosmos  as  well  as  in  the 
individual,  by  the   dividing  of  the  Whole  which 
in  its  divisions  still  remains  Whole.     All  this  is 
a  faint  and  far-off  image  of  the  Pampsychosis, 
which  is  here  expressed   abstractly,  without  the 
inner  process  of  the  Self.     Still  the  latter  too  is 
suggested  in  this  same  chapter:   "  Our  own  Soul 
is  similar  in  form  (^homoeides)  to  the  elder  God," 
who  is  the  All-Soul,  and  is  the  cause  of  the  later 
Gods    above    mentioned.     And    if   the  cosmical 
Body  is  an  object  of  pursuit  for  our  thoughts,  be- 
cause it   is    ensouled,    "  why  dost  thou   neglect 
thine  own  Soul,  running  after  another?     Admir- 
ing the  Soul  in  another,  admire  thyself."     Such 
a  subjective  psychical  turn  we   can  often  find  in 
Plotinus,  but  rather  as  a  premonition  than  as  a 
principle.     He   has    at   least    directed   the   Soul 
inwards,  with  the  possibility  of  seeing  something 
there  corresponding  to  the  All-Soul.     Of  course 
if  he  would  push  this  insight  to  its  conclusion, 
he  would  have  to  reconstruct  his  whole  system 
by  it,  and  become  psychological  instead  of  phi- 
losophical.      Any    such    mighty    stride   at    that 
period  and  in  his  environment  is  impossil)le,  for 
the  greatest  thinker    can   only  philosophize    his 
own   world.      Plotiiuis   having    caught    just    a 


PL  0  TIN'  US.  —  PHYSICS.  635 

glimpse  of  the  Pampsycnosis,  must  drop  it,  for 
if  it  once  rose  to  his  supra-rational  One  and  be- 
gan ordering  the  same,  astonishing  would  be  the 
metamorphosis  of  the  Plotinian  universe. 

But  what  was  the  Cosmos  before  the  Soul  en- 
tered it  and  transfigured  it  in  a  living  Whole? 
"  It  was  a  dead  body,  earth  and  water,  or  rather 
the  darkness  of  matter  and  non-Being,  hateful  to 
the  Gods,  as  some  one  says."  Here,  then,  we 
have  come  upon  the  antecedent  element,  that 
which  the  World-Soul  found  before  itself  ready 
for  its  formative  breath. 

II.  Matter.  —  The  tirst  necessity  of  Matter  lies 
in  the  fact  that  the  Soul  must  form  something 
absolutely,  which  something  is,  therefore,  pre- 
existent  and  formless.  This  is  the  substrate  {hi/- 
pokeimenon)  of  all  material  bodies,  which  never 
changes  amid  the  manifold  changes  of  form  in 
physical  objects.  Water,  for  instance,  has  the 
three  forms,  vapor,  liquid,  and  solid,  yet  its  sub- 
strate is  one  and  indestructible.  This  substrate 
is  the  Plotinian  conception  of  Matter,  which  he 
describes  at  considerable  length  and  with  no  small 
labor,  since  he  declares  it  to  be  without  qualities . 
Still  he  has  somehow  to  qualify  with  predicates 
that  which  properly  has  no  predicates.  Herein 
we  shall  follow  him,  endeavoring  to  think  a  con- 
tradiction,  which  is  just  the  profoundest  fact  of 
Matter,  as  it  is  the  self-opposed,  the  self-nega- 
tive,    the   self -contradictory,     fluug     down    by 


636         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Plotinus  to  the  bottom  of  his  Universe,  where 
all  is  dark  {shoteinon),  the  gloomy  abysm 
(hythos). 

The  first  determination  of  Matter,  then,  is  that 
it  is  the  undetermined,  chaotic,  without  form.  It 
is  the  infinite  as  such  (apeiron)  which  the  Greek 
plastic  spirit  shunned  as  the  Ugly  and  damned  as 
the  Bad.  Yet  the  Greek  philosophic  spirit  had  to 
recognize  it  as  the  primordial  stuff  out  of  which 
all  forms  are  produced.  So  Plotinus  as  thinker 
philosophizes  Matter,  but  with  the  feeling  of  the 
artist  he  sends  it  down  below  into  the  Erebos  of 
monstrosities  where  dwell  Gorgons,  Hydras  and 
Chimceras  dire  —  the  poetic  shapes  of  the  shape- 
less. It  is  the  other  side  of  the  Universe,  the 
other  pole  of  it,  opposite  to  the  Supreme  One  on 
the  top  of  the  All. 

Another  predicate  (negative,  to  be  sure)  which 
is  applied  to  Matter  is  that  it  is  without  Body, 
being  that  out  of  which  Body  is  produced  by  the 
Soul.  "  Corporeity  is  a  certain  form  or  a  cer- 
tain reason  which,  getting  to  be  in  Matter,  makes 
Body."  (Unn.  II.  7,  3.)  Herein  we  see  that 
Body  is  divided  into  its  two  constituents.  Form 
and  Matter;  when  the  Form  is  taken  away  Body 
drops  down  to  Matter,  which  is  thus  a  separation, 
really  a  separation  of  the  Soul  from  its  unity 
with  the  Body.  In  this  comes  to  view  another 
important  predicate  which  Plotinus  applies  to 
Matter;   it  is  Privation    (^aieresus),    the    World's 


PL  O  TINVS.  —  PHYSICS.  637 

orand  deprivation  of  its  Soul,  Such  a  condition 
he  likewise  calls  absolute  Poverty  (penia  pan- 
teles),  also  the  desert,  the  solitude,  the  shadow 
of  existence,  w^hich  is  not,  and  the  non-Being 
which  nevertheless  is. 

In  such  fashion  Plotinus  seeks  to  brinar  before 
our  minds  the  conception  of  pure  negativity, 
which  runs  through  all  his  stages  of  descent. 
Hence  Nous  as  the  primal  separation  from  the 
One  has  a  material  element  (hi/Ie  noeic).  In 
like  manner  the  Soul  in  its  manifold  divisions 
shows  that  which  is  at  bottom  Matter,  which  is 
thus  the  ver}^  principle  of  multiplicity  and  of  all 
distinction.  In  this  sense  we  can  truly  say  that 
without  Matter  there  would  be  no  Nous,  no 
Intellect,  no  self-consciousness.  There  w^ould 
never  be  any  separation  from  the  Primal  One, 
whose  characteristic  is  to  be  the  unseparated,  the 
completely  immaterial.  No  Bodj^  no  Soul,  no 
Eeason  without  Matter ;  indeed  that  first  over- 
flow of  the  Supernal  One  secretly  implies  Mat- 
ter, w^hich  gradually  purifies  itself  into  pure 
Negation  or  pure  Privation  and  Separation  which 
is  Matter.  The  separative  stage  in  man  and  in 
the  world  is  thus  abstracted,  taken  by  itself,  and 
looked  at  in  its  purity.  Hence  Matter  is  a  very 
important  concept  in  the  scheme  of  Plotinus; 
without  it  indeed  there  w^ould  be  no  scheme.  It 
is  the  opposite  of  the  undifferenced  One,  and 
so  is  the  One  containing:  all  difference. 


638        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

We  place  Matter  under  Physics  since  it  reaches 
its  complete  abstraction  as  Body  deprived  of 
Soul.  Still  Plotinus  indicates  a  material  prin- 
ciple in  the  noetic  world  also,  where  it  appears 
in  the  image  (^eidolon)  but  not  in  the  form 
(morphe)  as  sensible.  Being  in  itself  separation, 
it  belongs  to  the  separative  stage  of  the  physical 
realm,  which  is  likewise  the  second  or  separative 
stage  of  the  total  Norm  of  Plotinus  (see  this 
Norm  outlined  on  p.  614-6). 

Thus  pure  Matter  is  not  simply  separation,  but 
the  separation  in  all  separation.  It  remains  not 
merely  passive,  but  becomes  active.  As  nega- 
tive it  has  two  phases;  one  is  only  absence,  a 
mere  nothing;  the  other  is  a  working  power. 
Poverty  is  the  absence  of  wealth,  but  this  ab- 
sence is  also  an  active  negative  presence  —  is  an 
evil.  "Whatever  lacks  anything  but  can  get 
what  it  lacks,  may  become  a  mean  between  good 
and  evil,  if  perchance  it  be  equally  related  to 
both  sides;  but  whatever  has  nothing  at  all,  as 
being  in  poverty,  or  rather  as  being  Poverty  itself, 
is  of  necessity  evil  "  (^Enn.  II.  4.  16).  That  is. 
Matter  as  simple  privation  may  be  indifferent, 
intermediate  between  good  and  evil;  but  Matter 
virulent,  as  the  active  privation,  may  de^Drive  the 
Soul  of  wisdom,  of  virtue,  of  beauty.  At  this 
point  the  physical  world  shows  a  new  stage. 

Matter  is  deemed  by  Plotinus  as  the  Soul  in 
complete  estrangement  from  itself,  which  is  man- 


PL  0  TIN  US.  —  PHYSICS.  639 

ifested  iu  the  lapse  to  Evil.  Matter  has  a  more 
important  place  in  his  system  than  in  that  of 
either  Plato  or  Aristotle,  from  whom  he  derives 
his  thought  of  it  primarily.  Plato  makes  it 
chiefly  the  passive  material  for  the  Demiurge ; 
with  Aristotle  it  is  potential  Being.  But  Ploti- 
nus  gives  it  an  active  negative  power  as  Priva- 
tion, which  drags  the  Soul  down  to  its  antipodes 
in  the  grand  descent. 

III.  Evil.  — The  negative,  destructive  element, 
which  has  unfolded  out  of  Nature,  turns  back 
upon  Nature  and  assails  it.  Thus  Body  becomes 
Evil,  since  it  as  virulent  Matter  is  hostile  to  the 
Soul  united  with  itself.  The  great  struo-gle 
between  the  supersensible  and  the  sensible 
worlds  has  its  source  here ;  Soul  and  Matter 
wedded  in  the  Body  have  made  the  Universe 
resound  with  their  quarrel,  and  it  is  not  done 
yet. 

The  pre-existence  of  the  Soul  before  entering 
the  Body,  and  thus  causing  Evil,  is  a  doctrine 
strongly  maintained  by  Plotinus.  The  Soul 
after  death  migrates ;  if  it  is  worthy  it  ascends 
into  the  supersensible  world  and  d\vells  among 
spirits;  if  unworthy,  it  enters  a  new  bodj^ 
according  as  inclination  leads  it ;  it  may  becom? 
an  animal  if  its  propensities  are  bestial;  or  it 
may  sink  down  into  pure  Matter  as  a  mere  cipher 
or  as  a  destructive  fiend.  Plotinus  was  a  fol- 
lower  of    Plato,  who  also  holds  the  doctrine  of 


640        ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

transmigration,  wliicli  probably  came  to  both 
Pythagoras  and  Plato  from  Egypt.  ButPlotiuus 
who  was  a  born  Egyptian  may  have  had  in  him- 
self an  ancestral  strand  of  belief  in  metempsy- 
chosis deeper  than  his  Platonism.  However  this 
may  be,  the  Soul  by  its  own  destiny,  not  by 
choice  or  calculation,  slips  into  a  Body  and  the 
wrestle  begins.  Not  consciously  does  the  great 
event  transpire,  still  it  lies  in  the  Soul's  own 
nature  to  do  just  this,  unconstrained  from  with- 
out. 

Evil  is,  accordingly,  the  division  which  assails 
the  One  or  the  Good  by  dividing  it  and  so  un- 
doing it.  Separation  separates  unity,  and  there- 
by tears  the  Universe  to  pieces,  which  rending 
of  the  Supreme  One  is  Evil.  Such  is,  however, 
the  result  of  the  primal  overflow  of  the  Supreme 
One,  with  which  the  grand  descent  started, 
ending  in  the  very  opposite  of  the  One  or  of  the 
Good. 

The  question  comes  up  with  Plotinus,  What 
is  the  purpose  of  Evil?  Why  must  the  Soul 
take  this  dip  into  material  existence,  which  it 
is  to  get  out  of  with  all  speed?  An  interesting 
passage  runs  thus :  ' '  Experience  of  Evil  is  a 
more  manifest  knowledge  of  the  Good  for 
weaker  natures  than  the  knowledge  of  Evil  by 
information  without  experience."  (Enn.  IV.  8. 
7.)  Such  is  then  the  argument:  The  Soul  is  to 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Good  consciously 


PL  0  TINUS.  —  PHYSICS.  64 1 

through  the  experience  of  Evil.  For  the  sake 
of  knowledge  is  the  colossal  lapse  of  the  Uni- 
verse into  Evil ;  man  can  now  know  the  Good  and 
return  to  it  throuo;h  wisdom. 

The  Soul,  accordingl}^,  becomes  conscious  of 
its  own  division  into  Soul  and  Matter.  Body 
had  the  same  division,  but  unconscious,  imme- 
diate. Thus  the  Soul  has  become  a  self-con- 
scious individual  knowing  the  Self  and  the  not- 
Self,  or  that  which  is  its  other  or  opposite.  It 
is  different  from  Nous  as  previously  set  forth, 
for  Nous  is  inner  self-consciousness,  is  the  sepa- 
ration into  subject  and  object,  while  Soul  is  now 
the  deeper  separation  into  the  Ego  and  Non-Ego, 
having  gone  through  the  process  of  the  Negative 
or  of  Evil. 

Plainly  the  Soul  has  at  last  attained  the  knowl- 
edge which  makes  it  a  moral  Ego.  As  simply 
one  with  the  Body,  it  was  an  animal,  unaware  of 
the  deepest  fact  of  itself  and  hence  not  responsi- 
ble. But  the  separation  takes  place.  Matter  by 
itself  gets  to  be  destructive,  yea  soul-destructive  ; 
the  Soul  becomes  conscious  of  havmg  a  destroyer 
bound  up  Avith  itself,  which  destroj^cr  it  must 
subordinate  or  perish.  The  bottom  of  the  de- 
scent is  reached  in  the  self-conscious  Ego,  and 
therewith  the  whirl  upwards  begins. 

Evil  lies  implicitly  in  all  emanation,  or  other- 
ing  of  the  One  or  the  Good,  and  really  reaches 
back  to  the   first  overflow  as  its    source.     This 

41 


642         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

unconscious  One  above  lapses  till  it  reaches  the 
self-conscious  one  below  which  is  the  individual 
Soul  as  ethical.  Evil,  therefore,  concludes  what 
we  have  called  the  physical  or  phenomenal  stage, 
since  the  Soul  goes  back  to  itself  in  Body  and 
becomes  aware  of  itself  as  different  from  Body, 
Nature,  or  the  World.  This  is  the  great  turning 
point  in  the  Plotinian  system ;  the  Universe  has 
descended  till  it  reaches  the  self-conscious  Ego, 
which  is  the  pivot,  being  able  to  turn  around  on 
itself,  and  to  know  its  past,  its  descent,  and  to 
rise  out  of  the  same.  This  rise  is,  accordingly, 
what  comes  next. 

III.  Ethics. 

The  Soul,  having  reached  the  bottom  of  its 
descent,  is  now  to  return  to  the  top,  overcoming 
the  various  stages  of  separation  which  it  has 
passed  through  in  the  lapse.  In  a  general  way 
the  line  of  return  is  that  of  descent,  though  an 
exact  co-incidence  must  not  be  expected.  The 
Eo;o  havinoj  won  consciousness,  the  knowledo;e  of 
good  and  evil,  is  to  flee  from  the  sense-life  and 
strive  to  get  back  to  the  primal  One,  union 
with  which  is  blessedness.  This  return  is  eth- 
ical in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term,  not  simply 
moral,  but  also  religious  and  contemplative.  It 
is  the  journey  of  the  Soul  back  to  its  source,  the 


PL  0  TIKUS  —  E  THICS.  643 

restoration  to  God  out  of  separatioD,  the  grand 
epish'ojjhe  of  the  whole  Plotinian  system. 

The  ethical  rise  has  its  starting-point  in  the 
AVill  of  the  individual  which  can  now  choose  be- 
tween the  two  courses,  the  Descent  and  the 
Ascent.  Hitherto  there  was  no  such  choice ; 
necessity  ruled  the  Descent  from  the  top  to  the 
bottom,  but  at  this  bottom  is  found  freedom. 
The  lapse  is  therefore  to  freedom  which  is  the 
true  Evil  of  the  Universe.  God  overflows  "  with- 
out any  motion  of  will."  Plotinus  intimates 
that  the  origfin  of  the  Bad  is  "  man's  wish  to  do 
as  he  pleases."  Capricious  liberty  is,  indeed, 
not  good,  but  institutional  liberty  is  unknown  to 
Plotinus.  There  is  only  one  way  out:  man  is 
to  travel  back  the  long  line  of  his  lapse,  and 
reach  the  essence  beyond  essence  (epekeina 
ousias),  the  supra-essential  One.  This  is  in  gen- 
eral the  ethical  movement  of  our  philosopher. 

Plotinus  seems  to  say  in  a  well-known  passage 
{Enn.  I.  3.  1)  that  Music  (or  Art),  Love  and 
Philosophy  are  the  three  ways  to  the  attainment 
of  the  One  or  the  Supreme  Good.  Now  what 
he  really  declares  is  that  the  musician,  the  lover 
and  the  philosopher  are  naturally  adapted  for 
such  elevation.  But  he  does  not  affirm  that  the 
ways  of  these  three  are  the  only  ways  upward. 
On  the  contrary  he  gives  quite  a  number  of 
other  waj^s  in  his  work,  though  they  are  not 
systematically  arranged  and  co-ordinated.      Plo- 


6  4 4         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tiiius  shows  a  certain  impatience  in  staying 
below;  he  makes  his  start  in  the  lower  spheres 
and  then  rushes  upward  without  elaborating  the 
stages  of  his  flight.  These  have  to  be  put 
together  out   of  the  different  parts  of  his  book. 

It  seems  to  us  that  we  have  been  able  to  find 
in  Plotiuus  three  leading  paths  of  ethical  ascent, 
and  that  these  three  paths  are  capable  of  minor 
subdivisions.  It  must  be  repeated  than  any 
such  precise  formulation  is  not  found  in  Plo- 
tinus,  who  is  not  easily  detained  below  by  a 
system,  since  in  his  case  the  essence  of  Being  is 
above  essence  (or  supra-essential).  We  name 
the  three  paths  as  follows:  (1)  Praxis,  the 
moral  life,  or  the  practice  of  the  Virtues;  (2) 
Theoria,  which  embraces  all  forms  of  contem- 
plative life;  (3)  Ecsfasis,  the  final  union  of  the 
Soul  with  the  One,  which,  is,  therefore,  the 
ultimate  purpose  and  realization  of  this  phi- 
losophy. 

I.  Praxis. —  This  pertains,  in  general,  to  the 
moral  life,  to  the  training  of  the  individual  to 
Virtue.  It  is,  therefore,  but  a  phase  or  stage  of 
the  total  ethical  process,  dealing  with  outer  con- 
duct more  than  inner,  with  the  Soul  (Psyclte) 
more  than  with  JSTous.  But  to  Plotinus  morality 
has  not  the  all-absorbino;  sionificance  which  we 
have  seen  it  to  have  in  certain  phases  of  Hellen- 
isticism.  Nor  has  it  the  same  prominent  place 
in  Neo- Hellenism  that  it  has  in  the  great  Hel- 


PLOTINUS.— ETHICS.  045 

lenic  philosophers,  Phito  and  Aristotle.  Their 
hiy;he.st  Virtue  was  institutional,  which  with 
Plotinus  is  the  lowest,  since  institutions  have 
little  or  no  meaning  for  him.  One  may  well  ask, 
How  could  he  believe  in  them,  living  in  such  a 
State  as  the  Roman  Empire  of  his  time?  If  the 
State  determined  the  moral  individual  (as  both 
Plato  and  Aristotle  maintain),  that  Roman  State 
could  only  make  man  immoral.  So  Plotinus 
really  throws  overboard  the  institutional  world, 
but  out  of  respect  for  his  great  masters  assigns 
a   little  corner  in  his  scheme  to  political  Virtue. 

The  general  character  of  Virtue  in  the  account 
of  Plotinus  is  negative  more  than  positive;  it 
consists  chiefly  in  the  suppression  of  the  sensuous 
nature  of  man,  when  the  Soul  will  of  itself  begin 
the  ethical  ascent.  The  universal  form  of  Virtue 
is  the  indifference  to  the  blows  of  fate  and  to 
external  fortune ;  its  end  is  the  inner  discipline 
of  the  Ego,  which  quite  corresponds  to  the  Stoic 
apathy.  By  moral  practice  the  Ego  is  not  de- 
termined by  the  sense-world  in  which  it  has  to 
dwell  temporarily. 

All  virtues  are  purificatory  (^Enn.  I.  2.  7)  in 
character  or  at  least  have  a  purificatory  stage ; 
their  object  is  to  free  the  Soul  of  its  sensuous 
determination.  "  Virtue  pertains  to  the  Soul, 
not  to  the  N'ous  or  to  the  One  beyond  the  JSfous.''' 
Enn.  II.  2.  3.)  The  moral  act  is  "  to  separate 
the   Soul  from   the   Body  ' '  and  to  restore  it  to 


646         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

its  original  uncontaminated  purity  from  Matter. 
This  is  "to  gather  itself  up  from  different 
places,"  from  its  separated,  scattered  condition 
in  its  Body  and  so  to  become  entirely  impassive 
(I.  2.  5)  having  regained  its  original  unity. 

Though  virtue  as  such  properly  pertains  to 
the  Soul,  still  the  idea  or  pattern  {paradeigina) 
lies  back  in  the  Nous,  or  Intellect,  which,  there- 
fore, determines  and  orders  the  virtues.  Indeed 
this  pattern  may  itself  be  deemed  a  higher  vir- 
tue, while  the  lower  corresponding  virtue  is  that 
of  the  Soul.  For  instance,  temperance  is  a 
political  (or  social)  virtue  m  Plato;  yet  the 
truly  good  man  will  not  live  the  life  which  such 
a  virtue  demands,  but  "  fleeing  from  it  he  will 
choose  the  life  of  the  Gods,"  who  belong  to 
Nous.  "For  the  assimilation  should  be  to 
these  and  not  to  good  men  "  who  are  themselves 
but  an  image  of  the  Gods.  Hence  Virtue  must 
rise  above  the  Soul  into  JSFous,  copying  the 
original  itself,  and  not  staying  with  the  image  of 
an  image.     (See  Enn.  I.  2.  7.) 

Thus  before  Plotinus  hover  three  sorts  of 
virtues,  or  perchance  each  virtue  may  have 
three  stages — the  political,  the  purificatory 
(cathartic),  and  the  paradeigmatic.  It  is  mani- 
fest that  these  stages  are  an  adjustment  to  his 
philosophical  Korm  —  the  Sense-world,  the  Soul- 
world,  and  the  Nous-world.  He  is  not  altogether 
consistent  in  his  account  of  the  relation  of  virtue 


PL  0  TIN  US.  —  E  THICS.  647 

to  these  stages,  as  the  reader  will  note.  Of 
course  virtue  cannot  be  predicated  of  the  supra- 
natural  One,  since  this  is  also  supra-moral. 
So  we  see  in  the  present  as  in  other  cases  that  the 
end  of  morality  is  to  transcend  morality,  or  that 
the  Plotinian  morality  is  transcendental.  Even 
the  essence  of  Being  has  now  became  supra- 
essential  (  hyperousion ) . 

Later  Neo-Platonists  added  other  divisions  of 
the  virtues,  but  these  three  are  the  fundi' mental 
ones.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  new  Platonic 
Eepublic  of  Plotinus,  the  Platonopolis,  was  not 
for  embodying  the  cardinal  virtues  —  justice, 
temperance,  fortitude,  wisdom, as  political,  but 
as  paradeigmatic.  The  philosophers  there  were 
not  to  rule  a  city  with  people  in  it,  but  were  to 
devote  themselves  to  the  cultivation  of  the  para- 
deigmatic virtues,  dictated  or  determined  by  the 
Nous. 

Thus  virtue  as  practical  {praxis)  rises  to 
intellect,  in  which  there  must  be  vision  (^theoria) 
of  the  pattern  or  idea.  The  practice  of  the 
virtues  becomes  their  contemplation  also,  with 
which  we  have  entered  a  new  phase  of  the  ethical 
ascent  to  the  Supreme  One. 

II.  Theoria  —  The  Contemplative  World. 
The  present  subject  (or  World)  occupies  a  very 
important  place  in  the  scheme  of  Plotinus. 
With  him  the  Soul  is  to  rise  out  of  the  sensible 
to  the  supra-sensible  realm   through  Contempla- 


648         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tiou  or  Vision.  This  is  really  the  inner  self- 
activity  of  the  Ego  which  is  now  to  retrace  its 
steps,  to  ascend  toward  the  first  source,  the  One 
along  the  general  path  by  which  it  descended. 
The  Soul  when  it  has  sunk  to  the  bottom  of  the 
Universe  and  is  materialized,  or  rather  completely 
individualized,  has  as  its  prime  function  to  undo 
its  fall,  and  to  regain  its  first  unity  with  the  All. 
The  ultimate  duty  of  the  individual  is  to  get  rid 
of  his  individuahty.  The  one  only  One  over- 
flowed somehow  and  produced  him ;  he  is  now  to 
compel  that  Supreme  One  to  take  him  back  into 
the  orio-inal  Oneness  from  which  there  is,  theo- 
retically  at  least,  no  separation. 

Theoria  or  Contemplation  shows  always  an 
ascent  of  the  Soul  from  the  sense-world  to  the 
pure  forms  of  the  nous-world,  which  is  just 
below  the  supra-rational  One,  the  great  object  of 
attainment.  Between  these  ^vorlds  run  three 
roads.  Art,  Kehgion,  and  Philosophy,  each  of 
which  is  a  Theoria  with  a  sensuous,  psychic,  and 
noetic  stage.  That  is,  the  Soul  is  to  behold  the 
Beautiful,  Godhood  and  Science,  iu  its  complete 
ascent  to  the  Supreme  One,  who  is,  however, 
supra-beautiful,  supra-religious,  and  supra-philo- 
sophical. Thus  Theoria,  after  having  disciplined 
itself  in  all  the  stages  of  Art,  Eeligion  and  Phi- 
losophy, must  rise  above  itself  in  order  to  reach 
its  purpose.  All  of  which  will  be  briefly  outlined 
in  the  following  details. 


PL  O  TINUS.  —  E  Tines.  G4  9 

1.  Art.  Through  the  contemplation  of  the 
Beautiful  we  rise  out  of  the  sensible  realm 
to  the  supra-sensible,  since  even  the  material 
world  Plotinus  holds  to  be  l)eautiful.  Still  it  is 
Form  and  not  Matter  which  is  the  Beautiful 
as  object  of  sense,  and  it  is  this  Form  which 
we  are  to  separate  from  its  material  part  and 
contemplate.  In  this  way  art  becomes  an  ethical 
trainer  of  the  Soul  to  the  su[)ra-scnsiljle. 

Of  the  Beautiful  Plotinus  seems  to  have  three 
different  phases  before  him,  corresponding  to  the 
descendiug  series  —  Nous  (Intellect),  Psyche 
(Soul),  and  Matter  (Hyle).  The  ascent  through 
the  contemplation  of  Beauty  may  be  conceived 
as  follows :  — 

(a)  Sensuous  Beauty;  in  spite  of  his  depre- 
ciation of  the  sense-world,  Plotinus  is  too  much 
of  a  classic  Greek  not  to  enjoy  and  praise 
its  beauty.  His  return  to  Hellenism  is  too 
complete,  he  cannot  leave  out  one  of  its  most 
distinctive  characteristics.  Herein  also  he  differs 
from  his  Christian  antagonists,  who  despise  the 
beautiful  world  both  of  Nature  and  Art  (see 
Ennead  II.  9,  which  is  directed  particularly 
against  the  Christians).  Still  Plotinus  regards 
sensuous  Beauty  as  something  to  be  transcended  ; 
the  Form  or  Idea  finds  no  fitting  home  for 
itself  in  Matter,  which  is,  after  all,  the  bad, 
the  negative,  the  damnable.  Hence  the  Beautiful 
must  rise  out  of  it  to  the  supra-sensible  realm, 


6oO         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(Jj)  Psychic  Beauty,  or  the  Beauty  of  the 
Soul  in  itself ;  this  is  seen  when  the  Soul  mani- 
fests itself  in  the  virtues,  in  all  noble  activities, 
in  worthy  deeds.  Here  is  likewise  a  contempla- 
tion of  the  Beautiful  by  which  we  ascend  to  the 
higher  sphere  of  Soul.  Art  we  still  call  it,  being 
a  manifestion,  though  not  a  material  one.  Hence 
the  Form  may  be  deemed  purer,  even  if  it  needs 
still  an  act  for  its  appearance.  Hence  we 
ascend  a  step  beyond,  to  JSfous. 

(c)  Noetic  Beauty;  the  Forms  of  things 
which  have  made  the  material  world  beautiful, 
and  also  the  moral  world  of  action,  are  now  seen 
in  a  world  of  their  o\ni\  (^cosmos  iioeios).  Not 
an  outward  appearance  have  they  here,  but  as 
they  are  in  themselves  they  exist,  indeed  as 
Gods.  This  is  the  realm  of  primal  Beauty, 
from  which  all  other  sorts  of  Beauty  flow. 
Contemplation  now  beholds  the  beautiful  Gods, 
not  their  statues  or  images,  or  even  their  deeds. 
Such  is  truly  the  vision  of  the  artist ;  for  Phidias 
fashioned  the  statue  of  Zeus  not  after  some 
perceived  object,  but  from  the  sight  of  the  God 
himself  (^Enn.  V.  8.  1).  Only  as  a  copy  of  the 
Idea  in  the  noetic  world  is  the  sensuous  object 
beautiful,  whose  true  effect  is  to  carry  the 
beholder  back  to  its  source  in  the  Nous. 

But  even  this  is  not  the  highest  attainment ;  be- 
yond the  Nous  is  still  the  One  in  which  the  many 
Ideas   or   Forms    are   to    vanish.     Here  lies  the 


PL  0  TINUS.  —  E  TIIICS.  65 1 

supra-be«autiful  realm,  out  of  which  is  the  pri- 
mordial overflow  into  all  these  beautiful  worlds 
above  designated — noetic,  psychic  and  material. 
Thus  the  complete  movement  of  Beauty  is  to  get 
rid  of  itself  and  pass  beyond ;  its  ethical  purport 
is  its  evanishment.  Art  is  a  kind  of  beholding 
or  vision ;  as  such ,  it  ceases  when  it  has  served 
its  purpose,  since  all  vision  is  a  separation  into 
subject  and  object  which  the  Supreme  One  can- 
not admit  into  itself.  So  the  final  view  of  Art 
is  to  see  it  leading  beyond  Art;  the  final  view  of 
the  Beautiful  is  its  form  disappearing  into  the 
supra-l)eautiful. 

"\A'hen  through  the  Beautiful  the  Soul  is  borne 
up  to  the  noetic  or  intelligible  world,  it  finds 
there  the  realm  of  the  Gods,  the  archetj^pal 
Forms  which  the  artist  is  to  copy.  But  this 
realm  of  the  Gods  exists  in  its  own  right  and  can 
be  reached  in  another  w^a}',  which  Plotinus  does 
not  neglect  —  Religion.  This  is  also  res^arded 
as  a  form  of  Contemplation  by  which  the  Soul 
is  brought  into  communion  with  the  One. 

2.  Religion.  The  great  end  of  the  scheme 
of  Plotinus  as  of  all  Neo-Hellenists  may  be 
deemed  religious,  being  the  unity  of  the  soul 
with  God,  or  with  the  Supreme  One.  Plotinus 
is  ready  to  employ  the  transmitted  Religion, 
especially  of  Greece,  as  a  means  of  ascent  to  the 
Divine ;  still  he  emploj's  it  as  philosopher  rather 
than  as  a  l^elicver.  In  other  words  he  philosophizes 


652         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Eelitrion  far  more  than  he  religionizes  Phik)so- 
ph}^  this  hitter  being  rather  the  attitude  of  Jani- 
blichus.  Herein  he  follows  the  Neo-Pythago- 
reans,  and  differs  from  the  Platonizing  Jews  of 
Pliilo's  pattern,  both  of  whom  we  have  already 
found  in  the  religious  movement  of  Hellenisti- 
cism.  It  may  be  questioned  if  Plotinus  had 
much  direct  spontaneous  faith  in  the  Greek  or 
any  Gods,  in  the  plural,  but  he  certainly  had  an 
immediate  faith  in  the  one  God  above  all  Gods. 
His  manifold  deities  and  demons  are  hardly  more 
than  forms  for  his  concepts,  though  their  names 
be  taken  from  the  popular  Keligion.  His  poly- 
theism is  an  inferior  thing,  an  overflow  and  de- 
scent from  his  monotheism  or  monism.  So  the 
One  emanates  the  whole  Pantheon  intoa  descend- 
ino-  system.  But  beside  its  deities  Eeligion  has 
my  thus  and  worship,  all  of  which  Plotinus 
brings  into  line  with  his  thought. 

(a)  As  to  his  Gods,  the  first  grade  is  to  be 
assio-ned  to  jSFoas,  being  the  first  emanation,  as  we 
have  previously  seen.  In  this  fact  we  may  well 
read  that  Thought  is  the  highest  derived  God, 
who,  however,  is  divided  up  into  many  Thoughts 
or  Ideas,  or  into  many  forms  of  Nous.  Another 
grade  of  divine  Beings  is  the  heavenly  bodies, 
then  the  class  of  demons  follows. 

(6)  Plotinus  has  an  extensive  interpretation 
of  the  stories  of  the  Gods,  of  their  Mythology 
in  which  he  finds  philosophical  concepts.     The 


PL  0  TINUS.  —  E  Tines.  G53 

mythical  form  is  translated  into  the  thought  of 
the  Ph)tinian  system.  Homer  in  particular  en- 
tices him  to  an  explanation  of  the  inner  meaning 
of  poetic  shapes  and  occurrences.  Of  course, 
Plotinus  was  not  the  first  to  employ  this  sort  of 
interpretation.  Really  it  is  as  old  as  Homer 
himself,  who  can  be  detected  in  places  allegori- 
zing his  deities,  and  also  personifying  his  abstrac- 
tions. 

(c)  To  Religion  also  belongs  worship  with 
rites,  prayers,  images,  etc.  The  worship  of 
idols,  to  which  the  old  Greek  philosophers  ob- 
jected, Plotinus  defends  by  his  doctrine  of  sym- 
pathy {Enn.  IV.  3,  11).  The  image  of  the 
God,  patterned  after  his  Idea  in  the  realm  of 
Nous,  has  the  power  of  mediating  the  worshipper 
with  the  God.  In  like  manner  the  God  hears 
the  prayers  of  the  supplicant,  since  all  things 
above  and  below  are  connected  in  a  sympathetic 
or  magic  relation,  which  the  individual  through 
worship  may  be  able  to  set  in  motion. 

Thus  Plotinus  philosophizes  Religion,  which 
he  received  in  its  estabhshed  form.  Herein  Neo- 
Hellenism  can  be  seen  running  counter  to  the 
general  movement  of  the  early  Hellenic  Period, 
which  turned  away  from  the  popular  Religion. 
Plato  indeed,  as  a  born  poet  and  myth-maker, 
often  mythologizes  his  philosophy,  moulding  the 
myth  anew  according  to  his  conception.  But 
Plotinus    does    the    converse :     he    philosophizes 


664         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

mythology,  which  is  the  given,  accepted  thing, 
to  be  transformed  as  it  is  into  philosophic 
thousrht.  Such  a  treatment  means  an  outer  con- 
formity  to  the  positive  Religion  of  the  time,  even 
if  it  does  not  mean  an  inner  acceptance  thereof. 
The  trend  of  the  age  was  religious,  the  world 
was  seeking  God.  So  Plotinus  wheels  into  line 
Religion  as  a  means  of  the  Soul's  rise  to  the  one 
God,  through  the  vision  of  and  communion  with 
the  many  Gods  of  the  received  polytheism. 

The  preceding  account  of  Religion  as  em- 
ployed by  Plotinus  gives  its  descent  from  the 
One.  But  its  true  ethical  conception  must  pro- 
ceed the  other  way,  which  is  the  rise  of  the 
Soul  or  Self  to  the  One  through  Religion.  This 
will  have  its  sensuous  or  immediate  stage  in  the 
external  rites  and  worship;  thence  it  will  show  a 
psychic  (or  imaginative)  stage  in  the  history  of 
the  Gods,  or  Mythology ;  finally  the  noetic 
stage  shows  the  Gods  as  they  are  in  themselves, 
and  demands  some  kind  of  Theology. 

In  this  field,  then,  Philosophy  begins  to  take 
hold  of  Religion  and  to  transform  the  same  into 
itself,  philosophizing  all  religious  forms  and 
stages.  But  Philosophy  has  its  own  forms  or 
categories,  its  own  process  and  history.  Plo- 
tinus is,  after  all,  the  philosopher;  so  he  will 
not  fail  to  give  an  account  of  his  own  science  in 
this  connection. 

3.  Philoso2:)1ii/.     This  term  has  been  already 


PL  0  TINUS  —  E  TIIICS.  655 

used  for  the  entire  movement  of  the  system  of 
Plotinus — Metaphysics,  Physics  and  Ethics. 
But  here  we  employ  the  word  in  a  narrower 
sense,  designating  the  ethical  effect  of  the 
study  of  Philosophy  as  a  means  for  the  Soul's 
ascent  to  the  Supreme  One.  Philosophy  deals 
with  the  knowing  of  the  truth  in  its  present  form, 
the  truth  stripped  of  its  artistic  and  religious 
wrappage.  The  metaphysical  movement,  more 
or  less  hidden  in  the  shapes  of  Art  and  Eeligion, 
is  now  to  be  grasped  as  it  is  in  itself  and  made 
the  discipline  of  the  Soul  (or  Self)  unto  the 
attainment  of  the  Highest  One.  INIan  through 
knowing  or  science  also  is  to  return  to  God. 
Indeed,  Plotinus  as  philosopher  must  deem  this 
the  best  way,  and  the  foundation  of  all  the  other 
ways  to  the  same  end.  He  discusses  the  many 
forms  of  mental  activity  in  knowing,  which  we 
shall  omit  except  the  following  main  ones :  — 

(a)  Sensuous  knowing  or  sense-perception  is 
naturally  placed  lowest  by  Plotinus,  who  regards 
it  as  a  faint  shadowy  indication  of  the  Idea  or 
the  Truth  lying  in  the  supra-sensible  realm. 
The  senses,  as  determined  by  the  outer,  material 
world,  belong  to  the  impure  part  of  our  nature 
and  are  to  be  transcended  by  the  training  of 
Philosophy,  not  only  for  the  sake  of  our  morals 
but  also  for  the  sake  of  our  knowledge. 

(6)  Representative  (or  psj'chic)  knowing  is 
higher,  since  the    Soul  now   reaches  the  supra- 


656        ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

sensible,  and  deals  with  its  own  forms,  as  in 
memory,  imagination,  and  also  reflection.  Yet 
these  forms  are  derived  from  the  sense-world,  as 
images,  judgments,  inferences.  Thus  the  Soul 
(Psyche)  works  over  the  shapes  of  sensation  into 
its  own  manifold  combinations.  But  whence 
comes  this  its  power?  From  a  higher  source 
than  itself,  to  which  we  may  next  look. 

(c)  Dialectic  (or  noetic)  knowing  is  the  true 
science,  whose  ultimate  ground  or  principles 
must  be  sought  for  in  the  JVous.  We  have  the 
advantage  of  a  special  dissertation  on  the 
Dialectic  by  Plotinus  (^Enn.  I.  3).  It  enables  us 
"to  say  rationally  what  each  thing  is,  wherein 
it  differs  from  other  things,  and  what  is  the 
common  principle  of  those  things  in  which  it 
is."  It  deals  "with  science  and  not  with 
opinion ;  it  causes  the  Soul  to  cease  from  wan- 
dering about  in  the  Sense-world  and  to  take  its 
position  in  the  Nous-world  "  (c.  4).  Moreover 
the  Dialectic  is  the  ordering  principle,  being  not 
a  mere  "  collection  of  propositions  and  rules,  but 
deals  with  things  ",  with  the  objective  fact 
(ch.  5).  It  is  indeed  "  the  most  honorable  part 
of  Philosophy,"  the  highest  stage  thereof,  and 
Plotinus  revolts  at  its  being  called  "the  in- 
strument (organon)  of  the  philosopher,"  as  if 
the  latter  employed  it  like  a  tool,  when  rather  it 
employs    him.     In  the  Dialectic,  as  Plotinus  re- 


FL  O  TIXUS.  —  E  THICS.  657 

gartis  it,  Thought  is  grasped  as  the  reality,  and 
orders  itself  and  all  else. 

Thus  we  see  that  Philosophy  here  reaches  the 
highest  point  of  Aristotle,  which  is  Thought- 
thinking-Thought  as  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  the  Universe.  This  is  the  realm  of 
Nous,  to  which  there  has  been  a  rise  of  the 
individual  up  through  the  sensuous  and  psychic 
spheres  by  means  of  Pliil()SO[)hv. 

Looking  back  at  this  whole  movement  of 
TJieoria,  we  find  that  the  same  end  (the  noetic) 
has  been  attained  tlirough  its  two  other  waj's, 
those  of  Art  and  of  Religion.  The  grand 
theoretic  attainment  is,  therefore,  the  realm  of 
the  Nous,  where  are  the  highest  forms  of 
Beauty,  the  highest  Gods  and  the  highest 
Thoughts,  even  that  Thouo;ht  thinkinsf  the 
Thought  of  all  Art,  of  all  Religion,  and  of  all 
Philosophy. 

This  is  essentialh'  the  supreme  Thought  of  the 
Hellenic  Period.  But  Plotinus  is  no  longer  sat- 
isfied with  it,  and  so  he  proceeds  to  that  princi- 
ple which  is  the  chief  characteristic  of  the  Neo- 
Hellenic  Period,  making  this  something  more 
than  a  mere  return  to  and  repetition  of  Hellenism. 
He  will  transcend  the  separation  which  lies  in 
self-consciousness,  in  Thought  thinkino;  Thought, 
and  reach  back  to  the  One  in  which  all  distinc- 
tion and  Reason  itself  vanish  —  to  the  supra- 
rational  One  from  which  the  rational  (noetic), 

42 


658         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

psychical,  and  physical  realms  overflowed  in  a  de- 
scending order.  The  Soul,  however,  is  to  ascend 
through  these  same  grades  to  the  supra-rational 
One,  with  which  it  is  to  become  one,  and  thus 
bring  to  a  final  consummation  its  ethical  process, 
to  whose  third  stage  we  have  now  come. 

III.  EcsTASis. — The  Soul  or  the  individual 
Self  is  now  to  rise  beyond  all  kinds  of  knowing, 
beyond  Nous,  beyond  TJieoria  or  Vision,  since 
it  must  obliterate  the  difference  between  subject 
and  object,  between  the  seeing  and  the  seen. 
Hence  beyond  Art,  Religion  (as  positive)  and 
Philosophy  (as  Hellenic),  is  to  be  the  ascension, 
and  Plotinus,  the  individual,  through  his  indi- 
vidual effort  is  to  break  over  the  bounds  of 
individuality  and  to  become  united  with  the  One 
and  the  All.  Thus  the  final  stage  of  his  Philos- 
ophy is  to  mount  above  all  Philosophy,  and  the 
height  of  his  Reason  transcends  all  Reason. 

In  this  act  our  philosopher  does  not  know 
God  but  is  God ;  he  is  divine  as  much  as 
the  Divinity  Himself.  For  he,  the  philosopher, 
is  no  longer  a  separate  entity,  is  no  longer 
a  Self  properly  or  a  Soul.  He  has  still  experi- 
ences, but  he  has  them  in  God,  and  as  God ; 
these  he  may  remember  if  he  ever  is  ema- 
nated again  as  an  individual  Soul.  Such  is  the 
Ecstasy  (^Ekstasis)  of  Plotinus,  in  which  the 
Self  gets  rid  of    Selfhood,  and  becomes  one  with 


PL  0  TINU8.  —  E  Tm  as.  Co  1) 

the    One,  with    the    Supreme  God    of    Plotmus, 
as  distinct  from  the  many  Gods  of  his  jVous. 

In  this  Ecstasy  we  shall  also  find  a  process  if 
we  carefully  trace  and  put  together  the  discon- 
nected hints  of  our  philosopher. 

(1)  We  must  begin  with  the  Soul  abstracting 
from  all  difference  and  separation  in  the  world 
and  in  itself.  As  self-conscious  intellio-ence,  as 
N'ous  it  must  rid  itself  of  that  selfhood  wdiich 
knows  itself,  and  rise  to  the  '  Unconscious. 
Such  a  negative  power  over  itself  and  its 
own  process  the  Ego  has :  the  sei)arative  stage 
(as  subject-object)  which  makes  it  what  it  is,  it 
must  take  away.     Then  it  is  ready. 

(2)  Keacly  for  what?  For  the  grand  over- 
flow of  the  One  which  can  now  reach  out,  take 
it  up,  and  make  it  one  with  the  One.  When  the 
Soul  is  thus  free  of  all  knowledge,  then  comes  to 
it  "  a  Presence  better  than  knowledge,  inasmuch 
as  the  Soul  suffers  a  separation  from  the  One 
when  it  knows  anything.  It  must  therefore 
transcend  knowledge,  and  hold  aloof  from  every 
beautiful  view,  since  the  Beautiful  comes  after 
and  from  it,  as  all  light  of  the  day  comes  from 
the  Sun."  (Enn.  VI.  9.  4.)  The  great  illustra- 
tion of  the  One  for  Plotiuus  is  the  sun  with  its 
light.  He  is  a  sun-worshiper  witn  the  sun  in- 
ternalized. Into  the  soul  which  has  liberated 
itself  from  division,  the  light  suddenly  enters ; 
"  this  light  is  from  Him  and  is  He  ;  then  we  must 


OnO         ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL OSOPHY. 

consider  Him  to  be  present.  So  the  Soul  without 
light  is  without  God,  and  having  light,  has  what 
it  seeks.  Such  is  the  true  end  of  the  Soul:  to 
receive  that  light,  and  to  see  that  through  which 
it  was  illuminated."  (Enn.Y.  3.  17,  adfinem.) 
Strictly  there  can  be  no  vision  of  the  One,  as 
that  implies  the  very  dualism  which  is  to  be 
gotten  rid  of.  Such  inconsistencies, however,  are 
very  frequent  in  Plotinus  and  often  confusing. 

So  the  illumination  comes  from  without  when 
the  Soul  is  prepared  within.  And  yet  even  these 
terms  are  not  applicable.  It  does  not  come  at 
all,  but  is  already  there,  and  everywhere;  *'we 
are  not  to  ask  whence,  for  it  neither  comes  nor 
goes  away,  it  appears  and  does  not  appear." 
{Enn.  V.  5.  8.)  Such  is  the  struggle  of  Plo- 
tinus to  express  the  inexpressible,  to  see  the 
invisible,  to  point  out  the  way  when  there  is  no 
way;  "  for  the  soul  hastening  to  another  simply 
runs  to  itself,  and  getting  to  be  in  another,  is  in 
itself  alone."  For  the  One  is  what  truly  it-i, 
and  when  the  Soul  also  truly  is,  it  has  found  the 
Divine  Presence,  which  likewise  finds  it.  Thus 
all  "privation,"  separation,  indeed  the  Will  it- 
self vanishes  into  the  transcendental  One. 

(3)  Going  back  to  the  individual  Soul  we  see 
that  it  is  swallowed  up,  is  no  longer  §elf-consci- 
ous,  or  a  distinct  individual  at  least  in  Thought 
or  Will.  The  primordial  outflow  of  the  One  or 
of  God  which  produced  it  in  a  descent  down  to 


PL  0  TIXUS.  —  E  THICS.  661 

man,  has  been  counteracted  or  overcome  by  a 
corresponding  inflow  which  has  borne  the  Soul 
back  to  its  original  source.  The  individual 
through  his  own  Will  refuses  to  be  individual, 
to  be  separated  from  the  One ;  his  whole  effort, 
after  becoming  an  individual  by  a  divine  act, 
is  to  undo  this  divine  act  through  its  entire 
course  down  to  his  making.  From  this  point 
of  view,  the  supreme  ethical  end  of  man  is  to 
negate  God's  work  in  producing  him.  If  he 
can  do  that  which  is  God's  undoing,  he  is  cer- 
tainly divine.  Mighty  indeed  is  that  individual 
who  refuses  to  be  an  individual,  but  will  be  God 
in  spite  of  God,  and  so  returns  out  of  his 
emanated  state  and  compels  the  Supreme  One 
to  take  him  back,  after  having  thrown  him  out. 
In  this  return  of  the  Soul  to  the  Supreme  One 
and  its  unification  with  the  same  lies  the  princi- 
ple of  mysticism  as  it  has  manifested  itself  in 
Religion,  and  even  in  Philosophy.  The  Soul  as 
God-comiDcller  gets  back  to  its  Divine  Source 
and  becomes  one  with  it  again.  This  is  the  con- 
dition of  blessedness,  as  the  mystics  conceive,  the 
supernal  rapture  and  ecstasv,  the  complete  get- 
tina:  rid  of  Self,  of  that  Self  which  is  the  cause 
of  all  suffering,  limitation  and  fate.  It  would 
seem,  therefore,  that  the  Soul  as  individual  is  not 
wholly  lost,  not  wholly  absorbed,  but  has  still 
Feeling,  which  indeed  is  the  potentiality  of  Self, 


662         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and    indicates    the    possibility    of    its    becoming 
again  an  individual. 

And  this  is  what  happens,  at  least  during  the 
present  life.  Only  for  a  short  time  here  can  the 
state  of  ecstasy  be  enjoyed.  For  in  the  midst  of 
its  unconscious  rapture  there  steals  u[)on  the  soul 
a  fear  of  passing  into  pure  nothingness,  and  of 
losing  utterly  that  individuality  whose  Will  and 
Intellect  have  been  obliterated,  and  whose  Feel- 
ino;  alone  remains  in  the  boundlessness  of  the 
One.  "  When  the  Soul  passes  into  the  realm  of 
formless  One,  being  unable  to  comprehend  it  on 
account  of  its  being  unlimited,  then  the  Soul 
weakens  and  is  afraid,  terrified  lest  it  may  get 
nothino;.  Wherefore  it  labors  in  such  a  state." 
What  now  has  become  of  our  ecstas}^?  And  our 
vanished  Self  seems  to  have  returned  and  to  be 
claiminor  its  rio;ht  against  the  All.  Still 
further  in  the  same  passage:  "Thence  the 
Soul  descends  ivifh  joy,  often  falling  away 
from  all,  until  it  gets  back  to  the  sense- 
world,  breathing  freely  as  it  were  upon  solid 
ground."  (^;i«.  VI.  9.  3.)  In  this  connection 
what  Porphyry  says  in  his  Life  of  Plotinus  (c. 
43)  should  be  cited.  The  biographer  states  that 
Plotinus  attained  this  ecstatic  unification  with 
"  the  God  above  all  Gods  four  times  while  I  was 
with  him,"  and  then  had  to  descend  again  into 
his  body.  Porph^'ry  himself  rather  plaintively 
confesses  that  he  "  once  for  all  in  my  sixty-eighth 


PL  0  TIXUS.  —  E  THICS.  663 

year  "  succeeded  in  ascending  into  the  Ecstasis, 
from  which  he  came  back  again  and  wrote  the 
Life  of  Plotinus. 

So  it  seems  that  the  individual,  having  made 
himself  one  with  God,  cannot  stay  there,  in  this 
life  at  least,  on  account  of  a  creeping  fear  lest  he 
may  lose  his  individuality.  Accordingly  he  is 
emanated  again,  unable  to  dwell  harmoniously 
with  the  One,  and  returns  to  his  noetic,  psychic, 
and  sensuous  life,  with  the  marvelous  account  of 
his  supernal  experience. 

Herewith  the  ethical  movement  of  the  Ploti- 
nian  Philosophy  is  concluded,  having  shown  its 
three  stages  of  Praxis,  Theoria,  and  Ecstasis. 
And  the  philosophical  Norm — Metaphysics,  Phys- 
ics, and  Ethics — in  its  Plotinian  form  has  ex- 
pressed itself  with  a  fair  degree  of  fullness.  This 
Norm  is  that  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  though  each 
philosopher  fills  it  out  after  his  own  fashion, 
wherein  lies  the  difference  between  these  three 
greatest  thinkers  of  Hellas.  The  horizon  of 
Greek  Philosophy  widens  in  accord  with  the 
nativity  of  the  three.  Plato  was  an  Athenian, 
Aristotle  was  colonial  (Hellenic)  by  birth,  Ploti- 
nus was  an  Oriental.  It  is  the  last  one  (Ploti- 
nus) who  pushes  Greek  Philosophy  beyond  itself 
and  thus  leads  the  way  to  its  evanishment  in  the 
Supreme  One  from  whom  it  originally  started  as 
a  reaction  in  the  Milesian  Movement. 

Plotinus  has  told  us  a  good  deal  about  the  One 


664        ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

which  cannot  be  known,  yet  which  he  knows 
pretty  well.  Also  he  has  described  a  state  of 
consciousness,  of  which  he  must  have  been  un- 
conscious. His  God  is  not  a  Self  but  is  above  all 
selfhood,  yet  it  is  the  Self  of  Plotinus  which  has 
to  reach  Him,  conceive  and  formulate  Him.  He 
is  placed  above  all  Thought,  and  still  this  very 
statement  must  be  the  way  to  think  Him.  The 
Ego  of  Plotinus  is  the  product  of  the  overflowing 
God,  but  this  Ego  of  his  must  go  back  and  re- 
produce the  God  overflowing  into  himself,  the 
individual.  This  individual,  however,  must  van- 
ish back  into  the  God  who  produced  him  — 
wherein  lies  the  chief  vocation  of  man  according 
to  Neo-Hellenism. 


JAMBLICHUS.  665 


2.  3aml)licbu0, 

After  Plotinus  (204-270)  is  usually  placed  his 
pupil  Porphyiy,  a  good  man  and  important  in  a 
number  of  ways.  But  in  philosophical  signifi- 
cance, and  as  giving  expression  to  the  age,  he  is 
far  outstripped  by  his  scholar  Jamblichus,  the 
dates  of  whose  birth  and  death  are  not  known 
with  exactness.  But  the  best  authorities  place 
his  death  at  about  330  A.  D.,  after  a  long  and 
active  hfe.  Thus  the  period  of  his  work  nearly 
coincides  with  that  of  the  Emperor  Constantine 
the  Great,  in  whose  reign  the  supremacy  of 
Christianity  began  to  be  recognized  by  the  Roman 
State.  The  old  Greco-Roman  world  with  its 
religion  or  its  religions  felt  itself  to  be  sinking 
before  a  new  and  mightier  power.  Jamblichus 
sought  to  stay  this  result  and  preserve  the  ancient 
order.  Such  was  his  general  relation  to  the 
trend  of  his  time,  which  accounts  for  much  in 
his  thousfht  and  in  his  career.  An  overwhelmino- 
need  of  help  fi-om  above,  an  almost  crushing 
sense  of  God  as  the  Supernal  One  comes  over 
man  here  below,  which  state  of  mind  finds  a 
voice  in  Jamblichus,  who  thereby  adds  a  trans- 
forming principle  to  Plotinus. 

So  we  have   reached  a  new  stage  in  the  total 


Q66         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

sweep  of  Neo-Hellenism.  The  general  character 
of  this  stage  is  indicated  by  the  first  fact  of  it : 
over  and  apart  from  the  supra-rational  One  of 
Plotinus  appears  another  and  even  higher  One, 
to  which  attaches  no  predicate  or  quality  ;  it  can- 
not even  be  called  the  Good,  or  be  said  to  have 
Being.  Thus  Jamblichus  shows  the  strugffle  to 
reach  out  beyond  Plotinus,  and  produces  a  new 
separation  in  the  latter' s  unseparated  First  Prin- 
ciple, the  One.  In  such  fashion  the  very  thing 
guarded  against  has  taken  place  in  the  master's 
own  School;  the  undivided  is  divided,  and  at  the 
first  glance  is  dualized. 

Still  it  is  not  the  intention  of  Jamblichus  to 
introduce  a  dual  principle  as  ultimate ;  if  that 
were  so,  he  would  have  to  be  ruled  out  of  the 
Neo-Hellenic  movement.  On  the  contrary,  his 
object  is  to  keep  off  by  a  new  bulwark  the  dual- 
ism which  threatens  the  undivided  One  of 
Plotinus ;  it  overflowed  and  so  in  a  manner  im- 
parted itself  in  a  kind  of  generation ;  hence  we 
must  have  two  Ones  up  somewhere  above,  the  first 
of  which  is  not  impartible,  Avhile  the  other  is. 
Moreover  we  may  well  deem  that  the  Plotinian 
One  might  be  disturbed  by  the  individual  who 
succeeds  in  rising  to  it  and  becoming  united  with 
it  through  ecstasy.  So  Jamblichus  must  insist 
u})on  the  idea  that  the  Absolute  One  cannot  be 
comniumcsiicd  (a methekfos).  To  be  sure,  this  is 
•d  predicate  of  the  One,    though    nothing  was  to 


JAMBLICEUS.  667 

be  predicuted  of  it,  being  allowed  not  even  a 
negative  predicate.  Still  "  the  altogether  un- 
speakable principle  "  has  been  at  least  spoken. 

Such  is  the  desperate  struggle  of  Jamblichus 
to  preserve  the  original  One  of  Neo- Hellenism, 
and  we  ask  why?  Undoubtedly  keen  antagonists, 
especially  the  Christians,  had  pointed  out  that 
the  act  of  emanation  in  the  One  implies  separa- 
tion, and  that  Plotinus  himself  saj'S  that  it 
generates  what  lies  below  it.  Thus  division  has 
crept  into  the  primal  undivided  One,  which 
division  must  be  banished  by  a  new  effort. 
Moreover  there  lay  another  and  deeper  reason  in 
the  time.  Christianity  was  becoming  more  and 
more  the  prevailing  religion ;  even  the  Emperor 
Constantine  had  begun  to  favor  it  during  the  life 
of  Jamblichus.  Now  the  Christian  God  was 
supremely  a  creative  God,  who  freely  imparted 
Himself  to  His  creatures  through  divine  grace. 
The  grand  act  of  the  Christian  God  was  His 
begotten  Son,  Christ,  who,  according  to  the 
formulated  dogma,  was  of  like  nature  with  the 
Father.  Such  was  the  doctrine  of  the  Church 
established  at  the  Council  of  Nice  (325  A.  D.), 
toward  the  close  of  the  life  of  Jamblichus, 
who  was  surrounded  everywhere  with  the  din 
of  the  Arian  controversy.  His  ineffable  and 
incommunicable  One  is  the  direct  opposite  of 
Christian  Homoousianism.  His  First  Principle 
or   God   cannot   descend   or   impart    itself,    or 


668         ANCIENT  EUBOTEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

generate  a  Son  of  like  substance  (homoousios) 
with  Himself ;  that  were  His  greatest  degradation. 
We  can  hardly  now  conceive  how  shocking 
it  was  to  these  Neo-Hellenic  idealists  that  the 
one  only  God  should  perpetrate  an  act  of 
generation,  bringing  His  only  Son  into  the  world 
of  Matter,  which  even  to  Plotinus  was  the  First 
Evil  (^proton  JcaJvon).  Hence  Jamblichus,  in  his 
sheer  repulsion  against  the  fundamental  doctrine 
of  the  Nicene  Creed,  hoists  over  the  highest  One 
of  Plotinus,  which  was  still  emanative,  another 
and  higher  One  which  has  no  emanation.  Thus 
he  sought  to  keep  at  least  the  Supreme  One 
pure,  uncontaminated  with  the  world,  unsullied 
with  the  thought  of  any  physical  process.  This 
was  a  genuine  feeling  of  the  time  and  was  one 
main  reason  why  Neo-Hellenism  held  out  so 
many  centuries  against  its  mighty  rival. 

The  second  important  fact  in  connection  with 
the  work  of  Jamblichus  was  his  remarkable 
religious  tendencies.  He  retained  the  metaphy- 
sical outline  orskeleton  of  the  system  of  Plotinus, 
but  filled  up  this  outline  with  a  vast  multitude 
of  deities.  That  which  is  Nous  in  Plotinus 
becomes  in  Jamblichus  a  God  or  rather  several 
orders  of  Gods  connected  together  mostly  in 
Triads.  Every  abstract  concept  of  mind  seems 
to  be  struggling  for  the  personal  shape  in  his 
supra-sensible  world.  What  a  multiplication  of 
divinities  !     He  wheels   into  line  the  polytheistic 


JAMBLICHUS.  669 

religions  of  the  Orient  and  of  Hellas,  making 
them  fit  somewhere  into  his  Divine  Order. 
The  unity  of  Philosophy  passes  over  into  the 
diversity  of  Religion :  this  we  may  consider  the 
general  transition  from  Plotinus  to  Jamblichus ; 
the  former  is  indeed  religious,  but  he  philoso- 
phizes Religion,  while  the  latter,  though  still  a 
philosopher,  religionizes  Philosophy.  The  Neo- 
Hcllcnic  philosophical  Norm  is  preserved  b}^ 
Janil)lichus  but  is  made  over  into  the  holder  of 
all  the  Gods  of  all  the  religions  except  one,  the 
Christian. 

This  characteristic,  too,  we  can  see,  springs 
from  hostility  to  the  popular  sweep  toward 
Christianity.  Plotinus,  living  many  years  be- 
fore the  time  of  Constantine,  was  still  the  Greek 
philosopher,  opposed  to  superstition  and  to  the 
crude  Greek  religion  of  the  people.  We  have 
seen  that  he  was  essentially  aristocratic  and  his 
Philosophy  was  imperialistic,  being  favored  by 
at  least  one  Roman  emperor.  The  same  is  true, 
though  doubtless  in  a  less  degree,  of  Porphjay. 
It  is  plain  from  the  treatise  De  Mysteriis 
Egyptiorum  that  a  rift  had  occurred  in  the  Neo- 
Hellenic  School,  caused  by  just  this  change  of 
tendency  in  Jamblichus  who  probably  did  not 
write  the  aforesaid  treatise,  though  it  must  have 
come  from  one  of  his  followers.  It  censures 
Porphjay  for  his  attitude  toward  the  new  move- 


670         AXCIEXT  EUROPEAN  PillLOSOPHt. 

meut    of    the  School,    but  the  reproof  would  be 
quite  as  strong  against  Plotinus  himself. 

Very  striking  indeed  is  the  change.  Of  a  sud- 
den Philosophy,  in  the  Neo-Hellenic  stage  of  it 
represented  by  Jamblichus,  takes  up  the  old 
Greek  religion  and  the  Gods  into  its  bosom,  and 
becomes  their  warm  defender  and  devotee. 
Polytheism  is  patronized,  paganism  is  re- 
affirmed with  its  rites  and  beliefs.  Yet  this  is 
not  all.  There  is  a  resort  to  sorcery,  magic, 
exorcism  of  spirits ;  the  world  of  delusion  seems 
to  pour  itself  out  into  these  Neo-Hellenic  meta- 
physical formulas  and  to  make  them  overflow 
with  Gods,  demons,  angels,  spirits,  produc- 
ing a  phantasmagoria  which  has  hardly  been 
equaled  since.  The  great  word  is  Theurgv,  a 
making  of  the  Gods,  or  at  least  a  producing  of 
their  activity  through  prayers,  incantations,  and 
many  ceremonies.  Yet  all  this  is  kept  in  the 
general  framework  of  Plotinian  metaphysics. 

"What  does  it  mean?  It  is  the  desperate 
attempt  to  recover  religious  Hellenism,  from 
which  Philosophy  hitherto  had  been  in  the  main 
a  re-action.  It  is  the  merit  of  Jamblichus  that 
he  saw  the  deepest  problem  of  the  age  to  be 
religious  and  not  merely  philosophical;  he  saw 
that  the  civilized  world  would  no  longer  be 
satisfied  with  Philosophy  alone,  but  must  have 
also  Religion.  He  recognized  that  the  Christian 
Faith  could  only  be   met  by  another  Faith.     So 


JAMBLICHUS.  C71 

he  proposes  to  construct  ii  universal  Religion  bv 
throwing  together  into  one  seething  cauldron 
all  the  cults  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and  after 
due  process  moulding  them  into  one  system  of* 
belief  after  the  Neo-Hellenic  scheme.  Thus 
Philosophy  in  a  sense  faces  about  at  this  point, 
for  it  was  really  Philosophy  which  had  under- 
mined Greek  polytheism,  having  assailed  it  since 
the  time  of  old  Xenophaues,  the  Eleatic;  but 
now  Philosophy  undertakes  to  restore  not  merely 
Greek  but  to  construct  a  universal  polytheism. 

Another  profound  insight  of  Jamblichus  into 
the  needs  of  his  age  is  that  he  would  make  his 
Religion  popular.  He  saw  that  the  lofty  ideal 
Philosophy  of  Plotmus  could  never  win  in  the 
form  given  to  it  by  its  founder;  it  could  not  be 
understood  generally,  it  was  exclusive,  for  the 
select  few,  not  truly  universal.  Hence  Jam- 
bUchus,  while  preserving  the  Neo-Helleuic 
thought,  would  till  it  with  the  folk-soul  of  faith 
in  the  Gods.  Great  and  noble  was  his  idea  of 
winning  all  peoples  by  their  religions  and  uniting 
them  into  one  religious  Institution  correspoudino- 
to  their  secular  union  in  the  political  Institution 
of  the  Roman  Empire.  One  thinks  that  a  kind 
of  Church  hovered  before  his  mind,  whereof  he 
could  see  the  Christian  counterpart  already  build- 
ing around  him.  Another  Semite  (he  was  from 
Syria)  would  found  a  new  Religion,  all-inclusive, 
embracing  all  peoples    under  its  imperial  sway, 


672         ANGIEKT  E  UBOPEAK  PHIL  0 SOPHY. 

being  set  in  the  frame-work  of  an  imperial  Phi- 
losophy such  as  ^Yas  that  of  Plotinus.  In  like 
manner  we  have  seen  that  the  Christian  Eeligion 
had  been  already  organized  by  Greek  Philosophy 
in  the  hands  of  Orio-en. 

Nor  must  we  forget  to  emphasize  still  an- 
other weighty  matter  in  Jambliclms :  his  em- 
ployment of  the  triadal  movement  in  his 
arrangement  of  the  Gods.  This  indeed  he 
could  have  picked  up  directly  from  his  con- 
tact with  Oriental  religions,  especially  the 
Egyptian,  which  has  a  peculiar  fondness  for 
Triads  in  its  manifold  systems  of  deities. 
Nor  is  the  Triad  by  any  means  absent  from  the 
Greek  religion  in  the  earliest  stages  of  it  known 
to  us.  The  religious  instinct  of  Jamblichus,  his 
deep  sympathy  w^ith  the  universal  form  of  all 
religions,  not  even  excepting  those  called  mono- 
theistic, made  him  a  trinitarian,  to  be  sure  not 
after  the  Christian  pattern,  which  was  just  what 
he  scouted  and  sought  to  supplant.  Moreover 
each  stage  or  person  of  these  Triads  is  made  to 
form  a  new  Triad ;  each  part  has  in  it  the  whole 
triadal  movement,  and  often  manifests  the  same 
in  a  genetic  fashion.  This  we  hold  to  be  a  very 
important  thought  universally,  and  it  is  one  that 
specially  pervades  later  Neo-Hellenism.  Already 
we  have  noticed  a  triadal  tendency  in  Plotinus, 
not  so  much  religious  as  metaphysical.  When 
we  come  to  Proclus  who  substantially  closes  the 


JAMBLICHU8.  673 

Neo-Hellenic  niovcmeut,  we  shall  find  the  Triad 
all-dominating  both  in  Philosophy  and  in  Relig- 
ion. We  need  hardly  remind  the  reader  that 
the  Triad  more  or  less  implicitly  controls  the 
whole  line  of  Greek  Thought  from  its  beo;inninoc 
in  Thales.  Undoubtedly  there  is  a  great  differ- 
ence in  the  formal  completeness  and  develop- 
ment of  these  Triads  ;  this  present  book  of  ours 
may  well  be  called  a  book  of  Triads,  which  have 
to  be  seen  finally  as  psychological,  not  simply  as 
philosophical  or  religious.  In  this  grand  triadal 
process  of  the  thought  of  the  ages,  Jaml)lichus 
has  his  place,  his  special  niche,  whom  it  is 
easy  to  scoff  at  and  nickname,  but  whom  it  is 
better  to  appreciate. 

We  do  not  know  many  facts  about  the  life  of 
Jamblichus,  though  it  has  been  written  by  Euna- 
pius,  a  devoted  admirer  and  follower.  He  came 
from  Chalcis  in  Coelesyria,  and  belonged  to  a  rich 
and  influential  family.  He  is  said  to  have  visited 
Rome,  and  there  to  have  met  Porphyry,  who  was 
his  teacher  for  a  time,  Rome  being  still  the  cen- 
ter of  Neo-Hellenism.  After  a  period  of  instruc- 
tion Jamblichus  went  back  to  Syria  and  opened  a 
school  of  his  own  which  became  flourishino;  and 
powerful.  In  fact  it  transferred  the  seat  of  Nc.p- 
Hellenic  Philosophy  from  Rome  to  the  East,  and 
to  a  degree  orientalized  it  with  the  religions  of 
Western  Asia.  Hence  it  is  called  the  Syrian  or 
Oriental  stage  of  Neo-Hellenism  in  contrast  with 

43 


674         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  earlier  Roman  and  the  Liter  Athenian  stagfes. 
The  name  of  Jambhchus  eclipsed  that  of  his 
teacher  Porphyry  who  was  also  a  Syrian,  and 
even  that  of  the  great  founder  Plotinus.  The 
most  extravagant  titles  were  given  him  by  his 
pupils,  and  the  wildest  stories  were  current  about 
his  miraculous  powers.  Rumor  had  it  that  dur- 
ing prayer  he  hovered  above  the  earth  surrounded 
by  an  aureole  oi  light.  Among  the  later  Neo- 
Hellenic  writers  his  standing  designation  is  "  the 
divine  Jamblichus. ' '  There  is  an  agreement  that 
his  personality  was  very  impressive.  Eunapius 
praises  his  noble  character,  his  readiness  to  im- 
part his  knowledge,  and  his  friendly  intercourse 
with  his  pupils,  who  in  great  numbers  flocked  to 
his  school  and  became  deeply  attached  to  him 
personally  as  well  as  animated  with  a  fervent 
discipleship.  Living  some  three  hundred  years 
after  Christ,  he  wrought  in  the  same  general 
territory,  and  to  a  certain  extent  emploj'ed  the 
same  means.  His  influence  must  have  been  a 
personal  one  largeh%  for  his  writings,  as  far  as 
they  have  come  down  to  us,  must  be  regarded  as 
poor  both  in  form  and  content.  A  heavy  turgid 
style,  and  an  exposition  obscure,  full  of  repetition, 
and  ever  wandering  from  the  point,  a  love  of  the 
occult  and  the  miraculous  are  some  of  the  literary 
sins  laid  at  his  door,  which  must,  however,  have 
been  far  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  charm 
and  power  of  his  personal  presence. 


JAMBLWHUS.  675 

Jambliclius  read  with  his  pupils  and  wrote  com- 
mentaries upon   Plato    and  Aristotle,  whom   he 
sought  to  bring  into  agreement,  following  a  fun- 
damental    canon    of  the   Neo-Hellenic    School. 
The  inheritance    of    Greek  culture  had  been  for 
six  hundred   years    in  Syria,  ever  since  the  time 
of  its  conquest   by  Alexander   the  Great ;   that 
culture    too  he  proposed  to  retain,  though  fillino- 
it     and    supplementing     it     with      the     native 
religions    of   his    Oriental    home.      In    contrast 
with  Hellenisticism,  which    spread    out  into  the 
Orient   from  Hellas,  we  now   see   the  Orient  re- 
turning to  Hellas,  cherishing  and  safe-guardino- 
her  spiritual  treasures.     Nevertheless  Jamblichus 
was    essentially   religious,  his  deepest  conscious- 
ness lay  in  the  belief  that  man  needed  help  from 
above  in  working  out  the  purification  of  his  sen- 
suous   nature.      So    he    oi-ganizes  a  divine  world 
which    is  to  give  life  to  the  philosophic  skeleton 
of  abstract  thought,  and  at  the  same  time  be  a 
means  of  the  grand  catharsis  of  mortality. 

Still  along  with  this  interference  of  the  Gods, 
Jamblichus  asserts  the  freedom  of  man.  Thouo-h 
the  soul  descends  into  flesh  and  becomes  laden 
with  appetites  and  passions,  it  has  nevertheless 
the  power  to  rise  out  of  its  low  condition,  which 
fact  constitutes  its  ethical  turning-point  in  its 
return  to  the  Upper  World.  Yet  it  must  have 
the  continued  help  of  the  Gods  from  above. 
Herein  Jamblichus  has   a  spirit   different   from 


676         ANCIENT  EUMOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  of  Plotinus  who  in  his  ethical  return  to  the 
Good  and  the  One  sives  the  o;reater  rano;e  to 
Morality  and  to  Art  and  Philosophy.  This 
tendency  of  Jamblichus  shows  a  decided  lean- 
ing toward  Neo-Pythagoreanism  which  had  long 
been  known  as  a  cult  embracino;  doctrines  from 
various  religions.  This  cult  he  threw  into  the 
philosophic  formula  of  Neo-Hellenism. 

It  is  not  possible  to  put  together  in  any  great 
detail  the  system  of  Jamblichus  from  the  docu- 
ments pertaining  to  it  which  have  come  down  to 
us.  And  learned  historians  of  Philosophy,  read- 
ing and  weighing  these  documents,  give  a  vary- 
ing report  of  their  meaning  and  contents.  Nev- 
ertheless it  is  manifest  that  Jamblichus  must 
have  had  in  his  mind  the  philosophical  Norm  of 
Greek  thought,  especially  in  its  Plotinian  form. 
The  three  divisions.  Metaphysics,  Physics,  and 
Ethics  must  have  been  known  to  him  from  his 
studies  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  as  well  as  of  the 
Stoics  and  later  philosophers.  Little  use  can 
he  have  for  the  study  of  Natural  Science,  since 
Nature  is  controlled  by  Magic,  by  Theurgy. 
All  the  more  does  he  expand  his  metaphysical 
outline  and  fill  it  up  with  orders  of  deities. 

I.  Metaphysics. 

That  which  Jamblichus  starts  with  are  the 
first  three  principles  of  the  Plotinian  scheme  — 


JAMBLICIIUS  —METAPHYSICS.  677 

the  One,  Nous,  and  the  Soul.  (See  the  scheme, 
p.  614.)  lie  makes  some  changes,  still  they  re- 
main the  three  notes  upon  which  he  plays  his 
variations.  These  three  metaphysical  elements 
of  Plotinus  are  to  be  transformed  into  deities  by 
Jamblichus,  which  fact  becomes  evident  in  the 
following  plan :  — 

A.  The  First  One,  above  all  Being,  above 
the  Good,  without  predicates ;  it  has  no  emana- 
tion, and  cannot  be  imparted,  neither  moving 
nor  moved.  (More  about  it  on  a  previous  page, 
as  well  as  the  probable  reasons  which  led  Jambli- 
chus to  posit  such  a  principle  over  the  One  of 
Plotinus.) 

B.  The  Second  One,  which  is  the  source  of 
the  lower  intelligences,  and  which  is  endowed 
with  the  power  of  emanation,  and  even  of  gener- 
ation. This  Second  One  is  to  stand  between  the 
First  or  Absolute  One,  and  the  multiplicity  of 
both  the  supersensible  and  sensible  worlds  below. 
Here  the  creative  power  of  the  Plotinian  One  is 
explicitly  stated,  while  its  unemanative  phase  is 
relegated  to  the  First  One  above  mentioned. 

C.  Many  Ones,  which  are  next  in  the  order 
of  creative  descent.  Jamblichus  had  not  merely 
one  but  many  of  these  Gods  above  all  Being 
{lii/ptrousioi),  "a  multitude  of  them"  says 
Damascius.  These  were  probably  the  Henads, 
which  have  an  important  part  in  the  later  system 
of  Proclus, 


678         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  here  lies  a  difficulty  in 
the  ordering  of  Jamblichus.  Fairly  distinct  are 
the  three  preceding  stages.  But  he  now  passes 
to  another  part  of  his  scheme,  and  it  is  hard  to 
see  how  he  makes  his  transition.  Of  a  sudden 
his  divisions,  the  Nous  and  the  Soul  (after  Plo- 
tinus)  are  endowed  with  divinities.  We  ask  our- 
selves :  Where  is  the  antecedent  of  these  two, 
the  One? 

1.  It  is  probable  that  Jamblichus  took  the 
three  preceding  stages  (the  First  One,  the  Second 
One,  and  the  Henads)  as  his  exposition  of  the 
Plotinian  Supreme  One.  At  least  in  our  emer- 
gency we  shall  have  to  conjecture  this  to  be  the 
case,  and  so  pass  on  to  the  next  in  schematic 
order. 

2.  The  Nous-Gods  or  Gods  of  Intellect, 
which  are  of  two  kinds  (some  say  three)* 
Note  that  Jamblichus  is  following  Plotinus,  but 
is  transforming  the  latter 's  metaphysical  entities 
into  deities. 

The  first  kind  of  these  Nous-Gods  is  the  in- 
telligible (^noe(os),  which  appear  in  a  Triad  of 
Father,  Power,  and  Energy.  Each  of  these 
ao:ain  forms  a  Triad,  so  that  there  are  at  least 
three  intellis^ible  Triads. 

The  second  kind  of  Nous-Gods  is  the  intel- 
lectual («oero.s).  Here  again  is  a  Triad  of  Gods, 
each  of  which  forms  a  new  Triad  of  its  own, 
which  new  Triad  becomes  a  Hebdomad  (seven) 


JAMBLICUUS.  —  ME  TAniYSICS.  679 

in  a  peculiar  way.  For  each  God  of  this  new 
Triad  begets  a  still  newer  Triad  of  his  own  ex- 
cept the  last  God  who  remains  unproductive; 
thus  the  Triad  is  made  up  of  seven,  a  sacred 
number  which  Jamblichus,  in  his  universal  adop- 
tion of  all  religious,  had  to  take  somehow  into 
his  system. 

3.  Soul-Gods  we  have  next  to  consider,  in 
accord  with  the  Plotinian  Scheme  which  Jam- 
blichus still  follows  in  outline.  Here  again  he 
introduces  his  triadal  principle,  and  the  meta- 
physical Soul  breaks  forth  into  systems  of  Gods. 

Primarily  he  places  above  all  others  the 
one  Soul,  supernal,  evidently  corresponding 
to  his  absolute  One,  Then  comes  his  series 
of  supra-mundane  Souls  which  are  Gods. 
Finally  are  the  mundane  deities  (also  Souls), 
those  which  are  placed  just  over  man's  world, 
namely  the  common  Gods,  the  Angels,  the 
Demons  and  the  Heroes.  At  this  point  we 
come  upon  the  deities  of  the  popular  re- 
ligions, among  whom  we  find  the  twelve  Great 
Gods  of  Greece  arranged  in  Triads ;  each  of 
these  again  has  his  own  Triad,  making  thirty-six 
Gods,  who  are  still  further  increased  to  three 
hundred  and  sixty.  Every  people  and  every 
tribe  have  their  guardian  Gods  and  guardian 
Spirits,  who  must  be  taken  into  the  universal 
system.  For,  as  there  is  a  universal  State  exist- 
ent, so  there  must  also  be  a  universal  Religion 


680         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

with  its  law  and  organization.  Some  such 
aspiration  underlies  the  fantastic  scheme  of 
Jamblichus. 

II.  Physics. 

The  Neo-IIellenic  School  regards  the  phenom- 
enal world  as  a  descent  from  the  supra-sensible, 
which  descent  is  not  the  fiat  of  a  single  will  but 
has  been  going  on  from  all  eternity.  Herein 
Jamblichus  accords  with  his  School.  He  has 
before  his  mind  the  physical  Norm  of  Plotinus  — 
Body,  Matter,  Evil.  The  Powers  or  Gods  who, 
in  the  supersensible  world,  act  for  themselves, 
become  embodied  in  the  phenomenal  world,  and 
are,  as  it  were,  borne  down  by  a  foreign  element, 
which  is  in  general  called  Nature.  It  is  through 
this  Nature  that  Evil  arises,  which  requires  for 
its  avoidance  the  continued  interposition  of  the 
Gods  above. 

Of  course  there  could  be  no  investigation  of 
Nature  and  her  laws  in  such  a  doctrine  as  that  of 
Jamblichus.  She  was  determined  primarily  by  the 
world  of  spirits  above;  man,  if  he  wished  to  con- 
trol her,  or  to  use  her  for  his  ends,  must  appeal 
to  them  as  her  masters.  Still  Nature  was  en- 
dowed with  a  kind  of  independent  material  ele- 
ment, which  was  in  opposition  to  the  spirit-world, 
and  which  was  united  with  the  Soul  in  Body. 
Hence  Nature  from  this  side  became   a  sort  of 


JAMBLICnUS.  — ETHICS.  681 

Fate  to  man,  a  new  hostile  power  or  possibly 
demon  over  him,  which  it  was  his  great  duty  to 
cast  out. 

So  we  see  that  the  phj^sical  calls  for  the  ethi- 
cal, which  fact  we  noted  in  Plotinus  as  well  as  in 
Plato  and  Aristotle.  The  metaphysical  part  of 
the  system  with  all  its  manifold  organization  is 
ultimately  for  the  sake  of  man  with  his  dual 
nature,  which  produces  the  final  struggle  between 
good  and  evil.  So  Jamblichus  must  also  have 
his  process  of  purification  which  is  fundamentally 
ethical,  though  this  includes  his  vast  religious 
procedure  on  its  practical  side. 

III.  Ethics. 

The  return  from  the  world  and  from  evil  to 
the  Gods  and  the  Good  is  the  scope  of  the  ethical 
process.  Here  as  elsewhere  Jamblichus  holds  to 
the  general  scheme  of  Plotinus,  but  he  carries  it 
out  in  a  somewhat  different  way,  and  with  a  dif- 
ferent spirit.  Plotinus  was  still  the  philosopher 
and  laid  stress  upon  the  abstract  virtues ;  Jam- 
blichus retains  these  abstract  virtues,  but  has  a 
decided  tendency  to  make  them  religious,  and  to 
put  them  into  a  cult  connected  with  Gods.  Plo- 
tinus has  not  lost  the  Greek  love  of  Art  and  of 
the  Beautiful,  the  latter  being  properly  a  part  of 
his  ethical  process  ;  Jamblichus  the  Semite  shows 
little  or  no  tendency  of  the  kind. 


G82         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

1.  As  to  the  Virtues  Jambliclius  has  given 
us  five  classes,  adding  a  new  chiss  to  those  of 
his  teacher  Porphyry.  First  are  the  political 
Virtues,  secular,  institutional,  worldly,  and  so 
lowest  in  the  scale.  It  may  be  here  noted  that 
Jamblichus  shows  probably  less  regard  for  the 
political  Virtues  than  even  Plotinus  (who  has  lit- 
tle enough),  owing  to  the  changed  attitude  of 
the  Eoman  State  toward  Christanity.  For  in 
the  reign  of  Constantine  all  the  ethnic  deities 
were  being  slowly  deprived  of  their  author- 
ity by  the  political  institution  —  which  fact 
could  not  be  regarded  in  a  friendly  light  by 
Jamblichus  with  his  universal  Pantheon  of 
heathen  Gods.  Still  he  keeps  the  political  Vir- 
tues, probably  more  as  a  reminiscence  of  Plato's 
Eei^ublic  than  any  love  of  them  or  belief  in 
them . 

The  second  class  of  Virtues  is  the  purificatory, 
in  which  spirit  turns  back  into  itself  for  the 
catharsis  of  the  Self.  The  third  class  is  the 
theoretic  Virtues,  in  which  the  spirit  contem- 
plates what  is  above  itself,  in  the  supersensible 
world.  The  fourth  class  is  the  paradeigmatic, 
which  indicate  not  only  a  rise  to  the  Nous,  but  a 
participation  and  union  with  it.  To  these  Jam- 
blichus adds  the  hieratic  or  sacerdotal  Virtues, 
in  which  the  spirit  rises  yet  above  the  Nous,  to 
the  Supreme  One  with  which  there  is  the  final 
mystic    union.     This  would   seem  to  correspond 


JAMBLICHUS.  —  E  TRIGS.  683 

to  the  ecstas}'  of  Plotinus,  though  the  name  has 
the  suggestion  of  a  speeial  caste  or  set  of  initiates 
"who  practice  these  Virtues. 

2.  The  distinctively  religious  element  in  the 
scheme  of  Jamblichus  far  overbalances  the 
practice  of  the  Virtues  as  such.  The  rites  and 
worship  of  all  Gods  of  all  religions  are  a  very 
important  part  of  his  plan;  his  generous  spirit 
included  every  manifestation  of  human  belief. 
He  was  a  thorough-going  idolater,  maintaining, 
in  a  special  treatise  on  the  subject,  that  images 
of  the  Gods  have  a  divine  efficacy.  Miracles 
he  performed;  he  believed  in  magic  and  prac- 
ticed it;  prophecy,  praj'er,  sacrifice  in  the 
crassest  forms  were  defended  b}'  him.  Appar- 
ently he  accepted  as  truth  what  the  most  ignorant 
soul  regarded  as  divine. 

3.  The  conception  of  ecstasy  is  not  of  so  great 
significance  with  Jamblichus  as  with  Plotinus, 
who  had  the  tendency  to  have  the  Soul  carry 
itself  up  from  quite  any  point  in  the  system  and 
to  unite  itself  with  the  Highest  Oneimmediatelj' . 
But  Jamblichus  would  evidently  have  the  Soul 
pass  through  the  intermediate  stages  of  Gods 
and  their  Triads,  partially,  at  least.  Divine 
mediation  is  in  fact  very  strongly  developed  in 
Jamblichus,  and  belongs  to  his  age  more  pro- 
foundly, on  account  of  the  increased  influence  of 
Christianit}^  than  to  the  age  of  Plotinus.  This 
mediatorial   tendency  we  may   note  in  his  par- 


684         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tiality  for  Triads,  and  we  can  also  trace  it  in  his 
highest  abstract  principles.  His  Absolute  One 
does  not  immediately  pass  over  into  the  Many 
Ones,  but  there  must  be  a  mediating  principle 
between  them,  the  Second  One,  which  becomes 
Many.  In  response  to  the  spirit  of  the  time,  he 
seeks  to  evolve  a  Mediator,  in  a  kind  of  rivalry 
(one  cannot  help  thinking)  with  the  Christian 
Mediator.  He  employs  Neo-Hellenic  Philosophy, 
whose  metaphysical  scheme  he  fills  up  with  his 
ordered  system  of  divinities  taken  from  the  posi- 
tive religions  of  the  world.  Mighty  was  the  re- 
sponse of  his  age  to  this  attempt  of  Janiblichus, 
and  we  can  see  the  reason  why :  he  felt  the  pulse- 
beat  of  a  sick  world,  recognized  the  disease  and 
tried  to  supply  what  it  most  needed  — a  Mediator, 
a  Savior.  For  that  Greco-Roman  heathen  world 
knew  itself  to  be  sinking,  to  be  lost,  unless 
there  came  from  some  quarter  a  God  to  save 
them.  It  was  an  epoch  that  seemed  in  one 
continued  prayer  for  divine  help,  and  was  ready 
to  grasp  at  anything  that  offered  assistance. 
Hence  it  could  swallow  the  grossest  superstitions 
and  ask  for  more.  In  the  light  of  his  period 
we  must  see  what  Jamblichus  endeavored  to  do, 
and  appreciate  his  effort  though  it  was  fore- 
doomed to  failure.  Still  to  a  large  portion  of 
the  people  of  the  Roman  Empire — many  of 
them  the  best  souls  of  the  age  —  it  furnished 
spiritual  food  for  fully  two  centuries. 


TBOCL  US.  685 


3.  iproclus. 

The  third  great  philosopher  of  Neo-Hellenism 
is  Proclus,  who  was  born  at  Constantinople  in 
410  and  died  at  Athens  in  485.  He  was  called 
the  Lycian,  since  his  ancestors  came  from  Lycia 
in  Asia  Minor.  Already  the  fact  has  been 
emphasized  that  all  of  the  leading  Neo-Hellenic 
philosophers  were  Oriental  in  origin.  Proclus 
studied  at  Alexandria  in  early  life,  then  he  went 
to  Athens  where  he  received  instruction  from 
Plutarch  the  Neo-Hellenist,  and  then  from 
Syrianus,  whom  he  succeeded  in  the  school  which 
had  been  established  at  Athens  by  the  Neo- 
Hellenic  philosophers.  These  still  taught  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  the  latter  was  regarded  as  a  prep- 
aration for  the  former.  According  to  Proclus, 
Aristotle  was  demonic,  but  Plato  was  divine.  In 
the  coming  Medieval  Theology  Aristotle  will 
keep  his  place  as  a  preliminary  discipline,  but 
Plato  will  be  supplanted  by  the  Christian  Bible 
and  doctrine. 

It  is  not  known  exactly  how  or  when  this 
Athenian  movement  of  Neo-Hellenism  began,  but 
it  is  conjectured  that  some  pupil  or  pupils  of  Jam- 
blichus  may  have  made  the  start.  The  Christians 
obtained  the  upper  hand  in  Alexandria  and  drove 


686         ANCIENT  ETTROPEAN  PmLOSOPItr. 

out  the  Heathen  Schools  of  Philosophy.  During 
these  troubles  the  most  famous  woman  philoso- 
pher of  antiquity,  Hypatia,  was  murdered  by  a 
Christian  mob  (415  A.  D.).  She  was  a  sup- 
porter of  Neo-Hellenism,  which  began  to  look  to 
Athens  as  its  future  home.  Proclus  was  already 
in  Athens  durmg  his  twenty-second  year,  accord- 
ing to  his  biographer  Marinus,  though  he  had 
previously  studied  at  Alexandria.  Plutarch,  the 
above-mentioned  Scholarch,  dying  in  432,  had 
left  the  School  prosperous  and  famous,  so  that 
from  this  time  forward  it  is  the  center  of  Neo- 
Hellenism. 

We  are  then  to  see  a  second  Athenian  move- 
ment in  philosophy,  the  first  being  Hellenic  and 
this  being  Neo-Hellenic.  Each  lasts  about  the 
same  length  of  time,  a  century  more  or  less  (see 
p.  207),  and  their  beginnings  are  not  far  from 
eight  centuries  and  a  half  apart.  Both  are  the 
result  of  a  centripetal  tendency ;  the  first  sweeps 
inward  from  the  periphery  of  Hellas,  the  second 
from  the  Greco-Roman  world.  Thus  both  Hel- 
lenism and  Neo-Hellenism  cencentrate  in  Athens 
for  their  last  philosophic  movements.  We  see 
that  Neo-Hellenism  is  outwardly  a  return  to 
Athens,  as  well  as  inwardly  a  return  to  her 
great  thinkers.  Particularly  Proclus  who  is  the 
real  spatial  returner  of  this  Neo-Hellenic  return 
(the  grand  episti^ophe)  will  make  explicit  the 
total  process  of  it  in  his  famous  Triad. 


PB0CLU8.  687 

A  brief  reaction  to  Heathendom  took  posses- 
sion of  the  throne  of  the  Cassars  in  Julian  the 
Apostate,  who  became  emperor  (361-3),  and 
sought  to  restore  the  old  Hellenic  Religion. 
This  is  the  most  important  philosophic  fact  in 
the  century  between  the  School  of  Jamblichus 
and  the  School  of  Athens.  Such  was  the  last 
attempt  to  re-establish  the  ancient  Gods  by 
authority.  Still  they  did  not  yet  perish.  Their 
worship  was  kept  up  in  many  an  unobserved 
corner  of  the  Roman  Empire;  particularly  the 
learned  Neo-Hellenists  preserved  in  secret  the 
faith  of  the  fathers.  Proclus  once  had  to  retire 
from  Athens  to  escape  from  Christian  persecu- 
tion, though  he  returned  after  a  year's  absence, 
and  remained  in  the  city  till  his  death.  He  took 
up  his  abode  not  far  from  an  old  Greek  temple 
to  which  he  might  betake  himself  to  worship 
without  attracting  attention. 

The  School  of  Athens  shows  a  development 
out  of  the  exclusive  religious  tendency  of  Jam- 
blichus, to  which  it  added  the  study  of  pure 
philosophy,  specially  of  Metaphysics  and  Dialec- 
tics. It  made  the  attempt  to  reduce  to  a  philo- 
sophic form  all  heathen  religions.  It  restored 
Aristotle  to  his  place  as  the  organizer  of  thought. 
Jamblichus  had  undoubtedly  kept  to  the  Nco- 
Hellenic  Norm,  but  in  a  loose  way ;  his  vast 
polytheistic  material,  derived  from  many  cults, 
was  not  a  well-arranged  Whole.     The  School  of 


688         ANCIENT  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Athens,  ou  the  contrary,  has  a  tendency  to  order- 
ing and  categorizing  the  Universe  anew,  especially 
its  accumulated  religious  stores.  This  order,  it 
is  true,  remains  more  or  less  external,  formal, 
without  inner  development.  The  movement  be- 
gins before  Proclus,  who,  however,  inherited  tiie 
work  and  carried  it  forward  to  its  highest  point. 
Herein  we  observe  the  strugo-le  between  the  two 
Norms,  philosophical  and  religious,  the  former 
at  present  subordinating  the  latter.  Proclus 
retains  an  exceedingly  diversified  religious  con- 
tent in  the  shape  of  rites,  ceremonies,  theurgy, 
even  magic;  sacred  books  he  has,  such  as  the 
Orphic  Sayings,  the  Chaldean  Oracles,  even  the 
poems  of  Homer;  this  recalcitrant  mass  he  will 
compel  into  philosophic  form,  chiefly  by  means 
of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Certainly  a  catholic 
taste  ho  sliows ;  he  seems  to  have  tlie  idea  of  an 
universal  religion,  the  Christians  alone  being 
kept  out  of  his  scheme.  Also  a  philosophy  of 
religion  lies  fermenting  in  his  thought;  in  fact 
his  whole  plan  is  largely  a  philosophizing  of  re- 
ligion. 

As  Proclus  had  predecessors  in  the  School  of 
Athens,  so  he  will  have  successors.  But  none 
will  approach  him  in  importance,  none  will  be 
able  to  form  with  him  a  great  movement. 
Hence  he  rises  up  from  the  lesser  mountains 
about  hiui  a  lofty  solitary  peak.  For  this  reason 
the  second  Athenian  period  of  Philosophy  will 


rnocLUS.  689 

not  be  like  the  first  in  having  a  personal  trinity 
of  three  great  philosophers  in  a  process  with  one 
another,  as  we  see  in  the  case  of  Socrates,  Plato 
and  Aristotle.  Proclus,  however,  will  form  the 
third  stage  of  the  total  Neo-Hellenic  process, 
which  is  likewise  personal.  Still  this  personal 
Triad  of  individual  philosophers  will  have  as  the 
ultimate  principle  the  evanishment  of  the  indi- 
vidual in  the  One.  The  essence  of  Being  with 
them  is  indeed  the  Universal,  but  the  Universal 
as  negative  to  the  individual.  In  Hellenisticism 
we  saw  the  Universal  realized  in  the  individual 
as  such,  but  in  Neo-Hellenism  we  see  it  realized 
in  the  Supreme  One  which  is  the  negation  of  in- 
dividuality. Hellenism  unfolds  the  Universal  as 
such,  Hellenisticism  puts  the  Universal  into  the 
individual,  and  thus  makes  him  universal, 
Neo-Hellenism  puts  the  individual  into  the  Uni- 
versal which  undoes  him.  Proclus,  indeed,  did 
not  live  in  the  autonomous  Athens  which  pro- 
duced the  great  individuals  whose  very  character 
was  that  of  universality.  His  time  went  rather 
the  opposite  way,  and  he  moved  with  it.  The 
Universal  no  longer  passed  over  into  the  indi- 
vidual and  made  the  latter,  but  the  individual 
passed  over  into  the  Universal  and  was  lost  as  a 
self-conscious,  self-active  being. 

Such,  then,  is  the  outcome  of  Neo-Hellenism. 
Jamblichus  sought  to  divinize  the  metaphysical 
stages  of  Plotinus,  turning  the  hitter's  Nous  and 

44 


690         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Soul  into  Threes  of  Gods.  But  Proclus  will  go 
back  to  Plotinus,  making  metaphysical  Triads  out 
of  the  personal  Trinities  of  Jamblichus,  whose 
work  is  thus  retained  but  philosophized  by  Pro- 
clus. Tlie  deities  adopted  by  Jamblichus  and 
put  into  the  Plotinian  Norm,  were  those  of  es- 
tablished systems  of  religion,  Greek  and  Oriental. 
Proclus  will  keep  them,  but  subordinate  them  to 
his  metaphysical  principle,  which  is  the  abstract 
Triad.  Thus  it  is  Jamblichus  who  furnishes 
the  religious  content  to  Proclus,  while  the  latter 
brings  to  it  his  Philosophy. 

Proclus  has,  therefore,  in  mind  the  philosoph- 
ical Norm  of  Plotinus  as  modified  by  Jamblichus  ; 
the  latter  he  modifies  in  turn.  We  must  also 
connect  Proclus  with  the  total  movement  of  Greek 
Philosophy  primarily  through  this  Norm,  which 
seeks  to  comprehend  and  to  categorize  the  Ab- 
solute One  (God),  the  World  (Nature),  andMan. 
These  three  constituents  of  the  Universe  we  have 
found  most  fully  developed  and  expressed  by 
the  great  Athenian  Philosophers,  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle, of  whom  Proclus  may  be  deemed  a  worthy 
successor  in  their  own  home.  He  was  probably 
the  most  important  philosopher  that  had  taught 
in  the  city  of  Athens  since  Aristotle,  with  the 
possible  exception  of  Zeno  the  Stoic.  We  shall 
look  at  the  three  usual  divisions  in  order. 


PROCL  US.  —  ME  TAPHYS1C8.  691 

I.  Metaphysics. 

Especially  in  tli€  metaphysical  sphere  Proclus 
is  a  return  to  Plotinus,  whose  three  staares  of 
it — the  One,  Nous,  and  Soul  —  form  the  core 
of  the  Proclian  exposition.  Still  there  are  im- 
portant changes  from  both  Plotinus  and  Jam- 
blichus.  Indeed  these  two  philosophers  are  on 
weighty  points  combined  in  Proclus,  who  shows 
the  abstract  philosophical  tendency  of  the  one 
and  the  concrete  religious  tendency  of  the  other. 
The  trend  of  Plotinus  is  to  categories,  the  trend 
of  Jamblichus  is  to  Gods,  both  meaning  pretty 
much  the  same  thing.  Proclus  keeps  the  two 
forms  of  expression,  though  with  him  it  is  the 
Category  determining  the  God  (as  in  case  of 
Plotinus)  rather  than  the  God  determininsf  the 
Category  (as  in  case  of  Jaml)lichus).  Still  both 
the  philosophical  and  the  religious  sides  are 
vigorously  present  in  his  scheme. 

A.  The  Supra-eational  Oxe. — At  the  top 
of  his  system  Proclus  places  the  One  which  is 
above  Nous  (Reason  or  Intelligence).  It  is  the 
supreme  Good  above  all  kinds  of  Good,  the 
primordial  cause  before  all  Being,  the  First  One 
before  the  Many,  in  any  shape.  Yet  after  giv- 
ing these  predicates  he  struggles  to  deny  them  all ; 
it  is  not  even  One,  but  above  One,  it  is  above  all 
negation  or  affirmation;  ineffable,  incommunica- 
ble, incomprehensible;   it  can  have  no  thought, 


692         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PIULOSOPIIY. 

no  consciousness,  no  will.  Herein  Proclus  has 
reproduced  the  Supreme  One  of  Plotinus  who 
banished  from  his  first  principle  all  separation, 
and  therewith  the  self-conscious  Person.  No 
Neo-Hellenist  could  let  the  Highest  be  a  Self, 
an  Ego ;  that  would  introduce  the  division  which  it 
was  the  object  of  Philosophy  to  drive  out  of  the 
Universe. 

B.  TiieHenads.  — With  some  surprise  we  now 
find  Proclus  deviating  from  Plotinus  by  intro- 
ducing at  this  point  the  Henads  (the  Many 
Ones),  which  we  also  found  in  Jamblichus,  but 
far  more  obscurely,  and  in  a  somewhat  different 
position.  For  they  take  the  place  of  the  Second 
One  of  Jamblichus,  which  is  not  divided  into 
multiplicity.  These  Henads  are  still  above 
Being,  above  Life,  above  Nous;  yet  they  are 
distinct  from  the  Supreme  One  undivided,  for 
these  are  divided,  and  also  they  are  distinct  from 
one  another.  Just  in  this  fact  lies  their  mean- 
ing :  they  are  the  principle  of  separation  in  the 
Universe,  theirs  is  the  primal  realm  of  divine 
differentiation,  for  each  of  these  Henads  Proclus 
specially  calls  a  God.  The  Henads  are  a  group 
of  Gods  individualized.  Says  Proclus  in  a 
cardinal  passage:  "The  First  One  is  sim- 
ply the  Good,  and  simply  the  One;  but 
each  of  those  succeeding  the  First  One  (the 
Henads)  is  a  particular  goodness  or  a  particular 
Henad.     For  divine    individuality  has  so  differ- 


TBOCL  VS.  —  ME  TAPHYSIC8.  693 

cnced  the  Henads  that  each  has  its  own  kind  of 
Sfoodness  *  *  *  Each  of  these  is  a  certain 
good,  but  not  the  total  Good."  (Ins(itutio 
Theologica,   133). 

This  tells  distinctly  the  general  character  of 
the  Henads  as  well  as  suggests  their  place  in  the 
system.  They  represent  the  stage  of  difference, 
of  separation  over  against  the  undivided  First 
One.  Herein  Proclus  has  made  a  decided 
advance  upon  Plotinus  who  has  no  such  distinct 
stage  of  separation,  and  also  an  advance  upon  Jam- 
blichus,  who  has  apparently  a  second  stage,  but  it 
is  still  the  One,  undivided  though  impartible. 

The  Henads,  being  Gods,  are  the  source  of 
divine  influence  extending  from  above  to  below, 
and  are  also  the  seat  of  divine  providence.  Thus 
they  have  a  mediatorial  character.  Here  we 
see  Proclus  theologizing  his  metaphysical  cate- 
gories. The  Henads  are  primarily  a  product  of 
our  philosopher's  thinking,  but  he  is  not  satis- 
fied with  these  abstract  thoughts,  till  he  has 
projected  them  into  Gods.  This  procedure  is 
characteristic  of  Proclus  in  contrast  both  with 
Plotinus,  who  keeps  more  closely  to  philosophy, 
and  with  Jamblichus,  who  keeps  more  closely 
to  religion. 

We  may  also  note  a  relation  to  the  age.  The 
Henads  give  a  ground  for  polytheism,  about 
which  Proclus,  as  a  foe  of  triumphing  Chris- 
tianity,   must     have    been     deeply    concerned. 


694         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Plotinus,  two  hundred  years  before,  could  have 
felt  no  such  anxiety  to  enthrone  the  many  Gods 
so  high  in  his  system. 

C.  The  Fundamental  Triad.  —  This  is  the 
greatest  insight  of  Proclus.  He  distinctly  de- 
clares that  the  basic  principle  of  the  Universe  is 
triadal,  and  that  it  is  a  process,  not  a  fixed  single 
concept.  This  process  has  in  it  the  three 
stages,  which  may  be  here  simply  expressed  as 
the  Stay  {mom),  the  Going-forth  ( proodos) 
and  the  Coming-back  (epistropJie).  Such  is  the 
movement  which  Proclus  declares  to  be  in  all 
things,  and  he  proclaims  it  to  be  the  true 
method  of  all  science,  wdiich  has  to  seek  out  and 
formulate  this  triadal  process. 

Undoubtedly  this  Triad  has  been  more  or  less 
in  evidence  from  the  beginning  of  Greek  Philoso- 
phy. It  rises  to  the  surface  repeatedly  in  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  but  does  not  stay  there.  Particu- 
larly it  has  w^ovcn  itself  through  the  Neo-Hellenic 
stage,  since  this  is  the  third  stage  of  the  grand 
triadal  movement  of  Greek  philosophic  thought, 
and,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  the  Return 
{ejnsfropJie)  to  the  first  or  Hellenic  Period.  It  is 
the  chief  merit  of  Proclus  that  he  has  completely 
abstracted  the  fundamental  Triad  which  has 
been  implicit  in  Greek  thinking,  but  which  be- 
gins to  become  ex[)licit  in  Plotinus,  and  still 
more  so  in  Jaml)lichus.  Neo-Hellenic  thought  is 
Greek  Philosophy  turning  back  upon  itself  and 


PROCL  US  —  ME  TAPE  YSICS.  695 

becoming  conscious  of  itself  in  its  own  inner 
process.  Proclus,  having  torn  the  metaphysical 
Triad  from  all  its  former  wrappage,  and  held  it 
forth  to  the  light,  as  it  in  itself,  in  all  its  naked- 
ness, has  wound  up  not  only  Neo-Hellenic  but 
all  Greek  philosophy.  To  be  sure,  its  inside  is 
now  outside,  its  soul  is  separated  from  its  body 
and  will  animate  it  no  more.  Still  that  soul, 
though  deprived  of  its  own  Greek  body,  is  im- 
mortal, and  begins  (in  Neo-Hellenic  phrase)  its 
career  of  transmigration  into  other  future  philos- 
ophies, wherein  it  is,  one  sometimes  thinks, 
more  lively  than  ever. 

In  the  ordering  of  his  philosophic  scheme  we 
shall  take  Proclus  at  his  word,  and  arrange  its 
divisions  under  the  present  head.  According  to 
him  the  above  triadal  movement  is  the  genera- 
tive principle  of  the  true  philosophical  method. 
It  really  transforms  the  fixed,  indivisible,  supra- 
rational  One  of  Neo-Hellenism  into  a  process, 
which  is  indeed  the  process  of  all  things.  That 
is,  the  Absolute  One,  the  many  Henads,  and  the 
fundamental  Triad  are  themselves  converted  into 
the  stages  of  the  Triad  through  the  Triad,  which 
thus  returns  upon  its  starting-point,  the  First 
One,  and  wheels  it  into  the  universal  movement 
of  itself.  Very  important  is  this  development  of 
the  Plotinian  Norm,  which  hitherto  has  been  so 
inactive  and  solitary,  even  if  Proclus  did  not  in- 
tend to  disturb  the  impassive    and    unimpartibls) 


696         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Supreme  One  of  his  School.  At  any  rate  we  have 
gotten  a  genetic,  unfolding  principle  launched 
from  above,  and  we  shall  see  first  how  it  organ- 
izes itself  and  then  proceeds  to  organize  other 
things. 

I.  The  Triad  organized.  In  the  organism  of 
the  Triad  Proclus  emphasizes  primarily  its  three 
elements.  First  is  the  Stay  with  itself,  or  the 
immediate,  implicit  stage  of  anything,  the  undi- 
vided and  undeveloped  condition  (>f  it,  in  which 
it  is  "  asleep."  Second  is  the  Separation  within 
itself,  which  Proclus  calls  the  Procession,  or  the 
moving  forth  into  multiplicity  and  externality. 
Third  is  the  Eeturn  or  the  going  back  to  the  first 
stage,  which  attracts  the  object  and  draws  it  out 
of  its  second  stage  of  separation  or  procession. 
Mighty  is  the  stress  which  Proclus  puts  upon  this 
Eeturn.  "  All  that  goes  forth  from  anything,  by 
its  inherent  nature  turns  itself  back  to  that  from 
which  it  comes  forth . "  ( Inst.  Tlieol.  31  e^  'pas- 
sim'). It  is  said  by  Proclus  to  desire  its  source  which 
is  the  Cause,  the  Good,  the  One  which  heals  it  of 
all  difference  and  separation.  Is  not  this  the 
Psychosis?  asks  our  alert  reader.  Yes,  it  is,  but 
not  yet  complete,  as  we  shall  see  later. 

(ff)  Looking  at  the  organic  movement  of  the 
Triad  as  it  is  within  itself,  we  observe  that  it  is 
a  cycle.  It  rounds  itself  out  in  a  circular  process. 
Says  Proclus:  "All  that  goes  forth  from  any- 
thing and  conies   back  has   an    energy  which  is 


PBOCL  US.  —  METAPHYSICS.  6'J7 

cyclical.  Thus  the  end  connects  with  the  be- 
ginning, and  the  movement  is  single  and  con- 
tinued, starting  from  the  staying  one  and  return- 
ing to  the  same.  All  things  move  in  a  cycle 
from  their  causes  to  their  causes."  (Inst.  TJieol. 
33).  Of  course  this  idea  is  not  original  with 
Proclus,  it  is  found  in  the  religions  of  the  Orient 
as  well  as  in  Greek  philosophy,  and  is  the  basic 
fact  of  human  consciousness,  which  is  just  what 
it  is  through  its  self-separating  and  its  self-re- 
turning movements,  or  itscj^cle.  But  this  is  not 
the  end  of  the  matter.  Out  of  the  one  cycle  are 
generated  many  cycles  or  circular  processes, 
which  constitute  the  essence  of  things. 

(&)  The  organic  Triad,  having  unfolded  itself, 
proceeds  to  realize  its  genetic  nature  by  devel- 
oping into  many  Triads.  Each  stage  of  the  first 
Triadbecomes  itself  triadic  in  energy,  as  it  were  by 
inheritance.  Thus  there  is  a  Triad  of  Triads,  and 
cycles  within  cycles.  In  the  same  passage  Pro- 
clus says :  ' '  There  are  greater  and  lesser  cycles ; 
the  return  may  be  to  the  beginning  which  lies 
immediately  above,  or  to  the  one  still  higher,  or 
up  to  the  beginning  of  all  things.  From  this 
primal  beginning  all  comes  and  to  it  all  returns." 
This  thought  has  been  already  pointed  out  in 
Plotinus  and  Jamblichus,  and  it  was  common  in 
the  Neo-Hellenic  School.  That  is,  each  stage  of 
the  one  total  process  participates  in  that  process 
and  shows  in  itself  the  three  stages —  the  simple 


698         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Unity,  the  Separation,  and  the  Return.  Thus 
the  fundamental  triadal  process  shows  itself  cre- 
ative in  all  its  parts,  reproducing  itself  in  all  its 
differences,  as  their  uniting  principle. 

(c)  The  line  of  cycles  is  conceived  by  Proclus 
to  be  made  up  of  "  lesser  or  greater  cycles,"  in 
succession ;  but  this  line  is  not  a  straight  line  on 
which  the  cycles  are  strung,  but  is  itself  circular, 
and  returns  into  itself.  The  earth  turning  on  its 
axis  performs  its  daily  cycle,  while  it  is  at  the 
same  time  going  forth  and  returning  in  its  yearly 
cycle,  which  is  itself  probably  but  a  stage  of  a 
still  vaster  cycle  spatial  and  temporal.  The  meta- 
physical counterpart  to  this  physical  illustration 
was  present  to  Proclus,  and  we  find  it  hovering 
vaguely  before  the  minds  of  other  Greek  think- 
ers, who  may  have  derived  it  from  Egypt,  that 
land  of  cycles  both  in  nature  and  spirit. 

Such  is,  in  general,  the  triadal  system  of  Pro- 
clus, which  one  cannot  study  in  its  vast  bearings 
without  being  impressed  with  the  greatness  of 
the  thought.  Its  suggestiveness  ^carries  us  back 
to  the  beginning  of  Neo-Hellenism  and  compels 
us  to  see  this  as  a  Triad.  Indeed  we  are  borne 
back  to  the  beginning  of  the  total  sweep  of 
Greek  philosophy  which  we  now  have  to  see  also 
as  a  Triad.  Nay,  the  philosophical  Norm  seems 
to  have  separated  its  very  shape  and  movement 
from  itself  and  to  be  holding  the  same  up  before 
lis  through   Proclus.     Instinctively  he  leads  to  a 


PEOCL  rs.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  699 

view  of  the  lesser  jind  o;reater  Triads  ever  circlinof 
and  unfolding,  even  to  a  glimpse  of  the  greatest, 
all-inclusive  Triad.  The  inner  moving  principle 
of  Greek  philosoph}^,  that  which  produced  all  its 
divisions,  large  and  small,  with  tbeir  separations 
and  returns,  the  secret  thinkino;  Demiurge  who 
has  been  lurking  and  working  in  this  world  of 
Hellenic  thought  for  a  thousand  years  and  more, 
has  now  been  exorcized  and  been  made  to  appear 
in  his  own  naked  form  and  in  his  own  pure  ac- 
tivity. Surely  the  end  of  this  world  is  at  hand. 
Still  we  must  consider  the  limitation.  This 
Triad  is  formal,  metaphysical,  producing  a  kind 
of  shadowy  multiplication  of  shadows,  a  disem- 
bodied soul  triplicating  itself  in  round  after  round 
to  infinity.  Just  here  lies  the  diificulty.  The 
Triad  of  Proclus  is  not  the  concrete  spirit,  not 
the  self-conscious  Ego  with  its  power  of  self- 
verification,  but  abstract,  unreal,  producing  the 
impression  of  a  dance  of  phantoms.  Over  and 
over  again  he  describes  the  triadal  process  care- 
fully and  rightly,  yet  he  never  identifies  it  with 
the  Self,  which  is  just  this  process  in  fact.  For 
it  is  really  the  Self  of  Proclus  describing  its  (nvn 
inner  movement,  and  affirming  such  a  movement 
of  the  Self  to  be  the  process  of  the  All 
that  produces  the  Triad.  But  the  Triad  be- 
comes metaphj^sical  and  indeed  unreal  when 
divorced  from  the  Self  which  is  just  it  (the 
Triad^   in    the    making  of    it,    and    which    i^ 


700         ANGIEN2'  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

its  reality.  In  other  words,  Proclus  lius 
the  Psychosis  without  the  Psyche,  which 
he  put  down  far  below  the  Triad  as  one  of 
its  inferior  products,  whereas  the  Triad  is  really 
its  product  or  rather  it  itself.  The  worth  of 
the  Self  in  its  own  right  as  the  self-conscious 
principle  of  the  All  is  not  recognized  by  Pro- 
clus ;  he  extracts  its  inner  process  and  projects 
it  outwards  as  the  creative  essence  of  his  system, 
whereby  it  is  emptied  of  its  true  content.  So 
the  Triad  in  his  hands  appears  a  kind  of  machine 
or  gimcrack  which,  being  external,  he  applies  ex- 
ternally to  man  and  also  to  the  Gods  who  are 
whipped  into  order  by  this  contrivance.  Pro- 
clus is  truly  a  God-compeller  by  means  of  his 
Triad,  leaving  out  of  the  account,  all  uncon- 
scious, the  user  of  the  Triad,  the  Self  who  with 
it  is  manipulating  with  such  ease  apparently  the 
vast  multitude    of  Hellenic  and  Oriental  deities. 

All  this  is  only  saying  that  Proclus  is  meta- 
physical and  not  psychological,  that  he  lived 
Ions  ago  at  an  earlier  stao;e  than  ours  in  the 
evolution  of  human  Thinking.  Let  not  our 
different  and  possibly  higher  criterion  blind  us 
to  his  deep  insight  and  his  greatness.  Like  all 
the  past  he  has  much  to  tell  us  by  way  of  instruc- 
tion. I  hold  that  the  Proclian  Triad  has  still 
a  message  for  the  thinker  of  to-day. 

2.  N'ous.  We  are  fir,st  to  observe  that  Proclus 
has  his    Nous    follow   from    the    triadal  process 


PliOCLUS.  — METAPHYSICS.  701 

which  determines  it  throughout  as  threefold  in 
its  movement.  This  is  diferent  from  Plotinus 
whose  Supreme  One  simply  overflows  and  lapses 
(enumates)  into  Nous.  At  first  glance  it  would 
seem  that  Proclus  makes  his  Nous  evolve  out  of 
the  antecedent  stage,  from  which  it  is  an  advance. 
But  he  breaks  just  at  this  point,  his  Nous  is  still 
an  emanation  or  descent,  not  an  evolution  or 
ascent ;  Proclus  now  turns  back  from  Proclus  to 
Plotinus,  not  proceeding  to  the  higher  but  to  the 
lower;  his  return  becomes  a  relapse.  His  Triad 
is  still  retained,  but  is  externally  applied  rather 
than  internall}^  developed.  The  Going-forth 
(proodos)  is  really  a  going  down  to  Nous;  our 
philosopher  dualizes  himself,  his  Janus-face  on 
one  side  looks  toward  the  rising  and  on  the  other 
toward  the  setting  sun. 

The  divisions  of  Nous  will  show  in  all  fullness 
the  f  ormalistic  strain  in  the  philosophic  character 
of  Proclus.  He  first  separates  the  sphere  of 
Nous  into  three  leading  departments  or  classes, 
which  are  still  further  divided  triadally  into 
Orders,  'and  these  again  are  subdivided  into 
fresh  Triads. 

The  Classes  of  Proclus  start  from  Jamblichus 
who  had  two  Classes  of  Nous,  the  Intellegible 
(noefos),  and  Intellectual  (noeros).  Proclus 
interjects  an  intermediate  Class  between  these 
two,  in  accord  with  his  triadal  principle,  which 
Class  he    names    Intelligible-Intellectual  (noetos 


^02         ANCIENT  EUEOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Tcai  noeros)  being  compoimded  of  the  two 
extreme  classes.  At  the  same  time  he  gives  the 
essential  attributes  of  these  three  Classes  respec- 
tively as  Being,  Life,  Thinking  (Nous  in  the 
narrower  sense).  Even  a  second  set  of  attributes 
appears  which  need  not  be  mentioned.  The 
relation  of  these  attributes  he  describes  as 
follows.  "Being  is  before  Life,  and  Life  is 
before  Thinking.  *  *  *  All  things  are  in  all, 
and  peculiarly  in  each ;  in  Being  are  Life  and 
Thinking,  in  Life  are  Being  and  Thinking, 
and  in  Thinking  are  Being  and  Life."  (^Inst. 
Theol.  101,  103.)  The  triadal  organization  is 
not  clear  in  all  its  details,  but  a  general  outline 
can  be  given  about  as  follows :  — 

(I.)  Litelligible  Class  (noetos).  Object,  Be- 
ing, Actuality,  even  Goodness.  But  the  main 
point  is  its  three  Triads. 

(1)  The  Triad  pertaining  to  the  Limit:  (a) 
the  Limit  as  such,  (b)  the  Unlimited,  (c)  the 
Composite  (^mixton)  of  the  two,  which  he  calls 
also  essence  (ousia).  Moreover  out  of  this  last 
composite  springs  a  notable  Triad:  Symmetry, 
Truth,  and  Beauty;  notable  as  one  little  gleam 
that  Proclus  may  not  have  wholly  left  out  of 
his  philosophy  some  consideration  of  Art  and 
Beauty.  Still  this  remote  Triad  may  only  have 
been  a  faint  suggestion  from  Plotinus. 

(2)  The  second  Intelligible  Triad  is  called  the 
Litelligible  Life,  or    Eternity.     It  is  a  Triad  as 


PBOCL  US.  —  ME  TAPHYSICS.  703 

follows  :  (a)  the  One  or  the  Limit,  (b)  the  Force' 
or  the  Unlimited,  (c)  Life.  It  will  be  observed 
that  each  of  the  categorise  of  this  Triad  has  been 
used  before  in  other  connections  by  Proclus,  who 
thus  lays  bare  his  chief  sin  in  exposition.  He 
has  no  hesitation  in  appl3ing  the  same  term  to 
members  of  w4iolly  different  Triads,  so  that  the 
reader  is  often  confused  utterly  about  the  no- 
menclature. In  lilve  manner  be  puts  the  same 
God  into  different  Triads  w^hereby  his  Pantheon 
becomes  a  veritable  jumble  of  the  fiends.  Pa- 
tience-provoking is  this  "  damnable  iteration"  of 
Proclus,  so  that  one  feels  at  times  like  flinging 
his  whole  scheme  out  of  the  window.  Still  the 
much-endurino;  investigator  of  human  Thouo;ht 
must  know  Proclus.  So,  havinsj  reoained  our 
composure,  let  us  glance  at  the  next  Triad. 

(3)  The  third  Intelligible  Triad  embraces  the 
world  of  Ideas,  originally  transmitted  from 
Plato,  who  (with  Aristotle)  wTote  the  Neo- 
Hellenic  Bible.  Here  then  we  have  (a)  unity 
which  creates  (b)  multiplicity  with  all  its  Ideas 
inclosed  (c)  in  a  new  or  mediated  unity. 

(II.)  The  Intelligible-Intellectual  Class.  Its 
main  predicate  is  Life,  which  is  alwaj^s  creating 
and  multiplying;  as  the  second  stage,  it  is  the 
Procession  or  the  Separation  specially.  This  too 
furnishes  a  set  of  three  Triads. 

(1)  The  original  numerical  elements  which 
underlie  this  double  Class:    («)    One  as  number 


704         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

"(b)  the  Other  (heteron)  (c)  Being,  seemingly  as 
rehited  to  number. 

(2)  The  connected  elements  which  are  joined 
in  pairs:  («)  The  One  and  Many,  (5)  the 
Whole  and  the  Parts,  (c)  the  Limited  and  the 
Unlimited.     These  are  called  combining  Gods. 

(3)  The  completing  elements,  also  made  into 
Gods.  These  show  a  return  to  the  three  Orders  of 
Nous,  which  are  set  forth  again  in  three  Triads. 

(III.)  The  Intellectual  Class.  Here  a  new 
principle  is  added :  to  the  three  a  four  is  joined, 
making  a  seven  (Hebdomad).  This  is  derived 
from  Jamblichus  directly,  but  the  sacredness  of 
the  number  seven  is  old,  hinting  probably  of  the 
ancient  worship  of  the  seven  planets.  Still  in 
the  Hebdomad  the  underlying  Triad  is  preserved 
by  making  the  first  two  members  treble  while  the 
latter  remains  single.  Thus  the  seven  keeps  the 
triadal  form. 

But  now  comes  another  result.  Instead  of  the 
Class  beino;  divided  into  three  Triads  as  hereto- 
fore,  we  now  see  it  divided  into  seven  Hebdo- 
mads. The  development  of  these  are  given  by 
Proclus  in  his  Platonic  Theology,  where  the  ab- 
stract categories  may  usually  be  found  along 
with  the  corresponding  deities. 

Such  is,  in  brief  outline,  the  organization  of 
Nous  in  Proclus,  whose  procedure  here  seems 
external  and  capricious,  quite  different  from  his 
treatment   of   the   preceding    stage,  the   triadal 


PliOCL  VS.  —  ME  TAPE  YSICS.  705 

One.  We  cannot  help  thinking  that  they  belong 
to  different  periods  of  the  philosopher's  own 
development,  though  these  periods  can  hardly 
be  studied  so  fully  in  Proclus  as  they  have  been 
in  Plato,  whose  writings  reflect  so  completely  his 
spiritual  unfolding. 

3.  The  S021I.  In  general  Proclus  follows 
Plotinus  in  his  view  of  the  Soul,  which  as  dis- 
tinct from  the  sensible  world  has  the  power  of 
turning  back  into  itself,  or  self -consciousness. 
Thus  it  makes  itself  One  through  the  return.  It 
is  the  bridge  from  the  material  to  the  immate- 
rial, though  bodiless  in  itself  and  immortal. 

There  are  three  classes  of  Souls  —  divine, 
demonic,  and  human. 

(I.)  The  first  class  is  composed  of  divine 
Souls,  specially  the  Gods  of  Greek  mythology. 
These  again  fall  into  a  Triad,  composed  as 
follows :  — 

(1)  The  leading  Gods  (kegemonikoi),  or  the 
Great  Gods,  who  are  still  further  divided  iuto 
four  Triads,  of  which  the  first  has  Zeus,  Posei- 
don and  Pluto,  but  the  rest  we  shall  omit. 

(2)  The  separative  Gods  [apolutoi),  inter- 
mediate, separating  upper  or  supramundane 
Gods  and  the  lower  or  mundane  Gods.  Also 
four  Triads  embracing  familiar  names  of  the 
Greek  Pantheon. 

(3)  The  mundane  Gods  (egkos7nioi) ,  which 
can  have  a  body,  and  which  seem  to  have  but 

45 


706         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

two    divisions,    the  stellar    and    the    sublunary 
Gods. 

(II.)  The  second  Class  is  made  up  of  demons, 
which  word  does  not  mean  in  Proclus  bad  spirits, 
as  he  directly  denies  that  they  are  bad,  probably 
in  answer  to  the  Christian  belief  which  after- 
wards has  such  a  tremendous  expression  in  Dante's 
Inferno.     These,  too,  are  in  three  sets. 

(1)  Angels,  whom  we  are  surprised  to  meet 
here  in  this  heathen  company  of  ghosts.  But 
it  is  not  the  only  interpolation  which  Proclus 
has  taken  from  his  Christian  environment. 

(2)  Demons  in  the  special  sense,  intermediate 
beings  of  varied  rank  and  power  who  have 
played  a  great  part  in  popular  superstition,  and 
who  have  furnished  materials  for  a  special 
science,  demonology. 

(3)  Last  are  the  souls  of  Heroes,  who  also 
have  their  worship  and  their  influence  over  the 
world  from  which  they  have  departed.  This  is 
decidedly  a  Greek  cult. 

(III.)  The  third  Class  of  souls  are  human,  or 
like  the  human  soul,  which  shares  in  a  thinking 
and  an  unthinking  principle.  These  too  can  be 
divided  into  various  kinds,  but  it  is  manifest  that 
the  soul  with  its  unthinking  part  has  a  body  of 
some  sort. 

Thus  we  have  before  us  in  brief  outline  the 
supersensible  or  metaphysical  sphere  of  Proclus. 
We  see  that  it  is  a  highly  organized  system  which 


PB0CLU8  —METAPHYSICS.  707 

tries  to  put  into  order  the  vast  multitude  of  the 
divinities  of  the  Greco-Roman  world  according 
to  the  philosophical  categories  of  the  Plotinian 
scheme.  Still  Proclus  has  gotten  behind  even 
this  scheme  and  evolved  out  of  it  the  Triad  as 
the  governing  principle  of  the  categories  and 
through  them  of  the  Gods.  This  grovernino- 
principle  is,  however,  applied  externally,  clapped 
on  from  the  outside;  only  the  original  Triad 
seems  to  be  self-unfolding,  and  so  is  truly  the 
topmost  part  of  Proclus  who  makes  a  descent 
from  it  both  in  his  method  as  well  as  in  the  value 
of  his  work. 

This  descent  gives  Proclus  no  little  trouble, 
for  his  generative  Triad  has  to  be  linked  into 
the  emanative  principle  of  Neo-Platouism.  So 
he  employs  (in  his  Insf.  Theol.  particularly) 
two  categories  for  explanation:  similaritj^  and 
dissimilarity.  It  is  similarity  which  makes  the 
One  stay  with  itself  {mom),  but  it  is  dissimilar- 
ity which  causes  it  to  move  forth  and  to  produce 
separation  and  multiplicity.  Now  this  second 
stage  is  alwaj^s  a  descent  with  Proclus,  because 
it  has  something  dissimilar  to  the  First  One. 
Still  it  has  also  something  similar,  therefore  it 
desires  to  return  to  what  is  purely  similar  or 
simple.  Hence  the  simplest  beings  are  the  most 
perfect,  while  the  composite  or  differenced  ones 
are  lower.  Also  the  more  perfect  a  being  is, 
the  more  power  it  has,  and  the  more  productive 


708         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

it  is,  that  is,  the  more  it  goes  over  into  multi- 
plicity (Lisf.  Theol.  25)  or  imperfection,  from 
which,  however,  it  longs  to  get  back.  Still 
another  category  which  Proclus  employs  to 
explain  his  triadal  procedure  is  Cause.  Every 
effect  has  in  itself  its  Cause,  yet  also  a  separa- 
tion from  its  Cause,  otherwise  it  would  not  be 
effect.  Hence  this  effect  is  something  derived, 
inferior,  baser,  wherefore  it  too  strives  to  return 
to  its  Cause. 

Such  is  the  struggle  of  Proclus  to  get  back  of 
his  abstract  triadal  process,  for  he  feels  that 
something  lies  behind  it,  something  deeper  than 
it  is.  And  in  this  feelmg  he  is  right.  But  he 
is  unable  to  help  himself.  He  feels  the  in- 
adequacy of  his  metaphysical  Triad;  but  in 
order  to  explain  it  he  can  only  project  behind  it 
another  set  of  metaphysical  categories,  which 
are  in  precisely  the  same  need  of  explanation. 
So  he  rolls  from  this  abstraction  to  that,  in  a 
kind  of  philosophical  fever.  Still  we  cannot 
help  admiring  the  genuine  instinct  of  the  man, 
which  will  not  be  satisfied  with  his  own  formu- 
lation. No  wonder  that  he  at  last  throws  the 
whole  business  up  into  the  realm  of  the  One 
where  there  is  no  consciousness,  no  reason,  and 
especially  no  categories,  being  just  the  realm  of 
the  Ineffable. 

To  our  mind  that  which  Proclus  feels  from 
afar,    in    a  kind  of    distant  presentiment,  is  the 


PBOCL  US.  —  FJIYSICS.  70'J 

fundamental  Triad  of  the  Self  as  the  principle 
of  all  things,  the  Psychosis.  But  his  philo- 
sophical Norm  of  Neo-Hellenism  cannot  express 
it,  in  spite  of  iteration  and  reiteration  of  triple 
ternaries  in  eternal  succession.  Thus  all  Phi- 
losophy gets  empty,  reverberating  its  own 
hollowness  in  a  long  line  of  fantastic  Triads 
without  real  connection  or  content.  Still  that 
first  organic  or  perchance  genetic  Triad  of  his 
must  be  deemed  a  very  significant  step  in  Phi- 
losophy. 

II.  Physics. 

The  search  for  the  laws  of  Nature  as  a 
pursuit  in  itself  is  hardly  known  to  Proclus, 
since  in  his  thought  Nature  was  determined 
by  Spirits  from  above,  and  is  a  lapse.  Yet 
he  assigns  the  origin  of  this  lapse  to  a  being  far 
above  the  Demiurge  of  Plotinus,  so  that  the 
regular  gradation  of  descent  is  broken  into  by 
Proclus.  In  other  words,  a  form  of  Nous 
creates  the  material  world  directly,  without 
passing  through  the  intervening  third  stage  of 
the  Soul.  This  may  have  been  influenced  by  the 
Christian  doctrine  which  makes  God  the  creator 
of  all  things.  Nature  included.  Still  Proclus 
follows  in  the  main  the  Neo-Hellenic  ladder 
of  descent,  and  combats  openly  the  Christian 
idea  of  creation  by  fiat.  He  holds  with  the 
Greek    thinkers    in   general,    that    the    creation 


710         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  world  did  not  take  place  in  time,  nor  was 
it  the  act  of  a  conscious  will. 

1.  Body.  The  primal  corporeal  shape  is  the 
Cosmos,  which  is  a  living  animal,  and  has  the  union 
of  soul  and  body.  Proclus  considers  even  Space 
to  have  a  body  with  a  soul  in  it.  Still  the  soul 
is  apart  from  the  body.  Says  he  :  "  Every  soul 
isincorporeal,  and  distinct  from  the  body.  What- 
ever knows  itself  (self-conscious)  turns  back  to 
itself,  which  is  not  possible  with  the  body." 
Here  Procius  has  come  upon  the  Ego  "  which 
knows  itself,"  and  therefore  cannot  be  cor- 
poreal; for  this  self-knowing  "is  the  turn- 
ing back  into  itself."  He  sees  the  triadal 
form  of  the  Soul  (or  the  Ego)  and  declares:  if 
it  knows  the  things  above  itself,  so  much  the 
more  by  its  nature  must  it  kuow  itself,  since  it 
knows  itself  apart  from  the  cause  before  itself. 
Thus  Proclus  has  really  identified  with  his  self- 
returning  Triad  the  self-conscious  Ego,  and  says 
or  seems  to  say  that  the  latter  or  the  Soul  can 
only  know  what  is  above  itself  through  knowing 
itself.  If  he  could  have  carried  out  this  thought 
he  would  have  had  the  Psychosis  fifteen  hundred 
years  ago.  But  he  proceeds  at  once  to  imply 
that  the  Triad  above  causes  this  self-conscious 
act  —  which  is  to  put  the  cart  before  the  horse. 
Like  all  Greek  p!iil()S()[)hcrs,  Aristotle  included, 
when  he  had  the  real  self-returning  process 
before  his  eyes  and   had  formulated  it,  he  could 


nwcL  us.  —  niYSics.  7 1 1 

not  conceive  of  it  as  Ego  or  Self,  but  projected 
out  of  all  selfhood  into  an  abstract  metaplij^sical 
entit}' ,  and  so  could  not  rise  to  a  psychological 
view  of  the  Universe. 

Thus  Body  separates,  the  Soul  within  it  turn- 
ing back  into  itself  and  thereby  showing  itself  to 
be  bodiless.  The  self-conscious  act  is  the  self- 
assertion  of  the  Soul  as  incorporeal.  "  Every- 
thing which  turns  back  into  itself  cannot  have  a 
body"  (Insf.  Theol.  15.  16.  Also  186  for  the 
identification  of  the  self -returning  Triad  with  the 
self -knowing  act.) 

The  soul  may  be  said  to  roll  back  from  the 
body  and  curl  over  into  itself,  though  it  be 
united  with  the  body.  Still  the  body  without 
soul  is  strictly  no  longer  body  but  drops  down 
to  the  next  element. 

2.  Matter.  Something  already  existent  must 
be  given  to  the  soul  for  its  embodiment.  This 
is  Matter  which  according  to  Proclus  (wherein 
he  differs  from  Plotinus)  is  a  product  of  the 
Unlimited,  a  God  whose  seat  is  in  the  first  Triad 
of  Nous  far  over  it  (see  the  Intelligible  Class 
above).  Matter  is  not,  therefore,  the  First  Evil, 
being  neither  good  nor  bad.  Herein  Proclus 
makes  a  step  outside  the  entire  Platonic  School, 
and  goes  over  to  Aristotle  who  certainly  found  no 
ethical  character  in  Matter  taken  by  itself.  To  be 
sure,  Matter  is  in  Proclus  still  nearly  at  the 
bottom   of  the    ladder,    far   removed   from    the 


712         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Oue  and  the  Good.  Still  that  does  not  neces- 
sarily make  it  bad,  since  it  has  no  will  or 
consciousness,  and  cannot  help  itself  from  getting 
to  be.  This  brings  us  face  to  face  with  the 
question:  Whence  does  Evil  come  and  what 
is  it? 

3.  Evil.    It  springs  from  the  Free-Will  of  the 
individual,  which  is  much  more  strongly  empha- 
sized  by   Proclus    than   by   Plotinus.     In    this 
ao-ain   we    may   well    see    a    Christian    influence 
coming   particularly   from  Origen.     Everything 
as  sent   forth   from   the    Higher   Powers   is    in 
itself    good,  the  Evil  in  the  world  is  the  fault 
of     man    and    his    freedom.     Proclus    considers 
external  ills  not  to  be  evil,  but  to  be  the  course 
of  nature,    wherein   lies    often   the  punishment 
of  some  former  offense.     As  Proclus  also  believes 
in  pre-existence,  he  has  that  to  fall  back  upon 
in  accounting  for  the  afliictions  of  this  -present 
life.     Moreover  he,  with  Plotinus,  regards  Evil 
as  a  great  means  of   instruction  through  expe- 
rience.    But    man,    being   endowed   with   Free- 
Will,  becomes  more  distinctively  an  ethical  being 
whose  rise  we  may  next  consider. 

V  III.  Ethics. 

This  sphere  embraces  the  complete  return 
of  the  Soul  (or  Ego)  to  the  One,  to  the  Good, 
or  to  God,  the  creative  source  of  all  Being.     It 


PR  OCLUS.—E  THIC  S.  713 

IS  the  third  stage  of  the  philosophical  Norm, 
which  we  have  found  to  be  the  inner  frame- 
work of  Greek  philosophy.  It  is  Proclus  who 
is  more  conscious  of  this  return  than  any 
philosopher  of  Hellas,  since  he  has  made  it 
the  third  stage  of  his  metaphysical  Triad  which 
is  really  the  genetic  source  of  all  things.  But 
the  ethical  return  had  long  been  known,  since 
it  appears  distinctly  in  the  great  Athenian 
thinkers  and  may  be  traced  in  some  of  their  pre- 
decessors. In  fact,  the  idea  of  some  sort  of 
restoration  to  God  lies  more  or  less  explicitly 
in  every  kind  of  religion.  The  ethical  in  the 
present  case  includes  the  religicnis  and  every  other 
method  of  rising  to  the  supra-sensible  out  of  the 
sensible  world. 

This  rise  or  ascent  proceeds,  in  general,  by  the 
same  steps  which  we  saw  in  the  descent.  Proclus, 
being  the  formalist  of  his  school,  naturally  insists 
more  strongly  upon  a  methodical  procedure  than 
Plotinus  or  Jamblichus.  "  The  road  upward  is 
through  the  same  stages  as  the  road  downward  " 
(In  Timaeum  325.  E,  apud  Zeller).  "  All  that 
proceeds  from  several  causes,  returns  through 
just  what  it  has  proceeded.  Every  Going-back 
is  through  the  same  stages  as  the  Coming-f  orth  ' ' 
(lusf.  Theo.  38).  "  Through  whatever  (course) 
Being  arises  to  the  individual,  through  the  same 
arises  his  Well-being"  or  the  Good.  By  the 
same  stages  he  gets  to  be  in  descent,  by  the  same 


7 1 4         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

stages  does  he  get  to  be  good  in  ascent.  Still  Pro- 
clus  holds  to  an  immediate  union  with  God  as  the 
end  of  this  mediational  scheme,  though  it  receives 
much  less  emphasis  with  him  than  with  Plotinus. 

It  is  from  Plotinus,  however,  that  Proclus  has 
his  general  outline  of  ethical  ascent  to  the  Hish- 
est  Good,  to  which  lead  three  main  ways. 

I.  The  practice  of  the  Virtues  is  one  of  these 
ways.  This  we  may  specially  call  the  moral 
sphere  to  distinguish  it  from  the  broader  ethical 
sphere  which  includes  it.  The  classes  of  Virtues 
are  not  altogether  certain  in  Proclus,  but  they 
seem  to  be  nearly  as  follows :  — 

1.  The  political  Virtues,  which  are  the  four 
cardinal  Virtues  of  Plato's  Republic.  But  Pro- 
clus, like  most  of  the  Neo-Hellenic  philosophers, 
will  have  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  State  or 
with  other  Institutions. 

2.  The  theoretic  Virtues  are  often  placed  next, 
but  they  properly  belong  to  a  different  sphere. 

3.  The  paradeigmatic  Virtues  are  still  higher, 
drawing  the  soul  into  communion  with  the  pure 
Ideas  above  the  sensible  world. 

4.  The  hieratic  Virtue  is  essentially  religious, 
bringing  into  the  soul  the  divine  illuminaion 

II.  Contemplation  (^llieoria)  is  the  second  gen- 
eral way  to  rise  to  the  Highest.  Some  of  the 
Virtues  seem  to  overlaj)  into  the  present  sphere, 
such  as  the  theoretic  and  dialectic  Virtues.    Still 


PEOCL  US  —E  THICS.  715 

it  is  better  to  consider  this  sphere  by  itself  under 
the  heads  of  Art,  Religion,  and  Philosophy. 

1.  Art  has  little  hold  of  Proclus  compared 
with  Plotinus.  Indeed  he  seems  to  think  that 
the  ugly  and  repulsive  element  in  many  myths  of 
the  Gods  is  what  brings  the  Soul  to  the  realm 
above,  the  Beautiful.  The  more  unnatural  the 
outer  form,  the  more  elevating.  Herein  Proclus 
has  become  wholly  non-Greek. 

2.  Religion  is  all  the  more  important  with  Pro- 
clus, who  believes  in  religious  rites,  symbols, 
prayers,  fastings,  and  most  emphatically  believes 
in  belief,  which  he  puts  above  all  thought  in 
attaining  the  Highest.  Hence  he  is  ready  to 
accept  every  sort  of  superstition ;  theurgy  is 
better  than  virtue,  and  has  a  greater  power 
to  call  down  the  Gods  to  human  assistance. 
He  deals  in  magic,  miracles,  signs,  following 
in  this  respect  the  footsteps  of  Jamblichus, 
whose  religious  phase  he  joins  to  the  more 
philosophical  tendency  of  Plotinus. 

3.  Philosophy  has  an  important  place  in  the 
ethical  discipline  of  Proclus  who  shows  how 
we  are  to  rise  from  the  sensuous  percept  *or 
image  to  the  mathematical  concept  and  thence 
to  dialectical  thinking.  Herein  he  is  essentially 
like  Plato  and  the  Neo-Hellenic  School  generall}'. 
In  particular  he  values  the  Dialectic,  as  his 
mental  bent  is  largely  dialectical ;  a  fact  which 
shows  itself  everywhere  in  his  works.     For  this 


716         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

reason  he  has  been  called  by  somebody  the  first 
scholastic  philosopher.  Still  Proclus  seems  to 
hold  that  all  thought  finally  moves  between 
two  contradictious  which  it  does  not  solve, 
and  that  the  Divine  Unity  lies  beyond  it, 
unattainable  except  by  illumination  from  above. 

III.  So  it  comes  that  Faith  is  elevated  above 
all  knowing  and  thinking  by  Proclus.  This 
Faith  has,  in  general,  the  place  corresponding 
to  the  Ecstasy  of  Plotinus,  but  it  is  not  so 
immediate,  not  so  ready  for  a  flight,  far  more 
quiet  and  much  less  certain  of  itself.  In  this 
upper  sphere  we  also  learn  of  the  three  paths, 
apparently  the  final  ethical  Triad,  Love,  Truth, 
Faith,  of  which  the  last  is  best  and  highest. 
Possibly  this  is  an  echo  of  the  three  Christian 
Virtues,  Faith,  Hope,  and  Love  (Charity). 

In  this  mj^stic  union  with  the  Supreme  One 
the  ethical  process  of  Proclus  ends,  and  also  his 
total  triune  process  of  the  Norm,  metaphysical, 
physical  and  ethical,  which  we  have  sought  to 
make  plain  to  eye  as  well  as  to  mind  by  the  fore- 
going somewhat  formally  tabulated  statement. 
This  does  not  do  injustice  to  the  manner  of  his 
exposition  which  has  in  it  a  decidedly  methodical 
movement,  even  if  he  throws  down  his  dialectical 
ladder  after  he  has  climbed  upon  it  to  God. 
Hence  he  calls  his  two  main  works  by  the  name 
of  Theologi/,  the  end  of  Philosophy  being  no 
longer  in  itself  but  in  God.     Herein  we  see  that 


PBOCL  US.  —  E  TJTICS.  7 1 7 

Proclus  has  the  same  general  trend  as  Christian 
scholasticism.  When  the  Philosopher  vanishes 
into  the  Divine  Essence,  he  has  nothing  further 
to  say ;  the  purpose  of  philosophy  is  to  get  rid  of 
itself.  But  as  long  as  Proclus  has  anything  to 
say,  philosophy  is  really  first,  since  he  uses  phi- 
losophical categories  for  ordering  all  religions  into 
his  scheme. 

Proclus  stands  in  manifold  relations  to  Chris- 
tianity as  well  as  to  Medieval  Philosophy  which  is 
his  successor,  and  of  which  he  is  in  numerous 
ways  the  teacher.  In  him  we  find  both  mysti- 
cism and  scholasticism  which  run  through  all 
Christian  Theology  down  to  the  present  time. 
Proclus,  however,  subordinates  Religion  to  his 
philosophical  Triad ;  but  Medieval  Philosophy  will 
subordinate  the  philosophical  Triad  to  Eeligion, 
whereby  the  abstract  Triad  is  made  to  explain  the 
concrete  personal  Trinity.  Thus  Philosophy  goes 
into  the  service  of  Religion,  where  she  remains  a 
thousand  years,  the  ancilla,  no  longer  the  mistress 
of  the  house  as  she  was  in  old  Greek  times.  In 
Proclus,  then,  we  find  the  end  of  Greek  Philos- 
ophy as  an  independent  discipline. 

On  a  number  of  lines,  we  see  that  Proclus  has 
broken  through  Neo-Hellenism  in  spirit  if  not  in 
form.  His  fundamental  Triad  is  really  creative, 
a  divinity  producing  divinities,  though  dressed  in 
abstract  categories.  Then  he  declares  that  the 
origin  of  evil  lies  in  the  will  of  man,  where  the 


718         ANCIENT  EUBOPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Christian  Theologians  had  already  put  it,  and 
thus  it  is  not  the  necessitated  overflow  of  the 
One.  Matter  with  him  is  not  the  "First  Evil  " 
as  it  is  with  Plotinus.  The  Soul  by  its  Free- 
Will  is  to  overcome  its  determination  through 
Matter  as  emanated,  and  indeed  through  the 
whole  line  of  emanation  from  the  Supreme  One, 
which  is  thus  to  be  negated  by  the  ethical  pro- 
cess of  freedom.  So  the  Free-Will  of  the  indi- 
vidual in  Proclus  has  as  its  function  to  destroy 
emanation,  that  is  to  destroy  the  Neo-Hellenic 
principle.  This  self-negation  of  Neo-Hellenism 
lurked  originally  in  it,  but  Proclus  makes  it 
explicit. 

The  emanative  principle  of  Proclus  is  in  a 
continual  struggle  with  the  developmental ;  the 
second  stage,  the  going-forth,  is  really  an  un- 
folding of  the  One,  but  Proclus  insists  upon 
makinsf  it  a  descent ;  with  a  kind  of  violence  he 
turns  evolution  or  progress  (proodos)  into  de- 
cadence. This  is  only  another  form  of  the  in- 
herent dualism  of  Neo-Platonism,  which  Proclus 
in  his  very  resistance  has  made  more  pronounced. 
But  the  Return  (epistrophe)  is  openly  the  nega- 
tion of  the  whole  emanative  descent. 

Still  the  great  fact  of  the  work  of  Proclus 
remains  his  explicit  triadal  process,  which  has 
been  more  or  less  blindly  working  itself  out 
through  all  Greek  Philosophy  from  the  be- 
ginning.    To  be  sure  this  process  in  Proclus  is 


PnOOLUS  —ETHICS.  7 19 

external,  formal,  a  mere  skeleton,  but  a  skele- 
ton ought  not  to  be  despised  in  these  days  of 
palaeontology.  It  is  said  that  the  skillful  nat- 
uralist can  construct  the  living  animal  from  a 
few  bones  of  its  skeleton,  and  therewith  also 
its  manner  of  life  and  its  environment.  Proclus, 
then,  has  extracted  the  triadal  skeleton  of  the 
total  body  of  Greek  Thought  and  set  it  up 
before  us.  And  this  is  his  trouble,  for  most 
people  do  not  like  bones,  even  their  own,  but 
want  life. 

There  is  no  denying  that  Proclus  is  a  fearful 
formalist,  and  often  rattles  his  abstract  cate- 
gories in  a  manner  which  dazes  the  wearied 
brain.  Dialectician  he  is  usually  called  with  a 
shade  of  contempt  in  the  word ;  but  his  is  not 
the  true  Dialectic,  which  is  always  concrete. 
Still  we  may  call  him  by  this  name  in  a  second- 
ary sense,  though  his  procedure  is  logical  rather 
than  dialectical. 

Many  other  designations  have  been  applied 
to  Proclus  and  the  Neo-Platonists  generally, 
with  an  ironical  cast  in  them,  such  as  mysto- 
gogue,  hierophant,  theurge,  gymnosophist  — 
words  which  they  once  used  to  characterize 
themselves.  It  must  be  confessed  that  these 
terms  represent  not  the  best  side  of  Neo- 
Hellenism.  Here  mav  be  one  reason,  thousfh 
it  is  not   the   only    one,  why  the  Neo-Hellenic 


720         ANCIENT  E UBOPEAN  PHIL OSOPHY. 

movement  has  never  been  assigned  its  true  place 
in  the  total   development  of  Greek  Philosophy. ' 

After  the  death  of  Proclus  the  School  of 
Athens  continued  under  the  guidance  of  its 
Scholarchs,  of  whom  the  most  famous  was  Damas- 
cius  and  also  the  last.  Boethius  (470-525)  in  the 
West,  though  a  professed  Christian,  was  strongly 
tinged  with  Neo-Platonism.  With  the  close  of 
the  School  of  Athens  the  History  of  Ancient 
Philosophy  as  an  independent  discipline  is 
brought  to  a  conclusion,  though  its  light  flick- 
ered long  afterwards  in  various  places  and  per- 
sons. 

We  may  apply  to  Neo-Hellenism  its  own  doc- 
trine and  movement:  it  has  returned  to  the  One 
from  which  it  came,  and  has  vanished  as  an  in- 
dividual Philosophy.  As  Ilellenisticism  was  the 
overflow  which  produced  it,  so  it  is  the  going 
back  to  the  source  of  its  own  emanation.  Neo- 
Hellenism  regards  its  descent  from  the  Supernal 
One  as  an  unconscious  lapse,  as  a  kind  of  dream, 
till  it  reaches  Evil  which  wakes  up  the  self-con- 
scious individual  hitherto  asleep.  Thus  the 
dream  ends,  and  man  is  to  undo  consciously  his 
consciousness,  his  very  individuality,  and  be- 
come one  with  the  one  only  One.  From  this 
point  of  view  Neo-Hellenism  as  a  Philosophy 
has  fultilled  its  own  principle  in  its  evanishment, 
its  waking  existence  it  has  put  to  eternal  sleep. 


PROCL  US.  —  E  THIC8.  72 1 

Herewith  Greek  Philosophy  in    its  three    great 
Periods  has  completed  its  career. 

Two    immediate  results  lie    before    us.     The 
one  is  the  abstract  metaphjsical  Triad  of  Pro- 
clus,  which  the  philosopher  has  posited  as  the 
fundamental   principle    of   the    Universe.     The 
other  is  the   Christian  Trinity  or  the  divine  tri- 
personal  Triad,  which  the  theologian  has  posited 
as   the  fundamental   principle  of  the  Universe. 
Both  belong  to  the  future.     Both   are  different 
utterances  or  formulations  of   the   one    deepest 
process    of  the    All,  which    we  have    sought  to 
bring   to  light  in   the  development    of  Ancient 
Philosophy,  and  which   has  been  emphasized  bv 
giving    to    it  a    name  peculiarly  its    own  — the 
Pampsychosis. 

46 


722         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


NOTES. 

P.  32.  There  are  some  Historians  of  Pliilosopliy  who  do 
not  adopt  these  three  divisions.  One  is  Ueberweg  who 
makes  two,  Greek  and  Christian.  Windelband  (ia  his  Hist, 
of  Phil.)  has  no  less  than  seven  divisions,  apparently  co- 
ordinate, of  European  Philosophy.  Lewes  (in  his  Biogr. 
Hist,  of  Phil.)  gives  two  periods,  ancient  and  modern, 
throwing  out  the  medieval  as  unphilosopliical. 

P.  47.  The  leading  Historians  of  Greek  Philosophy,  have 
for  the  most  part  divided  it  into  three  main  periods.  But 
when  these  Historians  come  to  consider  what  shall  be  in- 
cluded in  the  three  periods,  there  is  a  good  deal  of  difference 
among  them.  The  following  is  a  comparative  view  of  six  of 
them  upon  this  point. 

Tennemann  (Kantian)  has  three  periods  arranged  as  fol- 
lows: (1)  Pre-Socratic;  (2)  from  Socrates  to  the  conclusion 
of  the  conflict  of  the  Schools  during  Roman  sway;  (3)  from 
Roman  philosophy,  chiefly  eclectic  and  skeptical,  to  John  of 
Damascus  (700  A.  D.).  This  last  division  of  Tennemann 
has  not  found  many  supporters. 

Eitter  (influenced  by  Schleiermaclier)  has  three  periods: 
(1)  Pre-Socratic — the  rise;  (2)  Socrates  and  tlie  Socratic 
Schools,  including  the  earlier  Stoics,  Epicureans,  and 
Skeptics  —  the  bloom  of  Greek  Philosophy;  (3)  the  later 
Schools  down  to  end  of  Neo-Platonism  — decadence. 

Hegel.  (1)  From  Thales  to  Aristotle.  (2)  The  Greek 
School  (dogmatic,  skeptical,  eclectic)  till  about  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Christian  Era.  (8)  Tiie  Neo-Platonic  period, 
which  extends  from  Philo  to  Proclus  and  to  the  end  of  the 
School  of  Athens.  The  first  period  is  correct,  but  the  otlier 
two  need  revision. 

Zeller.  (1)  Pre-Socratic.  (2)  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aris- 
totle. (3)  Post-Aristotelian  Philosophy  The  famous 
author  of  the  Philosophie  der  Griechen,  to  whom  we  are 
specially  indebted,  is  always  to  be  reckoned  with  We  have, 
in  spite  of  his  great  and  deserved   authority,  felt  ourselves 


NOTES.  723 

compelled  to  change  all  three  of  his  divisions.  For  in- 
stance, the  Pre-Socratic  period,  in  our  view,  is  not  a  divi- 
sion of  the  Avhole,  but  contains  two  sub-divisions  of  the  first 
division  (the  Hellenic)  of  the  whole.  (See  general  scheme 
pp.  66-8.)  Zeller's  second  division  has  the  merit  of  singling 
out  the  three  greatest  Greek  philosophers  and  putting  them 
together  in  a  striking  position.  But  this  advantage,  we 
think,  can  be  retained  without  separating  them  so  completely 
from  the  great  Hellenic  or  National  movement  to  which  they 
essentially  belong.  But  we  find  our  chief  objection  to 
Zeller's  scheme  in  his  third  division,  in  which  all  the  philos- 
ophy after  Aristotle  is  throw^n  together  in  a  mass,  though 
it  is  of  great  diversity  and  lasts  more  than  8.50  years.  Zel- 
ler  himself  seems  not  to  be  fully  satisfied  with  this  last 
division. 

Erclmann.  (1)  From  Thales  to  the  Atomists  Leucippus 
and  Democritus  — immaturity;  (2)  fi'om  Auaxagoras  to 
Aristotle  —  maturity;  (3)  from  the  Dogmatists  and  Skeptics 
to  the  lioman  time  of  Cicero  and  Philo  (Christian  Era)  — • 
decay.  Erdmaun  throws  the  Neo-Hellenists  (Plotinus  and 
Proclus)  out  of  Greek  Philosophy,  and  puts  them  into  the 
medieval  period. 

Uebenoeg.  (1)  Pre-Sophistic;  (2)  from  the  Sophists  to 
the  Stoics,  Epicureans  and  Skeptics,  ending  with  the  Eclec- 
tics (Cicero  and  the  Sextians);  (3)  From  Jewish-Alex- 
andrian Philosophy  and  the  Neo-Pythagoreans  to  the  Neo- 
Hellenists.  It  is  plain,  however,  from  his  exposition  that 
Ueberweg  does  not  place  much  sti'ess  upon  these  divisions 
or  their  principle;  wherein  one  may  see  a  tendency  to  the 
more  recent  treatment  of  the  History  of  Philosophy,  repre- 
sented by  Windelband,  for  instance. 

We  have  selected  the  above  six  Historians  of  Philosophy 
as  those  whom  the  consen.'us  of  the  best  judges  has  pro- 
nounced to  be  the  best  of  their  kind.  All  of  them  are  Ger- 
mans and  belong  to  the  middle  half  of  the  19th  century. 
This  period  may  well  be  considered  the  bloom  of  the  written 
History  of  European  Philosophy.  Before  it  were  other  Histo- 
rians of  Philosophy,  industrious  and  voluminous  (Brucker, 
Tiedemann,  Buhle),  also  there  were  many  co-temporaries  of 


724         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

these  sis,  laboring  in  the  same  liekl  aud  doing  meritorious 
worii  (the  names  of  the  most  of  them  can  be  read  iu  Zel- 
ler's  notes  and  in  Ueberweg's  lists).  Of  course  in  recent 
years  Histories  of  Philosophy  have  not  been  wanting.  Still 
this  peculiar  form  of  literature  seems  to  have  had  its  cul- 
mination during  the  period  just  designated,  doubtless  in 
response  to  a  spiritual  need  of  the  time,  which  desired  to 
look  back  and  take  a  complete  survey  of  the  movement  of 
philosophic  thought  from  its  beginning,  in  order  to  find  out 
what  it  really  was  Avortli,  and  whether  it  deserved  to  be  con- 
tinued. European  Pliilosophy,  making  such  a  laborious  in- 
ventory of  itself  during  its  long  career,  seems  to  suggest 
that  it  is  on  the  point  of  taking  a  new  step  or  of  going  out 
of  business. 

Of  the  preceding  six,  Hegel  is  the  only  original,  con- 
structive philosopher.  This  fact  alone  gives  him  a  unique 
and  indeed  commanding  position.  Those  coming  after  him, 
antagonists  as  well  as  followers,  introduce  his  views  as  their 
starting-point,  either  by  way  of  acceptance  or  rejection  or 
partial  adhesion.  In  philosophical  originality  he  is  unques- 
tionally  the  greatest  of  the  six  and  of  all  Historians  of 
Philosophy.  Zeller,  usually  classed  as  an  independent 
follower  of  Hegel,  is  doubtless  to  be  placed  next  to  him, 
though  surpassing  him  in  erudition,  in  completeness  of 
treatment,  and  (let  it  not  be  forgotten)  in  courtesy. 

It  is  first  of  all  to  be  noted  that  the  preceding  six  without 
exception  see  a  threefold  movement  in  Greek  Philosophy. 
Still  they  disagree  about  the  limits  of  these  three  stages.  Tet 
even  here  we  may  note  tliat  they  hover  around  certain  com- 
mon boundary  lines,  thoi:gh  tliese  be  estimated  differently. 
For  instance,  Ueberweg  makes  his  first  division  of  the  whole 
the  Pre-Sophistic  period;  Hegel  makes  the  same  a  sub- 
division of  the  first  division  of  the  whole.  But  both  agree 
in  emphasizing  the  same  boundary  line,  though  this  emphasis 
is  stronger  in  the  one  than  in  the  other. 

For  this  threefold  division  each  of  the  six  assigns  a  differ- 
ent reason,  and  none  the  right  one,  in  our  judgment.  Still 
they  seem  to  agree  that  there  should  be  a  reason.  Undoubt- 
edly there  should:  the  deeper  the  better.     And  if  this  reason 


NOTES.  725 

for  the  threefold  movement  of  all  Greek  Philosophy  be  a 
universal  principle,  as  it  must,  then  it  ■vvill  control  and 
organize  the  whole  of  this  Philosophy  in  detail.  A  true 
principle  is  to  be  applied  universally  in  its  sphere,  it  is  not 
to  be  omitted  sometimes  and  sometimes  employed.  The  six, 
therefore,  have  borne  witness,  more  or  less  unconsciously, 
it  is  true,  to  the  triadism  of  the  History  of  Gi'eeli  Philosophy. 
Not  alone  Hegel  and  his  school  are  triadists,  as  is  often 
asserted.  Indeed  Hegel  in  his  History  of  Philosophy  by  no 
means  follows  out  the  threefold  division,  but  often  violates 
it,  sometimes  in  cases  of  deepest  consequence. 

Here  we  may  briefly  notice  a  common  raisapprelieusion. 
The  number  tliree  does  not  determine  the  process  of  mind, 
as  some  objectors  seem  to  thiuli ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  the 
process  of  mind  which  determines  and  indeed  malces  the 
number  three.  The  most  external  manifestation  of  tlie 
movement  of  mind  is  this  number;  still  it  is  a  manifestation 
and  cannot  be  left  away  without  formal  incompleteness, 
which  shows  a  lack  of  order  At  the  same  time  it  must  be 
confessed  that  in  tlie  name  of  the  number  three  the  greatest 
follies  have  been  committed,  as  they  have  also  in  tlie  name 
of  freedom  and  even  in  the  name  of  God. 

In  the  future  History  of  Philosophy  the  question  of  order, 
hitherto  in  the  background,  must  become  paramount.  A 
principle  of  structure  must  be  found  which  not  only  organ- 
izes the  whole  subject,  but  makes  the  entire  organism  trans- 
parent from  its  largest  part  to  its  least.  In  our  view  the 
epoch  of  the  great  Historians  of  European  Philosophy  has 
suggested  and  partially  applied  such  a  principle,  but  has  not 
adequately  realized  it. 

P.  69.  The  movement  here  called  Elementalism  has  been 
generally  recognized  by  the  Historians  of  Greek  Pliilosophy 
under  the  name  of  the  Cosmologists  or  the  Physiologists, 
since  the  chief  content  of  philosophizing  is  taken  from 
Nature.  Zeller  and  others  make  it  a  full  division  of  Greek 
Philosophy  —  the  Pre-Socratic;  we  make  it  the  first  sub- 
division of  the  Hellenic  Period,  which,  to  our  mind,  should 
be  held  together  in  a  common  development. 

P.  79.  With  the  three  Milesian  philosophers  begins  tlie  tri- 


72G         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

personal  movement  which  runs  through  all  Greek  Philosophy 
(as  we  see  it),  being  especially  pronounced  in  its  two  greatest 
Periods,  the  Hellenic  and  Neo-Hellenic.  Particularly  at  this 
point  occurs  the  break  with  the  European  Historians  of 
Philosophy,  not  one  of  whom  makes  their  triadal  principle 
personal,  except  in  Religion  when  they  recognize  the  Trinity. 
But  the  threefold  personal  Psychosis,  according  to  our  view, 
is  just  the  basic  principle  of  the  whole  philosophical  develop- 
ment of  Europe.  In  it  we  reach  down  to  the  Self  with  its 
process,  which  is  really  the  source  of  all  philosophizing. 
Tlie  triad  remains  abstract  unless  it  has  the  personal  prin- 
ciple as  its  content.  It  is  significant  that  the  European  His- 
torian of  Philosophy  seems  to  shun  making  his  threefold 
movement  personal  and  concrete.  Thus,  however,  he  is  true 
to  Philosophy,  which  was  originally  an  abstraction  from  a 
personal  Creator  of  the  World.  From  this  point  of  view  he 
holds  to  the  philosophic  tradition. 

P.  92.  We  put  the  Eleatics  next  after  the  Milesians  in- 
stead of  the  Pythagoreans,  wherein  we  agaiii  run  counter  to 
the  order  of  the  preceding  Historians  of  Philosophy.  But  we 
notice  that  some  of  i  he  more  recent  writers  are  changing  the 
old  order.  See  Weber,  Hist,  of  Phil,  trans,  by  Prof.  Thilly; 
also  the  First  Philosophers  of  Greece  by  Prof.  Fairbanks ; 
and  Windelband,  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,  traus.  by 
Prof.  Cushman.  Windelband,  however,  overdoes  the  mat- 
ter by  putting  the  Pythagoreans  after  the  Atomists  and  by 
placing  Pythagoras  himself  before  Thales  apparently.  In 
his  later  work  (^Ilist.  of  Phil.  2nd  ed.  1900,  trans,  by  Prof. 
Tufts),  Windelband  seems  to  recede  somewhat  from  his  ex- 
treme position  on  this  subject.  The  same  Historian  of 
Philosophy  employs  anew  way  (which  is,  however,  very  old) 
of  ordering  the  movement  of  Philosophy  by  topics,  Avhicli 
has  its  advantages,  but  also  great  drawbacks,  especially  in 
the  matter  of  preserving  the  thread  of  philosophic  evolution. 
He  is  the  modern  doxographer  (influenced  by  Diels?)  col- 
lecting anew  the  placita  philosophorun,  and  putting  them 
together  under  certain  rubrics,  in  a  suggestive  manner. 

P.  113.  What  we  here  call  the  Inter-connecting  Movement 
has  been  a  source  of  great  difficulty  with  the  Historians  of 


NOTES.  727 

early  Greek  Philosophy.  First  of  all,  what  shall  be  done 
with  Heraclitus?  Many  tack  him  to  the  Milesians  —  a  wrong 
place  for  him,  in  our  judgment.  He  must  somehow  come 
after  the  Eleatics,  aud  so  be  seen  as  a  return  to  the  Milesian 
Movement.  Then  Empedocles  has  been  very  recalcitrant  to 
any  principle  of  order.  Even  Hegel,  certainly  a  man  of 
many  philosophical  resources,  gives  him  up  and  throws  him 
out  as  "of  no  great  account,  of  whose  philosophy  not  much 
is  to  be  made  "  (^Gesch.  Phil.  I.  s.  337).  Still  Empedocles 
has  kept  his  place  and  must  be  ordered  with  the  rest. 

P.  151.  The  group  of  Atomists  as  here  designated  is  not 
recognized  by  any  Historian  of  Greek  Philosophy  within  our 
knowledge.  And  yet  several  approach  it.  That  with  the 
conception  of  the  Atom,  Philosophy  has  gone  out  of  its 
elemental  or  purely  physiologic  stage  seems  not  to  be  per- 
ceived, or  if  perceived,  is  disregarded  in  the  arrangement. 

The  first  general  division  of  Greek  Philosopliy  usually 
embraces  all  before  Socrates  (Pre-Socratic)  tliough  some 
draw  the  line  at  Anasagoras  (Erdmann)  and  others  at  the 
Sophists  (Ueberweg).  Of  this  first  division  the  sub-division 
is  often  triadal  (Zeller,  Erdmann),  though  some  give  to  it 
four  parts  (Ritter,  Ueberweg).  It  is  noteworthy  that  Hegel, 
the  supposed  triadist  through  thick  and  thin,  makes  six  sub- 
divisions in  his  first  (Pre-Sophistic)  stage, 

P.  192.  This  view  of  the  Homo  Mensura  of  Protagoras  is 
the  one  usually  accepted.  It  is,  however,  strongly  contested 
by  a  recent  writer.  Prof.  Gomperz,  in  his  Griechische  Denker. 
(See  his  remarks  on  Protagoras;  in  his  notes  he  mentions 
some  who  agree  with  him.) 

P,  2 10.  The  most  important  movement  of  Greek  Philosophy, 
here  named  Universalism,  and  embracing  Socrates,  Plato, 
and  Aristotle,  has  been  variously  ordered.  We  hold  that 
any  division  is  inadequate  which  does  not  put  these  three 
greatest  ancient  philosophers  together,  and  show  them  as 
one  supreme  process.  Still  they  are  not  to  be  separated 
from  the  great  national  movement  of  Hellas  and  made  the 
second  division  (Zeller)  of  the  entire  Greek  epoch.  Nor  are 
they  to  be  placed  with  Hellenistic  philosopliies  (Ritter, 
Ueberweg),  from  which  they  are  so  wholly  different.     They 


728         ANCIENT  EUROPEAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

must  be  kept  in  the  Hellenic  Period,  of  which  they  are  the 
third  stage.  Hegel  does  this,  but  he  strangely  cuts  Socrates 
off  from  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  places  him  in  the  move- 
ment with  the  Sophists.  Thus  Hegel  (the  great  triadist) 
really  destroys  the  chief  personal  triad  of  Greek  Philosophy. 
One  cannot  help  querying  at  times :  Is  not  this  perhaps  the 
work  of  editor  Michelet? 

In  the  world's  literature  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle  are 
classed  together  as  constituting  the  grand  Athenian  philo- 
sophical triad,  which  is  indeed  a  kind  of  norm  for  tiie  order- 
ing of  all  Greek  Philosophy.  Three  colossal  individuals, 
yet  one  process  which  is  psychical:  so  we  have  to  regard 
them.  Here,  then,  the  tri-personal  movement  of  Philoso- 
phy becomes  not  only  explicit,  but  the  most  striking  fact  It 
is  the  culmination  of  the  Hellenic  Series  which  is  made  up 
of  these  threefold  Psychoses  of  philosophic  persons  with  their 
doctrines.  Thus  the  line  of  Hellenic  philosophers  of  this 
Period  is  not  merely  a  succession  of  individuals,  but  they 
form  processes  with  one  another.  Yet  eacli  has  within  him- 
self, more  or  less  pi'onounced,  the  total  process  of  which  he  is 
externally  but  a  part.  So  the  process  which  determines  him, 
he  determines  in  turn,  and  his  free  activity  is  one  with  his 
environing  world  of  necessity. 

The  connection  of  the  formula  of  Universalism  with  the 
great  Athenian  characters  of  their  epoch,  is  to  be  noted. 
They  all  said  in  one  way  or  other  that  the  essence  of  Being 
is  universal,  not  merely  individual,  such  as  I  am  in^my  little 
particularity.  It  was  the  Sophist  who  said  that  the  essence 
of  Being  is  the  individual  merely.  Not  so  Pericles,  Thu- 
cydides,  and  Phidias;  not  so  Socrates,  Plato  and  Aristotle. 
All  these  characters,  though  individuals,  rise  to  universality 
in  thought  and  action,  and  tliereby  show  in  their  case  that 
the  essence  of  Being  is  universal.  This  principle  with  the 
philosophers  has  become  conscious,  and  is  the  formulated 
thought  of  the  epoch. 

P.  459.  For  the  diversities  in  ordering  the  Second  Period 
of  Greek  Philosophy  (here  called  Hellenisticism)  among 
the  si^  leading  historians,  the  reader  can  consult  the 
abstract  already  given.     There  is   a  vast  mass  of  material 


NOTES.  729 

here  which  is  not  easy  to  organize.  When  it  comes  to  the 
sub-divisions  of  this  Period,  the  difficulty  increases,  particu- 
larly from  the  fact  that  Ileligion  Ijegins  to  enter  the  Philo- 
sophic movement,  from  which  it  was  substantially  excluded 
during  the  Hellenic  Period. 

Moreover  a  necessary  change  in  the  exposition  takes 
place.  There  are  in  the  Hellenistic  Period  no  great  domi- 
nating individuals  such  as  we  saw  in  the  Hellenic  Period. 
The  result  is  the  tri-personal  movement  recedes  into  the  back- 
ground. Undoubtedly  important  philosophers  appear,  the 
most  original  ones  being  near  to  the  Hellenic  time,  as  Zeno 
the  Stoic,  Epicurus  and  Pyrrho.  But  on  the  whole  the 
function  of  Hellenisticism  is  not  to  originate  Philosophy, 
but  to  propagate  it,  to  impart  it  to  all  individuals  who  will 
receive  it.  Hence  its  formula  is,  to  make  the  Universal 
individual,  which  is  to  scatter  it,  not  to  concentrate  it. 
Thus  Hellenisticism  is  a  time  of  apostleship  in  philosophy, 
not  of  creativity,  till  it  reaches  religion,  when  it  becomes 
grandly  creative.  So  the  personal  movement  in  the  present 
Period  has  not  and  cannot  have  the  stress,  such  as  we  must 
give  it  in  the  Hellenic  and  Neo-Hellenic  Periods. 

P.  577.  Again  our  arrangement  breaks  away  from  that  of 
the  six  great  Historians  of  Philosophy  in  placing  the  Neo- 
Hellenic  movement  as  the  third  in  the  total  sweep  of  Greek 
Philosophy  (see  the  previous  abstract  of  their  divisions). 
The  reasons  for  this  change  are  given  in  the  main  text  of  our 
exposition.  It  follows  from  the  universal  principle  of  order, 
and  is  not  the  result  of  a  mere  subjective  guessing. 

In  general  Neo-Hellenism  is  a  return,  in  particular  it  is  a 
return  to  the  tri-personal  movement  which  was  so  emjihatic 
in  Hellenism.  Here  we  may  cite  Zeller  to  whom  we  are  un- 
der special  obligations  in  the  present  part  of  our  work.  He 
also  finds  in  the  historic  development  of  Neo-Platouic  (Neo- 
Hellenic)  philosophy  three  stages  represented  by  Plotiuus, 
Jamblichus,  and  Proclus.  Thus  he  indicates  at  the  start  the 
tri-personal  movement  of  this  Period.  But  when  he  comes 
to  the  full  exposition  of  these  three  stages,  he  gives  more 
space  to  Porphyry  than  to  Jamblichus  (the  central  stage), 
and  Proclus  is  not  distinctly  marked  off  as  the  third  stage  in 


730         ANCIENT  E UROPEAN  PHIL 0 SOPHY. 

the  Neo-Hellenic  process.  In  general,  however,  Zeller's  ac- 
count of  Neo-Hellenism  is  much  the  best  that  we  have  been 
able  to  find. 

In  the  preceding  treatment  of  Greek  Philosophy,  wf  have 
sought  to  put  special  stress  upon  the  ordering,  which  has 
not  been  given  its  due  place  hitherto;  also  there  has  been 
the  attempt  to  establish  a  universal  principle  of  order,  and 
to  relieve  the  History  of  Philosophy,  as  far  as  possible,  from 
a  merely  capricious  arrangement;  then  this  principle  of 
order  is  to  be  evolved  out  of  philosophy  itself,  so  that  the 
latter  can  be  seen  to  be  self-ordering  ultimately. 


WORKS  BY  DENTON  J.  SNIDER 

PUBLISHED   BY 

SIGMA  PUBLISHINa  COMPA^r, 

10  Van  Buren  Street,  Chicago,  III. 

I-  Commentary  on  the  Literary  Bibles,  in  9  vols. 

1.  Shakespeare's  Dramas,  3  vols. 

Tragedies  (new  edition),  ....  $1,50 

Comedies  (new  edition),  ....  1.50 

Histories  (new  edition),  .         .         .         .  1.50 

2.  Goethe's  Faust. 

First  Part  (new  edition),     ....        1.50 
Second  Part  (new  edition),         .         .         .        1.50 

3.  Homer's  Iliad  (new  edition),        ,         .         .        1.50 

"        Odyssey, 1.50 

4.  Dante's    Inferno, 1  50 

"  Purgatory  and  Paradise,       .         .        1.50 

II.  Poems  —  in  5  vols. 
1.  Homer  in  Chios,     .         .         .         .         .         ,       1  OO 

Delphic  Days, 1  00 

Agamemnon's  Daughter,       ....  1.00 

Prorsus  Eetrorsus, 100 

Johnny  Appleseed's  Rhymes,        .         .         .  1.25 

III.  Psychology. 

1.  Psychology  and  the  Psychosis,     .         .         .  1.50 

2.  The  Will  and  its  World,        ....  1.50 

3.  Social  Institutions, 1.50 

IV.  Kindergarden. 

1.  Commentary  on  Froebel's  Mother  Play-Songs,    1.25 

2.  The  Psychology  of  Froebel's  Play-Gifts,     ^  '    1.25 

3.  The  Life  of  Frederick  Froebel,    .         .         .1.25 

V.  Miscellaneous. 

1.  A  Walk  in  Hellas, I.25 

2.  The  Freeburgers   (a  novel),       .         .         .1.25 

3.  World's  Fair   Studies,  ....        1.25 

4.  The  Father  of  History  (Herodotus,  in  preparation). 
Works  by  Elizabeth  Harrison: 

1.  In   Storyland, 1  25 

2.  Two  Children  of  the  Foothills,     .         ,         .        1I25 
For  sale  by  A.  C.  M'Clurg  &  Co.,  Booksellers,  Chicago,  Ills., 

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